In RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO P.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO P.C.,
X.C., and L.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0207
FILED 07-22-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County
No. S0900SV202400006
The Honorable Michala M. Ruechel, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Matthew Lara, Mesa
Counsel for Appellant Father

Aspey, Watkins & Diesel, PLLC, Flagstaff
By Zachary J. Markham
Counsel for Appellee Mother

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO P.C., et al.
Decision of the Court

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Father appeals the superior court’s order terminating his
parental rights to his children P.C., X.C., and L.C. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father were never married but lived together in
Phoenix when the twins P.C. and X.C. were born in 2016. Shortly after,
Mother and Father moved to Winslow with the children. Mother and Father
had L.C. in early 2017. In May 2017, they ended their relationship and the
three children remained with Mother in Winslow.

¶3 Mother petitioned for parenting time orders in 2019, and
Father was allowed two supervised visits per week. After Father failed to
fully exercise his time, Mother petitioned to amend his parenting time in
2020. The court ordered a progressive parenting plan, where Father would
have one supervised visit per week and time would be added if he
substantially exercised his time. Father failed to do so. He did not
consistently show up, rescheduled often, poorly communicated, and went
months without seeing the children.

¶4 In May 2022, Father took one of the children from Winslow to
Phoenix in violation of the parenting time order. The same day Father took
the child, Mother obtained an emergency order to have Father bring the
child back to Mother. Father did not return the child until a few days later.
A new parenting time order was entered, and Father was allowed one visit
per week with an agreed-upon supervisor.

¶5 In June 2022, when the children were being picked up for their
first visit with Father under the new parenting time order, Father did not
bring an agreed-upon supervisor. This led to a non-physical altercation
between Father and Mother’s boyfriend. Father then obtained a protective
order against Mother. This order prohibited Mother from contacting Father
except through attorneys, legal processes, and court hearings. Father
attempted to contact the children through Mother and third parties, but
Mother did not respond given concerns about violating the order. Father’s
attempts to contact the children stopped in 2023.

¶6 In March 2024, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s
parental rights to all three children, alleging abandonment. She alleged that
Father had not paid child support since 2019 and had not seen the children
for three or four years.

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Decision of the Court

¶7 During a court-ordered interview for a social study with a
court-appointed counselor, where Mother and the children were present in
person, but Father attended virtually, Father admitted to being charged
with domestic violence against Mother, but blamed “explosiveness” caused
by his bipolar disorder. Only one child appeared to recognize Father during
the interview. The court-appointed counselor noted Father’s minimal
relationship with the children and that Mother “provides a trusting and
loving environment” for the children. Based on Father’s lack of contact and
support, as well as his history of domestic violence, the court-appointed
counselor opined that it was in the children’s best interests for Father’s
rights to be terminated.

¶8 A one-day trial was held in September 2025, where the court
heard testimony from Mother, Father, and the court-appointed counselor.
The social study was admitted into evidence.

¶9 The court found that Mother had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the children under A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(1), based on Father’s failure to see or contact the children since
2023, to fully exercise his court-ordered parenting time, to file anything
with the court to exercise his parenting time, and to pay child support since
2019.

¶10 The court also found that Mother had proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination was in the best interests of
the children. It found that not terminating Father’s rights would be
detrimental to the children because they were currently stable and secure,
Father had unresolved issues with “explosiveness,” and Father failed to
follow court orders.

¶11 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-
120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶12 Father argues that the superior court erred by: (1) finding that
he abandoned the children; and (2) finding that termination was in the
children’s best interests.

¶13 When terminating parental rights, the superior court must
find: (1) a statutory ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear
and convincing evidence, and (2) that termination is in the children’s best
interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,

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245 Ariz. 146, 149–50, ¶ 8 (2018). We accept the superior court’s factual
findings if reasonable evidence and inferences support them. Brionna J. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 (2023) (quotations omitted). We
affirm the court’s legal conclusions unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 478–79,
¶ 31.

I. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding that Father
Abandoned the Children.

¶14 The superior court found Mother proved Father abandoned
the children under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). The statute defines abandonment as

the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to
maintain regular contact with the child, including providing
normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial finding
that a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and
communicate with the child. Failure to maintain a normal
parental relationship with the child without just cause for a
period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of
abandonment.

