In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0033
FILED 10-19-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD31472
The Honorable Suzanne E. Cohen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant Mother

John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale
By John L. Popilek
Counsel for Appellant Father

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Laura J. Huff
Counsel for Appellee DCS

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Diamond H. (“Mother”) and Denroy C. (“Father”) appeal the
termination of their parental rights to their minor child (“Child”).
Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that grounds
for termination existed and DCS provided sufficient reunification services.
We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Father are the biological parents of Child, born in
May 2023. Child was born exposed to HIV and was placed on a medication
regimen. At the time of Child’s birth, Mother was suffering from psychosis.
Mother was known to the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) because six
of her previous children were removed due to Mother’s struggle with
mental illness and cognitive delays. Father was also known to DCS because
he had three other children removed. Later that month, Child was removed
from both parents’ care and placed in DCS’s temporary legal care.

¶3 Mother was placed in court-ordered treatment from 2023 to
2024. She had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder in remission, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and a moderate intellectual disability. Through
mental health services, Mother received medication to treat hallucinations,
paranoia, aggression, agitation, insomnia and inappropriate behavior.

¶4 Mother made significant improvements throughout these
proceedings. Mother was compliant with her prescribed medication, she
had her own apartment with on-site staff, and she continued treatment with
mental health service providers. Additionally, Mother was allowed to have
four hours per week of parenting time with Child in her home—three hours
supervised and one hour unsupervised.

¶5 Father had little contact with DCS after Child was born, as he
only contacted DCS’s case manager for bus passes and he was inconsistent
in his visits. Father did not drug test, attend substance abuse treatment, or
attend parenting classes for over a year. After visiting Child in person in

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C.
Decision of the Court

August 2024, Father disappeared for about a year before communicating
with DCS in May 2025 and again in October 2025.

¶6 Throughout this case, DCS attempted to provide numerous
services to both Mother and Father to reunify them with Child. This
included supervised visitation, family resource programs, case aides, drug
testing referrals, substance abuse treatment, psychological evaluations,
clinical services, and other services.

¶7 In October 2025, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental
rights to Child based on mental illness, mental deficiency, and fifteen
months’ time-in-care grounds, and Father’s parental rights based on
abandonment, chronic substance abuse, and fifteen months’ time-in-care
grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (3), (8).

¶8 Mother acknowledged that she has a mental illness and
deficiency and that she could not parent Child at the time of the severance.
However, Mother argued the juvenile court should give her more time to
improve her mental conditions, that DCS did not provide her with adequate
services, and that with proper services and time she can parent Child in the
future.

¶9 Father acknowledged he had limited contact with Child early
in the case, but he asserted that DCS failed to provide him with adequate
reunification services since October 2025, and that he should receive more
time before his rights are terminated.

¶10 The juvenile court found that DCS provided sufficient
services for both Mother and Father and terminated their parental rights to
Child based on each ground alleged by DCS.

¶11 Mother and Father timely appealed this ruling, and we have
jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S.
§§ 8-235(A) and 12-120.21(A)(1), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the
Juvenile Court 603(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶12 When reviewing a termination order, we accept the juvenile
court’s factual findings if reasonable evidence and inferences support them.
Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 30 (2023). “We will
affirm a termination order unless the juvenile court abuses its discretion or
the court’s findings are not supported by reasonable evidence.” Timothy B.
v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 14 (2022). We view the record in

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C.
Decision of the Court

the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court’s findings. Brionna
J., 255 Ariz. at 479 ¶ 32.

I. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Terminating Father’s Parental
Rights.

¶13 Father asserts DCS failed to provide adequate reunification
services. DCS argues that Father’s argument is moot because he does not
challenge the juvenile court’s abandonment finding.

¶14 Under A.R.S. § 8–533(B), “only one statutory ground for
severance is required” to terminate parental rights. Crystal E. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577 ¶ 5 (App. 2017). Where a parent fails to
challenge a termination ground found by the juvenile court, the parent
“waive[s] any contention that the court erred in granting severance on that
basis.” Id.

