In Re Term of Parental Rights as to R.H.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.H.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0029
FILED 10-14-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS521550
The Honorable Katherine Cooper, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Czop Law Firm PLLC, Queen Creek
By Steven Czop
Counsel for Appellant Father

Summer S., Scottsdale
Appellee Mother

John L. Popilek PC, Scottsdale
By John L. Popilek
Counsel for Appellee Child

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.H.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Justin H. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental
rights to R.H. (“Child”). The evidence supports the juvenile court’s
conclusion that termination was warranted under A.R.S § 8-533(B)(1) and
in Child’s best interests. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Child was born in February 2017. In November 2017, Summer
S. (“Mother”) petitioned for divorce and obtained an order of protection
against Father, which did not include Child.

¶3 The superior court granted the divorce in February 2018. The
parenting plan awarded the parties joint legal decision-making but
required that Father’s parenting time be supervised because his violent
behavior presented a serious danger to Child’s well-being. The court also
ordered him to pay $705 in child support per month.

¶4 Father soon stopped complying with the supervision order.
He began to stalk Mother and was arrested for aggravated assault and
domestic violence after he attempted to strangle his girlfriend. By late 2018,
Mother stopped responding to his requests to see Child because of his
increasingly violent behavior. She also obtained a second order of
protection against him, which again did not include Child.

¶5 In April 2019, Father was arrested on two counts of sexual
assault and 10 counts of voyeurism. Mother was a victim of one of the
counts of voyeurism.

¶6 Later that month, Father was released on house arrest
pending his criminal trial. His release conditions included an order
prohibiting him from having contact with children, which remained in
place for the next three years.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.H.
Decision of the Court

¶7 In March 2022, Father was convicted of both sexual assault
counts and all 10 counts of voyeurism.1 The court sentenced him to 14 years
in prison. His current release date is June 24, 2037, when Child will be 20
years old.

¶8 In September 2025, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s
parental rights. She alleged Father had abandoned Child and that the length
of his sentence would deprive Child of a normal home for a period of years.
See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (4). She also alleged that termination was in Child’s
best interests so he could be adopted by her fiancé (“Stepfather”). In
January 2026, Mother and Stepfather were married.

¶9 In February 2026, the juvenile court held the termination trial.
Afterwards, the court terminated Father’s rights on both statutory grounds.

¶10 Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Father argues the juvenile court erred in terminating his
parental rights.

¶12 The juvenile court may terminate a parent-child relationship
if: 1) clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one statutory ground
for termination and 2) a preponderance of the evidence shows termination
is in the child’s best interests. Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574,
579 ¶ 8 (2021). On review, we accept the court’s factual findings if
supported by reasonable evidence, giving due regard to that court’s unique
role in weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility. Brionna J.
v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 30 (2023). We will uphold the
court’s legal conclusions on statutory grounds and best interests unless they
are clearly erroneous. See id. at 478-79 ¶ 31; A.R.S. § 8-533(B).

1 The facts relating to Father’s criminal offenses are set forth in our decision

affirming his sentence. State v. Harwood, No. 1 CA-CR 22-0254 (Ariz. App.
Sept. 19, 2023) (mem. decision).

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.H.
Decision of the Court

I. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Finding that Father Abandoned
Child.

¶13 The juvenile court found Mother proved by clear and
convincing evidence that Father abandoned Child under A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(1). “Abandonment” is defined as:

the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to
maintain regular contact with the child, including providing
normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial finding
that a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and
communicate with the child. Failure to maintain a normal
parental relationship with the child without just cause for a
period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of
abandonment.

A.R.S. § 8-531(1).

¶14 A parent can defeat an allegation of abandonment by showing
just cause. In re B.W., 260 Ariz. 123, 130 ¶¶ 18-19 (2025). “[T]he juvenile
court should examine what a parent has done to facilitate a normal parental
relationship.” Id. at 132 ¶ 26; see Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196
Ariz. 246, 250 ¶ 22 (2000) (affirming that a parent “must act persistently” to
establish and maintain a relationship with his child and “must vigorously
assert his legal rights to the extent necessary”). But the juvenile court “must
also consider that the parent’s conduct—or ability to ‘do something’—may
be affected by a parent’s reasonable, good faith belief that circumstances
exist that preclude the parent from exercising traditional methods of
maintaining a normal parental relationship.” In re B.W., 260 Ariz. at 132
¶ 26.

