In RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C., L.S., L.S.,
AND L.S.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0036
FILED 09-02-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD44159
The Honorable Michael Rassas, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant Victoria S.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer L. Thorson, Toni M. Valadez
Counsel for Appellee DCS

The Law Office of Shannon R. Glau, PLC
By Shannon Glau
Counsel for Appellee M.C.

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C., et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Anni Hill Foster
joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 Victoria S. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental
rights to her four children. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother has four children: Anna, Barry, Charlie and Don, all
born between 2014 and 2025.1

¶3 In June 2024, DCS opened an investigation after it received
allegations that the children’s paternal grandfather had sexually abused
nine-year-old Anna. During that investigation, DCS uncovered substance
abuse by Mother and domestic violence between Mother and the father of
her youngest three children. DCS removed the children, and the superior
court found them dependent. The court ordered Mother to participate in
services, including substance-abuse treatment and testing, individual
counseling, domestic-violence classes, Family Connections, the Nurturing
Parenting Program and supervised parenting time. Don was born
substance-exposed in January 2025; his umbilical cord tested positive for
marijuana and alcohol.

¶4 Mother did not meaningfully participate in services. She was
closed out of some and faced closure out of others because she irregularly
attended. She also tested positive for methamphetamine in October 2025.

¶5 DCS placed Barry, Charlie and later Don together in a
licensed foster home, and placed Anna with a family friend before moving
her to a group home when that placement broke down. DCS looked for
relatives. It identified, vetted and reached out to known family members.
None were willing or able to take the children, so DCS assigned a Family
Connection Specialist to keep searching. At a review hearing in December
2025, Mother’s counsel named a maternal aunt and uncle in Maricopa as a

1 We use pseudonyms for the children to protect their identities.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C., et al.
Decision of the Court

possible placement and promised Mother would send DCS their contact
information. She never did.

¶6 The superior court changed the case plan to severance and
adoption. DCS moved to terminate Mother’s rights on the grounds of
chronic substance abuse and out-of-home placement. See A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(3), (8)(a)–(c). Mother skipped the termination hearing in January
2026. At that hearing, DCS’s case manager mistakenly testified that Mother
had never given DCS the names of an aunt and uncle when Mother had
only neglected to provide their contact information.

¶7 The court found DCS proved every alleged ground, by clear
and convincing evidence, for all four children. It found termination was in
each child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Barry,
Charlie and Don already lived in an adoptive placement that met all their
needs. Anna had no placement yet, but the court found her adoptable and
noted DCS had assigned a search specialist to find her a home. The court
also found that keeping the parent-child relationship alive would harm the
children because Mother could not or would not meet their basic needs, and
she was unlikely to parent them anytime soon. And last, the court found
the children’s placements were the least restrictive available.

¶8 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 8-
235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 DCS argues Mother waived her argument on appeal because
she never raised it in the superior court and fails to allege fundamental
error. See Brenda D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437, 447–48, ¶¶ 37–38
(2018) (a parent who skips the due-process objection below is limited to
fundamental-error review on appeal, and must show error, that the error is
fundamental, and that it caused prejudice). Because the children’s best
interests are at stake, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits. Nold v.
Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 10 (App. 2013).

¶10 Mother raises one argument. She argues the superior court
erred by ignoring a conflict in the DCS case manager’s testimony about a
possible kinship placement, and by terminating her rights without
investigating that placement further. Had the court done so, she argues, it
could have weighed guardianship as a less restrictive alternative to
termination. She leans mainly on Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz.
470 (2022), along with a cluster of statutes and rules governing DCS’s

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C., et al.
Decision of the Court

placement duties and the court’s required findings. See A.R.S. §§ 1-601(B),
8-514(B), -538(C); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 341(f)(2)(B).

¶11 Timothy B. does not help Mother. There, DCS moved to
terminate on the length-of-sentence ground, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4), which
asks whether an incarcerated parent’s sentence will deprive the child of a
“normal home” for years. Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 472, ¶ 1. Our supreme
court held that when no other parent can provide a normal home during
incarceration, the court should ask whether another person was willing to
serve as permanent guardian. Id. at 477, ¶ 27. A “normal home,” the court
explained, can be one headed by a guardian rather than the parent. Id. at
476–77, ¶¶ 25–27. That holding rests on the length-of-sentence ground’s
“normal home” inquiry. It does not force every termination case to weigh
guardianship. DCS never sought, and the court never found, termination
on the length-of-sentence ground here. The grounds were chronic
substance abuse and out-of-home placement. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3),
(8)(a)–(c). Timothy B.’s guardianship-consideration rule does not reach
those grounds.

¶12 Even if DCS was required to pursue the guardianship option,
Mother cannot show she was prejudiced by the alleged error. A permanent
guardianship requires a finding that “[t]he likelihood that the child would
be adopted is remote or termination of parental rights would not be in the
child’s best interests.” A.R.S. § 8-871(A)(4). The superior court found the
opposite. Barry, Charlie and Don lived in an adoptive placement that met
their needs. Anna, though not yet placed, was adoptable, with a search
specialist already looking for her home. Thus, even if the court did not
recognize the case manager’s mistaken testimony, Mother has not shown
the court could have found a guardianship as a less restrictive alternative.
See Brenda D., 243 Ariz. at 448, ¶ 38 (under fundamental error review,
appellant “must affirmatively prove prejudice”).

¶13 Mother separately contends DCS failed its statutory duty to
identify and assess relative placements. See A.R.S. § 8-514(B) (DCS must
place a child in the least restrictive available placement, following an order
of preference that starts with parents and grandparents). We review the
adequacy of DCS’s placement efforts for an abuse of discretion. See Antonio
P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 402, 404, ¶ 8 (App. 2008). The record
shows DCS identified, vetted and tried to reach known relatives, and kept
a specialist searching for others. None were willing or able to take the
children. The court did not abuse its discretion.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.C., et al.
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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