¶15 Before parental rights are terminated, DCS generally must
show it made “reasonable efforts to preserve the family relationship.” Mary
Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 186 ¶ 1 (App. 1999).

¶16 But DCS is not required to provide reunification efforts before
severing parental rights on the statutory ground of abandonment, because
although parents have a constitutional right to “the care, custody, and
control of their children,” there is a “lesser constitutional standard in
absence of an existing parent-child relationship.” Toni W. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 61, 65-66 ¶¶ 13, 15 (App. 1999). Where abandonment
has been shown, there is at best a de minimis parent-child relationship. See
id. at 66 ¶ 14. Therefore, a showing of abandonment provides a basis for
terminating parental rights to Child, regardless of DCS’s reunification
efforts.

¶17 Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding of
abandonment and even if he did, reasonable evidence supports it.
Abandonment is:

[T]he failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to
maintain regular contact with the child, including providing
normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial finding
that a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and
communicate with the child. Failure to maintain a normal
parental relationship with the child without just cause for a
period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of
abandonment.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C.
Decision of the Court

A.R.S. § 8-531(1).

¶18 Father admitted he had little contact with Child after Child
was born and was inconsistent in attending the scheduled visitations.
Father failed to communicate with DCS for almost a year. He did not visit
Child from August 2024 to December 2025. DCS presented prima facie
evidence of abandonment and reasonable evidence supports the trial
court’s finding.

¶19 Because we affirm termination of Father’s parental rights on
abandonment grounds, we need not address whether DCS provided
sufficient reunification services to Father. See Crystal E., 241 Ariz. at 577 ¶ 5.

¶20 Additionally, Father argues that the juvenile court abused its
discretion by failing to continue the matter for a few additional months. A
motion to continue “must be made in good faith and must state good cause
for the continuance.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 318(a). But Father did not file a
motion to continue the termination trial. Although Father quotes trial
counsel’s closing argument asking the juvenile court to deny the severance
and “allow [Father] just a little bit more time” to get his own place and
complete services, this was not a request for a continuance of the
termination trial. Thus, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.

II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Terminating Mother’s Parental
Rights.

A. Mother Did Not Waive Her Challenge to DCS’s
Reunification Efforts.

¶21 Mother asserts that DCS did not provide adequate
reunification services to her. DCS argues that Mother waived her challenge
to the juvenile court’s diligent-effort findings because she failed to
challenge DCS’s provision of services throughout the dependency or at the
termination trial.

¶22 DCS’s reunification efforts cannot be challenged for the first
time on appeal. Shawanee S. v. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178–79 ¶ 16
(App. 2014). It is incumbent on the parent to bring concerns over the
Department’s reunification services to the juvenile court, “thereby giving
that court a reasonable opportunity to address the matter and ensure [DCS]
was in compliance with its obligation to provide appropriate reunification
services.” Id. at 179 ¶ 18.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C.
Decision of the Court

¶23 Here, however, because Mother arguably raised the issue at
trial, she did not waive her argument that DCS provided insufficient
reunification services. See Shawanee S., 234 Ariz. at 178 ¶ 14 (“[A]t a
termination hearing, a parent can dispute evidence that [DCS] claims shows
a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services.”). Moreover,
we prefer to resolve this issue on the merits because this case involves the
best interests of a child, and we will thus consider Mother’s argument. See
Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273 ¶ 10 (App. 2013).

B. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
Diligent-Efforts Finding.

¶24 Mother claims that DCS did not make diligent efforts to
provide her with reunification services. DCS claims reasonable evidence
supports the juvenile court’s diligent-efforts finding. We agree with DCS
that reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings.

¶25 To sever Mother’s parental rights on mental illness grounds
and time-in-care grounds, DCS must demonstrate that it has made
reasonable and diligent efforts to preserve Mother’s parental relationship
with Child. See Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192 ¶ 33; A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). DCS
does not have to provide “every conceivable service,” but it must provide
a parent with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed
to improve the parent’s ability to care for the child. Maricopa Cnty. Juv.
Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). DCS does not provide
such an opportunity “when it neglects to offer the very services that its
consulting expert recommends.” Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192 ¶ 37.

