In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.G.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS AS TO A.G.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0171
FILED 08-07-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300SV202500012
The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Janelle A. McEachern Attorney at Law, Chandler
By Janelle A. McEachern
Advisory Counsel for Appellant

Cole G., Tucson
Appellant

Giovanna R., Prescott
Appellee

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.G.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David B. Gass1 delivered the decision of the court, in which
Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Father appeals from the superior court’s order terminating his
parental rights to A.G. Because reasonable evidence supports the superior
court’s order, the court affirms.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The court accepts “the [superior] court’s findings of fact
unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings, and . . . will affirm
a [termination] order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 4 (App. 2002). Because the superior court
is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses, the court does not reweigh the evidence. In re J.C., 259 Ariz. 60,
68 ¶ 34 (App. 2024) review denied (Apr. 1, 2025). Instead, the court
determines whether reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s
ruling. See Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App.
2009).

¶3 A.G. was born in 2018. Mother and father divorced in 2021. In
that same year, the superior court convicted father for aggravated assault
against mother and sentenced him to prison for 1 year. Mother filed for an
order of protection against father in 2023. The 2023 protective order did not
include A.G. Father thus could have exercised his parenting time during
that time but did not. Instead, father stopped all contact and visitation with
A.G. About 2 years later (in 2025), the superior court again convicted father

1 Judge David B. Gass was a sitting member of this court when the
matter was assigned to this panel of the court. He retired effective June 30,
2026. In accordance with the authority granted by Article VI, Section 3, of
the Arizona Constitution, and under A.R.S. § 12-145, the Chief Justice of the
Arizona Supreme Court has designated Judge David B. Gass as a judge pro
tempore in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of participating in the
resolution of cases assigned to this panel during his term in office and for
the duration of Administrative Order 2026-87.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.G.
Decision of the Court

for aggravated harassment against mother, at which point mother renewed
the order of protection and included A.G. on it at that point.

¶4 After father’s 2025 incarceration, mother filed her petition to
terminate father’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment, neglect or
abuse, and father’s length of incarceration.2 The superior court held a
termination hearing in September 2025. Father testified he did not pay child
support after June 2023, has not seen A.G. since 2023, but gifted her a
skateboard and nothing else. He said he sent 3 letters to A.G. and was
unable to send more because of the 2025 order of protection. Father also
testified he could not have a relationship with A.G. before his incarceration
because of the order of protection and the decree of dissolution.

¶5 Father attempted to make rehabilitative efforts. While
incarcerated, father took parenting, anger management, and critical
thinking classes to “parent [A.G.]” and “become a better father.” But the
superior court found his actions were not enough. In its ruling, the superior
court granted mother’s petition to terminate father’s parental rights. The
superior court said:

It is clear that Father did not have a close relationship with
[A.G.] prior to this most recent incarceration. Father has not
acted persistently to establish his relationship with [A.G.] nor
has he vigorously asserted his legal rights to parent [A.G.] to
the extent necessary. The Petitioner has proven the factual
allegation of abandonment contained in, 8(a) of the Petition
for Termination.

¶6 In considering the child’s best interests, the superior court
said:

[T]he best interests of the minor child would be served by
terminating the father’s parental rights. The child does not
have any meaningful parent-child relationship with Father,
and the history of the relationship is such that it is detrimental
to the child. Father’s conduct is unstable and erratic and poses
a risk to the child. Termination of parental rights will remove
all risks of uncertainty and promote a safer, more stable
upbringing for the child. Father has shown a pattern of
domestically violent and erratic behavior. It is in the child’s

2 Though mother’s petition originally alleged substance abuse,
mother chose to withdraw this ground at trial.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.G.
Decision of the Court

best interest to not be exposed to Father’s behavior.
Termination of Father’s rights will allow Mother to provide
safety and security for the child, allowing her to make all
decisions necessary to care for the child.

¶7 The court has jurisdiction over father’s timely appeal under
Article VI, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 8-235.A, 12-
2101.A.1, and Juvenile Rule 603(a), Arizona Rules of Procedure for the
Juvenile Court.

DISCUSSION

¶8 The superior court may terminate a parental relationship
upon proof by “clear and convincing evidence” of any statutory ground
under A.R.S. § 8-533.B. Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280 ¶ 4. “Clear and convincing”
means the grounds for termination are “highly probable or reasonably
certain.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284–85 ¶ 25 (2005) (citation
omitted). On appeal, the court “view[s the] facts in the light most favorable
to affirming the [superior] court’s findings.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No.
JV-132905, 186 Ariz. 607, 608 n.1 (App. 1996).

¶9 The superior court also must determine a child’s best interests
by a preponderance of the evidence. In re J.C., 259 Ariz. at 74 ¶ 73. When
the superior court finds a parent unfit, it must consider the totality of the
circumstances, looking at both the unfit parent’s interests in the child’s care
and custody and the child’s need for a safe and stable home. Id. at 75 ¶ 73.
In doing so, the superior court considers the benefits of terminating the
relationship or the harm of continuing it, considering factors such as the
child’s adoptability and the parent’s rehabilitation. Id. “Once the superior
court finds a parent unfit under at least one statutory ground for
termination, the interests of the parent and child diverge, and the superior
court then balances the unfit parent’s interest in the care and custody of his
or her child against the independent and often adverse interests of the child
in a safe and stable home life.” Id. (cleaned up).

I. Though father’s opening brief does not comply with the Arizona
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, the court will reach the merits
of the appeal.

