In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.H. and N.N.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.H. and N.N.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0031
FILED 07-21-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD27020
The Honorable Suzanne E. Cohen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli, Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Robert D. Rosanelli
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Marika J. Hodge
Counsel for Appellee Arizona Department of Child Safety
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.H. and N.N.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Robert H. (“Father”) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights as to his daughter A.H., asserting the
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) failed to diligently provide
reunification services.1 Because the record shows that Father received
sufficient services, and that offering additional services would have been
futile, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to affirming the
juvenile court’s findings. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 2, ¶ 2 (2016).
Father has two children with Valerie B. (“Mother”)—A.H., born in April
2023, and N.N., born in April 2024. N.N.’s birth was tumultuous; he was
born substance-exposed to methamphetamine, and during his birth Father
was arrested for threatening to harm a nurse with a bike pump. Shortly
after N.N.’s birth, and fearing DCS would take A.H. into DCS custody,
Mother abandoned N.N. at the hospital. DCS did not locate A.H. until July
2024, where she was found at a shelter along with her parents.

¶3 DCS promptly petitioned for dependency, alleging in part
that Father is unwilling or unable to provide parental care due to substance
abuse. Several months later, following a hearing at which neither parent
appeared, the juvenile court found A.H. and N.N. dependent as to both
parents and approved a case plan of family reunification.

¶4 Except for supervised visitation, Father showed little interest
in engaging in DCS’s services. He refused to complete any drug testing for
nearly 18 months. Though DCS offered substance abuse treatment through
Terros, Father’s refusal to test prevented him from participating in that

1 The same order also terminated Father’s rights as to his son N.N.,
but he did not contest termination of those rights at the termination hearing
and does not challenge that termination on appeal.

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treatment. DCS’s caseworker explained that communicating with Father
was difficult, as he either refused to speak with her or would simply tell her
he did not understand why DCS was involved with his children. On at least
one occasion when the caseworker tried to speak with Father at a
supervised visit, the caseworker felt that Father “appeared aggressive”
toward her.

¶5 In late 2025, DCS gave the parents letters outlining available
services and confirming DCS’s willingness to offer additional support. Of
the services offered, Father only engaged consistently in supervised
visitation.

¶6 Though he never participated in any substance abuse
treatment with DCS, Father claimed that he and Mother attended a
treatment program separate from what DCS offered beginning in July 2025
through November of that same year, when the program closed. Father,
however, never provided any records showing his participation in that
program and DCS could not confirm his engagement. The caseworker
attempted to call the facility the parents claimed they were attending, with
a phone number Father provided, but the caseworker was unable to reach
anyone at the program to confirm the parents’ participation. When Father
provided an address for the program, the caseworker discovered the
program had closed. There were records of Mother’s attendance at a
treatment program; however, those records also suggested Mother was
discharged from the program in October because of lack of attendance.

¶7 In October 2025, DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental
rights as to A.H. and N.N., alleging the statutory grounds of substance
abuse, six months’ time-in-care, and 15 months’ time-in-care. See A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(3), (8)(b)–(c). Following the February 2026 termination hearing,
at which Father, Mother, and the DCS caseworker testified, the juvenile
court granted the motion for termination of Father’s parental rights.
Relevant to this appeal, the court found that DCS provided, or offered,
several reunification services to Father, including supervised visitation,
drug testing, substance abuse assessment and treatment, paternity testing,
transportation, and case management.

¶8 Addressing participation in the case, the court explained that
the parties “chose to limit their engagement with the case manager,” who
unsuccessfully tried “to talk to the parents either in person or via
telephone.” The court noted Father’s aggressive behavior, and that the
parents frequently changed their phone numbers, but the case manager was
successful in communicating via email. The court also found that even

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though Father participated in pretrial hearings over the course of the
proceedings, it was not until the termination adjudication hearing when he
questioned the adequacy of services. The court concluded that Father’s
objection was not based in fact, as he had “refused to participate in
services,”2 and that based on the evidence presented DCS had made
“reasonable and/or diligent efforts (where applicable) . . . to effectuate
reunification of the family.” Father timely appealed, and we have
jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Father argues DCS failed to provide him with adequate
reunification services. Specifically, he points to the months between the
closure of his own treatment program in November 2025 and the
termination hearing in February 2026, which he characterizes as a
“substantial gap in his treatment.”

¶10 In considering an order terminating parental rights, we accept
the juvenile court’s factual findings if they are supported by reasonable
evidence, giving deference to that court’s unique role in weighing the
evidence and assessing witness credibility. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 (2023). We will affirm the court’s legal conclusions
unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 478–79, ¶ 31.

¶11 Before seeking termination of parental rights based on
substance abuse, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), DCS must make reasonable efforts to
provide reunification services, Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz.
450, 453, ¶ 12 (App. 2005). Similarly, termination of parental rights based
on time-in-care requires DCS to make a “diligent effort to provide
appropriate reunification services,” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8), meaning DCS
must “identify the conditions causing the child’s out-of-home placement,
provide services that have a reasonable prospect of success to remedy the
circumstances as they arise . . ., maintain consistent contact with the parent,
and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance
proves difficult.” Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 23, ¶ 50
(App. 2019). Even so, the requirement to provide services does not oblige
DCS to provide every conceivable reunification service or to ensure parents
participate in those services. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180
Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). Nor is DCS obligated to provide reunification
services that are futile or have no reasonable prospect of success. In re J.C.,

2 Earlier in its ruling, the juvenile court made it clear that Father did
participate in supervised visitation.

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259 Ariz. 60, 69, ¶ 39 (App. 2024); Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227
Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 15 (App. 2011).

¶12 Though Father argues it is undisputed that DCS “did not offer
him reunification services” after his treatment provider closed in
November 2025, the DCS caseworker testified that she provided the parents
with a service letter in late 2025 that included information on obtaining
substance abuse treatment through Terros. Any inability to access
substance abuse treatment did not arise from DCS’s neglect, but rather
Father’s refusal to engage in testing. Thus, viewed in the light most
favorable to affirming the juvenile court’s findings, Demetrius L., 239 Ariz.
at 2, ¶ 2, the record belies Father’s assertion that DCS failed to provide him
with substance abuse treatment after his other program closed.

¶13 Even accepting Father’s argument that reunification services
were not offered after November 2025, the record also shows that Father
consistently refused to engage with the services DCS had offered. For
nearly a year and a half, Father did not complete a single drug test that was
offered, and his willful refusal to engage in such testing interfered with his
ability to engage in appropriate treatment. The DCS caseworker similarly
testified that Father would not constructively communicate with her about
any such services. As the juvenile court explained, Father could not refuse
to participate in services and then properly claim DCS failed to provide
adequate services. Given his consistent refusal to engage in testing, offering
any additional substance abuse treatment would have been futile. Thus,
Father has not shown the court clearly erred by concluding that DCS
provided reasonable or diligent reunification services.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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