In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.M.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.M.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0019
FILED 08-28-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD41336
The Honorable Michael Rassas, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Barreda Law, PLLC, Gilbert
By Bonnie Platter
Counsel for Appellants

Robert D. Rosanelli, Phoenix
Counsel for Appellees/Intervenors

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Autumn Spritzer
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.M.
Decision of the Court

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Phil and his stepmother, Ann,1 unsuccessfully moved to
intervene in this termination of parental rights proceeding. They appeal
from the order denying their motion for permissive intervention. Because
they have shown no abuse of discretion, the order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 S.M. was born in May 2020 to Mother. Days later, Mother and
C.M. signed an acknowledgement of paternity (AOP), stating C.M. was the
child’s father. The AOP was then used to obtain a birth certificate for S.M.,
also listing C.M. as the child’s father. The AOP was filed with the Arizona
Department of Economic Security, giving it “the same force and effect as a
superior court judgment.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 25-812(D)(2026).2 The
AOP was never set aside, making C.M. was the legal father of the child until
C.M.’s paternal rights were terminated.

¶3 At some point, Phil lived with Mother and the child. In
September 2021, Phil stabbed Mother more than a dozen times in front of
the child. When a neighbor found the 14-month-old child covered in blood
and crying, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) took custody of the child
and filed a dependency petition in October 2021. The court found the child
dependent as to C.M. in December 2021, and as to Mother in March 2022.
Although the record is unclear, Phil apparently was found guilty of
stabbing Mother, and was in prison until sometime in 2024.

¶4 At the time the dependency petition was filed, C.M. was
unwilling to parent, claiming he was not the child’s father.3 Mother claimed
that Phil was the child’s biological father.

1 Given confidentiality concerns, the court uses pseudonyms throughout.
2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
3 The dependency petition alleged that C.M. had taken “an at home

paternity test and found out that he was the biological father of the child in
September 2021.” Although the superior court found C.M. was the child’s
father, on appeal, Phil alleges this allegation was a typographical error.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.M.
Decision of the Court

¶5 Initially, the court ordered DCS to facilitate paternity testing
and authorized an amended dependency petition to add Phil as a potential
father. Those orders were either rescinded or stayed because the six-month
period for C.M. to challenge the AOP had expired and C.M. failed to
provide any facts showing the AOP was fraudulent. C.M. took no action to
disestablish paternity, even though ordered to do so by the court.

¶6 In September 2024, finding C.M.’s paternity had been
established, the court terminated his parental rights in an order that was
not appealed. In April 2025, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights,
a ruling affirmed on appeal in November 2025. Neither C.M. nor Mother
are parties to this appeal.

¶7 When considering possible placements for the child, the
superior court directed DCS to evaluate Ann. After a home study, in
February 2022, DCS rejected Ann as a placement, given that her significant
other had been convicted of reckless homicide.

¶8 In August 2024, after the dependency had been pending for
nearly three years, Phil moved to intervene, claiming he was the child’s
biological father and was “eager to establish paternity,” adding that he had
been released from prison earlier in 2024. When terminating C.M.’s parental
rights in September 2024, the court denied Phil’s motion to intervene. Phil
did not appeal from that ruling.

¶9 In November 2024, Ann moved to intervene. The court denied
that motion in February 2025. In May 2025, Ann moved to reconsider that
February 2025 denial, which the court denied in June 2025. Ann did not
appeal from either of those rulings.

¶10 From the record presented, Phil never filed a notice of claim
of paternity expressing a willingness and intent to support the child and
never sought to comply with the requirements of the putative fathers
registry. See A.R.S. § 8-106.01; see also A.R.S. § 8-106.01(F) (“Lack of
knowledge of the pregnancy is not an acceptable reason for failure to file.”).
Sometime in 2023, Phil filed a family court case. In August 2025, Phil
obtained family court orders for paternity testing and for the placement to
cooperate with that testing. In September 2025, Phil lodged those orders in
this juvenile court matter. Because juvenile court orders “take precedence
over any order of any other court of this state,” A.R.S. § 8-202(F), the
juvenile court found the family court orders were not valid, and the family
court proceeding apparently was dismissed.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.M.
Decision of the Court

