In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.K.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.K.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0021
FILED 07-09-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD536078
The Honorable Ronee Korbin Steiner, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of H. Clark Jones, LLC, Mesa
By H. Clark Jones
Counsel for Appellant James W.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Marika J. Hodge
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda Adams
Counsel for Appellee K.K.

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.K.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 James W. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental
rights to K.K. (“Child”). Because the superior court properly found
termination warranted under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 8-
533(B)(4) and Child’s best interests, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Child was born substance-exposed to Nadia K. (“Mother”) in
late 2024. The superior court found Child dependent as to Mother due to
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Mother’s drug use and neglect and committed him to the care of the
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”), which placed him with a foster family.

¶3 Mother initially did not provide DCS any information on
Father, and DCS had to obtain Father’s name from other sources. DCS
learned that Father was incarcerated, but without a date of birth or any
other identifying information DCS was initially unable to locate him. DCS
eventually determined that Father was convicted of aggravated assault and
possession or use of narcotic drugs, began serving a prison sentence in
December 2024, and is projected to be released in March 2027.

¶4 In April 2025, DCS located Father and amended the
dependency petition to include him. A DNA test confirmed Father’s
paternity, and in July 2025 the court adjudicated Father as Child’s parent.
The court found Child dependent as to Father due to Father’s incarceration,
set a case plan of family reunification, and ordered DCS to provide Father
with visitation and to assess Father’s recommended relative placement.

¶5 Weekly virtual visitation with Child began in August 2025
while Father was incarcerated at a prison in Eloy. From the start, there were
disruptions and missed visits due to faulty video connection links sent by
the prison. There was also a scheduling issue after Father was moved

1 Mother’s parental rights to Child were previously terminated. She is not
a party to this appeal.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.K.
Decision of the Court

within the prison, though this was resolved after communication between
the DCS case manager and the prison. Father also appeared late to or failed
to attend several of the scheduled visitation times. Father was transferred
to a new correctional facility in January 2026, and his attorney reported that
the new facility was much easier to work with.

¶6 In September 2025, DCS successfully requested, over Father’s
objection, that the case plan be changed to severance and adoption due to
the length of Father’s incarceration and Mother’s lack of engagement with
DCS. DCS moved to terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights as to
Child later that month. As to Father, DCS alleged that his sentence was of
such a length as to deprive Child of a normal home under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(4).

¶7 Father opposed the motion to terminate and moved to grant
custody of Child to paternal cousins who lived in Colorado (“Cousins”).
Cousins also unsuccessfully moved to intervene in the termination case.

¶8 The superior court held a termination adjudication hearing in
January 2026. After the hearing, the court terminated Father’s parental
rights as to Child on the length-of-incarceration ground. See A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(4). The court found DCS made reasonable and diligent efforts to
provide Father with appropriate reunification services and found DCS
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in Child’s
best interests. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Soon after, the court denied Father’s
motion to grant custody of Child to Cousins on several grounds, including
that Father was no longer a party to the custody proceeding because his
rights were terminated.

¶9 Father timely appealed the termination and the denial of the
motion for change of custody. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-
235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1), (2).

DISCUSSION

¶10 To terminate parental rights, the superior court must find by
clear and convincing evidence that a ground for termination exists under
A.R.S. § 8-533(B) and must find by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination serves the child’s best interests. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
245 Ariz. 146, 149-50, ¶ 8 (2018). On review, we must accept the superior
court’s factual findings provided they are supported by reasonable
evidence and inferences. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478,
¶ 30 (2023). We do not reweigh the evidence; instead, we defer to the
superior court’s determinations on conflicting evidence and witness

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.K.
Decision of the Court

credibility. Id.; Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 18. We will affirm the superior
court’s legal conclusions regarding a statutory basis for termination unless
they are clearly erroneous. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478-79, ¶ 31.

¶11 Father argues the superior court erred by finding termination
warranted under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). Section 8-533(B)(4) provides for
termination of an incarcerated parent’s parental rights “if the [felony]
sentence of that parent is of such length that the child will be deprived of a
normal home for a period of years.” The parent’s physical absence does not
itself deprive the child of a “normal home.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 476-77, ¶¶ 24-27 (2022). A “normal home” can consist
of “a stable and long-term family environment outside a foster care
placement, where another parent or a permanent guardian resides and
parents the child, and where the incarcerated parent affirmatively acts to
maintain a relationship with the child that contributes to rather than
detracts from the child’s stable, family environment.” Id. at 477, ¶ 27.

¶12 Whether the child will be deprived of a “normal home” for
years is not subject to a bright-line rule; each case must be considered on its
facts. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251, ¶ 29 (2000).
The superior court should consider all relevant factors, including, but not
limited to:

(1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship
existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which
the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured
during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the
relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that
incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the
length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent
[or permanent guardian] to provide a normal home life, and
(6) the effect of the deprivation of a parental presence on the
child at issue.

