In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.L. and B.L.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.L. and B.L.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0028
FILED 07-30-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015JD202400033
The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Robert D. Rosanelli
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Veronica F. Rios
Counsel for Appellee DCS

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.L. and B.L.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Vice Chief Judge David D.
Weinzweig joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1 Marlo L. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s termination
of her parental rights as to A.L. and B.L. She argues the Department of Child
Safety (the “Department”) failed to make diligent efforts to reunify her with
her children and that the court erred in finding termination in their best
interests. This Court affirms.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother gave birth to A.L. in December 2023. Mother admitted
to using oxycodone during her pregnancy. After birth, A.L. suffered
withdrawals and the Department intervened. The Department allowed
A.L. to remain in Mother’s care and began offering services to ensure A.L.’s
safety. A few months later, Mother and A.L. tested positive for fentanyl.
Mother entered treatment and the Department placed A.L. in a family
member’s care.1

¶3 A few months later, the Department removed A.L. from
family care for safety reasons. It could not locate Mother, who was known
to be abusing drugs, and filed a dependency against her. The dependency
petition alleged that Mother neglected A.L., could not provide proper care
because of substance abuse and was unable to provide for A.L.’s basic
needs.

¶4 Mother pled no contest to the dependency and the juvenile
court found A.L. dependent as to Mother. The court adopted a concurrent
case plan of “family reunification” and “severance and adoption” for A.L.

¶5 In November 2024, Mother gave birth to B.L. B.L. required
special medical care because of fentanyl and cocaine exposure before birth.

1 The court terminated Father’s parental rights as to B.L., but he has not

appealed and is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, this Court only
discusses Father to provide context.

2

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.L. and B.L.
Decision of the Court

The Department amended A.L.’s dependency petition to include B.L. It
alleged Mother neglected B.L. and asked for the juvenile court to grant it
custody of B.L. The amended petition reasoned Mother could not care for
B.L. due to substance abuse, an unfit home, Mother’s failure to provide for
B.L.’s basic needs and her inability to provide for B.L.’s future medical
needs. The court held a dependency hearing on the petition and Mother
failed to appear. In Mother’s absence, the court found B.L. dependent as to
Mother.

¶6 After the court found both children dependent, the
Department offered Mother reunification services, including substance
abuse treatment and testing, parenting programs and supervised visitation.
Around two years after the dependency finding, Mother remained
minimally engaged with the Department and the services it offered. But she
failed to submit to drug testing required to reunify the family. Mother also
missed many supervised visitations.

¶7 When Mother did attend supervised visits, the Department
noted concerns about substance abuse. During visits, Mother would go to
the bathroom multiple times for extended periods. At one visit, after using
the bathroom, Mother fell asleep and drooled while sleeping. The case aide
noted during this visit that Mother appeared groggy due to heavy eyelids
and bags under her eyes. Mother then visited the bathroom for about 20
minutes. Upon returning, the caseworker noted a strong unpleasant smell
from Mother. The caseworker then investigated and found an
overwhelming burnt and toxic smell in the bathroom as well as evidence
that Mother lied about her need for using the bathroom. During a
subsequent visit, Mother looked sickly with a grayish pale skin tone and
droopy under eyes. She again used the bathroom for an extended period
and again a toxic smell emanated from the room after her use. This repeated
behavior resulted in the case aide terminating Mother’s visit with A.L.

¶8 In October 2025, the Department moved to terminate
Mother’s parental rights to both children. It alleged chronic substance
abuse, six months’ time in an out-of-home placement and fifteen months’
in an out-of-home placement. See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(3), (8)(b)–(c). Around
this time, Mother was arrested and jailed. After her release from jail in
December, Mother requested the Department again provide services such
as drug testing and supervised visitations. But its attempts to connect with
her failed. The Department was unable to contact Mother after she
contacted them and provided an address.

3

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.L. and B.L.
Decision of the Court

¶9 The juvenile court held a termination adjudication hearing in
February 2026 and terminated Mother’s rights as to both children. It found
that Mother “has made little to no effort to demonstrate sobriety” and
“failed to demonstrate any enhanced parenting capacities,” which could
put the children “at a significant risk of harm if returned to her care.” The
court found termination was in the children’s best interests because it
would provide the children with permanency through adoption. It also
determined that allowing Mother to retain her parental rights would create
a “significant risk of harm” to the children.

