In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.I. and N.I.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.I. and N.I.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0201
FILED 10-08-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS521090
The Honorable Justin Beresky, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

David W. Bell, Attorney at Law, Higley
By David W. Bell
Counsel for Appellant Father

Crystal D., Buckeye
Appellee Mother

Law Office of H. Clark Jones LLC, Mesa
By H. Clark Jones
Counsel for Appellees Children

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.I. and N.I.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Veronika Fabian and Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig
joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Shawn I. (“Father”) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights to his daughters. Because Father has not
shown that the court clearly erred, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Crystal D. (“Mother”) are the biological parents of
Amy, born in 2008, and Nina, born in 2009 (collectively, the “children”).1
Through a consent divorce decree, the parents were awarded joint legal
decision-making and equal parenting time. Father exercised his parenting
time under the decree for about 18 months, but the time he spent with the
children decreased substantially over the next few years. Between 2020 and
2025, the children interacted with Father in person four times, and he text-
messaged with Amy at times but that ended in 2023 when she stopped
responding.

¶3 Mother met her current husband (“Stepfather”) in 2019 at the
Arizona Department of Corrections, where she was working and he had
been incarcerated for many years. They married after his release from
prison in 2020, and Stepfather has assumed responsibility for supporting
the children, who now want to be adopted by him. The prospect of
adoption, however, is uncertain because Stepfather’s initial application for
a fingerprint clearance card was denied due to his criminal record. See
A.R.S. § 8-112(D)(1) (requiring a state and federal criminal records check for
a stepparent to adopt). He has appealed the denial but does not know how
long that process will take.

¶4 In April 2025, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s
parental rights based on abandonment, alleging he failed to provide
reasonable support or maintain regular contact with the children for five

1 We use pseudonyms to protect the children’s identities.

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years. The juvenile court promptly issued an order setting an initial hearing
and appointed counsel for the children. At the hearing, the court appointed
counsel to represent Father, and over his objection, the court ordered a
social study to be completed and filed with the court. See A.R.S. § 8-536(A)
(stating that after a termination petition is filed, the court “shall order” a
social study to be conducted and submitted before a hearing occurs).

¶5 Ashley Mahone, MS, of Hope Study LLC, conducted a joint
interview with Mother and Stepfather, and separate interviews with Father
and each of the children. Mahone summarized the interviews and
recommended that Father’s parental rights be terminated, noting in part
that “adoption could be pursued into adulthood if” Stepfather’s fingerprint
clearance card application “is denied and requires an appeal.” After the
social study was filed with the court, Father objected to admission of the
study on hearsay grounds unless Mahone testified at the termination
hearing and was subject to cross-examination.

¶6 At the hearing, the juvenile court received exhibits and heard
testimony from Mother, Stepfather, Amy, and Father. Father did not
subpoena Mahone to testify, nor did he object to the court considering the
social study. During trial, Father noted he had concerns about requiring his
daughters to testify, and he withdrew his objection to the social study
because it contained the children’s views on termination. The court
declined to allow Nina to testify, explaining in part that her testimony was
unnecessary because the court had “read the [social] study report,” and
“she ha[d] her attorney [] to advocate for her, as well.”

¶7 In its subsequent ruling, the court found Mother proved
abandonment by clear and convincing evidence, noting Father had “done
virtually nothing to provide reasonable support [or] maintain regular
contact” with the children. The court also found Mother proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights
is in the children’s best interests.

¶8 Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

A. Mootness

¶9 Counsel for the children asserts that because Amy turned 18
in January 2026, termination issues relating to her are moot. See Cardoso v.
Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 617, ¶ 5 (App. 2012) (recognizing that an appeal will be

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Decision of the Court

dismissed as moot when our review would have “no effect” on the parties).
But if Amy and Stepfather petitioned for adult adoption, the petition would
need to list Father if he maintained parental rights. See A.R.S.
§ 14-8101(F)(4) (requiring that a petition for adult adoption state “[t]he
names and addresses of any living parents . . . of the proposed adoptee.”).
Father may also be entitled to notice of the adoption if his rights were not
terminated. See Matter of Hirsch, 2 CA-CV 2023-0294, 2024 WL 3450903, at
*2, ¶ 6 (Ariz. App. July 17, 2024) (mem. decision) (assuming but not
deciding that a parent is an “interested person” entitled to notice of the
adult adoption under A.R.S. § 14-8101(D)). Consideration of Amy’s best
interests also weakens the mootness argument. See In re G.L., 259 Ariz. 463,
465, ¶ 7 (App. 2025) (recognizing the relevancy of a child’s best interests in
considering mootness of a termination proceeding). Thus, no portion of the
appeal is moot.