A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The party seeking termination has the burden of proving
these elements. In re B.W., 260 Ariz. 123, 130, ¶ 18 (2025). If a parent offers
controverting evidence or shows just cause for failing to maintain a normal
parental relationship with their children, abandonment will not be
presumed. Id. at ¶ 19. Even when a parent cannot exercise traditional
methods of bonding with his children, he must still “act persistently to
establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his
legal rights to the extent necessary.” Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196
Ariz. 246, 250, ¶ 22 (2000) (quotation omitted).

¶15 Father argues that the court erred in not considering: (1)
Mother’s obstruction with his parenting efforts; and (2) Father’s reasons for
not maintaining contact with the children after 2023. He alleges that his
depression, emotional trauma, bipolar disorder, PTSD, suspended drivers’
license, lack of vehicle, and financial hardship hindered his ability to file a
petition to enforce parenting time.

¶16 The superior court found that Father had abandoned his
children due to his lack of contact with them. The record supports the
court’s conclusion that Mother presented prima facie evidence of
abandonment. At trial, Mother testified that Father had not contacted the
children since 2022, except for once in 2024 when Father saw the children
virtually in order to complete the social study. Father did not send gifts,

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letters, or financially support the children during that time, had not paid
child support, and did not file a petition to enforce his parenting time.

¶17 Father did not show just cause for his abandonment of the
children. Contrary to Father’s assertion, the court did consider Mother’s
obstruction with his parenting time. Specifically, the court noted that
“Mother did obstruct Father’s attempts to see or speak to the children in
2022.” However, Father then stopped attempting to contact the children at
all.

¶18 Father testified that he had not filed any petitions with the
court because he was discouraged by Mother’s filings. But a parent “must
vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary,” Michael J., 196
Ariz. at 250, ¶ 22, and Father’s choice to forego filing because he did not
think he would prevail does not discharge that obligation, id. at 251, ¶ 25
(“The burden to act as a parent rests with the parent, who should assert his
legal rights at the first and every opportunity.”). Father’s other reasons for
not filing a petition similarly do not show just cause. Father did not
persistently attempt to establish a parental relationship with the children.
Id. at 250, ¶ 22. Although Father was dealing with personal issues, including
not having a vehicle or license, the record allowed the court to conclude he
failed to make even a minimal effort to maintain contact with his children.
Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 97 (1994) (“[W]e judge
abandonment by conduct, not by subjective intent.”).

¶19 The superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that Father had abandoned his children under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1).

II. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding that
Termination Was in the Children’s Best Interests.

¶20 Father argues that the court improperly relied on the same
facts supporting abandonment to support its findings that termination was
in the children’s best interests. He also contends that the evidence did not
show that it would be detrimental to the children if his rights were not
terminated.

¶21 When making a best interests inquiry, “the focus shifts to the
interests of the child as distinct from those of the parent.” Alma S., 245 Ariz.
at 150, ¶ 12. Termination is in the children’s best interests if they will benefit
from termination or will be harmed if termination is denied. Id. at ¶ 13.

¶22 Father provides no authority in support of his contention that
the statutory ground and best interests findings require separate evidence.

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Instead, we have held the opposite: “Courts should not ignore facts or
evidence supporting best interests just because they also support
abandonment—facts or evidence may support both.” In re M.L., 261 Ariz.
189, 197, ¶ 40 (App. 2025).

¶23 The superior court found that not terminating Father’s rights
would be detrimental to the children because Father committed domestic
violence against Mother, the children were doing very well in Mother’s
care, Father has failed to follow court orders, and “Father has not addressed
his issues that cause him to be ‘explosive.’”

¶24 The court’s findings are supported by the record. Father
admitted that he has significant behavioral health issues, including
“explosiveness” caused by bipolar disorder, but he is not being treated for
those issues. The social study determined that “[t]he children are
appropriately bonded with their mother, and she provides a trusting and
loving environment for them.” Mother said the children have been “doing
really well,” both in school and personally. Additionally, Father violated
court orders by taking a child to Phoenix for several days without
permission.

¶25 Therefore, the superior court did not err in finding that
termination would be in the best interests of the children.

CONCLUSION

¶26 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. Mother seeks an award
of attorneys’ fees under ARCAP 21(a). Because she does not state a statutory
basis, we deny her request. See Roubos v. Miller, 214 Ariz. 416, 420, ¶ 21
(2007) (noting that a party must state the statutory or contractual basis when
requesting attorneys’ fees). As the prevailing party, we award Mother her
costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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