¶15 Father argues that there was just cause for his abandonment
because his release conditions from 2019 through 2022 prohibited him from
having contact with children, including Child. He testified, however, that
he never sought to modify his release conditions so he could see Child. He
also testified that he did not file anything in the superior court to enforce
his parenting time. He explained that he was “well aware that [he] could
have taken the avenue of going through the court system,” but he did not
do so because he prioritized fighting his criminal charges. Although these
circumstances required that he assert his legal rights, they did not preclude
him from maintaining a relationship with Child. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at
251 ¶ 25 (“The burden to act as a parent rests with the parent, who should
assert his legal rights at the first and every opportunity.”).

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.H.
Decision of the Court

¶16 Father next argues that Mother’s status as a victim in his
criminal case, and her decision to obtain a lifetime no-contact injunction
against him, were also circumstances that prevented him from maintaining
a parental relationship with Child. The juvenile court, however, rejected
Father’s efforts to blame Mother for his failure to maintain a relationship
with Child. Mother’s interference with Father’s relationship with Child
only defeats the claim of abandonment if the interference was wrongful. See
In re C.R., 256 Ariz. 170, 174 ¶ 15 (App. 2023) (principle that parent who has
persistently and substantially restricted other parent’s interaction with
child may not use that to prove abandonment “applies only if the parent
wrongfully restricts the other parent’s access to the child”). Here, Mother did
not act wrongfully in asserting her legal rights as a crime victim.

¶17 The court also properly concluded Father did nothing for
eight years to assert his rights as Child’s father or to maintain his
relationship with him. Reasonable evidence supports this finding. As
described above, he never sent a letter or gift to Child and never took action
in the family law matter after his incarceration. He did not challenge
Mother’s no-contact injunction or request that the court modify it to allow
limited communication concerning Child. Additionally, he explained that
he never paid child support because he was “extremely bitter” about the
divorce, and after his arrest, he devoted all his resources to fighting his
criminal charges.

¶18 Father also argues that he relied on his relatives to
communicate with Mother about Child because of the restrictions arising
from his criminal case. He contends that Mother’s refusal to coordinate
visits with his relatives was another circumstance that prevented him from
maintaining a relationship with Child.

¶19 Here, the paternal grandmother testified that she called and
texted Mother for a two-week period in April 2019. She explained that she
reached out to Mother—not on Father’s behalf—but because she and other
family members wanted to see Child. The grandmother testified that she
stopped trying to contact Mother after a third party informed her that she
was calling the wrong number. Mother testified that the grandmother had
reached out and Mother did not respond. Mother’s decision not to
communicate with the grandmother seven years before the termination
trial does not establish that Father had a “reasonable, good faith belief” that
his circumstances precluded him from maintaining a normal parental
relationship. In re B.W., 260 Ariz. at 132 ¶ 26.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.H.
Decision of the Court

¶20 Father’s final argument is that his relationship with another
child, E.H., demonstrates that he is a fit parent who is capable of
maintaining a normal parent-child relationship despite his incarceration.
But Father’s relationship with E.H. neither establishes good cause for his
abandonment of Child, nor does it demonstrate an ability to properly
parent Child in this case. See Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146,
150 ¶ 10 (2018) (observing most statutory grounds, including abandonment,
are proxies for parental unfitness because they demonstrate a parent’s
inability to properly parent his or her child).

¶21 Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in terminating
Father’s rights under the abandonment ground. Because we affirm the
termination on that ground, we need not address the court’s findings under
the length-of-sentence ground. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz.
576, 578 ¶ 5 (App. 2017).

II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding that
Termination Was in Child’s Best Interests.

¶22 The juvenile court may find that termination of parental
rights is in a child’s best interests if the child will benefit from termination
or be harmed if it is denied. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13. The court must
consider all the circumstances in deciding whether termination is in the
child’s best interests. Id. at 150-51 ¶ 13.

¶23 Father concedes that a child’s prospective adoption is a
benefit that can support best-interests findings. See Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn
F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4-5 ¶ 16 (2016). But he notes the adoption must be “likely,”
not just possible. Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 370 ¶ 22 (App.
2018). He argues the adoption in this case was “unlikely” because Mother
and Stepfather had been married for only two weeks before the termination
trial, and the adoption statutes appear to allow a stepparent to adopt only
after having been married to the legal parent for at least one year.

¶24 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that it was likely Stepfather would adopt Child. Stepfather testified that he
intended to adopt Child and Stepfather married Mother shortly before the
termination hearing to prove it. Because the court’s best-interests findings
are legally sufficient and supported by the record, the court did not abuse
its discretion by concluding that termination was in Child’s best interests.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.H.
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶25 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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