In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.V.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.V.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0126
FILED 02-13-2026

Appeal from the Maricopa County Superior Court
No. JS520982
The Honorable David J. Palmer, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant Matthew L.

Martinez Law Offices, Phoenix
By Elizabeth J. Martinez
Counsel for Appellee Desiree J.

Alexander Legal LLC, Chandler
By Amy Alexander
Counsel for Appellee Child J.V.

Rothstein Donatelli LLP, Tempe
By April E. Olson
Counsel for Appellee Navajo Nation
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.V.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined. Judge James B. Morse Jr. concurred in
part and dissented in part.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Matthew L. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental
rights as to his son J.V. on the grounds of abandonment, abuse and neglect,
felony conviction, and chronic substance abuse. We vacate the court’s best
interests ruling for lack of analysis and findings. Because the basis for
terminating on the statutory ground of abuse is undisputed, we remand to
the juvenile court for further proceedings, so it may analyze whether
termination on that basis is in J.V.’s best interests.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. J.V. is Born and Father is Arrested and Sentenced to
Seventeen Years in Prison.

¶2 J.V. was born December 13, 2019 to Father, then eighteen
years old, and Desiree J. (“Mother”), then seventeen years old. J.V. is their
only child, and they are all members of the Navajo Nation. In December
2019 and January 2020, they lived together with other members of Mother’s
family at Mother’s father’s home in Winslow.

¶3 On January 30, 2020, Father was arrested after violently
attacking Mother and her younger sister in J.V.’s presence. Father pled
guilty to attempted second degree murder of Mother, aggravated assault,
and child abuse, all felonies, and to possession of marijuana. He was
sentenced to seventeen years in prison. His expected release is January
2037, just after J.V.’s eighteenth birthday.

B. Father Petitions for Parenting Time and Mother Petitions to
Terminate Father’s Parental Rights.

¶4 In October 2024, Father filed a family court petition: for
parenting time and joint legal decision-making; to require him to pay child
support; asking that J.V. be allowed to receive gifts and that Father receive
documentation of their receipt; and for grandparent visitation. Before
filing, Father “had no contact with [J.V.] other than through” his mother,

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Decision of the Court

T.H. (“Paternal Grandmother”). But Father filed because he “wanted to
establish a relationship with [J.V.] and get to know him and bond with him
as he grows up[,]” in part because Father “didn’t have a father” figure
growing up, so he “want[ed] to make sure that [J.V.] doesn’t go down the
same path that [he had] gone down, which [he is] currently in right now.”

¶5 Mother then petitioned the juvenile court to terminate
Father’s parental rights to J.V. She pleaded four grounds for terminating
Father’s parental rights: (1) abandonment; (2) neglect or abuse; (3) chronic
substance abuse; and (4) felony conviction. Father contested Mother’s
petition, so the juvenile court appointed counsel for Father and for J.V.
Mother asked the family court to stay its proceedings until the juvenile
court could resolve her termination petition. The Navajo Nation intervened
as a party under the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”).

C. The Juvenile Court Holds a Termination Hearing.

¶6 On June 18 and July 14, 2025, the juvenile court held a two-
part hearing at which Mother testified. She detailed Father’s January 2020
attack and noted the violent nature of his felony convictions and the length
of his sentence. She also testified that, before his arrest, Father had a prior
alcohol-related incident with police, abused marijuana and cough
medicine, and once intentionally cut himself.

¶7 Mother explained Father’s relationships with her and with
J.V. She said Father had no relationship with J.V. during the first month of
J.V.’s life, and no contact with J.V. after his arrest, in part due to a temporary
protective order. She stated she made no efforts to facilitate any contact
between Father and J.V. after Father’s arrest, and blocked Paternal
Grandmother from facilitating contact because she did not want Paternal
Grandmother sharing pictures of J.V. with Father. Mother testified she had
no contact with Father after his arrest, no knowledge of Father’s current
circumstances, no knowledge of his rehabilitative efforts, and no
knowledge of any current use or abuse of any illicit substances. She offered
no evidence of any sort of his use of illicit substances since January 2020.

