In RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.M.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.M., R.M.,
A.M., P.M., and G.O.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0177, 1 CA-JV 26-0002
(Consolidated)
FILED 07-06-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD533703
The Honorable Ronee Korbin Steiner, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli, Phoenix
Counsel for Appellant Father

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Dawn R. Williams
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.M., et al.
Decision of the Court

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Jesus Macias Jr., (Father) appeals from orders terminating his
parental rights to five children. Because paternity was not established for
one of the children, that order is vacated and remanded. Because Father has
not otherwise shown error, the order terminating his parental rights to the
other four children is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father is the parent of P.M., A.M., R.M., M.M. and G.O.1 In
October 2020, DCS filed a dependency petition, alleging as to Father
neglect, substance abuse and an inability to provide proper and effective
parental care and control.2 Later in October 2020, the court was informed
that paternity was established for all children, except G.O. DCS had alleged
a John Doe father for G.O., and in January 2021, after service by publication,
the court found G.O. dependent as to John Doe.

¶3 In August 2021, after Father entered a no contest plea to the
dependency allegations, the court found all five children dependent as to
Father and adopted a family reunification case plan, with DCS to provide
reunification services.

¶4 By October 2022, Father was being held in jail and the court
ordered DCS to seek video visits between Father and the children. In March
2023, Father was sentenced to three years in prison for felony convictions.
For the next few years, the court continued to order video visits, including
makeup visits when they were missed. In August 2024, the court ordered
DCS to work on having in-person visits if the facility where Father was
being held allowed it. In December 2024, DCS told the court that Arizona
Department of Corrections (DOC) issues were preventing Father from
having visits. Father later indicated he was receiving virtual visits but
wanted in-person visits. Father was then moved to a different prison
facility, and visitation issues then continued.

1 The caption has been amended to safeguard the child’s identity pursuant

to Administrative Order 2013-0001.

2 Mother was also a party to the petition but is not involved in this appeal.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.M., et al.
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¶5 In June 2025, the court granted DCS’ motion to change the
case plan to severance and adoption. DCS’ motion to terminate alleged, as
statutory grounds for Father, substance abuse, length of felony sentence
and 15-months time-in-care. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S) § 8-533(B)(3), (4),
(8)(c) (2026).3

¶6 During the two-day severance adjudication hearing in
October 2025, DCS informed the court that it would not proceed with G.O.
until paternity could be established. On the second day, DCS requested the
court to preserve the testimony and evidence as to G.O., pending paternity
testing, and the court did so. In November 2025, the court granted the
motion to terminate for all children except G.O., finding DCS proved by
clear and convincing evidence all three statutory grounds alleged and
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that termination would be in
the children’s best interests.

¶7 At a December 2025 status conference, DCS indicated Father’s
paternity of G.O. had been established. The court then ordered DCS to file
an amended dependency petition. At the same status conference, however,
the court later stated it was prepared to rule on the motion to terminate as
to G.O. given the evidence provided at the October 2025 adjudication and
would issue its ruling in due course.

¶8 The court then issued its ruling and, based on the evidence
received at the October 2025 adjudication, terminated Father’s rights to
G.O. This court has jurisdiction over Father’s timely appeals of these
termination orders under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution
and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A), 12-2101(A) and Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 601-
03.

DISCUSSION

¶9 As applicable here, to terminate parental rights, a court must
find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground set
forth in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) has been proven and must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the
child. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). Because the juvenile court
“is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” this court will affirm

3 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.M., et al.
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an order terminating parental rights if it is supported by reasonable
evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App.
2009) (citation omitted). This court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to upholding the orders. See Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
214 Ariz. 445, 449 ¶ 12 (App. 2007).

I. Because Paternity Had Not Been Shown for G.O., the Juvenile
Court Erred in Terminating Father’s Parental Rights to G.O.

