In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.H.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS AS TO K.H.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0001
FILED 07-06-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD42811
The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Ingeet P. Pandya
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Public Advocate’s Office, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant Father

Maricopa County Legal Advocate’s Office, Phoenix
By Amanda L. Adams
Counsel for child K.H.

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.H.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David B. Gass1 delivered the decision of the court, in which
Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Father appeals the superior court’s order terminating his
parental rights to the child (born in 2024). Mother is not a party to this
appeal. Because reasonable evidence supports the order, the court affirms.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On appeal, the court views the facts in the light most
favorable to upholding the superior court’s findings. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 479 ¶ 32 (2023).

¶3 Father has a total of 10 children. Father and mother have 3
children together: a 4-year-old, a 3-year-old, and the child (who is 2 years
old). Father’s rights to the 4-year-old and the 3-year-old were terminated.
Father appealed that termination, and the court affirmed in January 26,
2026. See In re H.H., No. 1 CA-JV25-0118, 2026 WL 208403 (Ariz. App. Jan.
26, 2026) (mem. dec.). Father’s appeal here thus involves only the child.

I. Before the child was born, the Department removed the 2 other
children from father’s care.

¶4 Following the births of the 2 other children, the Department
took custody and petitioned for dependency, alleging neglect. The 2 other
children both tested positive for substances shortly after their births. The 3-
year-old child was born prematurely with special needs requiring several

1 Judge David B. Gass was a sitting member of this court when the matter

was assigned to this panel of the court. He retired effective June 30, 2026. In
accordance with the authority granted by Article VI, Section 3, of the
Arizona Constitution, and under A.R.S. § 12-145, the Chief Justice of the
Arizona Supreme Court has designated Judge David B. Gass as a judge pro
tempore in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of participating in the
resolution of cases assigned to this panel during his term in office and for
the duration of Administrative Order 2026-87.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.H.
Decision of the Court

months of hospitalization. The superior court ultimately found the 2 other
children dependent.

¶5 During the dependency, the Department provided father
with various services and submitted findings under the Adoption and Safe
Families Act (ASFA). Before the child was born, father made his sole
objection to ASFA findings. After that, father engaged in counseling and
completed some drug testing. But father missed other tests and consistently
tested positive for marijuana despite knowing his marijuana use—and how
it affected his ability to parent—concerned the Department. He also tested
positive for methamphetamines during a hair follicle test and failed to
complete substance abuse treatment. To his credit, father attended some
visits with the children. But he missed many, and of the ones he attended,
he cut many short. Though the Department repeatedly asked father to
attend appointments for the 3-year-old child with special needs, he
attended just 1 throughout the dependency.

¶6 The Department also twice referred father for a psychological
evaluation despite father skipping several appointments. In December
2023, father finally completed a psychological evaluation, which
highlighted several issues. Father shared his criminal history, including
time spent in jail for physical violence with former partners and others.
Father shared he diagnosed himself with lung cancer, and said he used
marijuana daily to treat it. But father never provided any records
supporting his alleged stage-3-lung-cancer diagnosis.

¶7 Over 1.5 years after petitioning for dependency, the
Department moved to terminate father’s parental rights. Though father
acknowledged his substance use throughout the dependency, he
repeatedly missed drug tests. Father conceded the Department referred him
for substance abuse treatment. Father completed intake appointments, but
never engaged in further services.

¶8 Based on the evidence, the superior court found by clear and
convincing evidence father was “not an appropriate caregiver and will not
be for the foreseeable future.” The superior court also found termination
was in the 2 other children’s best interests by a preponderance of the
evidence because they had bonded to their foster family. Termination
would allow the 2 other children to be adopted together into a supportive
and stable environment. The superior court thus terminated father’s
parental rights to the 2 other children.

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Decision of the Court

II. After the child was born, the conditions remained the same.

¶9 The child was born on February 18, 2024, while the
dependency for the 2 other children was pending. Because father had not
addressed the welfare risks raised in the dependency for the 2 other
children, the Department took the child into temporary custody and filed a
dependency petition. The superior court agreed, found the child dependent
as to father when father failed to appear for the pre-trial conference, and
adopted a case plan of family reunification.

