In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to K.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0030
FILED 08-28-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS521069
The Honorable Suzanne E. Cohen, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant Father

Shelby Rice, Glendale
Appellee Mother

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Kurt C. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights to K.C. For the following reasons, we vacate
and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father are the biological parents of K.C., who was
born in August 2012. Two years following K.C.’s birth, the parents, who
were never married, separated. That same year, in 2014, Mother filed a
motion to address parenting time and child support. Father was granted
parenting time every weekend and ordered to pay $350 per month in child
support.

¶3 Father exercised parenting time with K.C. until October 2017,
when Mother obtained an order of protection against him, which included
K.C. To obtain the order of protection, Mother alleged Father struck K.C.
Father denied this and contested the order, which the court upheld. The
order of protection was valid for one year and Father was unable to contact
Mother or K.C. while the order was in effect.

¶4 After the order of protection expired in October 2018, Father
attempted to restart parenting time through the court but never
successfully filed the appropriate documents to do so.

¶5 In March 2025, Mother filed a Petition to Terminate Parent-
Child Relationship, arguing Father’s parental rights should be terminated
based on abandonment and abuse grounds, as well as K.C.’s best interests.
Father contested the termination and requested a trial. Following trial in
August 2025, the juvenile court issued a ruling terminating Father’s
parental rights on the abandonment ground and found that termination
was in K.C.’s best interests.

¶6 Father timely appealed, and in February 2026 we issued a
memorandum decision vacating the termination order and remanding the

2

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.
Decision of the Court

case “to conduct a new best interests evaluation” because the juvenile court
improperly relied on speculation. See In re K.C., No. 1 CA-JV 25-0136, 2026
WL 294844, at *4 (Ariz. App. Feb. 4, 2026) (mem. decision). The juvenile
court then issued another termination order that same month, addressing
only K.C.’s best interests.

¶7 Father timely appealed the new termination order and we
have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and
-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Father challenges the court’s order terminating his parental
rights by arguing the court failed to comply with Arizona statutes,
misapplied Arizona’s best-interests law, and entered a best-interests
finding unsupported by the record.

¶9 We will “affirm a termination order unless the juvenile court
abuses its discretion or the court’s findings are not supported by reasonable
evidence.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 14 (2022).
In conducting our review, the juvenile court’s findings “will be accepted ‘if
reasonable evidence and inferences support them.’” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 30 (2023) (quoting Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 580 ¶ 10 (2021)). The court abuses its discretion when
it commits an error of law or when the record is “devoid of competent
evidence to support” its decision. Woyton v. Ward, 247 Ariz. 529, 531 ¶ 5
(App. 2019) (quoting Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520 ¶ 5 (1999)).

I. Statutory Grounds

¶10 Father contends the court violated his due process rights by
failing to include a statutory ground for termination in its February 2026
order.

¶11 To terminate parental rights, the court must follow a two-
step, sequential process. See In re B.W., 260 Ariz. 123, 129 ¶ 13 (2025). In this
two-step process, the juvenile court must first find, by clear and convincing
evidence, at least one ground for termination under A.R.S. Section 8-533(B).
Then, the court must find that termination would be in the child’s best
interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 477 ¶
20. To satisfy the first step, the court must make an express, written finding
regarding grounds for termination. See Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244
Ariz. 532, 539 ¶ 20 (App. 2018) (holding juvenile court must make written

3

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.
Decision of the Court

findings as to the ultimate facts supporting its legal conclusion regarding
termination). Failure to do so before entering a best-interests finding is
error. See In re E.C., 261 Ariz. 1, 7 ¶ 33 (App. 2025) (reversing court’s order
denying petition to terminate parental rights where order omitted statutory
grounds analysis).

