in Re Dependency as to A.M.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO A.M.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0022
FILED 07-31-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD45270
The Honorable Katherine Cooper, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Robert D. Rosanelli
Counsel for Appellant Takiyah M.

Denise L. Carroll Esq., Scottsdale
By Denise Lynn Carroll
Counsel for Appellant Ali M.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Anna V. Vaszar
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Burguan Law PLLC, Phoenix
By Jessica J. Burguan
Counsel for Appellee A.M.

IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO A.M.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Takiyah M. (“Mother”) and Ali M. (“Father”) appeal the
juvenile court’s order adjudicating their infant son, A.M., dependent as to
them after he suffered two fractures while in their care. Mother argues the
record didn’t establish that the parents had caused A.M.’s injuries and that
the parents had successfully participated in reunification services. Father
argues the record didn’t show he caused A.M.’s injuries, the court
improperly required him to explain how the injuries occurred, and the
record showed no threat to A.M.’s safety because A.M. had returned home
by the time of the adjudication hearing. Because reasonable evidence
supports the juvenile court’s order, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. A.M. Sustains Two Unexplained Fractures While in His
Parents’ Care.

¶2 A.M. was born in May 2025. When he was seven weeks old,
Mother took him to Banner Thunderbird Medical Center after he had
intermittently emitted a high-pitched cry, vomited after feedings, cried
unusually at night, and had what Mother described as a “dent” in his head.
The parents had observed those symptoms for approximately one week but
failed to seek medical care for A.M. But when Mother mentioned the
indentation during a routine medical appointment for A.M.’s older siblings,
the pediatrician told her to take A.M. to the emergency department.

¶3 A CT scan showed A.M. had a non-displaced right parietal
skull fracture. The parents claimed A.M.’s four-year-old sibling had
squeezed the front and top of A.M.’s head a week earlier. The treating
physician disagreed, concluding the reported incident was “not
mechanistically compatible” with the fracture on the right side of A.M.’s
skull. A member of Banner’s Child at Risk Evaluation (“CARE”) team
likewise testified the sibling could not have generated sufficient force to
cause the fracture as A.M.’s parents claimed. The CARE team also reviewed

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IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO A.M.
Decision of the Court

A.M.’s birth records and found no evidence that birth trauma caused the
fracture.

¶4 Two weeks later, the parents brought A.M. back to Banner for
a repeat skeletal survey. It revealed A.M. also had a distal right femoral
metaphyseal fracture (the “femoral fracture”).

B. DCS Provides Services, but Safety Concerns Remain.

¶5 After Banner reported the skull fracture, the Department of
Child Safety (“DCS”) implemented a fourteen-day present-danger plan that
allowed A.M. to remain home with his paternal grandmother present as a
responsible adult. When the plan expired, DCS’ investigation remained
open. The parents declined DCS’ request to extend the plan and declined
further interviews concerning the femoral fracture after learning there was
also a criminal investigation into A.M.’s injuries. DCS thereafter removed
A.M. and filed a dependency petition.

¶6 The parents had no prior DCS or criminal history. Father
cooperated during the early investigation and testified that A.M. was never
outside the parents’ supervision, but he did not know what caused the skull
fracture. The parents completed a parenting program, participated
consistently in parenting time, and completed psychological consultations.
Their progress led DCS to consider dismissing the case.

¶7 By trial, DCS agreed that A.M. could return home under an
in-home dependency requiring daycare, additional parenting education,
counseling, welfare checks, and other in-home services. A DCS specialist
testified that dismissal could expose A.M. to further injury because the
circumstances causing his fractures remained unidentified and
unaddressed. The parents continued to rely on an explanation for the skull
fracture that medical providers had rejected, provided no explanation for
the femoral fracture, and had not demonstrated how they would prevent
another injury.

C. The Juvenile Court Finds A.M. Dependent, and the Parents
Appeal.

¶8 The juvenile court held a four-day hearing at which both DCS
and the parents presented witnesses and evidence.

