In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to D.C. and T.R.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.C. and T.R.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0183
FILED 06-30-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD39791
JS22544
The Honorable Glenn A. Allen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of H. Clark Jones LLC, Mesa
By H. Clark Jones
Counsel for Appellant Ashley P.

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant Trenton R.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Anna V. Vaszar
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda L. Adams
Counsel for Appellees D.C. and T.R.

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.C. and T.R.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Ashley P. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her minor children, D.C. and T.R. 1
Trenton R. (“Father”) appeals the court’s termination of his parental rights
to T.R. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother is the biological mother of D.C., born August 2020,
and both Mother and Father are the biological parents of T.R., born
November 2021. D.C. was born substance-exposed to marijuana and placed
in the NICU due to breathing issues, feeding problems, jaundice, and
withdrawal tremors. Mother tested positive for marijuana three times
during the pregnancy and admitted to daily use. She disclosed diagnoses
of multiple mental health disorders but was not being treated for any of
them and refused medication. She was also homeless, unemployed, and
lacked supplies to care for a newborn. The Department of Child Safety
(“DCS”) took custody of D.C., placed him with a foster family, and filed a
dependency petition. The juvenile court found D.C. dependent.

¶3 DCS referred Mother for multiple reunification services,
including drug testing, psychological evaluation, parent-aide services,
supervised visitation, and transportation. From August 2020 to November
2021, Mother sporadically participated in services and refused to complete
a psychological evaluation. Parent-aide services were closed in April 2021
after Mother failed to attend multiple sessions. Mother disrupted
supervised visitation by bringing drugs and drug paraphernalia to visits
and acting erratic and aggressive toward supervisors, while making
minimal efforts to engage with D.C. Visitation eventually closed after
Mother cancelled a visit mid-session, yelled at the parent aide, and

1 The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of Dale C. and
John Doe, the alleged biological fathers of D.C. But they are not parties to
this appeal.

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prompted intervention by security. A re-referral for supervised visitation
in September 2021 yielded no visits.

¶4 In September 2021, while about seven months pregnant with
T.R., Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and
THC. T.R. was removed at birth. Both parents were hostile at the hospital;
security made Father leave after he threatened to abscond with the child,
and hospital staff noted a strong odor of marijuana in the baby’s room. T.R.
was placed in foster care together with D.C., and the juvenile court
adjudicated T.R. dependent in February 2022.

¶5 Over the next four years, DCS continued offering both parents
reunification services. Mother underwent multiple psychological
evaluations over the course of the case. A 2022 evaluation diagnosed her
with many disorders — including for anxiety — and noted immature
functioning and that she was likely unaware of her children’s needs. A 2024
evaluation added Cannabis Use Disorder (Severe) to her diagnoses. A
February 2025 evaluation found: (1) Mother produced significant results on
a child-abuse-risk index, (2) her continued marijuana use posed risks of
harm to any child in her care, and (3) she tended to say what she thought
would make a positive impression.

¶6 DCS referred both parents to the Nurturing Parent Program
(“NPP”) six times between 2023 and 2025. Each referral was ultimately
closed due to the parents’ hostility, refusal to engage, and failure to
demonstrate progress. During the sixth and final NPP referral — just four
months before the start of the termination trial — the parent aide reflected
that Mother “is in the preparation stage,” and “has her mind set and there
is no changing her view on issues such as keeping her children safe.” Just
two months before trial, the parent aide recorded that Mother “will buy
drugs before she will take care of herself,” and that she “can’t leave the
house without being high.” And the month before trial, the parent aide
observed that “Mother is in the relapse stage” and she “needs [marijuana]
in order to function and deal with her daily life.”

¶7 Neither parent ever progressed to unsupervised visitation at
any point during the case. A bonding and best-interest assessment found
both parents detached and unresponsive, with the children demonstrating
a primary bond with their foster mother.

¶8 At the four-day severance trial in August and September
2025, the case manager testified that Mother had made insufficient progress

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during the five-year dependency. Both children were adoptable, and their
foster placement intended to adopt them.

¶9 The court terminated Mother’s parental rights to both D.C.
and T.R. and Father’s parental rights to T.R. on the fifteen-months’ time-in-
care ground. They both timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 8-235, 12-120.21, and 12-
2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Court’s Termination Order.

¶10 A parent’s right to “the care, custody, and management of
their children” is fundamental but not absolute. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 476 ¶ 18 (2023) (citation modified). If the juvenile court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of at least one of the
statutory grounds under A.R.S. Section 8-533(B) and, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interests, it may
terminate parental rights. Id. at 477 ¶ 20.

¶11 In conducting our review, “[w]e will affirm a termination
order unless the juvenile court abuses its discretion or the court’s findings
are not supported by reasonable evidence.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 14 (2022). First, we examine the “factual findings
made by the juvenile court, and its factual findings will be accepted if
reasonable evidence and inferences support them.” Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at
478 ¶ 30 (citation modified). We also view the record in the light most
favorable to upholding the court’s findings, id. at 479 ¶ 32, and do not
reweigh evidence or reevaluate credibility determinations, even in the
presence of “sharply disputed facts[,]” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245
Ariz. 146, 151 ¶ 18 (2018) (citation modified).

