In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0136
FILED 02-04-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS521069
The Honorable Suzanne E. Cohen, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant Father Kurt C.

Shelby R.
Pro Per Appellee Mother

Law Office of Ed Johnson, PLLC, Peoria
By Edward D. Johnson
Counsel for Appellee Child K.C.
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Vice Chief Judge David D.
Weinzweig joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Kurt C. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental
rights to K.C., arguing the record does not support a finding of
abandonment or that termination was in the best interests of K.C.
Reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding of abandonment.
However, the juvenile court, in its best-interests determination, relied in
large part on speculative evidence of a prospective adoption in the event of
Mother’s death. This was improper under Maricopa County Juvenile Action
No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1 (1990). Therefore, the juvenile court’s order is
vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2012, Shelby R. (“Mother”) and Father had one child
together, K.C. After living together for two years, the parties separated and
Mother filed for parenting time and child support. Father was awarded
parenting time every weekend and ordered to pay child support.

¶3 In October 2017, Mother obtained a one-year order of
protection against Father for herself and K.C. based on alleged physical
abuse, which Father contested. Because of the order of protection, Father
stopped exercising parenting time.

¶4 In June 2019, Mother moved and did not provide Father with
her new address. Father moved out of Arizona in 2021 but did not tell
Mother.

¶5 Although the parties disagreed as to the exact year, in either
2023 or 2024, Mother texted Father after K.C. asked to speak to his Father
on K.C.’s birthday. Father then spoke to K.C. on his birthday. Otherwise,
Father did not speak or physically interact with K.C. after October 2017,
even though Mother testified that her email address and telephone number
remained the same.

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Decision of the Court

¶6 In March 2025, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s
parental rights, alleging abandonment and abuse. A termination
adjudication hearing was held on August 27, 2025.

¶7 Mother testified K.C. wanted Father’s parental rights
terminated. K.C.’s attorney confirmed K.C. was “worried that [K.C.’s]
father’s going to disrupt how well [K.C.’s] doing.” According to Mother,
K.C. was well-adjusted to the community and had family in town. K.C. had
also developed a close relationship with K.C.’s maternal uncle and saw him
as a father figure. Based on that close relationship, Mother testified she
would like maternal uncle to take custody of K.C. in the event something
happened to her. Maternal uncle did not testify.

¶8 Father testified that he emailed Mother and tried to call her
once he believed the order of protection expired. He also testified that
Mother reached out to facilitate contact only once in 2024 and thereafter
threatened to block him if he contacted her again. Paternal grandmother
testified she left voicemails and texted Mother over the years. Father
provided no phone records or other documentary evidence showing his
phone calls.

¶9 Father, paternal grandmother, and Father’s wife also testified
Father tried to modify custody many times, each time filing a petition for
modification, but he could not serve Mother because her address was
unknown. The court, however, took judicial notice that there was no record
in the court docket of any such petitions.

¶10 On September 3, 2025, the court found clear and convincing
evidence of abandonment (but not of abuse) because “[F]ather did nothing
to see [K.C.] after he moved in 2021” and “Mother’s actions do not rise to
the level of interference required to establish a defense to abandonment.”
The court also found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in
K.C.’s best interests. Father timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S.
§§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Father argues the record does not support the court’s
determination that he abandoned K.C. and that termination was in the best
interests of K.C. A court may terminate parental rights if: (1) any ground
for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533 is proven by clear and convincing
evidence and (2) a preponderance of evidence supports termination would
be in the child’s best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279 (2005). The

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Decision of the Court

best-interests finding must rely on more than speculative evidence. See JS-
500274, 167 Ariz. at 7. Under A.R.S. § 8-538(A), “[e]very order of the court
terminating the parent-child relationship . . . shall be in writing and shall
recite the findings on which the order is based.”

¶12 In reviewing a termination order, this Court “review[s] the
factual findings made by the juvenile court, and its factual findings will be
accepted ‘if reasonable evidence and inferences support them.’” Brionna J.
v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 30 (2023) (quoting Jessie D. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 580 ¶ 10 (2021)). This Court will not
reweigh reasonable evidence already considered by the juvenile court
because “the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and
assess witness credibility.” Id. at 478 ¶ 30 (quoting Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 580
¶ 10). The juvenile court’s legal conclusions “will be affirmed unless they
are clearly erroneous.” Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 479 ¶ 31.

I. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding of
Abandonment.

¶13 Abandonment is:

[T]he failure of a parent to provide reasonable
support and to maintain regular contact with
the child, including providing normal
supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial
finding that a parent has made only minimal
efforts to support and communicate with the
child. Failure to maintain a normal parental
relationship with the child without just cause
for a period of six months constitutes prima
facie evidence of abandonment.

A.R.S. § 8-531(1).