¶9 There was no dispute at the hearing that A.M. suffered a skull
fracture while in the parents’ care. The parents and their counsel suggested
A.M.’s sibling caused the skull fracture. But the only medical testimony at

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IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO A.M.
Decision of the Court

the hearing was that the parents’ explanation was incompatible with the
skull fracture their infant son suffered while in their care.

¶10 There was dispute at the hearing over the femoral fracture.
Dr. Gael Lonergan, a pediatric radiologist, testified A.M.’s femoral fracture
was visible on both the initial and follow-up images. She testified that the
fracture resulted from a “shearing” or “to-and-fro” force and was not
caused by normal handling of an infant. Though Dr. Lonergan
acknowledged the fracture was not independently diagnostic of abuse and
could occur unintentionally, other CARE team providers later testified this
type of fracture was highly suggestive of trauma inflicted on an infant who
didn’t walk, and couldn’t have resulted from an ordinary diaper change or
A.M. merely wiggling. The parents presented the testimony of three
orthopedists from whom they sought a second opinion as to A.M.’s
fracture: the orthopedic surgeon Dr. Vaughn, and two orthopedic
physician’s assistants, Morgan Stanley and Lauren Stafford. The
orthopedists explained different ways femoral fractures can occur and how
healed fractures can appear in imaging.

¶11 The court credited Dr. Lonergan’s testimony over that of the
orthopedic providers consulted by the parents. The court found Dr.
Lonergan the “most qualified and reliable witness” concerning A.M.’s
femoral fracture.

¶12 After considering the parties’ evidence, the juvenile court
found DCS proved dependency by a preponderance of the evidence
because: (1) A.M. sustained two fractures while in the parents’ care; (2) their
explanation for the skull fracture was not medically plausible; (3) they had
not explained the femoral fracture; and (4) they could not articulate an
adequate safety plan to prevent a recurrence.

¶13 The court also found the parents delayed seeking treatment,
minimized the seriousness of A.M.’s injuries, and failed to convey an
understanding of DCS’ safety concerns or explain how they would ensure
proper supervision and prompt medical care in the future. It concluded
those circumstances constituted “ongoing substantiated and unresolved
threats” that would remain until the parents completed sufficient education
and monitoring. The court adjudicated A.M. dependent and adopted a
“Remain with Family” case plan.

¶14 The parents timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. Ariz.
Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1).

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IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO A.M.
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DISCUSSION

Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Dependency
Finding.

¶15 Father argues DCS failed to prove the dependency because
no evidence established he personally inflicted either fracture. Mother
likewise argues something besides child abuse could have caused the
fractures. In the same vein, Father contends the court shifted the burden to
him to explain the injuries and improperly treated the absence of an
explanation as proof of abuse or neglect. Both parents argue no present
threat remained because A.M. had returned to their home by the time of the
dependency hearing. DCS responds that it was not required to identify
who inflicted the injuries and that the medical evidence, the parents’
inability to address the cause, and the conditions imposed on A.M.’s return
supported the finding of an unresolved safety threat.

¶16 DCS was required to prove the dependency by a
preponderance of the evidence. Stephens v. State, 262 Ariz. 233, --- ¶ 38, 589
P.3d 846, 856 (2026); A.R.S. § 8-844(C)(1). We review the juvenile court’s
dependency adjudication for abuse of discretion and affirm unless no
reasonable evidence supports it. In re G.R., 255 Ariz. 444, 447-48 ¶ 17 (App.
2023). Because the juvenile court is best positioned to assess credibility,
weigh conflicting medical testimony, and resolve disputed facts, we do not
reweigh the evidence on appeal. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203
Ariz. 278, 282 ¶ 12 (App. 2002). And although dependency must be based
on the circumstances existing at the time of the adjudication hearing, earlier
events may support the ruling when they continue to present a
“substantiated and unresolved threat” to the child. Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, 50-51 ¶¶ 12, 16 (App. 2016).

