In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0026

FILED 08-03-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS521138
The Honorable David D. Palmer, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of H. Clark Jones, LLC, Mesa
By H. Clark Jones
Counsel for Appellant

Law Office of Ed Johnson, PLLC, Peoria
By Edward D. Johnson
Counsel for Appellee A.C.

Stromfors Law Office, P.C., Chandler
By Stephanie A. Stromfors
Counsel for Appellee Desiree M.

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.C.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Carl C. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights to Aaron (a pseudonym). For the following
reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Aaron was born in December 2020 to Father and Desiree M.
(“Mother”), who were separated but not yet divorced.

¶3 Between February and August 2021, Father kidnapped and
sexually assaulted three women. Father committed one of the assaults
during his parenting time, though he disputed the victim’s report that
Aaron was present. Father was first arrested for the assaults in August 2021
and spent the next three months in jail. He was arrested again in October
2022 and has remained in custody since.

¶4 In March 2024, Father pled guilty to three counts of attempted
sexual assault and one count of attempted kidnapping, each class 3 felonies.
The court sentenced him to 7.5 years’ incarceration. Father is expected to be
released in January 2029, at which time he must register as a sex offender
and will be on lifetime probation with sex offender conditions.

¶5 In February 2025, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s
parental rights over Aaron. Mother alleged four grounds: abandonment,
child abuse, substance abuse, and length of felony sentence. At the two-day
termination hearing in December 2025, the court heard testimony from
Mother, Father, and several of their witnesses, including Mother’s new
husband (“Stepfather”).

¶6 One of Father’s witnesses testified that before his arrest,
Father took Aaron to church and parks. Father testified he tried to call
Mother in October and November 2022, and that he sent Aaron multiple
postcards. He also testified that Mother blocked his family from seeing
Aaron to prevent them from sending updates to Father. Mother admitted

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.C.
Decision of the Court

to blocking Father’s family from seeing Aaron, but testified that Father did
not contact her about Aaron until he sent a postcard in February 2024 and
did not call her until December 2024. She had her address protected after
she learned Father had been convicted. Mother testified that after she filed
the petition in February 2025, Father harassed her with multiple phone calls
per day until the prison blocked Father’s calls to Mother. She also testified
that Father did not provide financial support for Aaron. Stepfather testified
that he financially supports Aaron, that Aaron views him as his father, and
that he wants to adopt Aaron.

¶7 In February 2026, the court terminated Father’s rights on all
four grounds. Father appeals, and we have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 8-235,
12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 When reviewing a termination order, we will accept the
court’s factual findings if supported by reasonable evidence and inferences.
Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 (2023). “Because the
juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness
credibility,” we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining
the juvenile court’s decision. Id. at 478–79, ¶¶ 30, 32 (cleaned up).

¶9 To terminate the parent-child relationship, the court must
find (1) at least one statutory ground under Arizona Revised Statutes
Section 8-533(B) by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) termination is in
the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Alma S. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149–50, ¶ 8 (2018). We review the juvenile
court’s legal conclusions on the statutory grounds for clear error. Brionna J.,
255 Ariz. at 478–79, ¶ 31.

¶10 The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights under the
length of felony sentence ground “if the sentence of that parent is of such
length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of
years.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4).

¶11 A “normal home” is “a stable and long-term family
environment outside a foster care placement, where another parent . . .
resides and parents the child, and where the incarcerated parent
affirmatively acts to maintain a relationship with the child that contributes
to rather than detracts from the child’s stable, family environment.” Timothy
B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 477, ¶ 27 (2022). Whether a sentence
is “sufficiently long to deprive a child of a normal home” is an
individualized and fact-specific inquiry. Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.C.
Decision of the Court

Ariz. 574, 579, ¶ 9 (2021). The juvenile court considers six non-exclusive
factors:

(1) the length and strength of any parent-child
relationship existing when incarceration begins,
(2) the degree to which the parent-child
relationship can be continued and nurtured
during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child
and the relationship between the child’s age and
the likelihood that incarceration will deprive
the child of a normal home, (4) the length of the
sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to
provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of
the deprivation of a parental presence on the
child at issue.

Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251–52, ¶ 29 (2000). “A
lack of evidence on one or several of [these] factors may or may not require
reversal or remand on a severance order.” Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 450, ¶ 15 (App. 2007).

¶12 On the first factor, the length and strength of the parent-child
relationship before incarceration, the court found the preexisting
relationship was, “at best, 22 months,” and was significantly compromised
because Father was “more focused on engaging in criminal behaviors than
being a father and focusing on the needs and care of [Aaron].” The record
supports the court’s findings. Aaron was 22 months old when Father was
arrested in October 2022, and Father has remained in custody since. During
Aaron’s first 22 months of life, Father committed three sexual assaults, one
of which occurred during Father’s parenting time and possibly while Aaron
was present. And Father spent three of those 22 months in jail. This factor
favors termination.

¶13 As to the second factor, the court found Father’s ability to
nurture his relationship with Aaron would be “significantly and negatively
impacted.” The court found that Father’s lack of engagement with Aaron
already compromised the relationship, which, combined with Aaron’s
young age and the “difficult logistical factors” caused by Father’s
incarceration would “further strain that relationship.” Father argues the
court should have allowed him to maintain a relationship with Aaron and
that Mother frequently denied him contact. Reasonable evidence shows
Father’s lack of engagement during his incarceration was not solely the
result of Mother’s interference. Mother testified that Father did not contact

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Decision of the Court

her about Aaron until February 2024, well over a year after his arrest.
Though Father disputes that testimony, we will not reweigh the evidence.
Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478–79, ¶¶ 30, 32. We acknowledge that “difficult
logistical factors” will exist in every relationship between an incarcerated
parent and a young child, but combined with Father and Aaron’s already
strained relationship, this factor favors termination.

¶14 On the third and fourth factors, Aaron was under two years
old when Father was arrested. He had just turned five years old at the time
of termination and will be eight years old when Father is projected to be
released. And given the nature of Father’s felony convictions, it is unknown
whether Father can contact Aaron upon his release because Father will be
on lifetime probation with sex offender conditions. At minimum, Father
will need reunification services before reuniting with Aaron. See Jeffrey P. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 212, 214, ¶ 10 (App. 2016) (a court may
consider circumstances that could delay reunification after release, such as
release conditions and the time needed for a parent to complete services
after his release). Given Aaron’s young age and the length of Father’s
sentence, Aaron has been, and likely will be, deprived of a normal parental
relationship with Father for many more years. These factors favor
termination.

¶15 On the fifth factor, the availability of another parent, Father
argues that Mother and Stepfather can provide Aaron with a normal home
until Father is released from prison. But between Father and Mother, only
Mother is available to give Aaron a normal home life, and Father has done
little to contribute to the “stable and long-term family environment”
created by Mother and Stepfather. Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 477, ¶ 27. Indeed,
Father has undermined that stability. Mother sought and received a
protected address once Father was convicted. Father has not provided
financial support to Mother. And he harassed Mother with phone calls
multiple times per day for months, resulting in the prison blocking her
phone number.

¶16 Although the juvenile court did not make findings on the
sixth factor, the effect of the deprivation of a parental presence on the child
at issue, the record shows that this factor favors termination. Mother
testified that Aaron views Stepfather, not Father, as his father and is already
questioning why he has a different last name than the rest of his family.
Stepfather testified that he has no legal right to make decisions for Aaron,
and Mother testified that Aaron would be left without a parent to care for
him if she were incapacitated. So even though Stepfather is present, Father’s

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.C.
Decision of the Court

absence is still negatively affecting Aaron. The court did not clearly err in
terminating Father’s rights under the length of sentence ground.

¶17 Because we affirm the termination based on the length of
sentence ground, see Section 8-533(B)(4), we need not address the court’s
findings on the other statutory grounds. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002) (“If clear and convincing evidence
supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile court
ordered severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other
grounds.”). We do not address the court’s best-interests finding because
Father does not challenge it. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 13
(“[Appellant] has never challenged the superior court’s best interest
finding. We therefore accept that finding and do not address it further.”).

CONCLUSION

¶18 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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