¶14 Father argues there is not clear and convincing evidence that
he abandoned K.C. Specifically, he claims he “made objective—yet
unsuccessful efforts” to reestablish parenting time after Mother’s order of
protection expired, including: (1) attempts to modify parenting time, (2)
child support payments, and (3) contact with K.C. when Mother permitted.

¶15 Reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that Father
abandoned K.C., including that Father: (1) had not seen K.C. since 2017, (2)
did not reach out to Mother after the order expired, (3) did not petition to
modify parenting time, (4) moved out of Arizona without informing

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Mother or K.C., (5) was $10,000 in arrears for child support, (6) sent no cards
or other form of communication, (7) disappeared from K.C.’s life, and (8)
had no relationship with K.C. Father did not see K.C. for a period far
beyond six months, which constitutes prima facie evidence of
abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1).

¶16 Father argues the record shows he tried to modify his
parenting time but failed because he did not know Mother’s address.
However, the court docket did not show that Father had filed any “petitions
to modify,” the testimonies in support of Father’s claims were inconsistent,
and Father’s alleged inability to serve Mother would not have precluded
him from filing the petitions in the first place. The superior court did not
believe Father and this Court will not second guess its assessment of
credibility. Titus S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 369 ¶ 16 (App.
2018).

¶17 Next, Father argues he did not abandon K.C. because he made
weekly child support payments and although in arrears, he was paying
$376.00 a month in child support at the time of the hearing. In interpreting
the definition of abandonment under A.R.S. § 8-531(1), the Arizona
Supreme Court has found:

Although § 8-531(1) does not expressly define
“normal parental relationship,” the plain
meaning of “normal parental relationship” is
informed by the first two sentences of the
statute. Reading § 8-531(1) as a whole,
“abandonment” signifies the “[f]ailure to
maintain a normal parental relationship.”
Because “abandonment” means “the failure of a
parent to provide reasonable support and to
maintain regular contact with the child,
including providing normal supervision,” it
logically follows that a “normal parental
relationship” exists when a parent provides the
support and contact with the child that a parent
who abandoned the child has failed to offer.

In re B.W., ___ Ariz. ___, ___ ¶ 22, 572 P.3d 88, 96 (2025). Thus, Father’s
payment of some child support, in and of itself, was insufficient to show
that he did not abandon K.C.

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¶18 In an attempt to rebut the court’s finding of abandonment, see
Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 293 ¶ 1 (App. 2013), Father argues
“Mother actively hindered [his] and Paternal Grandmother’s ability to have
contact with K.C. by threatening to block [him], not responding to [his] or
Paternal Grandmother’s efforts to have contact with K.C., and having her
mailing address and not her physical address available publicly.” It is true
a parent may not wrongfully restrict the other parent’s access to a child and
then rely on that limited involvement to prove abandonment. Id. at 297-98
¶¶ 21-30. But reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
“Mother’s actions do not rise to the level of interference required” under
Calvin B. because Father did not sufficiently show that he “actively [sought]
more involvement than [Mother] would allow” throughout K.C.’s life.

II. The Determination That Termination of Father’s Parental Rights
Was in K.C.’s Best Interests Was Improperly Based on Speculation.

¶19 “[T]ermination is in the child’s best interests if either: (1) the
child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if
severance is denied.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13
(2018). Here, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination would be in K.C.’s best interests because:

Maintaining a parent-child relationship would
be detrimental to [K.C.] because father
disappeared from [K.C.]’s life and has no
relationship with [K.C.] If something happens
to mother, [K.C.]’s only legal parent would be
father. Father lives in another state and [K.C.]
has a life here in Arizona and family. [K.C.] has
a close relationship with maternal uncle who is
like a father to [K.C.] [K.C.] asked mother to
sever father’s rights. [K.C.] has no relationship
with father.

...

It is a benefit to [K.C.] to have . . . uncle be
available as [K.C.’s] caregiver should something
happen to mother.

¶20 Father challenges the court’s finding, arguing that uncle’s
potential adoption of K.C. is “speculation” and “not sufficient to support a
best interests finding.” Father is correct. According to the Arizona Supreme
Court, a parent’s “wish to make a testamentary nomination of [family

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Decision of the Court

members] to serve as guardians of [a child] in the event of [that parent’s]
untimely death” is “too speculative” to support a best-interests finding.
JS-500274, 167 Ariz. at 7.

¶21 The superior court did identify other factual findings in
support of its determination that termination was in K.C.’s best interests.
However, it is unclear to this Court whether the superior court would have
made the same determination if it had understood it could not consider the
speculative testimony regarding potential adoption by maternal uncle.

CONCLUSION

¶22 Because the court erred in relying on speculative evidence in
making its “best interests” determination, the termination order is vacated.
The matter is remanded to the superior court to conduct a new
best-interests evaluation consistent with this decision.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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