¶12 Here, the court’s most recent order terminating Father’s
parental rights did not include a statutory-ground finding. This is
presumably because our February 2026 decision concluded reasonable
evidence supported the court’s initial finding of abandonment. In re K.C.,
2026 WL 294844, at *2–3 ¶¶ 13–18. But despite this conclusion and our
direction only for “the superior court to conduct a new best-interests
evaluation consistent with [our] decision[,]” we also ordered the
termination order be vacated in its entirety. Id. at *4 ¶ 22. Because “[a]
vacated judgment lacks force or effect[,]” Nielson v. Patterson, 204 Ariz. 530,
533 ¶ 12 (2003), we cannot rely on the August 2025 order to satisfy the
required first step of finding at least one statutory ground proven by clear
and convincing evidence, In re E.C., 261 Ariz. at 5 ¶¶ 19–20.

¶13 We acknowledge the imprecision of our previous decision
and regret the additional work that is now needed to correct this procedural
failing. But because the law requires the superior court to first find that a
statutory termination ground is proven by clear and convincing evidence
before addressing the child’s best interests, id., we must vacate the court’s
February 2026 order and remand for the court to re-enter its finding of
abandonment.

II. Best-Interests Finding

¶14 Father also argues the court’s February 2026 termination
order was erroneous because it failed to provide sufficient factual findings
supporting its best-interests conclusion and relied again on speculation.
Specifically, he challenges the court’s finding that “[K.C.] should not have
to live in fear that father could return after years of abandonment and
abuse.”

¶15 After finding a statutory termination ground proven by clear
and convincing evidence, the court must also find that the party seeking
termination has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that termination
would be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); In re C.R., 256 Ariz.
170, 175 ¶¶ 23–24 (App. 2023). This analysis “is highly fact dependent[,]” In
re E.C., 261 Ariz. at 6 ¶ 22, so we will affirm the court’s factual findings if

4

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.
Decision of the Court

supported by reasonable evidence and will not reweigh evidence on appeal,
Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

¶16 “[T]ermination is in the child’s best interests if either: (1) the
child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if
severance is denied.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13
(2018). Ultimately, the court’s primary concern during the best-interests
inquiry is “protecting a child’s interest in stability and security.” Demetrius
L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 15 (2016) (citing Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210
Ariz. 279, 286 ¶ 34 (2005)). And because this analysis centers on the child,
the court must not consider a parent’s fears or wishes. Contrast Maricopa
Cnty. Juvenile Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 7 (1990) (concluding
mother’s wish to terminate father’s parental rights “just in case” she
remarries was too speculative and mother presented no evidence related to
child’s best interests) with In re V.M., 261 Ariz. 198, 202 ¶ 17 (App. 2025)
(concluding record showed children had present and harmful fear of
returning to father).

¶17 Here, the court found that “[K.C.] is worried that if something
happened to mother, he would have to go to his father.” But this finding is
not supported by the record. At the termination hearing, Mother testified
that K.C. requested Father’s parental rights be terminated. But she also
testified that this request came after she told K.C. about an incident
involving Father and the mother of K.C.’s half-sibling. Mother further
testified that this incident made her concerned “that if something did
happen to [her], that [K.C.] would not go to somebody who would be in his
best interests.” Thus, at most, the record shows Mother worried that K.C.
could be returned to Father, that her worry was based on an incident
Mother told K.C. about, and that K.C. then acquiesced to Mother’s concerns
and requested Father’s rights be terminated. There is no evidence in the
record which shows K.C. himself feared returning to Father or that such a
fear was immediately and detrimentally impacting K.C., so the court’s
finding of such a worry is unsupported. Additionally, to the extent the court
relied on Mother’s fears in its findings, it may not do so because Mother’s
fears are too speculative to support a best-interests finding. See JS-500274,
167 Ariz. at 7. Therefore, based on this record, we vacate the court’s best-
interests finding and remand for the court to conduct a new analysis.

5

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶18 We vacate and remand for the court to re-enter its
statutory-ground finding and to conduct a new best-interests analysis
consistent with this decision. We leave to the discretion of the juvenile court
whether it chooses to hear additional evidence on remand or to proceed on
the current record.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

6