¶12 Second, we review the court’s legal conclusions regarding the
statutory ground for termination, affirming those conclusions “unless they
are clearly erroneous.” Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478–79 ¶ 31. Under this
standard, “the question of whether the statutory factor is supported by the
mandated quantum of evidence will not be disturbed unless the appellate
court determines as a matter of law that no one could reasonably find the
evidence to be clear and convincing.” Id. at 479 ¶ 31 (citation modified).

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A. Reasonable evidence supports termination under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(8)(c).

¶13 To terminate a parent’s rights under the fifteen months’ out-
of-home placement ground, the court must find: (1) DCS has made “diligent
efforts to provide appropriate reunification services[,]” and despite such
efforts, (2) “[t]he child has been in an out-of-home placement for a
cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer pursuant to court order
or voluntary placement[,]” (3) “the parent has been unable to remedy the
circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement[,]”
and (4) “there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable
of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near
future.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), (11)(b).

¶14 Here, Mother contests only that she has been unable to
remedy the circumstances that caused D.C. and T.R. to be in out-of-home
care and that there is a substantial likelihood that she will not be capable of
exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.
She asserts that the court’s findings to the contrary are not supported by
reasonable evidence. We disagree.

¶15 D.C. and T.R. were removed from Mother’s care in 2020 and
2021 respectively because, among other things, both were born substance-
exposed to THC, and DCS was concerned about Mother’s ability to safely
and independently care for her children. At the time of both removals,
Mother admitted to daily use of marijuana to treat her severe anxiety and
other mental health conditions.

¶16 Mother’s heavy marijuana use troubled DCS for more than its
potential to cause direct harm to the children through exposure. In the
dependency proceedings, DCS made clear that “substance abuse impairs a
parent’s ability to provide proper care and prevents the parent from
performing essential parental responsibilities or places a child at risk of
harm in the parent’s care because common symptoms of marijuana use
include sensory distortion, impaired decision making and reaction time,
anxiety, and paranoia.” Indeed, the record contains multiple reports from
parent aides confirming concerns that Mother’s parenting skills and safety
awareness were lacking, due, at least in part, to the impact of marijuana.
This concern did not lessen, even five years later at the severance trial.
Mother was diagnosed with “Cannabis Use Disorder (Severe)” during a
psychological evaluation conducted in late 2024, and again in February of
2025. And Mother’s daily marijuana use continued unabated through the
date of trial on DCS’s termination petition, where she admitted that she

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Decision of the Court

continued to smoke it every day, multiple times a day, to self-medicate, and
intended to continue to do so if the children were returned to her, unless
absolutely required not to. In short, the children were removed, among
other reasons, because Mother’s lack of parenting skills and safety
awareness presented a danger to D.C. and T.R. Her marijuana use was a
significant contributor to those deficiencies. And those deficiencies
persisted at the time of trial, as did Mother’s heavy marijuana use.

¶17 Over the life of this case, Mother received a bevy of services,
which included programs intended to help Mother develop the essential
skills and awareness that she needed to care safely and independently for
D.C. and T.R. Yet, Mother’s participation was reluctant, lacking, and
sometimes non-existent. She was adamant that she would not stop using
marijuana. And Mother’s progress was slow and minimal, such that after
five years in a dependency proceeding, she still had not developed the
ability to safely and independently care for her children. And her
continuous, heavy use of marijuana continued to impact both her ability to
complete services and her ability to provide a safe and effective home for
the children.

¶18 Further, we agree with the juvenile court that “the crux of the
case here, [is] how long should these children have to wait to see if and
when the parents will be able to have them in their care.” It is undisputed
that D.C. and T.R. have been in out-of-home care their entire lives. Nor is it
contested that Mother and Father have never parented their children
without close supervision and assistance. And as noted, they were not in
any position to do so at the time of trial. Though Mother and Father
themselves were confident that they were able to immediately parent the
children, the record is devoid of any evidence that any evaluator, provider,
counselor, parent aide, or other professional associated with this case
shared the parents’ opinion. To the contrary, the 2024 Bonding/Best
Interests Assessment reported that “despite participating in services, the
mother and father have not demonstrated significant behavioral change.”
This is reasonable evidence supporting the court’s finding that there is a
substantial likelihood Mother will not be capable of exercising proper and
effective parental care and control in the near future.

¶19 Mother argues she has been working hard and has made
substantial progress in addressing DCS’s concerns. She points to evidence
that she maintains appropriate housing, that she has “stable income”
through social security and disability income, and that she completed
courses in domestic violence, anger management, and parenting. Accepting
these assertions as true, Mother’s arguments, at most, highlight a contest in

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the evidence. The evidence and inferences supporting termination are
reasonable and are such as a reasonable person could accept as clear and
convincing. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478–79 ¶¶ 30–31. And we cannot reweigh
it, even though Mother sharply disputes the court’s findings. Alma S., 245
Ariz. at 151 ¶ 18.