¶10 Father correctly argues that, because paternity had not been
established by evidence offered at trial or by stipulation or motion, and
because DCS did not file an amended dependency petition or motion to
terminate, the termination of his parental rights to G.O. was error. At trial,
DCS stated it could not proceed with termination as to G.O. until paternity
was established. The next day, DCS asked the court to preserve the
testimony as it related to G.O. The court then preserved the trial evidence
as to G.O., indicating it would make its findings regarding termination after
receiving evidence regarding paternity and making findings regarding
paternity.

¶11 At the December 2025 status conference, DCS told the court
that it had paternity testing evidence showing Father was the biological
father of G.O. and that it would file an amended dependency petition and
motion to terminate. Father’s counsel responded that the paternity test
results had not been reviewed, adding that “paternity does need to be
established in order to proceed with making a dependency finding and a
severance finding as well.” The court then ordered DCS to file an amended
dependency petition, which would also necessitate an amended motion to
terminate. Despite those directives, three days later and before those
amended filings were made, the court issued its ruling terminating Father’s
rights to G.O.

¶12 A parent is “the child’s biological, adoptive, or legal mother
or father whose rights have not been terminated.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 102(v).
But a parent does not include a person whose paternity has not been
established pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-812 or A.R.S. § 25-814. See A.R.S. § 25-
814(A) (a man is presumed to be a child’s father if the child was born within
the marriage, genetic testing affirms paternity, he appears on the birth
certificate, or the parties acknowledge paternity by a notarized or witnessed
statement).

¶13 DCS concedes that paternity must be resolved “before the
court determines dependency[,]” unless paternity is irrelevant to the

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dependency petition. See In re G.R., 255 Ariz. 444, 448 ¶¶ 22-23 (App. 2023).
Here, Father’s paternity was relevant to the dependency petition, with each
of the allegations against Father requiring a finding that he was a parent.
Id. Moreover, DCS’ dependency petition (which was not amended) alleged
(1) paternity had not been established as to G.O. and (2) named a John Doe
father for G.O. And at DCS’ request, in January 2021, the court found G.O.
dependent as to John Doe.

¶14 On the record presented, the issue of Father’s paternity was
not properly asserted in an amended dependency petition and an amended
motion to terminate, and Father did not consent (affirmatively, by action or
otherwise) to join that issue. Moreover, the court lacked the evidence to
adjudicate G.O. dependent as to Father, or terminate Father’s parental
rights to G.O., because it did not give the parties an opportunity to address
whether Father was G.O.’s parent. Accordingly, the termination ruling as
to G.O. is vacated and the matter is remanded for an evidentiary hearing
on the paternity issue and any further proceedings deemed necessary to
resolve whether Father’s parental rights to G.O. should be terminated. s.

II. The Juvenile Court Could Properly Find that DCS Made Diligent
Efforts to Provide Appropriate Reunification Services, Including
Visitation Between Father and the Children.

¶15 Citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), Father asserts
“DCS must make diligent efforts to preserve the family by providing
services to assist parents in maintaining a bond with their children.” To do
so, Father argues DCS must “initiate measures designed to address an
incarcerated parent’s desire to maintain a parent-child relationship. At
bottom . . . DCS ‘has a responsibility to assist parents, incarcerated or not,
who face termination of their rights.’” Father alleges DCS failed to
discharge that obligation, and that he was “repeatedly denied visits, in
person and virtual, as well as telephone contact with his children.” Father
also asserts the court erred in finding DCS made a diligent effort to provide
him with appropriate reunification services.

¶16 Although services for a parent in prison may be more limited,
DCS is obligated to make reasonable efforts to provide reunification
services, if requested by the incarcerated parent and if providing the
services will not endanger the child. See Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251
Ariz. 574, 581–82 ¶¶ 18, 21 (2021). DCS must “identify the conditions
causing the child's out-of-home placement, provide services that have a
reasonable prospect of success to remedy the circumstances as they arise
throughout the time-in-care period, maintain consistent contact with the

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.M., et al.
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parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where
compliance proves difficult.” Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9,
23 ¶ 50 (App. 2019) (citation omitted). The juvenile court is to “consider the
totality of the circumstances when determining whether DCS has made
diligent efforts.” Id. at ¶ 49. Although there were issues with Father’s
visitation, the trial record supports the juvenile court’s finding that DCS
made diligent efforts to provide Father with appropriate reunification
services, including visitation.