¶10 Father’s opening brief does not comply with Rule 13, Arizona
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. Under Rule 13, the opening brief must
set forward “a statement of the case that must concisely state the nature of
the case, the course of the proceedings, the disposition in the court from
which the appeal is taken, and the basis of the appellate court’s jurisdiction

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.G.
Decision of the Court

with appropriate references to the record.” Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519,
522 ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (citing Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(4)). The brief also must
cite any legal authority and make any substantive argument. See Ariz. R.
Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A) (“Appellant’s contentions concerning each issue
presented for review, with supporting reasons for each contention, and
with citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions
of the record on which the appellant relies.”).

¶11 “An appellant who fails to make a bona fide and reasonably
intelligent effort to comply with the rules will waive issues and arguments
not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or
authority.” Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 522 ¶ 8 (cleaned up). The court holds father,
a self-represented litigant, to the same standards as an attorney and does
not afford him special leniency. See Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 83–84
¶ 24 (2017).

¶12 Here, father’s opening brief raises no issue warranting relief.
Father’s brief is 3 pages long and cites no legal authority. Father does not
argue the superior court made any factual errors. For example, father
acknowledges his convictions and sentences for aggravated harassment
against mother. Then, without citing any legal authority, he challenges the
termination because he has never been charged with any violent, sexual, or
dangerous crime towards any child or mother.

¶13 Though father’s brief falls short, the court exercises its
discretion to decide father’s appeal on its merits based on its own review of
the record. See Adams v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 139 Ariz. 340 (App. 1984)
(recognizing courts prefer to decide each case upon its merits rather than
dismissing on procedural grounds).

II. Though mother did not file an answering brief, the court will not
treat her omission as a confession of error.

¶14 The court could treat mother’s failure to file an answering
brief as a confession of error. See Welch v. United Mut. Benefit Ass’n, 48 Ariz.
173, 174 (1936) (quoting Navarro v. State, 32 Ariz. 119, 120 (1927)); see, e.g.,
Skelsey v. Kuhn, 23 Ariz. 367 (1922); Hatch v. Leighton et al., 24 Ariz. 300
(1922). But the court grants relief on confession of error only if the appellant
raises a debatable question, and “no reasonable excuse is shown for the
[appellee’s] failure to appear and file a brief.” Welch, 48 Ariz. at 175; see also
Navarro, 32 Ariz. at 120–21 (assuming appellee confesses error if appellant
raises a debatable question and appellee has no reasonable excuse for not
filing an answering brief); see also Carter v. State ex rel. Eyman, 5 Ariz. App.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.G.
Decision of the Court

415, 415 (1967) (“[T]he failure to file an answering brief does not constitute
a confession of reversible error since no debatable issue is presented.”).

¶15 The Arizona Supreme Court has characterized a debatable
question as one which would “require much industry and independent
research to refute.” Merrill v. Wheeler, 17 Ariz. 348, 350 (1915). It must spark
“at least grave doubt” in the superior court’s order. Adkins v. Adkins, 39
Ariz. 530, 532 (1932). And any questions asked must raise a novel legal
issue. See Childs v. Frederickson, 21 Ariz. 248, 249 (1920).

¶16 Here, father’s opening brief raises no debatable question.
First, the opening brief raises no legal question, so there is nothing for
mother to research and refute. Second, father agrees with the superior
court’s order, stating the superior court was “right that [he] needed to learn
a lesson.” And third, father asks the court to reweigh the evidence and give
him another chance, which the court will not do. See In re J.C., 259 Ariz. at
68 ¶ 34.

¶17 Because the court concludes father raises no debatable
questions, it does not treat mother’s failure to file an answering brief as a
confession of error. See Verdex Steel & Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors,
Maricopa Cnty., 19 Ariz. App. 547, 550 (1973) (citation omitted).

III. The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it found by
clear and convincing evidence mother proved father abandoned
A.G.

¶18 Under the abandonment ground, the superior court must
consider “whether a parent has provided reasonable support, maintained
regular contact, made more than minimal efforts to support and
communicate with the child, and maintained a normal parental
relationship.” Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249–50 ¶ 18
(2000). And when determining abandonment, the superior court considers
only the parent’s conduct, not the parent’s subjective intent. Id.

¶19 Father offers no credible evidence he provided reasonable
support for or maintained regular contact with A.G. Father concedes he did
not provide any financial support to mother through court-ordered child
support payments. At best, father said, “I know it’s not through the Courts,
but I did hand her [referring to mother] like 900 bucks” in June 2023.

¶20 Father also had minimal communication with A.G. Though
A.G. was not on the order of protection until June 2025, father sent just 3
letters to A.G. before June 2023. There was nothing preventing father from

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.G.
Decision of the Court

arranging contact with A.G. through a professional supervisor or a third-
party. But father did not exercise his parenting time between June 2023 and
his arrest in January 2025. True, father is taking parenting classes while
incarcerated so he can become a better father. But father’s belated
participation can be—as the superior court concluded it is here—“too little,
too late.” See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577
(App. 1994) (saying State need not keep the “window of opportunity for
remediation open indefinitely” because doing so is not in the child’s or
parent’s best interests).

¶21 To his credit, father takes responsibility for the harm he has
caused and says he misses A.G., who father describes as “brilliant,
awesome, fun,” and “has a bright future.” Father acknowledges he needed
to learn a lesson, but argues terminating his parental rights to A.G. goes a
step too far. But father identifies no error in the superior court’s
abandonment findings. And without any support, he says it was not in
A.G.’s best interests to terminate his parental rights. In short, father’s brief
provides no legal basis for setting aside the superior court’s order.

¶22 Though the superior court found mother proved 3 grounds
for terminating father’s rights, the court can affirm based on abandonment
and thus will not address the remaining grounds and the evidence
supporting them. Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 578 ¶ 5
(App. 2017) (citing Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280 ¶ 3) (“If clear and convincing
evidence supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile
court ordered severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other
grounds.”).

CONCLUSION

¶23 The court affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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