B. Best Interests

¶10 To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find by
clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground under A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B) exists, and by a preponderance of the evidence that termination
is in the child’s best interests. See Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz.
282, 286, ¶ 15 (App. 2016). Father challenges only the court’s finding that
termination of his parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

¶11 We accept the juvenile court’s factual findings if supported by
reasonable evidence, giving due regard to that court’s unique role in
weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility. Brionna J. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 (2023). We will uphold the court’s
legal conclusions unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 478–79, ¶ 31; see
also Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151, ¶¶ 17–18 (2018).

¶12 “We cannot assume that a child will benefit from a
termination simply because he has been abandoned.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv.
Action No. JS–500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5–6 (1990). “In a best interests inquiry,
however, we can presume that the interests of the parent and child diverge
because the court has already found the existence” of a statutory ground
justifying termination. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286, ¶ 35 (2005).

¶13 “Termination may be in a child’s best interests if either the
child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of
the relationship.” In re C.R., 256 Ariz. 170, 175, ¶ 24 (App. 2023) (citation
omitted). In evaluating best interests, a court must consider the totality of
the circumstances existing when the petition for termination is determined.

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Decision of the Court

Id. Such circumstances include whether the current placement meets the
child’s needs, whether the child is adoptable, and whether an adoption plan
is in place. Id. (citing Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3-4, ¶ 12 (2016)).
A court should also consider the child’s “interest in stability and security.”
See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 15.

¶14 Addressing best interests, the juvenile court ruled in part as
follows:

While both children wish to have Father’s rights be
terminated so they can be adopted by [Stepfather], that may
not be likely at this time. Given [Amy]’s age, an adoption
could not be conceivabl[y] completed by the time she turns 18
years of age. While there is still time for [Nina], [Stepfather]’s
fingerprint clearance was rejected based on old felony
convictions. The Court understands [he] is in the midst of an
appeal of that denial, [but] as the case now stands, he would
be unable to adopt.

However, it was expressed through [Amy]’s testimony that
both children also fear what would happen if Mother were to
die for some reason and they could be forced into the
household of their Father who they frankly do not feel they
know. They wish to remain with [Stepfather] regardless of
what happens to Mother and both children think termination
of Father’s parental rights would give them some sense of
permanency or at least reduce their fear of being forced to live
with Father.

...

While his finger-print clearance has not been approved[,] he
is willing to adopt and is meeting the children’s needs and
providing a stable, healthy environment and fostering a
relationship with the children that outside observers would
describe as that of a parent/child. In other words, in the last
several years [Stepfather] has done everything to create a
parent/child relationship with the children and filled in the
void left by Father’s abandonment. Denying the Petition
would be detrimental to the children because they would
continue to linger in the uncertainty of navigating an
existence of having an absentee father versus having

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Decision of the Court

[Stepfather] continue to foster and nurture the parent child
relationship.

¶15 Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion because
the record contains no evidence that an adoption was likely. See Titus S. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 370, ¶ 22 (App. 2018). Father claims the
juvenile court’s termination order sets a “frightening precedent” because it
would allow custodial parents “to weaponize the legal system against their
former spouse in cases where there is no adoption possible and no
suggestion of any danger to the children if a termination action is denied.”
Father also contends the court focused solely on the children’s concern that
they would be forced to live with him if Mother were to die. Father,
however, reads the court’s order too narrowly and he fails to address the
totality of the circumstances.

¶16 As the juvenile court recognized, Stepfather’s inability to
obtain clearance to proceed with adoption makes adoption at this time
uncertain. Yet absolute certainty is not required; instead, an adoption plan
can be sufficient. See In re M.L., 261 Ariz. 189, 196, ¶ 34 (App. 2025)
(explaining that “prospective adoptions are always contingent—no
adoptive parent can complete every step to adopt a child before
termination. . . . So we require no more than an adoption plan, which is just
that: a plan”). Also, as the social study recognized, the children can still be
adopted even after they become adults. See id. at 195, ¶ 30 (explaining that
in state-initiated and private terminations, “best interests may be met if a
petitioner proves a current adoptive plan exists for the child, or even that
the child is adoptable” (citation modified)).

