In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to O.L.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO O.L.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0104
FILED 01-06-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. V1300JD820060038
The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer, P.C., Anthem
By Florence M. Bruemmer
Counsel for Appellant/Father

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Meredith Oakes Peterson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO O.L.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Richard L. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights to his child, O.L. For the following reasons,
we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 O.L. was born in November 2023. Her mother, Rhiannon M.
(“Mother”), and Father have a long history of substance abuse and O.L.
tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine when she was
born.

¶3 In November 2023, Father was arrested and incarcerated in
Eloy, Arizona, for forgery and possession of drug paraphernalia. Because
of both parents’ substance abuse and Father’s incarceration, the
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took custody of O.L. and her three
older siblings and petitioned for a dependency. The children were placed
together in their paternal grandmother’s home, where they remained
during the nineteen-month dependency. The juvenile court eventually
adjudicated O.L. dependent as to Father.

¶4 Following his release from incarceration in Eloy, Father was
sent to the California Department of Corrections for violating his parole
conditions relating to prior convictions. A week later, he was released from
the California Department of Corrections on parole. During this release,
however, he repeatedly failed to submit to DCS’s required substance-abuse
testing, and on the four occasions he submitted to testing, he tested positive
for marijuana each time and alcohol three of the four times. He also failed
to test throughout the entire month of January 2024 and was arrested again
in California in February 2024. He was released a month later and contacted
DCS and told the case manager that he planned to transfer his parole to
Arizona.

¶5 For the next seven months, the case manager repeatedly
called and emailed Father and sent him service letters to attempt to arrange
services for him, including substance-abuse treatment, substance-abuse

2
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO O.L.
Decision of the Court

testing, and behavioral health services. But Father did not maintain any
communication with the case manager, and he failed to submit the required
substance-abuse testing until November 2024. When he returned to
Arizona in October 2024, he also failed to notify DCS that he had returned
and was living with Mother. He also failed to contact the visitation
supervisor to set up visits with O.L. when he was told to do so by the case
manager and the visitation referral was closed.

¶6 In November and December 2024, Father submitted to drug
tests for DCS and tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines,
and marijuana on three occasions. Although DCS once more attempted to
help Father address his substance abuse and regain custody of O.L. through
various services, Father did not participate fully, despite being court-
ordered to do so. Father completed an intake for substance-abuse treatment
at Arizona Families First but did not otherwise engage in that service.
Father also appeared at his appointment for a psychological evaluation but
then refused to participate in it. He also completed an intake with Red Rock
Family Services in January 2025 for individual and family therapy but failed
to participate further in the service. At that intake, Father reported having
used drugs as recently as the week before. Father then submitted what
purported to be a negative drug test result to DCS in January 2025 from
Fastest Labs. But when the case manager attempted to subpoena an official
record, Fastest Labs certified they had no records for Father and he had not
taken a drug test at their lab.

¶7 In February 2025, DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental
rights to O.L. under the chronic substance abuse and six- and nine-month
out-of-home placement grounds. The following month, the court held a
termination hearing for O.L.’s younger sibling and terminated Father’s
parental rights to him. DCS thereafter amended its termination motion as
to O.L. to include the A.R.S. Section 8-533(B)(10) prior-termination ground.

¶8 The court held a contested severance hearing as to O.L. in
May 2025. The juvenile court found that DCS had established all grounds
for termination as alleged and that termination was in O.L.’s best interests.
Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. Sections 8-235,
12-120.21, and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 To terminate parental rights, a court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground articulated in A.R.S.
Section 8-533(B) has been proven and then must find by a preponderance

3
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO O.L.
Decision of the Court

of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child. Brionna
J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 477 ¶ 20 (2023). Because the court “is
in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts[,]” this court will affirm
an order terminating parental rights so long as it is supported by reasonable
evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App.
2009) (citation omitted). We view the facts in the light most favorable to
upholding the court’s order terminating parental rights. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549 ¶ 7 (App. 2010).

¶10 Father challenges the juvenile court’s findings of the grounds
of substance abuse, six- and nine-months’ time in out-of-home placement,
and prior-termination as statutory grounds for termination, as well as the
court’s finding that termination was in O.L.’s best interests.

I. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Court’s Termination of Father’s
Parental Rights Based on the Substance-Abuse Statutory Ground
Under A.R.S. Section 8-533(B)(3).

¶11 Father contends reasonable evidence did not support the
court’s finding that termination was warranted on the substance-abuse
ground. The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s parental rights when
that parent’s history of chronic substance abuse renders the parent “unable
to discharge parental responsibilities” and reasonable grounds exist “to
believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate
period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). To order termination on substance-abuse
grounds, the “court must also have found that [DCS] had made reasonable
efforts to reunify the family or that such efforts would have been futile.”
Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453 ¶ 12 (App. 2005).

¶12 Here, Father does not challenge the court’s finding that he has
a history of chronic substance abuse and thus has conceded its accuracy on
appeal. See Britz v. Kinsvater, 87 Ariz. 385, 388 (1960). Even so, Father
admitted in his behavioral health intake form to having started using
methamphetamine over a decade ago at the age of twenty-eight. He
repeatedly failed to submit to required testing. And when he did test just
before O.L.’s birth, Father repeatedly tested positive for methamphetamine
and amphetamine. See Amanda B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, No. 1 CA-JV 18-
0330, 2019 WL 1349581, at *5 ¶ 22 (Ariz. App. Mar. 26, 2019) (mem. decision)
(holding that a court may rely on parent’s failure or refusal to comply with
drug testing to reasonably infer that parent’s drug abuse is ongoing).
Reasonable evidence therefore supports the court’s finding that Father has
a history of chronic substance abuse.