¶11 In December 2025, Phil and Ann filed a joint motion seeking
permissive intervention. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(a)(2). Phil claimed that
he had a right to establish paternity, stating that Mother and Phil had
“completed a home paternity test” confirming Phil was S.M.’s biological
father. The motion, however, did not attach any paternity test results. Citing
A.R.S. § 25-812(E) and Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 85(b), Phil
claimed he was an interested party who could challenge the AOP at any
time by showing fraud on the court. After citing cases applying those
provisions, Phil discussed Juvenile Court Rule 113(b), listing factors
applicable to determining whether permissive intervention “would be in
the child’s best interests.” The motion then argued, from Ann’s perspective,
why she believed those same best interests factors should allow her to
permissively intervene. DCS filed a response and objection to the motion to
intervene. In January 2026, the superior court denied the joint motion for
permissive intervention. Phil and Ann appealed from that January 2026
denial. In February 2026, S.M. was adopted and the dependency was
dismissed.

DISCUSSION

I. Appellate Jurisdiction.

¶12 DCS argues that appellate jurisdiction is lacking because the
superior court denied the previous motions to intervene. Absent good
cause, juvenile appeals must be filed within 15 days after the entry of the
final order being appealed. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 603(a)(1)(A), (5)(A). Phil and
Ann timely appealed from the January 2026 denial of their December 2025
motion to intervene. Accordingly, although this court lacks appellate
jurisdiction over the previous denials of their motions to intervene, this
court has appellate jurisdiction over their appeal from the January 2026
denial pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S.
§§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A) and 12-2101(A) and Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 601-03.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the
December 2025 Motion to Intervene.

¶13 Phil and Ann cite no legal authority supporting their
arguments that the superior court erred in denying their December 2025
motion to intervene. That December 2025 motion cited Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.
113(b) allowing for permissive intervention and applied the enumerated
factors. But their appellate briefing fails to cite Rule 113, apply the
permissive intervention factors. or argue how the superior court erred in
denying their motion. That failure constitutes a waiver. See MacMillan v.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.M.
Decision of the Court

Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 591 ¶ 33 (App. 2011); ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A). Waiver
notwithstanding, they have shown no error in the superior court denying
their December 2025 motion to intervene.

¶14 This court reviews the denial of a motion for permissive
intervention for an abuse of discretion. See Bechtel v. Rose, 150 Ariz. 68, 72
(1986) (juvenile court case applying Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(b), the civil
permissive intervention counterpart to Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(a)(2) & (b));
Allen v. Chon-Lopez, 214 Ariz. 361, 364 ¶ 9 (App. 2007) (citing Bechtel).
Whether to grant permissive intervention requires the court to “determine
whether intervention would be in the child’s best interests,” based on eight
enumerated factors. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(b). On the record presented,
Appellants have shown no abuse of discretion.

A. Phil Has Shown No Abuse of Discretion in the Denial of
His Request for Permissive Intervention.

¶15 Starting with Phil, relevant factors include the nature and
extent of his interest and whether his interest or position would be
adequately represented by the existing parties; whether he is the child’s
relative, member of the child’s extended family or a person with a
significant relationship with the child; and whether his intervention will
significantly contribute to the full development of the underlying issues
and the just and equitable resolution of the proceeding. See Ariz. R.P. Juv.
Ct. 113(b)(1), (2) & (7). Although Phil claimed to be S.M.’s biological father,
he had years to support that claim with objective evidence and failed to do
so. He never provided or disclosed purported paternity test results. Nor did
he support his intervention motion with evidence supporting any claim
that the AOP constituted fraud on the court. Although there were no other
parties remaining in the proceeding adequately representing his position
by December 2025, Phil failed to show that he had any cognizable interest
in the proceedings. Moreover, after stabbing S.M.’s Mother in September
2021, there is no indication that Phil had any significant relationship before
filing the December 2025 motion.

¶16 Nor do “the timeliness of the motion” and “whether
intervention will unduly prolong or delay the case” show error. Ariz. R.P.
Juv. Ct. 113(b)(5) & (6). By the time of the December 2025 motion to
intervene: (1) the dependency had been pending for more than four years;
(2) S.M. had been in the same foster placement for nearly four years; (3)
Phil’s prior motion to intervene filed more than a year earlier had been
denied without seeking appellate review; (4) the parental rights of C.M. and
Mother had been terminated; (5) Phil’s family court order for paternity

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.M.
Decision of the Court

testing was invalidated given the ongoing juvenile case; and (6) S.M.’s
adoption was scheduled for February 2026. Allowing Phil to intervene at
that time to try to show the AOP was fraudulent and prove his own
paternity and then proceed with the dependency would have prolonged
the case, perhaps for perhaps years. And Phil’s motion to intervene
acknowledged that he had known of the paternity issue “for years” and that
intervention “will delay an adoption.” Phil asserted – without regard to the
best interests of S.M. – that he was “an innocent party,” not constrained by
time limits. Notwithstanding that approach, the superior court was not
required to excuse the delay in Phil seeking to intervene and the delay
granting intervention would have caused.