¶17 The juvenile court also found that Stepfather is meeting the
children’s needs by providing them with a stable home environment, a
finding Father does not address. See In re C.R., 256 Ariz. at 175, ¶ 25 (“The
undisputed evidence shows that the children’s needs are being met in
[m]other’s care.”). Nor does Father dispute the children’s assertion that
“because Appellant had abandoned the children, his relationship with them
had suffered and deteriorated extensively.”

¶18 Moreover, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding
that denying Mother’s petition would be detrimental. In the social study,
which Father does not address, Mahone documented that Amy “doesn’t
believe Father knows her or knows anything about her,” she “does not want
to talk to Father or see him” and “if she had to stay with him long-term or
even one night, she would question her safety and be worried.” Nina
explained that Father “is essentially a stranger to her, . . . doesn’t know her

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.I. and N.I.
Decision of the Court

and he doesn’t know anything about her”; she was also “worried if
something happened to [Mother], [Father] would not be someone she
would want to talk to or live with.” Nina also said she would not feel safe
with Father. Given the children’s consent to the adoption process, their
“ages at the time of th[e] [social study] when considering their mental
health [and] stability,” and Father’s “inability to change his behavior in a
way that would repair his relationships” with the children, Mahone
concluded “it would be detrimental” to them to preclude Stepfather from
pursuing adoption.

¶19 At the termination hearing, Amy testified she would refuse
Father’s care “because I am finally at a place where I’m comfortable and
safe, and have a steady . . . path that [] I’m going on, [] I don’t want to
destroy that for [someone] that already had a chance.” Cf. In re C.R., 256
Ariz. at 176, ¶ 26 (affirming termination order where social worker testified
that reintroducing the father to the children would be traumatic for them);
Juvenile Action No. S–2460, 162 Ariz. 156, 158 (App. 1989) (concluding that
the “continuation of the parent-child relationship may have such negative
consequences for the child that severance is warranted even though an
adoptive placement is unavailable.”).

¶20 Mother testified that the children expressed fear about
Father’s custodial rights and they feel safe with Stepfather. She explained
that she wanted Stepfather to be able to communicate with the children’s
schools and medical providers. Mother also testified that termination of
Father’s parental rights would benefit the children by giving them “peace
of mind” while Stepfather’s appeal was pending. Based on the social study
and the testimony presented at the termination hearing, reasonable
evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that denying Mother’s
petition would be detrimental to the children’s best interests.

¶21 A court should also consider a parent’s rehabilitation efforts
in evaluating the child’s best interests. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 15.
Father acknowledged he had not paid child support or sought to enforce
his rights, but he claimed Mother had withheld the children from him and
when he was “done with these proceedings, [he was] going straight to
family court to file paperwork there.” Yet the record provides no indication
that Father made any meaningful efforts to enforce his parental rights. See
In re H.V., 1 CA-JV 23-0190, 2024 WL 1168559, at *3, ¶ 16 (Ariz. App. Mar.
19, 2024) (mem. decision) (concluding that a father “failed to meaningfully
pursue a relationship with his daughter: he never attempted to arrange
visitation, establish custody, or provide for [her] financially”).

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Decision of the Court

¶22 Finally, the juvenile court’s ruling would allow the children
to remain with Stepfather if something happens to Mother, as they consider
Stepfather to be a parent. Termination sustains the children’s ability to
continue to live in a stable, healthy environment. See In re M.L., 261 Ariz. at
196–97, ¶ 37. Considering the totality of the circumstances existing at the
time the juvenile court made its ruling, Father has not shown the court
clearly erred in granting Mother’s petition to terminate his parental rights. 2

CONCLUSION

¶23 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

2 Mother contends the court erred by declining to allow Nina to testify
at the hearing. Because she has not cross-appealed, we do not consider her
argument. See ARCAP 13(b)(2) (noting that appellate courts may change a
judgment “to reduce the rights of the appellant only if the appellee has filed
a notice of cross-appeal”).

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