In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.M.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.M.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0004
FILED 08-18-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD44705
No. JS22555
The Honorable Glenn A. Allen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Phoenix
By Linda A. Bergevin
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Ingeet Pandya
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Law Office of Joseph Ramiro-Shanahan PLLC, Scottsdale
By Joseph C. Ramiro-Shanahan
Counsel for Appellee A.M.

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.M.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Mother appeals the termination of her parental
rights to A.M. (“Child”). The evidence supports the juvenile court’s
conclusion that termination was warranted under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) and
in Child’s best interests. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Child was born substance-exposed in November 2024. At the
time, Mother was incarcerated, facing several felony charges.

¶3 When Child was discharged from the hospital, the
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took temporary custody of her and
petitioned for dependency based on Mother’s substance abuse and
incarceration. DCS also placed Child with a kinship foster placement—
Mother’s cousin—where she has remained throughout this case.

¶4 In March 2025, Mother was sentenced in her criminal case and
transferred to the Department of Corrections, with an expected release date
of January 2028.

¶5 At the initial dependency hearing, Mother requested DCS
consider resolving the dependency through a pre-adjudication
guardianship. Two weeks later, DCS reported to the court that it would not
agree to a guardianship, although it agreed to staff the issue again.

¶6 In May 2025, Mother pleaded no contest to the allegations in
the dependency petition, and the court adjudicated Child dependent as to
her. At the subsequent disposition hearing, the court granted DCS’s request
for a case plan of severance and adoption, over Mother’s objection. DCS
then moved to terminate her parental rights, alleging she had a history of
chronic substance abuse and that the length of her sentence would deprive
Child of a normal home for a period of years. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (4).

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.M.
Decision of the Court

¶7 At the first pretrial conference on the termination motion in
September 2025, Mother pleaded no contest to the allegations of the motion.
The court found she knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her
right to a trial. However, the court preserved her no contest plea and
continued her initial termination hearing so the court could address her
parental rights, and the rights of the alleged fathers, together in a
subsequent hearing.1

¶8 Mother attended the continued termination hearing in
November of 2025. The court confirmed she wished to maintain her no
contest plea and then proceeded with the hearing. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to Child on the
substance abuse and length-of-incarceration grounds.

¶9 Mother appealed and we have jurisdiction. See Ariz. Const.
art. VI, § 9; A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1); A.R.S. § 8-235(A); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.
603(a)(5).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Mother argues the juvenile court erred by terminating her
parental rights without making findings about whether a permanent
guardianship was available to Child as a less restrictive option than
termination.

¶11 The juvenile court may terminate a parent-child relationship
if clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one statutory ground
for termination and a preponderance of the evidence shows termination is
in the child’s best interests. Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574,
579, 583 ¶¶ 8, 26 (2021); A.R.S. § 8-533(B). When a parent does not contest
the allegations of the termination motion, our review is limited to: 1) the
existence of a factual basis for termination, and 2) the adequacy of the
factual findings supporting termination. In re E.M., ___ Ariz. ___, ___ ¶ 11,
590 P.3d 268, 272–73 (App. 2026); see also Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(e)(3)-(4),
(h)(2)(A) (requiring “specific findings of fact in support of the termination
of parental rights”); A.R.S. § 8-538(A) (requiring a termination order to “be
in writing” and to “recite the findings on which the order is based”).
However, we review questions concerning the interpretation and
application of A.R.S. § 8-533 de novo. Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 580 ¶ 10.

1 The juvenile court also terminated the alleged fathers’ parental rights, but

they are not parties to this appeal.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.M.
Decision of the Court

I. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Finding That
DCS Proved the Substance Abuse Ground for Severance.

¶12 Mother did not dispute the substance abuse ground in
juvenile court. And the evidence supports a finding that her history of
substance abuse renders her “unable to discharge parental responsibilities”
and reasonable grounds exist “to believe that the condition will continue
for a prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). The DCS case
manager testified about Mother’s history of substance abuse, her arrests on
drug-related charges, and her continued use of substances while
incarcerated. Although rehabilitative services were available to Mother, she
provided no evidence she had completed them. The case manager opined
that, without such treatment, Mother’s substance abuse would likely
continue for a “prolonged indeterminate period.” DCS’s court reports,
which were admitted as exhibits, also showed Mother tested positive for
fentanyl, methadone, and amphetamines upon her admission to the
hospital to give birth.

¶13 Relying on Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470
(2022), Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to consider
and make findings about the availability of a guardianship in its analysis
under the substance abuse ground. But the ground for severance at issue in
Timothy B. was length-of-incarceration, and the holding in that case related
to a consideration of whether the incarcerated parent could contribute to
rather than detract from the stable environment being provided by a
permanent guardian. See 252 Ariz. at 477 ¶¶ 27 -28. That analysis has not
been applied to the chronic substance abuse ground for severance, and we
decline to do so here. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s conclusion
that DCS proved the substance abuse ground by clear and convincing
evidence.

¶14 Because we affirm on the substance abuse ground, we need
not address Mother’s arguments about the length-of-incarceration ground.
See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 578 ¶ 5 (App. 2017).

II. The Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding that
Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights Was in Child’s Best
Interests.

¶15 Mother also argues that the juvenile court should have
addressed the availability of a permanent guardianship in its best-interests
findings. But although the juvenile court must consider all the
circumstances in determining a child’s best interests, the court need not list

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.M.
Decision of the Court

every fact it considered. Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445,
451–52 ¶ 19 (App. 2007). And we presume the juvenile court considered all
of the evidence before making its ruling. See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51,
55–56 ¶ 18 (App. 2004).

¶16 The record in this case supports the juvenile court’s best
interests finding. The case manager testified that Child’s foster parent was
meeting all of Child’s needs and wished to adopt her. The case manager
opined that a guardianship was not in Child’s best interests because of
Mother’s long history of substance abuse, a concern that Mother would
return to abusing substances after her release from prison, and Child’s
established stability in the foster home. Finally, the case manager reported
that Mother and the foster parent had executed a post-adoption contact
agreement, which would enable Mother to have contact with Child after
her release from prison.

¶17 The juvenile court may find that termination of parental
rights is in a child’s best interests when the current placement meets the
child’s needs and the child’s prospective adoption is likely to occur.
Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3–4 ¶ 12 (2016). Here, the juvenile
court found Child is placed with a family member, and placement “is
providing the child with a loving and nurturing home environment and the
child has been thriving in her care.” The court also found “[p]lacement
intends to proceed to adoption, which will provide the child with the added
benefit of stability and permanency.” Because these findings are legally
sufficient and supported by the record, the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights.

CONCLUSION

¶18 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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