¶8 Mother testified she sought termination after Father
petitioned to protect his parental rights because she did not want him to
have a relationship with J.V. She feared any relationship would negatively
impact J.V.’s mental and physical wellbeing. She detailed J.V.’s current and
prospective relationships to other members of Father’s family. She did not
oppose their visiting J.V. in her home but did not want electronic contact
with them. And she said J.V. had no current contact with Paternal

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Decision of the Court

Grandmother, who had not asked to visit J.V. for three years. Mother
offered as evidence of Father’s parental unfitness: the Winslow Police
Department Report of Father’s January 2020 arrest; the grand jury
indictment of Father; Father’s plea agreement; and Father’s sentence.

¶9 Father also testified at the hearing. He described his
parenting efforts in the month of J.V.’s life before his January 2020 arrest.
He admitted he had no contact with J.V. after his arrest but argued he made
efforts to make contact. He described his mental health and rehabilitative
efforts while incarcerated, including therapy sessions between 2021 and
2024. And he explained that he petitioned for custody because he wanted
to have a relationship with J.V. himself and wanted his family members to
have a relationship with J.V., but that he would abide by any family court
orders restricting his ability to parent J.V. Father offered evidence of his
rehabilitative efforts, including his: Arizona Public Schools Certificate of
Promotion; certificate from a mandatory functional literacy program; and
Conquer Series Episodes IV, V, & VI certificate. He also introduced his
custody petition.

¶10 An ICWA expert testified termination would be in J.V.’s best
interests because she believed any relationship between J.V. and Father
would result in emotional or physical harm to J.V. due to Father’s crimes
and because active efforts to prevent the dissolution of the family proved
unsuccessful. Based on discussions with Mother, she testified Mother takes
care of J.V., that J.V. has a significant bond with Mother’s new partner, and
that Mother has good reason to oppose any relationship between J.V. and
Father. She testified Father never sent J.V. cards, gifts, or letters. And she
testified that Father’s incarceration limited his access to rehabilitative
services so there were no drug or alcohol rehabilitation services she
believed he could have, but failed to, participate in.

¶11 Paternal Grandmother testified that, for a short time after
Father’s arrest, she facilitated contact between Father, Mother, and J.V.
through Facebook, but Mother cut off that contact by blocking her. She also
testified that before his incarceration, Father had gone to counseling for
mental and behavioral issues and that he “was using” and “had an
addiction going on” which included sniffing shoe glue chemicals, smoking
marijuana, and taking pills. She said Father was unable to maintain his
sobriety before January 2020 and was likely under the influence at the time
of his arrest. She also testified to Father’s efforts to become a better person
while incarcerated and to her belief that J.V. should have a relationship with
Father and his family.

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D. The Juvenile Court Terminates Father’s Parental Rights.

¶12 After the hearing, the juvenile court terminated Father’s
rights to J.V. on grounds of abandonment, abuse and neglect, substance
abuse, and felony length of incarceration. However, the order’s first page
states in bold capital letters, “MOTHER’S SEVERANCE PETITION
DENIED[.]”

¶13 Abandonment. In discussing abandonment under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(1), the court stated “Father’s dangerous, violent actions have led to
multiple felony convictions and eventual lengthy periods of incarceration.
Without question, that incarceration will require others to undertake any of
the myriad responsibilities associated with his parenting of the children.
Instead, Father through his actions, has left those obligations to others.”
Based on this analysis, the court found this ground proven by clear and
convincing evidence.

¶14 Abuse. The court noted that Father pled guilty to Child
Abuse, a class 2 felony, and found the statutory basis for abuse under A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(2) was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

¶15 Neglect. The court found the statutory basis for neglect under
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) proven by clear and convincing evidence because
Father “has neglected his children due to his lengthy incarceration.”

¶16 Prolonged Substance Abuse. The court found that Father
chronically abused substances before January 2020. The court found Father
has impaired ability to parent J.V. because of “Father’s lengthy
imprisonment due to criminal behaviors closely associated with his abuse
of substances.”