4
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO O.L.
Decision of the Court

¶13 Father does challenge the sufficiency of evidence to support
the court’s finding that Father’s history of chronic substance abuse renders
him unable to discharge parental responsibilities. But the evidence
establishes that Father has been in and out of prison for a large portion of
O.L.’s life, including for drug-related charges, leaving O.L. without her
Father during that time. Further, DCS reported in January 2025—four
months before the termination hearing—that Father had “failed to
prioritize [his] children’s safety over [his] illicit substance use” and that he
is “unable to parent appropriately due to [his] use of illicit substances,
which could result in severe injury or even death of one or more of the
children.” DCS also reported that “[d]espite continuous conversations,
[Father] is not able to understand the reason for [DCS’s] involvement and
cannot comprehend how using substance[s] puts the children in an unsafe
situation and causes them harm.” Father himself testified that he is on a
“self-destructive path.” Thus, reasonable evidence supports the finding that
Father’s substance abuse renders him unable to safely discharge his
parental responsibilities and we will not disturb it. Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 93
¶ 18.

¶14 Father also challenges the court’s finding that there are
reasonable grounds to believe Father’s drug use will continue for a
prolonged indeterminate period. However, the record shows that on those
occasions Father submitted to testing, he has continued to test positive for
substances. In fact, Father tested positive for methamphetamine,
amphetamine, or marijuana as recently as November and December 2024.
And in January 2025, Father admitted on his behavioral health intake form
that he regularly used methamphetamine, hallucinogens, alcohol, and
marijuana, and that he had used methamphetamine only “a week ago.” He
also spurned or failed to follow through with any services DCS offered to
help him overcome his substance abuse issues. Taking all inferences from
this evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the court’s order,
Matthew L., 223 Ariz. at 549 ¶ 7, these facts establish reasonable evidence
supporting the court’s finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that Father’s chronic substance abuse will continue for a prolonged
indeterminate period.

¶15 Father argues insufficient evidence supports the court’s
finding that DCS made the required reasonable rehabilitative efforts. Yet
the record shows DCS has repeatedly attempted to provide Father with
services, including substance-abuse treatment and testing, to help him
overcome his substance-abuse problem. Father refused to participate in
treatment and often refused to participate in testing, despite knowing he
had been court-ordered to do so and that his parental rights to O.L. could

5
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO O.L.
Decision of the Court

be terminated if he did not participate. Therefore, reasonable evidence
supports the court’s finding that DCS made the required reasonable
rehabilitative efforts.

¶16 Accordingly, reasonable evidence supports the court’s
termination of Father’s parental rights under A.R.S. Section 8-533(B)(3).
Because the court did not err in terminating Father’s parental rights
pursuant to this ground and only one statutory ground is required, we need
not address Father’s challenges to the other grounds. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 3 (App. 2002) (citations omitted).

II. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding that
Termination Was in O.L.’s Best Interests.

¶17 Father claims that insufficient evidence supports the court’s
finding that termination of his parental rights was in O.L.’s best interests.
To terminate a parent’s parental rights, in addition to finding at least one
statutory ground for termination, the court must also find, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the child’s best
interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(a). We review a best-
interests finding for an abuse of discretion and reverse only if “no
reasonable evidence” supports the finding. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

¶18 When the child will either benefit from termination or be
harmed by continuing the parent-child relationship, termination is in that
child’s best interests. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13
(2018) (citations omitted). Ultimately, the court’s primary concern during
the best-interests inquiry is “protecting a child’s interest in stability and
security.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 15 (2016) (citation
modified). A child may benefit if a current adoptive plan exists, see Maricopa
Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 6 (1990), or if DCS can show the
child is adoptable, Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150–51 ¶¶ 13–14. The court may also
consider whether the existing placement meets the child’s needs and
adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at
3–4 ¶ 12.

¶19 Here, the court found that O.L. would benefit by termination
because she is “adoptable” and she was placed with a potential adoptive
placement that was meeting her needs by providing permanence and
stability. The court also found that O.L. would be harmed if termination
was denied because she would remain in care “waiting on parents who are
either completely absent from [her life] or have not made any significant

6
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO O.L.
Decision of the Court

progress towards the behavioral changes necessary for reunification.” The
court further found that O.L. was “deserving of permanency and [Father
has] been given long enough to remedy the issues that render [him] unsafe
to parent [her].”

¶20 Father does not challenge any of these findings, except for the
finding that he has been given “long enough” to remedy his substance-
abuse issue. Therefore, he has conceded their accuracy on appeal. See Britz,
87 Ariz. at 388. As to the “long enough” finding, O.L. has been in out-of-
home placement for nearly her entire life. And despite having nearly two
years in which to address his substance abuse issues, Father failed to do so
in any meaningful way. Though Father may see things differently, his and
O.L.’s interests are divergent and the court’s focus at this point must treat
O.L.’s interests as paramount. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 155 ¶ 36 (Bolick, J.,
concurring).

¶21 Further, each finding would support the court’s best-interests
determination independently, and each is supported by the evidence.
Therefore, Father has shown no abuse of discretion in the findings that O.L.
would benefit by termination and would be harmed if termination was
denied. See Aleise H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 569, 572 ¶ 10 (holding
that the court’s findings support the best interests independently and are
supported by trial evidence and therefore the mother showed no error).

¶22 Because the court’s findings are supported by reasonable
evidence and support the conclusion that termination was in O.L.’s best
interests, we affirm the order terminating Father’s parental rights.

CONCLUSION

¶23 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

7