B. Reasonable evidence supports the court’s best-interests
finding.

¶20 Mother further argues that insufficient evidence supports the
court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in D.C.’s and
T.R.’s best interests. To terminate a parent’s parental rights, in addition to
finding at least one statutory ground for termination, the court must also
find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the child’s
best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(a). We review a best-
interests finding for an abuse of discretion and reverse only if “no
reasonable evidence” supports the finding. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

¶21 Termination is in a child’s best interests if that child will either
benefit from termination or be harmed by continuing the parent-child
relationship. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13. The primary focus is on
“protecting a child’s interest in stability and security.” Demetrius L. v.
Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 15 (2016) (citation modified). Placement with one
who will adopt the child may support a best-interests finding. See Maricopa
Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 6 (1990).

¶22 Here, D.C. and T.R. have been with their current placement
their entire lives and that placement is willing to adopt them. This
uncontested evidence supports the court’s best-interests finding. Again,
though Mother asserts that other evidence supports that Mother is bonded
to the children, that is a dispute in the evidence, the balancing of which we
will not revisit. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 18. We see no error.

II. Father’s Due Process Rights Were Not Infringed.

¶23 We review constitutional issues de novo. Brenda D. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437, 442 ¶ 15 (2018). Due process requires notice and
an “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner[.]” Dep’t of Child Safety v. Carel G., 260 Ariz. 263, 270 ¶ 26 (App.
2025) (citation modified).

¶24 Here, Father contends his constitutional right to due process
was violated because the court “impermissibly conform[ed] the allegations

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to the evidence presented.” He objects to the court’s finding that Father’s
ongoing marijuana use was the cause of his inability to care for T.R. and
this constituted an implied amendment of the petition for termination to
include a substance abuse ground. He argues he did not have proper notice
that his marijuana usage was an issue in the termination proceedings
because DCS stopped requiring him to drug test, did not include a separate
substance abuse count in the petition for termination, and “only pleaded
that marijuana was an initial concern.” Not so.

¶25 DCS did not plead — and the court did not add, either
expressly or impliedly — a termination ground under A.R.S. Section 8-
533(B)(3) for substance abuse. Instead, the court proceeded exclusively on
the fifteen-months’ time-in-care ground under A.R.S. Section 8-533(B)(8)(c).

¶26 True, the court’s reasoning on this ground draws heavily
from evidence of Father’s and Mother’s severe marijuana use. But the
court’s analysis used that evidence to discuss what caused D.C. and T.R. to
be in out-of-home care, the impact the marijuana use has had on Father’s
and Mother’s inability to parent the children safely and independently, and
to gauge whether Father and Mother will be able to rectify the
circumstances that caused the children’s dependency in the near future.
These all relate to and support elements of the fifteen-months’ ground. It is
irrelevant that they might also have supported a finding of termination
under a separate substance-abuse ground. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

¶27 Nor did Father lack sufficient notice. As Father
acknowledges, the petition for termination states that his heavy marijuana
use was part of DCS’s initial concerns that led to T.R.’s out-of-home
placement. Father suggests that the phrasing “initial concern” indicates his
marijuana use was no longer any concern. This reading is inconsistent with
the context of the petition and the case’s long history and the evidence.

¶28 First, when read in context, the reference to “initial concern”
is properly understood as a temporal descriptor, not a limitation. DCS
noted that T.R.’s out-of-home placement began as a result of multiple
causes, including Father’s use of marijuana “several times per day.”
Because the later petition to terminate sought termination under A.R.S.
Section 8-533(B)(8)(c), DCS needed to prove Father was unable to remedy
the circumstances that caused T.R. to be in out-of-home care. Thus, Father’s
marijuana use, as a cause of T.R.’s removal, was directly relevant and at
issue. Inferring otherwise contradicts the main point of the text.

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¶29 Second, Father’s marijuana use has been a consistent concern
throughout T.R.’s dependency. It was repeatedly addressed as a source
problem that was preventing return of the children. NPP providers, DCS’s
case manager, the parents’ own counselors, and the Bonding/Best Interests
Assessment evaluator all referenced marijuana to some degree or another.
Given its centrality to the entire case, Father’s claim that he had no notice
that his heavy marijuana use continued to be a central issue in these
proceedings is not well-taken.

¶30 Moreover, Father did not raise his due process challenge
regarding notice to the juvenile court. As such, we review only for
fundamental error and Father bears the burden of showing both
fundamental error and prejudice. See Brenda D., 243 Ariz. at 447–48 ¶¶ 37–
38 (2018). Such prejudice must be proven affirmatively and cannot “rely on
speculation.” Id. at 448 ¶ 38.

¶31 Here, Father was able to testify at length about his marijuana
use, including to deny having a cannabis use disorder. Father’s counsel was
able to argue about his marijuana use in closing arguments. Father has not
affirmatively proven any prejudice to sustain his due process challenge.

¶32 The petition’s reference was sufficient to put Father on notice
that his marijuana use was at issue, he has failed to establish any prejudice,
and we perceive no due process violation.

CONCLUSION

¶33 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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