¶17 The court found Father to be engaged in “ongoing . . . abuse
of substances.” The court emphasized that factual finding, noting that a
“parent’s failure to abstain from substances despite a pending severance is
‘evidence [the parent] has not overcome [the] dependence on drugs and
alcohol.’”(quoting Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379
¶ 29 (App. 2010)) (alterations in original). Based on that factual finding, the
court found “it is reasonable to believe that it [chronic drug abuse] will
continue.” Based on these factual findings, the court found Mother had
proved by clear and convincing evidence prolonged substance abuse under
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

¶18 Length of Incarceration For Felony Conviction. The court
found Father was sentenced to 17 years for his criminal offenses. The court

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Decision of the Court

applied factors set forth in Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246,
249-50 (2000), and concluded that Father’s length of incarceration will
deprive J.V. of a normal home with Father for a period of years. The court
thus ruled that Mother had proved by clear and convincing evidence the
length of incarceration ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4).

¶19 Best Interests. The court listed legal standards concerning
best interests over six paragraphs of its ruling. The court then reached what
would be the findings of fact necessary to support a conclusion that
termination on the five statutory grounds would be in J.V.’s best interests.
The remainder of the court’s best-interests ruling read:

In ruling on the issues raised the Court notes that
Father Matthew Long is currently serving three concurrent
prison terms of 17 years, and one prison term of 1 year.
Testimony was provided regarding what the child [J.V.’s] age
would be Father Long would be released from prison.

The Court understands the severity of the offenses of
which Mr. Long stands convicted. The Court also
understands that barring a severe, unanticipated change of
circumstance, that Father’s release date from incarceration
would Father Matthew Long.

Testimony from the ICWA

Based on the above, the Petitioner has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence it would be in the minor
child's best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights.

¶20 The court then granted Mother’s petition and terminated
Father’s parental rights.

¶21 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const.
art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶22 “Parents enjoy a fundamental liberty interest in ‘the care,
custody, and management’ of their children.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 476 ¶ 18 (2023) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 753 (1982)). As such, “the permanent severance of the parental
relationship is a power of awesome magnitude that must be exercised with
great rectitude and always cognizant of the fundamental rights at stake,”

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Decision of the Court

Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 153 ¶ 26 (2018) (Bolick, J.,
concurring), which means termination requires “‘fundamentally fair
procedures’ that satisfy due process requirements.” Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at
476 ¶ 18 (quoting Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284 ¶ 24 (2005)).

¶23 Arizona statutes and rules ensure those fundamentally fair
procedures. A.R.S. § 8-533(B) “provides a two-step inquiry for termination”
of parental rights, whereby the juvenile court must first find “by clear and
convincing evidence that at least one of the enumerated statutory grounds
for termination exists,” and then must “find by a preponderance of the
evidence that termination . . . is in the child’s best interests.” In re M.P., ---
Ariz. ---, --- ¶ 11, 573 P.3d 564, 569 (App. 2025) (citation omitted).
Importantly, the petitioner “bears the burden of proof as to both inquiries.”
Id.

¶24 Further, A.R.S. § 8-538(A) and Arizona Rule of Juvenile Court
Procedure 353(h)(2)(A) require courts to make written factual findings to
terminate parental rights. Written factual findings “aid appellate review”
and ensure due process by “‘prompt[ing] judges to consider issues more
carefully because they are required to state not only the end result of their
inquiry, but the process by which they reached it.’” Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 538 ¶ 18 (App. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting
Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal Cnty., 175 Ariz. 296, 299 (1993)).

¶25 On appeal, we require “at least one sufficiently specific
finding to support each of the court’s conclusions of law.” Logan B., 244
Ariz. at 537 ¶ 15. The “court is not required to list each and every fact relied
upon,” but it “must include ‘all of the ultimate facts[,’]” which “are at least
the essential and determinative facts on which the conclusion was reached.”
Id. (quoting Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 132 (App. 1990)). Appellate courts
cannot “simply search the record to uncover ultimate facts the court may
have relied upon, or infer findings the court may have made, in reaching
the decision to enter an order of termination,” or “determine in the first
instance what ultimate facts the juvenile court would have reduced to
writing to support its conclusions of law.” Id. at 538–39 ¶¶ 17, 19.

