In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.G.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0124
FILED 02-04-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS521137
The Honorable Michael C. Blair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Denise L. Carroll, Esq., Scottsdale
By Denise L. Carroll
Counsel for Appellant Jesse G.

Stuart & Blackwell, PLLC, Chandler
By Cory A. Stuart
Counsel for Appellees Matthew R. and Angela R.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G.
Decision of the Court

¶1 This is a private severance action in which the superior court
terminated a father’s parental rights due to his incarceration and the child’s
prospective adoption by a stepparent. We affirm because the court
properly found termination warranted based on Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(4) and the child’s best interests.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 J.G. (“Child”) was born to Angela R. (“Mother”) and Jesse G.
(“Father”) in late 2019. When Child was four months old, Father was
arrested and jailed for sexually exploiting Mother’s minor sister. In 2021,
he was sentenced to a twenty-year prison term.

¶3 Mother and Father agreed to a parenting plan. Father’s rights
under the plan were limited to one visit per month with Child, with the
paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”) to transport Child to the prison.
The visits, however, were not consistent. By Mother’s estimation, Father
met with Child only four times before she stopped the visits at Child’s
request in late 2024; by Father’s estimation, he met with Child between
eleven and nineteen times. Father never sought to enforce his parenting
time or otherwise arrange more contact with Child. Nor did he send
Mother money, cards, letters, or gifts for Child.

¶4 Mother regularly allowed Grandmother to spend time with
Child until early 2025. Grandmother arranged for Child to have phone calls
with Father, and she gave Child drawings and a birthday card that Father
sent for him. Father could not approximate the number of calls he had with
Child beyond “quite a few.” According to Father, all his interactions with
Child were positive and loving, and Child told him he wanted Father “to
be his [only] dad.”

¶5 Matthew R. (“Stepfather”) began living with Mother and
acting as Child’s father in mid-2021, with the couple ultimately marrying
and having children. Child has a close, parent-child-like relationship with
Stepfather and calls him “Dad.” Both Stepfather and Mother want him to
adopt Child as soon as possible, and all evidence suggests he is qualified to
do so.

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the superior
court’s order. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7
(App. 2010).

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G.
Decision of the Court

¶6 In early 2025, Mother and Stepfather petitioned the superior
court to terminate Father’s parental rights on multiple grounds, including
the length of Father’s incarceration under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). Father
contested the petition.

¶7 After a termination adjudication hearing, the superior court
granted termination, finding it warranted under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4) by
clear and convincing evidence, and finding it in Child’s best interests by a
preponderance of the evidence. We have jurisdiction over Father’s timely
appeal under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 To terminate parental rights, the superior court must find by
clear and convincing evidence that a ground for termination exists under
A.R.S. § 8-533(B), and must find by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination serves the child’s best interests. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
245 Ariz. 146, 149-50, ¶ 8 (2018). On review, we must accept the superior
court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by reasonable
evidence and inferences. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478,
¶ 30 (2023). We do not reweigh the evidence; instead, we defer to the
superior court’s determinations on conflicting evidence and witness
credibility. Id.; Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 18. We will affirm the superior
court’s legal conclusions regarding a statutory basis for termination unless
they are clearly erroneous. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 479, ¶ 31.

I. The superior court properly found grounds for termination
under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4).

¶9 Father first argues that the superior court erred by finding
termination warranted under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). Section 8-533(B)(4)
provides for termination when “the parent is deprived of civil liberties due
to the conviction of a felony” and “the sentence of that parent is of such
length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of
years.” The parent’s physical absence does not itself deprive the child of a
“normal home.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 476-77,
¶¶ 24-26 (2022). A “normal home” can consist of “a stable and long-term
family environment . . . where another parent or a permanent guardian
resides and parents the child, and where the incarcerated parent
affirmatively acts to maintain a relationship with the child that contributes
to rather than detracts from the child’s stable, family environment.” Id. at
477, ¶ 27.

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G.
Decision of the Court

¶10 Whether the child will be deprived of a “normal home” for
years due to the length of the incarcerated parent’s sentence is not subject
to bright-line definition. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246,
251, ¶ 29 (2000). Instead, each case must be considered on its facts. Id. The
relevant factors include:

(1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship
existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which
the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured
during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the
relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that
incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the
length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent
[or permanent guardian] to provide a normal home life, and
(6) the effect of the deprivation of a parental presence on the
child at issue.

Id. at 251-52, ¶ 29 (as modified by Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 477, ¶ 27). No
factor is determinative, and termination may be warranted even if multiple
factors favor continuing the parental relationship. Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579, ¶ 9 (2021); see also Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 450, ¶ 15 (App. 2007). “Similarly, there is no threshold
level under each individual factor . . . that either compels, or forbids,
severance.” Christy C., 214 Ariz. at 450, ¶ 15.

¶11 Father contends that the superior court ignored the definition
of a “normal home” and the factor-based analysis, and instead focused on
the length of his sentence. He emphasizes that at the start of the trial, the
court stated it was “interested just legally speaking . . . . [H]ow are you
getting around [A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4)], if [Father]’s not even going to be out
until the child’s almost an adult?” But he ignores that his counsel
immediately responded with citations to the applicable caselaw, and,
moreover, that the court ultimately made express findings for termination
consistent with the law.

¶12 Contrary to Father’s contention, the court’s findings and
conclusion were reasonable based on the evidence. Child was only four
months old when Father was arrested, and Father thereafter did little to
build or maintain a relationship with Child as he grew up. According to
Mother, Father saw Child only four times in more than five years. And
even according to Father’s version of events, his interactions with Child
were minimal: no more than nineteen visits and some phone and mail
contact over that same period. He never sought to enforce his parenting

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G.
Decision of the Court

time or otherwise obtain more contact with Child, even after Mother
petitioned for termination and stopped making Child available to
Grandmother. On this record, the superior court reasonably found that
Child and Father had a limited relationship when Father’s incarceration
began, that the relationship could not be nurtured during the incarceration,
and that Child’s young age made it likely that the incarceration—which is
set to last until Child is nearly an adult2—would deprive him of a normal
home. Further, on this record, the court reasonably found that Mother and
Stepfather provided Child a normal home life with a paternal presence
mitigating the harm caused by Father’s absence. The court did not abuse
its discretion by finding termination warranted under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4).

II. The superior court properly found that termination served
Child’s best interests.

¶13 Father next argues that the superior court erred by finding
termination was in Child’s best interests. The best-interests inquiry focuses
on the child’s interest in stability and security. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 12 (2018). Termination will serve the child’s best
interests if he or she would benefit from termination or be harmed by its
denial. Id. at ¶ 13. This is a fact-specific inquiry that may be satisfied by the
child’s prospective adoption. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4-5,
¶¶ 13, 16-17 (2016). Adoption benefits children by binding them legally and
financially to their adoptive parents, ensuring consistency in their future
care and creating additional inheritance rights. Id. at 5, ¶ 17.

¶14 Here, record evidence supports the superior court’s finding
that terminating Father’s parental rights would serve Child’s best interests
by freeing him for adoption by Stepfather. Stepfather began acting as
Child’s father when he was very young, has continued to do so for years, is
closely bonded with Child, and, with Mother’s support, plans to adopt him
as soon as possible. As the court properly found, adoption by Stepfather
will ensure Child’s continued care by his father figure, thereby giving him
stability and permanency. The superior court did not abuse its discretion
by finding that termination served Child’s best interests.

2 Nothing requires the court to presume an early release. Jeffrey P. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 212, 214, ¶ 8 (App. 2016). We further note that
release conditions may affect Father’s ability to interact with Child. Id. at
¶ 10.

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G.
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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