¶10 Mother timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) and 12-120.21(A).

DISCUSSION

¶11 A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds by
clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for
termination is present. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149, ¶ 8
(2018). It must also find by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination is in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Id. at 150, ¶ 8;
see also Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 190, ¶ 27 (App.
1999). This Court will “not reweigh the evidence but will look only to
determine if there is evidence to sustain the court’s ruling.” Mary Lou C. v.
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Servs., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004) (citation omitted);
see also Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579, ¶ 10 (2021). “[I]f
reasonable evidence and inferences” support the court’s findings, this
Court “will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jessie D.,
251 Ariz. at 579, ¶ 10 (quoting Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9
(2016)). However, legal issues requiring interpretation and application of
statutes are reviewed de novo. Id. (citation omitted).

I. The Department made appropriate reunification efforts.

¶12 Mother argues that the Department failed to provide her with
services to reunify the family after she left jail. She contends that the
Department failed to tailor services to her specific needs as an addict and
failed to recognize her recent success. Mother claims the juvenile court
erred when it did not allow her additional time to demonstrate that she had
resolved her substance abuse and its impact on her past parenting. The
Department contends that Mother did not raise this claim with the juvenile
court and therefore waived it.

¶13 A parent is precluded from challenging the Department’s
reunification efforts for the first time on appeal. Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of

4

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.L. and B.L.
Decision of the Court

Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178–79, ¶ 16 (App. 2014). Here, over the course of
two years, the juvenile court conducted many hearings and Mother never
claimed that the Department failed to provide services or assist in
reunification. She also “never objected to the court’s periodic reasonable-
efforts findings.” Had Mother believed the Department was not making
diligent efforts to provide adequate services, “it was incumbent on her to
promptly bring those concerns to the attention [of] the juvenile court.” Id.
at 179, ¶ 18. Thus, Mother has waived these arguments. However, because
this case involves the interests of children, this Court prefers to resolve the
issues on the merits and in this Court’s discretion, it will consider Mother’s
argument. See Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 10 (App. 2013).

¶14 The Department must make all reasonable efforts to preserve
the family relationship. Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 186, ¶ 1. However, the
Department need not pursue measures that are futile; it only needs to
undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success. Id. at 192, ¶ 34.
Likewise, the Department is not required to “provide ‘every conceivable
service,’ it must provide a parent with the time and opportunity to
participate in programs designed to improve the parent’s ability to care for
the child.” Id. at ¶ 37 (quotation omitted). And in reviewing the
Department’s efforts, a court considers the Department’s diligent efforts
under the totality of the circumstances. See Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
247 Ariz. 9, 23, ¶ 49 (App. 2019).

¶15 The totality of the record supports the juvenile court’s
findings that the Department provided reasonable and diligent
reunification efforts. Mother’s involvement with the Department related to
A.L. and B.L. began in December 2023 and the record shows that as of April
2024, it had offered her extensive services. The services consisted of
substance abuse assessment and treatment, drug testing, counseling and
parenting programs. The Department also provided Mother with
transportation services as needed. The Department moved to terminate
Mother’s parental rights in October 2025—the same month she went to
jail—almost two years after its first involvement with her for this case.
Mother left jail in December 2025, two months after the termination petition
had been filed.

¶16 Mother testified that after her time in jail she attempted to
continue services including drug testing and visitation. At the termination
hearing, Mother also testified that she had been participating in drug
testing since being released from jail and had not tested positive for four
months. But that does not negate the years that she failed to participate. See
Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29 (App. 2010)

5

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.L. and B.L.
Decision of the Court

(“[T]emporary abstinence from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh
[Mother’s] significant history of abuse [and her] consistent inability to
abstain [from drugs] during this case.”).