¶17 The court’s 40-page minute entry detailing the services
provided to Father will not be repeated here. During the lengthy history of
this case, DCS provided Father a variety of services. Father was provided
substance abuse treatment and drug testing and counselling, but his
participation was inconsistent and he tested positive for drugs, including
methamphetamine, when he did participate. Father continued to test
positive for drugs despite being offered services by DCS including testing
and treatment. The court found Father’s excuse for failing to participate
(that he was working) to not be credible and that Father was selling illegal
drugs instead of attending substance abuse classes.

¶18 DCS provided Father services through a Nurturing Parent
Program, but he refused or rejected the services. Father’s psychological
evaluation revealed a poor prognosis for him to parent given lack of insight,
substance use and untreated trauma. The court noted two counseling
service referrals were closed out when Father failed to engage.

¶19 Before being incarcerated, Father participated in visits
facilitated by DCS. After he was taken into custody, visits were both remote
and in-person, often once a month. A DCS case aide testified that Father
had consistent visits with the children, but there were issues with DOC not
providing the necessary information for remote visits. Visits also were
complicated because Father kept getting transferred from one DOC facility
to another. The case aide testified that DCS took all the steps necessary to
make visits happen. A parenting time coordinator testified similarly,
adding that the virtual link was not always available but DCS attempted
“every week” to provide Father visits. The DCS case specialist conceded,
however, that DOC communication issues caused interruptions with visits.

¶20 While in custody from March 2023 to November 2025, Father
moved facilities 14 times, which complicated visits. Some of those moves,
however, were the result of Father violating rules while in custody.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the sporadic visitation was not the

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.M., et al.
Decision of the Court

fault of DCS but, instead, resulted from Father’s conduct in custody, issues
with DOC and the number of placements for the five children.

¶21 After detailing the services provided to Father by DCS, the
court concluded that DCS had made reasonable and diligent efforts to
provide appropriate reunification services, and that Father did not
meaningfully participate in those services to facilitate a change in his ability
to safely parent. On this record, Father has shown no error in the court’s
findings. See Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 582 ¶ 21.

III. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Failing to
Appoint a Guardian for the Children as Opposed to Ordering
Termination.

¶22 Father argues DCS “failed to reasonably address the option of
guardianship for these children.” The record shows that DCS considered a
guardianship, but the potential guardian was denied as a placement.
Although citing a Florida case to support his argument that guardianship
is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of protecting children,
A.H. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 144 So. 3d 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014),
Father concedes that case is not binding on this court. Moreover, it is
inapplicable here as it involved the termination of a permanent
guardianship, not whether a permanent guardianship was appropriate in
the first instance. A.H., 144 So. 3d at 664.

¶23 Although a permanent guardian may be an appropriate
alternative to termination of parental rights, a permanent guardianship is
not a prerequisite to termination, particularly where no ready, willing and
able potential guardian has been identified. See Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 477 ¶¶ 27-28 (2022). Here, the record indicates
guardianship was considered but no eligible potential guardian was
identified. On this record, Father has shown no error in the court’s
considering a potential guardian.4

4 Father argues the juvenile court’s findings regarding the substance abuse

statutory ground were not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The juvenile court, however, also found that DCS proved by clear and
convincing evidence the length of felony sentence and time in care statutory
grounds. Father does not challenge those findings on appeal, which appear
to be supported by substantial trial evidence. Accordingly, this court need
not address Father’s challenges to the substance abuse findings. See Jesus M.

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CONCLUSION

¶24 The order terminating Father’s parental rights as to G.O. is
vacated and remanded for further consideration. The order terminating
Father’s parental rights to his other children is affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 3 (App. 2002) (citing cases)
(“If clear and convincing evidence supports any one of the statutory
grounds on which the juvenile court ordered severance, we need not
address claims pertaining to the other grounds.”).

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