¶10 After the child was born, the Department referred father for
services, including Nurturing Parenting Program, Family Connections,
Terros, PSI, Supervised Visitation Only, and a psychological evaluation. But
father remained disengaged. Though the Department made transportation
accommodations for each appointment, father missed “almost every
appointment [he was] scheduled for.”

¶11 Father’s mental health and parenting skills continued to pose
serious concerns. Father “display[ed] a continuing pattern of unpredictable
and dangerous behavior” when he “threatened and attacked” mother. The
Department referred father for individual counseling, but father never
engaged with it. And La Frontera (his self-referral for substance abuse
treatment) discharged father from counseling because he failed to engage
in services after the intake assessment.

¶12 The Department thus moved to terminate father’s parent-
child relationship with the child because nothing had changed. After the
Department moved to terminate, the Department did not make any new
referrals, and father did not take any new actions. The Department argued
father made “incredibly little progress towards reunification” and failed to
engage in the wide variety of referred services listed above. Father still had
not secured adequate housing and was “living illegally in a public park.”
Even after the Department offered 2 community housing options, father
chose to remain homeless.

¶13 Father’s behavior remained unchanged throughout 2025.
Father still smoked marijuana, refused to sign a release of information, and
never provided any documentation about his alleged stage-3-lung-cancer
diagnosis. Father also struggled to maintain a stable income, though he
claimed to “make several thousand dollars per week.” When the
Department’s child safety specialist tried to verify his claim, father did not
cooperate and replied:

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.H.
Decision of the Court

In my opinion my finances are only for the judge. It truthfully
isn’t any of your business. How I make my money and what
I spend it on. You[’re] not entitled to [any] of it. It’s not like I
had sex with you and you had my children. So [none] of my
financials are your concern.

¶14 The superior court held a contested termination adjudication
4 months after the Department moved to terminate. The superior court
found the Department proved 2 grounds by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) father could not remedy the neglect which caused the Department to
remove the child from his care after 15 months; and (2) the superior court
terminated father’s parental rights on the same grounds in a prior
proceeding. The superior court also found by a preponderance of the
evidence the termination was in the child’s best interests.

¶15 Father timely appealed. The court has jurisdiction under
Article VI, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 8-235.A, 12-
2101.A.1, and Rule 603(a), Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile
Court.

DISCUSSION

¶16 Father argues the superior court abused its discretion: (1)
when it found the Department made diligent efforts to reunify father with
the child; and (2) when it found father’s rights already had been terminated
on the same grounds. Because the court resolves the matter based on the
Department’s diligent efforts, the court will not address father’s second
issue on the prior termination ground.

¶17 The court reviews a termination order for abuse of discretion.
E.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 58 ¶ 9 (App. 2015). Abuse of
discretion is “an exercise of discretion which is manifestly unreasonable,
exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.” Williams v.
Williams, 166 Ariz. 260, 265 (App. 1990).

¶18 “The [superior] court, as the trier of fact in a termination
proceeding, is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the
parties, [and] judge the credibility of witnesses.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 4 (App. 2002). The court will not reweigh the
evidence or redetermine the credibility of witnesses on appeal. Alma S. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151–52 ¶¶ 19–20 (2018). Rather, the court
will affirm a termination order if reasonable evidence supports the superior

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.H.
Decision of the Court

court’s factual findings, and its legal conclusions are not clearly erroneous.
Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478–79 ¶¶ 30–31.

¶19 Under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(c), the superior court may terminate
parental rights when (1) the child has been in a court-ordered out-of-home
placement for a cumulative total period of 15 months or longer; (2) the
parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances causing the child to be
in an out-of-home placement; (3) there is a substantial likelihood the parent
will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and
control in the near future; and (4) the Department has made a diligent effort
to provide the parent with appropriate reunification services. To terminate
rights under the 15-month out-of-home placement ground, the Department
must prove by clear and convincing evidence it made “a diligent effort to
provide appropriate reunification services.” A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8; In re J.C., 259
Ariz. 60, 69 ¶ 39 (App. 2024) (citing Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
193 Ariz. 185, 190 ¶ 25 (App. 1999)).

I. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding the
Department made diligent efforts to reunify father.

¶20 Father argues the Department failed to provide him with
services intended to effect reunification. Specifically, father argues the
Department should have referred him for substance-abuse treatment and a
psychiatric evaluation after the Department moved to terminate his rights
to the child. The Department argues the superior court did not abuse its
discretion when it found the Department made diligent efforts to provide
appropriate reunification services and did not need to re-refer father based
on his history of non-compliance. The Department is correct.

¶21 The Department must make diligent efforts to preserve the
family relationship. See Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192 ¶ 33. The Department
“must provide a parent with the time and opportunity to participate in
programs designed to improve the parent’s ability to care for the child.”
Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 94 ¶ 20 (App. 2009). But the
Department need not provide every conceivable service or “undertake
rehabilitative measures that are futile.” Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192 ¶ 34.
And the Department is not obligated to leave the window of opportunity
for remediation open indefinitely. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568,
177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994).

¶22 From 2023 to the time of the termination adjudication here,
father was inconsistent in testing and ultimately completed just about 60%
of scheduled urinalysis tests. And the times he tested, he either tested

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.H.
Decision of the Court

positive for marijuana, or the test was inconclusive. True, marijuana is a
legal drug. But father told the Department, despite daily use of the mind-
altering drug, he had no action plan to care for the child when under the
influence. Father, after several years, could not develop an understanding
of how being under the influence affects his ability to parent effectively. The
Department was especially concerned about father’s lack of willingness to
mitigate the safety concerns revolving around his marijuana usage, stating
the child needs “a safe, sober, and stable caregiver.”

¶23 In response, the Department referred father to 2 providers for
substance abuse counseling (including Terros), and father self-referred to 1
provider. After father threatened to sue Terros, he received mental health
services through his self-referral to La Frontera. When La Frontera
discharged father for his lack of engagement, the Department referred him
yet again to another provider. In sum, the Department provided services
for over 20 months after the child was placed in temporary custody, 5
months longer than the 15-month threshold. The specialist concluded “it
does not appear that [father] is able or willing to make the behavior changes
necessary.” The superior court thus did not abuse its discretion when it
chose not to order the Department to re-refer him yet again for substance-
abuse treatment.

¶24 Father’s December 2023 psychological evaluation said “[i]t is
unlikely that available services and interventions will benefit [father] to the
degree that he could be entrusted with the care of a child.” The evaluation
also said it would be unlikely “that additional mental health and parenting
services arranged by DCS will have a beneficial impact.” The psychological
evaluation further deemed an additional referral for a psychiatric
evaluation unbeneficial “unless [father] is motivated to seek psychiatric
services and comply with any recommended treatment.” The August 2025
report made note of father’s disregard for his psychiatric care and the
related prescribed medications. Over a year after the birth of the child,
father remained disengaged, making a psychiatric-evaluation referral
unwarranted.

¶25 Further, father never objected to ASFA findings during the
child’s dependency and termination. The superior court ordered the
Department to submit ASFA findings 6 different times. True enough, before
the child was born, father objected once in September 2023. He claimed the
Department did not make diligent efforts to provide him with behavioral
health treatment, and the superior court agreed. After that time, the
superior court consistently made ASFA findings with no objection from
father. Ultimately, the superior court found the Department referred father

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.H.
Decision of the Court

or provided him over 10 different services. The specialist testified the
Department “provided every service in the book for a father to make the
changes.” Father thus consistently recognized the Department had made
diligent efforts since 2023.

¶26 At bottom, reasonable evidence shows the Department made
diligent efforts to provide reunification services to father after the birth of
the child. Father demonstrated a pattern of unreliability despite the
Department’s diligence. To the extent the Department’s efforts were to no
avail, the fault lies with father. The record thus supports the superior
court’s finding that further efforts by the Department would have been
futile. As a final point, the court ruled the Department made diligent efforts
to reunify father with the 2 other children and that ruling has become final.
See In re H.H., 2026 WL 208403, at *1. Because the court may affirm on the
15-month out-of-home ground, the court need not address the prior
termination ground. See Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43,
49 ¶ 14 (App. 2004).

CONCLUSION

¶27 The court affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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