¶17 The juvenile court found that before Mother’s incarceration,
the Department offered Mother multiple services, which Mother
acknowledged in her opening brief. See Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 37
(the Department is not required to “provide ‘every conceivable service,’ it
must provide a parent with the time and opportunity to participate in
programs designed to improve the parent’s ability to care for the child”)
(quotation omitted); Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Act. No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348,
352–53 (App. 1994) (the Department satisfied its diligent efforts by offering
appropriate services and that a parent’s failure or refusal to participate in
those services does not preclude termination). Mother minimally
participated. The court recognized that after Mother’s time in jail, the
Department did not respond as it previously had, but the court found that
“overall, during the entire pendency of this case, [the Department] has been
diligent in providing appropriate reunification services.” The court also
found that the Department provided reasonable services, and, despite
Mother’s testimony, it could not “disregard[ ] the years of help that’s been
offered and the services that have been available.” The court properly
considered the Department’s services as a whole, rather than just the time
after Mother’s release from jail. See Donald W., 247 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 49. The
record supports the juvenile court’s findings.

II. Sufficient evidence supports the court’s finding that termination
of Mother’s rights was in the best interests of A.L. and B.L.

¶18 Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s best interests
findings. She acknowledges that she did not make a best interests argument
at the termination adjudication hearing but insists her arguments should
not be waived. Though this Court could treat Mother’s omission as waiver,
the decision to apply waiver is discretionary. See Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 536, ¶ 9 (App. 2018). For the reasons stated in ¶ 13, this
Court declines to apply waiver here. See id.

¶19 The juvenile court determines a child’s best interests by a
preponderance of the evidence. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 149–50, ¶ 8. “[A]
determination of the child’s best interests must include a finding as to how
the child would benefit from severance or be harmed by the continuation of
the relationship.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Act. No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5
(1990). Courts must consider the totality of the circumstances at the time of
severance, “including the child’s adoptability and the parent’s

6

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.L. and B.L.
Decision of the Court

rehabilitation.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 148, ¶ 1. And a court may also find that
a child’s best interests will be served by the permanency and stability an
adoption would provide. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332,
337, ¶ 16 (App. 2004).

A. A.L.’s best interests

¶20 Mother argues that the court improperly found termination
in A.L.’s best interests because it is pursuing a reunification plan with
Father rather than adoption. She asserts the only benefit to termination of
her rights is to allow Father to obtain sole decision-making authority if he
is able to reunify with A.L.

¶21 Here, the record does not support Mother’s arguments. The
juvenile court found termination in A.L.’s best interests given that she was
in an adoptive placement and that Mother had not provided consistent
efforts of her sobriety. Contrary to Mother’s argument, the court did not
mention Father’s reunification efforts in its best interests finding for
Mother. The court heard testimony that the Department removed A.L. from
Mother’s care in 2024 and that for two years, A.L. was in a kinship
placement. A caseworker testified about Mother’s history of substance
abuse and “her inability to keep [A.L.] safe in the future.” The court
expressed that Mother had “not demonstrated stability, safety, consistency
[and] sobriety,” despite her recent efforts. The court found that returning
A.L. to Mother’s care “would put [her] at risk of future abuse or neglect”
because of Mother’s longstanding substance abuse. See Oscar O., 209 Ariz.
at 337, ¶ 16; see also Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Act. No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 352
(a specific adoption plan is not required to terminate parental rights). The
record supports the court’s findings as to A.L.’s best interests.

B. B.L.’s best interests

¶22 Mother makes no argument about B.L.’s best interests. She
only argues that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that the termination of her parental rights was in A.L.’s best interests. But
this Court addresses B.L.’s best interests for a clear record. See Nold, 232
Ariz. at 273, ¶ 10.

¶23 The court found that B.L.’s medical needs and Mother’s
inability to demonstrate “stability, safety, consistency, [and] sobriety,”
supported termination was in B.L.’s best interests. The record shows a
caseworker testified that termination would be in B.L.’s best interests
because B.L.’s special needs were being met by her caregiver. B.L.’s attorney
agreed with the Department and reiterated that B.L. would require

7

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.L. and B.L.
Decision of the Court

someone who was willing and able to care for her on a consistent basis. The
court acknowledged that Mother admitted to being “unable to meet [B.L.’s]
needs and would be unable to reunify safely with her.” Evidence supports
the court’s finding that a continued relationship with Mother was not in
B.L.’s best interests. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Act. No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. at
5. Mother has shown no error.

CONCLUSION

¶24 This Court affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

8