Id. at 251-52, ¶ 29 (as modified by Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 477, ¶ 27). No one
factor is determinative, and termination may be warranted even if multiple
factors favor continuing the parental relationship. Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579, ¶ 9 (2021).

¶13 Father challenges the superior court’s findings under two of
the Michael J. factors: the degree to which the parent-child relationship can
be continued and nurtured; and the availability of a permanent guardian to
provide a normal home life. He does not challenge the court’s findings

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.K.
Decision of the Court

under the other four factors and thus concedes the accuracy of those
findings on appeal. See Britz v. Kinsvater, 87 Ariz. 385, 388 (1960).

I. The degree to which the parent-child relationship can be continued
and nurtured.

¶14 Father contends the court abused its discretion in finding that
termination was warranted when DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to
provide reunification services. Under the second Michael J. factor, DCS
must aid in continuing the parent-child relationship by making reasonable
efforts to provide reunification services if an incarcerated parent requests
those services and providing the services will not endanger the child. Jessie
D., 251 Ariz. at 582, ¶ 21. DCS need not provide futile efforts, only those
“with a reasonable prospect of success.” Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999). The court may also consider that
incarceration will, as a practical matter, typically preclude all but minimal
visitation. Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 451, ¶ 17 (App.
2007).

¶15 Father argues that while DCS provided Father with virtual
visits, it never offered to provide him with in-person visits or any other
reunification services. However, Father objected only once, in October
2025, to a finding that DCS was making reasonable efforts, and the record
does not reflect that Father requested that DCS provide in-person visits or
additional services. By failing to promptly bring these concerns to the
superior court’s attention, Father waived the right to argue for the first time
on appeal that other services should have been offered. See Shawanee S. v.
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179, ¶ 18 (App. 2014).

¶16 Waiver aside, the court also found that it was reasonable for
DCS to offer Father visitation only after paternity was established, that the
lapse of time to establish paternity was due to Father’s incarceration, and
that Father’s incarceration prevented him from having access to in-person
visits and additional services. Father contends that the virtual visits were
inadequate and that DCS refused to work with Father’s prison to resolve
the scheduling issues. The superior court did acknowledge the visitation
issues but found that the scheduling conflicts were mostly the fault of the
Arizona Department of Corrections rather than DCS. The court may
consider practical problems such as these when analyzing whether the
parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured. See Christy C., 214
Ariz. at 451, ¶ 17 (“The court can certainly consider that incarceration will
as a practical matter typically preclude all but minimal visits.”).

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.K.
Decision of the Court

¶17 The superior court’s findings are supported by reasonable
record evidence and so we defer to the superior court’s conclusions in its
role as factfinder. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478, ¶ 30. The court did not err
in finding that DCS made reasonable efforts to provide reunification
services to Father.

II. The availability of a permanent guardian to provide a normal home.

¶18 Father also contends that the superior court failed to consider
placing Child in a guardianship with Cousins as an alternative to foster
placement. The superior court is required to consider whether a permanent
guardianship could provide a child with a “normal home” while a parent
is incarcerated. Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 270, ¶ 28. In making this
assessment, the court should consider: “whether another person is willing
to be the child’s permanent guardian”; whether “the grounds for a
permanent guardianship exist, including that a guardianship would be in
the child’s best interests”; and “whether the incarcerated parent could
contribute to rather than detract from the stable, family environment
provided by the permanent guardian.” Id. at ¶ 27.

¶19 Contrary to Father’s argument, the court considered and
addressed the required factors. Father recommended that Cousins serve as
a potential placement, and the court considered Cousins’ viability as
permanent guardians. Cousins were willing to serve in that role. However,
the court found that establishing a guardianship with Cousins would not
be in Child’s best interests. The court heard and credited evidence that
Cousins had substance-abuse, family-relationship, and mental-health
concerns that would keep them from being an appropriate placement for
Child. The superior court also found that Child had been with his current
placement since the beginning of the case, that Child saw the current
placement as a parental figure, and that removing Child from the placement
would cause him trauma. The court further noted that Father has not cared
for or provided for Child’s needs during his incarceration. Father had
opportunities to involve himself further in Child’s life, as DCS provided
Father with the opportunity to send Child letters or gifts while Father was
incarcerated, but Father did not do so.

¶20 The superior court appropriately considered a guardianship
with Cousins as an alternative to foster placement and reasonable evidence
supported the court’s decision not to establish the guardianship. The court
also found that Child’s best interests would be served by remaining with
his current placement, and as Father does not challenge this finding, we
need not address it.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.K.
Decision of the Court

¶21 Reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s findings
on the two Michael J. factors Father challenged, and Father raised no
arguments on the other four factors. The court therefore did not err in
concluding that Father’s incarceration would deprive Child of a “normal
home” for a period of years. Father does not raise, and therefore has
waived, any challenge to the superior court’s finding that termination
serves Child’s best interests. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz.
576, 577, ¶ 1 (App. 2017).

CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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