¶26 Father challenges the court’s interpretations of and
conclusions regarding the abandonment, neglect, substance abuse, and
felony conviction grounds for termination. He challenges the court’s best-
interests conclusion and argues that factual misstatements and other errors
in the written termination ruling show he did not receive due process and
require reversing it. Mother argues the court made findings sufficient to

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support its legal conclusions, that the errors in the ruling are harmless, and
that Father received due process.

Father Does Not Challenge the Juvenile Court’s Finding of the
Statutory Ground of Abuse, But We Vacate as Unsupported and
Insufficient the Superior Court’s Best-Interests Finding.

¶27 We see serious and significant flaws in the juvenile court’s
analysis and approach to the abandonment, neglect, substance abuse, and
felony conviction grounds for termination. Extended incarceration is not
per se abandonment or neglect, there is no evidence of substance abuse
postdating February 2020 in this record, and Mother pleaded length of
felony sentence, not the type of felony. But Father does not challenge the
juvenile court’s finding of the abuse ground for termination under A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(2). Because he does not, we do not “consider whether the trial
court’s findings justified severance on the other grounds announced by the
court.” See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251 ¶ 27.

¶28 The juvenile court can find termination to be in the child’s best
interests in two different ways: “if either ‘the child would benefit from a
severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship.’” In re C.R.
and A.R., 256 Ariz. 170, 175 ¶ 24 (App. 2023) (quoting Matter of the Appeal in
Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-6831, 155 Ariz. 556, 559 (App. 1988)). And
as the juvenile court correctly stated, “[i]n most cases, the presence of a
statutory ground will have a negative effect on the children.” JS-6831, 155
Ariz. at 559. But that statement does not mean the existence of a statutory
ground makes termination in the child’s best interests. The JS-6831 court
explained that “in some cases, this will not be true,” so, “it becomes
necessary for the juvenile court to weigh the overall best interests of the
child against the objective behavior of the parent which constitutes the
statutory ground.” Id.

¶29 The juvenile court did not perform this necessary task. Rather
than “weigh the overall best interests of the child against the objective
behavior of the parent,” id., the juvenile court again noted Father is
“currently serving three concurrent prison terms of 17 years, and one prison
term of 1 year.” The court did not find J.V. would benefit from severance
or would necessarily be harmed by having a relationship with Father. In re
C.R. and A.R., 256 Ariz. at 175 ¶ 24. More concerning, the court’s brief
discussion of the crucial issue of J.V.’s best interests consisted of incomplete
sentences that found no facts. See supra ¶ 19.

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¶30 The juvenile court’s analysis was inadequate as a matter of
law. The juvenile court must support its best-interests conclusion with
written factual findings detailing the ultimate facts upon which it relied.
See Logan B., 244 Ariz. at 537 ¶ 15. Because the court did not, we vacate its
best-interests conclusion and remand for the court to make such findings as
are necessary to support its conclusions. We note that there has been no
change of judge in this matter, so on remand, Father retains that right. See
Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 108(c)(4). Because we vacate the termination order and
remand for further proceedings, we need not reach Father’s constitutional
objections to the vacated best-interests finding. See KPNX-TV Channel 12 v.
Stephens, 236 Ariz. 367, 372 n.3 (App. 2014) (“Because we have resolved the
issue on non-constitutional grounds, we need not address the constitutional
arguments.”).