¶17 While Father wasn’t required to prove he did not injure A.M.,
DCS likewise wasn’t required to establish which parent or caregiver
inflicted the injuries. Joshua W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 1 CA-JV 21-0108, 2021
WL 5371203, at *3 ¶ 13 (Ariz. App. Nov. 18, 2021) (mem. decision) (“The
law, however, does not require DCS to prove precisely how or why [the
child] was injured while in Father’s care.”). The point, as the juvenile court
correctly indicated, was that “[s]omething happened to [A.M.] in the
home.” A child may be dependent when a parent inflicted or allowed
physical injury, or was unable or unwilling to provide adequate
supervision or medical care, thereby creating a substantial risk of harm. See
A.R.S. § 8-201(2)(a), (15)(a)(iii), (25)(a). The dispositive question was thus
whether reasonable evidence showed that A.M. suffered abuse or neglect

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while in his parents’ care and that the conditions producing the harm
remained unresolved.

¶18 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding.
A.M., an infant in the first three months of his life, sustained two fractures
while continuously in his parents’ care. Medical providers testified the
parents’ account of the sibling squeezing A.M.’s head was incompatible
with the location of, and force required to cause, A.M.’s skull fracture.
While suggesting something besides parental abuse could have caused the
fracture, the parents offered no medical testimony of their own to support
that suggestion. The record thus contained sufficient evidence to support
the juvenile court’s finding of dependency.

¶19 But there was also medical testimony that A.M.’s second
fracture, of his femur, resulted from an abnormal shearing force not
associated with routine infant handling. Father emphasizes that their
inability to explain the cause of the fracture is not evidence of abuse . DCS
responds that Dr. Lonergan nevertheless testified the fracture resulted from
a shearing or “to-and-fro” force not associated with normal infant handling,
and that other CARE-team providers testified it was highly suggestive of
inflicted trauma and could not have resulted from routine care, an ordinary
diaper change, or A.M. merely wiggling. The juvenile court credited the
testimony that the fracture resulted from abuse or neglect. Father’s
challenge asks us to reassess competing medical opinions, which we will
not do. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 282 ¶ 12.

¶20 Nor did the juvenile court shift the burden to Father. Father
argues the court relied on his inability to explain the injuries rather than
affirmative proof of abuse or neglect. But as DCS argues, the lack of a
credible explanation was not the sole basis for the dependency finding. The
court also relied on medical evidence contradicting the parents’ proposed
explanation, the delay in obtaining care despite A.M.’s unusual crying,
vomiting, and visible head indentation, the parents’ continued
minimization of the injuries, and their inability to articulate how they
would ensure adequate supervision and prompt medical treatment. That
evidence supported the finding that the circumstances causing the injuries
remained unidentified and unaddressed; the court did not treat Father’s
lack of an explanation as proof that he inflicted them.

¶21 The parents also argue A.M.’s return home defeated any
finding of a present threat. DCS responds that it agreed to the return only
under an in-home dependency requiring daycare, additional parenting
education, counseling, welfare checks, and continued monitoring. A DCS

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Decision of the Court

specialist testified those safeguards remained necessary because the
circumstances causing the injuries had not been addressed and the parents
had not demonstrated how they would prevent another injury. Thus, the
return home did not establish that the threat had been resolved, but instead,
that it could be managed through continued services and oversight.

¶22 The parents’ cooperation, lack of prior DCS or criminal
history, and participation in services weighed in their favor. But those
circumstances did not account for how an infant sustained two fractures
while continuously in the parents’ care, reconcile the parents’ explanation
with the medical evidence, or establish an adequate plan to prevent another
injury. The juvenile court considered the parents’ evidence and
nevertheless found the threat to A.M.’s safety demonstrated by the injuries
inflicted while in his parents’ care remained unresolved. Because
reasonable evidence supports that finding, the parents have not shown the
court abused its discretion.

CONCLUSION

¶23 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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