¶17 Turning to the remaining factors, there is no indication that
Phil asked that DCS consider him as placement or that he sought to file a
motion for change of physical custody. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(b)(3) &
(4). And Phil cited no “other factors” that the court should find appropriate
in addressing intervention request. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(b)(8). On this
record, Phil has failed to show that the superior court abused its discretion
in applying the Rule 113(b) factors to conclude that granting his request
would not be in the child’s best interests. See Allen, 214 Ariz. at 364 ¶ 9
(citing cases). Nor do his other arguments on appeal show error.

¶18 Phil argues that he should be allowed to establish paternity
and to challenge the AOP. Nothing prevented Phil from pressing such
challenges during the several years the dependency was pending. Yet he
failed to do so. The AOP establishes paternity, A.R.S. § 25-812(A)(1); see also
Alvarado v. Thomson, 240 Ariz. 12, 15 ¶ 12 (App. 2016) (similar), and “is
presumed valid and binding until proven otherwise,” Andrew R. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 453, 457 ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (citation omitted).
None of the signers to the AOP timely challenged it, and the time for such
a challenge has passed. See Alvarado, 240 Ariz. at 15 ¶ 13; A.R.S. § 25-812(H).
Nor has Phil initiated a challenge to the AOP, or even provided admissible
evidence (as opposed to unverified argument) supporting such a challenge.
See Johnson v. Edelstein, 252 Ariz. 230, 233 ¶ 14 (App. 2021); Garcia v. Ison, 260 Ariz. 429, 433 ¶ 14-15 (App. 2025).

¶19 Citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), Phil argues his
due process rights were violated because he was unable to “assert[] his
paternal rights.” As noted above, however, Phil never filed a proceeding
challenging the AOP. Nor has he proffered any evidence supporting his
paternity claim during the years of the pendency proceeding, which started
when he repeatedly stabbed the child’s Mother. See In re Appeal in Pima
Cnty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 93-94 (1994)

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.M.
Decision of the Court

(“Although parents with an existing parental relationship, either in fact or
law, are entitled to the highest constitutional protection, an unwed father
must first take steps to establish a parent-child relationship before he may
attain the same protection.”); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t. of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz.
246, 251 ¶ 25 (2000 (noting the “burden to act as a parent rests with the
parent, who should assert his legal rights at the first and every
opportunity”).

¶20 On this record, Phil has shown no abuse of discretion in the
superior court denying his December 2025 motion for permissive
intervention.

B. Ann Has Shown No Abuse of Discretion in the Denial of
Her Request for Permissive Intervention.

¶21 Ann argues the superior court erred in denying her motion to
intervene, adding DCS never complied with an order to evaluate her as a
placement. As noted above, however, DCS considered her as a placement,
but rejected that possibility. Moreover, Ann has not shown the superior
court erred in denying her request to be a placement, given her partner who
lived in her home was convicted of committing a violent crime, thereby
precluding her as placement. See A.R.S. §§ 41-1758.07(B)(3); 8-509(C).
Although Ann did seek to be placement and to have physical custody of the
child, and her intervention might not have delayed the proceedings as
much as Phil’s would have, see Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(b)(3), (4) & (6), those
differences did not require the court to grant her motion to intervene.

¶22 Ann provides no authority supporting her argument that the
superior court was required to make specific findings of fact in denying her
motion to intervene. Such a ruling is not made as a finder of fact, like the
cases upon which Ann relies. See Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz.
532, 537-38 ¶¶ 13-15 (App. 2018) (requiring specific factual findings
supporting termination of parental rights); Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128,
132-33 (App. 1990) (requiring specific factual findings supporting child
support and spousal maintenance awards in family court). Nor does Ann’s
reliance on Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 317(a)(2), which describes the basis for
moving to amend a final order in juvenile court, support her argument.

¶23 On this record, Ann has shown no abuse of discretion in the
superior court denying her December 2025 motion for permissive
intervention.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.M.
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶24 The order is affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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