¶31 Resolution of factual disputes is “uniquely the province of the
juvenile court.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 18 (quoting Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282 ¶ 12 (App. 2002)). While the dissent would
decide these issues in the first instance, that is not our function. State v.
MacHardy, 254 Ariz. 231, 236 ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (“It is not our role as a
reviewing court to make factual findings.”). Together with the dissent, we
very much appreciate the gravity of the facts concerning Father’s criminal
history. And when the juvenile court weighs evidence and makes factual
findings on best interests, Father’s evidence may fail. But Father has
petitioned the family court that he be made responsible to pay support for
J.V., to facilitate visits from his kin with J.V., and for contact with J.V. Father
also cites his efforts toward rehabilitation in prison, including therapy,
schooling, and work toward spiritual growth. The juvenile court may
ultimately determine that J.V. would receive no, or little, benefit from what
Father now offers. But the juvenile court, not this court, must assess it in
the first instance. See City of Flagstaff v. Ariz. Dep’t of Admin., 255 Ariz. 7, 14
¶ 26 (App. 2023) (“[A] court of appeals sits as a court of review, not of first
view.”) (citation omitted)). We respectfully disagree that the cases the
dissent cites support making the initial best-interests decision on appeal
here. None of those cases addressed the circumstance here, where Father
presented some evidence in his favor on the best-interests issue and the
juvenile court failed to make any findings in its discussion of the child’s best
interests. See In re C.E., --- Ariz. ---, --- ¶¶ 9–11, 573 P.3d 101, 103-04 (App.
2025) (describing juvenile court’s best-interests findings); Brandon K. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 1 CA-JV 21-0146, 2021 WL 5085338, at *5 ¶¶ 30–33 (Ariz.
App. Nov. 2, 2021) (mem. decision). In this circumstance, we should
remand for the juvenile court to decide the matter in the first instance. See
Logan B., 244 Ariz. at 539 ¶ 22.

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CONCLUSION

¶32 We affirm the court’s finding of the ground for termination
under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). We vacate the court’s ruling that termination of
Father’s parental rights is in J.V.’s best interests. We remand for further
proceedings consistent with this decision. We deny Mother’s and the
Navajo Nation’s requests for fees. Father is entitled to his costs on appeal,
subject to his compliance with ARCAP 21.

M O R S E, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

¶33 I join the majority's well-written analysis of the superior
court's findings regarding the grounds for termination. Supra ¶¶ 2–27. But
I cannot join the majority's decision to vacate the superior court's best-
interests finding and remand for further proceedings. Supra ¶¶ 1, 28–32.
Instead, I respectfully dissent because the majority needlessly delays the
inevitable termination of Father's parental rights when "[n]o reasonable
evidence supports the . . . conclusion that preserving Father's parental
rights" could possibly be in J.V.'s best interests. In re C.E., --- Ariz. ---, ---, ¶
21, 573 P.3d 101, 105 (App. 2025), review denied (Nov. 25, 2025).

¶34 While the superior court's best-interests findings are
indisputably lacking, the egregious facts of this case compel the conclusion
that J.V. will benefit from termination and be harmed if termination is
denied. In this situation, we should affirm the superior court's decision to
terminate Father's parental rights. See id. at ---, ¶ 23; cf. also Brandon K. v.
Dep't of Child Safety, No. 1 CA-JV 21-0146, 2021 WL 5085338, at *5, ¶¶ 30–33
(Ariz. App. Nov. 2, 2021) (mem. decision) (overlooking erroneous factual
best-interests findings when "accurate factual findings in the record
sufficiently support the best-interests determination"). Once a ground for
termination is established, our "focus shifts to the interests of the child as
distinct from those of the parent." Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz.
146, 150, ¶ 12 (2018) (quoting Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 285, ¶ 31
(2005)). "It cannot be that we will readily reverse termination on appeal
when there is no evidence that termination is in a child's best interests but
fail to order termination on appeal when the only evidence is that
termination is in a child's best interests." In re C.E., --- Ariz. at ---, ¶ 25.

¶35 Remand is unnecessary when the facts and the law compel
only one possible outcome. See id. at ---, ¶ 21; State v. Goracke, 210 Ariz. 20,
23, ¶ 12 (App. 2005) (finding remand unnecessary if there are "no conflicting
facts or inferences"). Shortly after J.V.'s birth, Father brutally attacked and

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stabbed Mother, and stabbed Mother's 14-year old sister while she held J.V.
in her arms. Supra ¶ 3. Father pled guilty to the attempted second-degree
murder of Mother, aggravated assault of the sister, and child abuse of J.V.
Supra ¶ 3. Father was sentenced to seventeen years in prison and will not
be released until after J.V. is eighteen years old. Supra ¶ 3. Moreover, Father
did not attempt to have any contact with J.V. for over four years after his
arrest. Supra ¶ 4. Based on Father's violent criminal acts, his long sentence,
and his lack of a current relationship with J.V., it is impossible to conclude
that the maintenance of Father's parental rights will be in J.V.'s best
interests.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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