In RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO P.L.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO P.L.,
K.L., and D.L.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0200
FILED 07-31-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County
No. S1400JD202400004, S1400SV202400030
The Honorable Levi Gunderson, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Zachary Law Group, PLC, Mesa
By Jessica Zachary
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Laura J. Huff
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thuma delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO P.L., et al.
Decision of the Court

¶1 Kristina L. (Mother) challenges an order terminating her
parental rights to her children P.L., K.L. and D.L. 1 Because Mother has
shown no error, the order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Michael L. (Father) are the biological parents of
P.L., born in February 2023; K.L., born in December 2023; and D.L., born in
November 2024. In February 2024, the Department of Child Safety (DCS)
took temporary custody of P.L. and K.L. after receiving reports Mother was
unable to care for the children. DCS filed a dependency petition alleging
neglect. When the parents pled no contest, the superior court found the
children dependent and adopted a family reunification case plan. When
D.L. was born, DCS took the newborn into care and included D.L. in the
dependency.

¶3 DCS provided Mother with various services, including
individual parenting time supported by a parent aide, parental education
program, a psychological evaluation, referrals to housing and
transportation. Mother participated in some parenting time, a
psychological evaluation, and some parenting education, but refused other
services. Mother’s psychological evaluation confirmed Mother had a
mental disability and the court granted a request to have the case
designated under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

¶4 There are numerous other complicating factors. Mother and
Father have a significant history of domestic violence. Mother testified to at
least 100 instances of domestic violence and concerns about her safety.
Father obtained at least four orders of protection against Mother during the
dependency. Mother was arrested for domestic violence against Father.
Parents fled with P.L. to Florida, where law enforcement executed a pickup
order and returned the child to Arizona. Parents were arrested and charged
criminally for custodial interference. Mother also was incarcerated for
violating the conditions of her release in the criminal case.

1 The caption has been amended to safeguard the child’s identity pursuant

to Administrative Order 2013-0001.

2

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO P.L., et al.
Decision of the Court

¶5 In November 2024, DCS filed a termination petition that, as
amended, alleged neglect, mental illness and six-months time-in-care as to
Mother. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 8-533(B)(2), (3) & (8)(b) (2026).2 By
April 2025, Mother maintained that she would participate in family therapy
with Father but would not participate in any other services.
Communication with DCS also was an issue. DCS observed that, despite its
efforts, parents had made very little progress toward reunification.

¶6 A six-day adjudication hearing on the termination petition
was held from June through September 2025. In a 32-page order, the court
found DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds
for termination and found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
termination was in the children’s best interests. 3

¶7 This court has jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-
120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A) and Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 601-03.

DISCUSSION

¶8 As applicable here, to terminate parental rights, a court must
find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground in
A.R.S. § 8–533(B) has been proven, and must find by a preponderance of
the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child. See Kent K.
v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005). Because the superior court “is in
the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” this court will affirm
an order terminating parental rights as long as it is supported by reasonable
evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App.
2009) (citation omitted).

¶9 Mother does not challenge the superior court’s findings that
DCS met its burden of proof to show the statutory grounds alleged and best
interests for termination, which are supported by the trial evidence.
Instead, Mother argues that the court was required to hold DCS to a higher
standard of proof than it did given her mental disability. Mother argues
that “the standard of proof prior to terminating the parental rights of a

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

3 Although the parental rights of Father also were terminated, he is not a

party to this appeal.

3

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO P.L., et al.
Decision of the Court

parent with disabilities should be the same as” in cases governed by the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq.

¶10 Excerpting ICWA provisions regarding enhanced burdens of
proof that federal statute requires, Mother argues that her due process and
equal protection rights required DCS to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt”
that: (1) it “made active efforts to provide ‘remedial services’ and
‘rehabilitative programs’ targeted at preventing termination;” and (2)
“continued custody [by Mother] ‘is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child.’” Mother also argues her due process and
equal protection rights were violated when the superior court “failed to
find beyond a reasonable doubt the services and programs provided by
DCS were unsuccessful.” These arguments fail for several reasons.

¶11 Mother failed to raise these arguments in superior court,
meaning she has waived them on appeal. Cont’l Lighting & Contracting, Inc.
v. Premier Grading & Utils., LLC, 227 Ariz. 382, 386 ¶ 12 (App. 2011); Logan
B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 536 ¶ 9 (App. 2018). During trial,
Mother’s guardian ad litem stated that having the case designated under
the ADA does “not change any of the burdens that the State must meet.”
Even then, Mother made no objection or argument that the burdens were
different. By failing to raise these issues with the superior court, Mother has
waived them on appeal.

¶12 Although Mother references ICWA’s heightened standards,
she has not argued that ICWA applies to this case. Indeed, at trial and
without objection, the superior court found: “This is not an ICWA case,
that’s clear.” Moreover, Mother has not shown that the elevated burdens of
proof mandated by Congress in ICWA are constitutionally required.
Mother has made no showing that the enhanced ICWA standards of proof
apply to termination proceedings where a parent has a mental disability,
and Arizona law is to the contrary. In re J.C., 259 Ariz. 60, 69-75 ¶¶ 44–76
(App. 2024) (applying clear and convincing standard of proof for statutory
ground and preponderance of the evidence standard of proof for best-
interests finding to a parent with mental health issues); accord Brionna J. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 27 (2023) (similar). Thus,
notwithstanding Mother’s mental disability, the superior court properly
applied Arizona’s standards of proof, not the heightened standards that
Mother advocates. A.R.S. § 8-537(B); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(c).

4

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO P.L., et al.
Decision of the Court

¶13 The clear and convincing standard of proof satisfies due
process. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982); Alma S. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 9 (2018) (citing Santosky). Similarly,
Mother has shown no violation of the equal protection requirement that
“the law treat all similarly situated persons alike.” State v. Panos, 239 Ariz.
116, 118 ¶ 7 (App. 2016) (citation omitted). There is nothing in the record to
suggest that the court treated Mother differently from other parents in
termination cases.

¶14 On this record, the superior court properly found DCS proved
the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence and proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination was in the children’s best
interests. Because nothing more was required, and because the superior
court properly applied governing law, there was no error.

CONCLUSION

¶15 The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

5