¶26 The totality of the record supports the juvenile court’s
findings that DCS provided reasonable and diligent reunification efforts.
The juvenile court noted that DCS provided Mother parenting programs,
supervised visitation, case management services, transportation,
psychological evaluations, and other services. Additionally, Mother
received counseling, trauma therapy, psychiatric assistance, life skills, and
housing assistance from mental health service providers. The court further
noted that Mother “chose to self-refer” to those providers and that DCS
“justifiably, did not choose to have Mother engage in duplicative mental
health services.”

¶27 Mother claims that DCS did not provide “more targeted and
aggressive instruction surrounding emergency planning, and what to
expect in children at various levels of development,” which was
recommended by DCS’s psychologist. However, DCS’s psychologist

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C.
Decision of the Court

testified that Mother was already receiving some of these services through
COPA and she did not recommend that DCS provide services beyond those
Mother received through COPA. Additionally, DCS’s psychologist
recommended that the other mental health provider increase the
“specificity of the services” rather than having DCS provide duplicative
services. Furthermore, the juvenile court found that Mother failed to “avail
herself completely” of a child therapy program because she only attended
13 out of 41 scheduled appointments.

¶28 Thus, there is reasonable evidence to support the juvenile
court’s finding that DCS provided reasonable and diligent efforts to reunify
Mother with Child. See JS–501904, 180 Ariz. at 353 (DCS “is not required to
provide every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in
each service it offers” and a parent’s “failure or refusal to participate in the
programs and services [DCS] offered or recommended does not foreclose
termination of her parental rights”).

C. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
Determination that Mother’s Condition Will Continue for a
Prolonged Indeterminate Period.

¶29 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in severing her
parental rights based on her mental illness and deficiency because the
record shows there “was a definite time period to finalize and evaluate
whether Mother could parent her child.” DCS argues that the record gives
no indication that “Mother would be able to parent independently in one
to two years.”

¶30 To terminate parental rights due to mental illness or
deficiency, the juvenile court must find “[t]hat the parent is unable to
discharge parental responsibilities because of mental illness [or] mental
deficiency . . . and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition
will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

¶31 Mother points to testimony during the severance hearing
from one of Mother’s psychological evaluators that Mother “would have
needed maybe another year or two to continue to build on” the skills
needed to care for Child. However, this was not a definitive statement that
Mother was on a one to two year timeline for being able to parent Child.
Rather, the psychologist noted that was her opinion, at the time of a June
2025 evaluation, of the possible length of time it would take Mother to
acquire independent parenting ability, because although Mother was
making progress, “it was slow progress.” And this evidence did not

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C.
Decision of the Court

establish that the conditions causing Mother’s inability to parent would
only continue for a determinate period.

¶32 Indeed, the psychologist was then asked to clarify, as of that
moment, whether there were “reasonable grounds to believe that
[Mother’s] condition, the diagnosis that [the psychologist had] given, will
continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period,” whether there were
“reasonable grounds to believe that [Mother’s] cognitive disabilities,
mental deficiencies will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period of
time,” and whether there was “a substantial likelihood that [Mother] will
not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control
in the near future.” The psychologist said yes to all three questions.
Explaining her answer, the psychologist stated that she was concerned
about Mother’s desire to be off medication, missed child therapy visits,
reliance on provider support staff, and ability to maintain employment to
support Child.

¶33 The juvenile court, while noting Mother’s progress, found
there was a reasonable basis from which to conclude that Mother’s mental
illness and deficiency will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period
based on the totality of the record. The court stated that “Mother’s mental
illness and mental deficiency is a lifelong diagnosis” and that her
diminished IQ “will be unchanged.” While Mother was medically
compliant for the last year, the court found it “concerning” that she needed
to be continuously reeducated “on the importance of taking her
medications” as she will likely suffer psychosis, hallucinations, aggression,
and paranoia if she discontinues her medication. Reasonable evidence
supports the court’s determination.

CONCLUSION

¶34 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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