In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.F. and S.F.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.F. and S.F.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0041
FILED 10-09-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS521395
The Honorable Jay R. Adleman, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Myers & Associates PLLC, Phoenix
By Jamie N. Myers
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Berkshire Law Office PLLC, Tempe
By Alexandra Sandlin, Keith Berkshire
Counsel for Appellee Father

Stephen R. Jones Attorney at Law, Mesa
By Stephen R. Jones
Counsel for Appellee Children

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.F. and S.F.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

G A O N A, Judge:

¶1 Brittany S. (“Mother”) appeals the denial of her petition to
terminate Michael F. (“Father”)’s parental rights to their children. The
evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that Mother failed to
prove statutory grounds for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (2). We
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the
juvenile court’s order. See Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 479
¶ 32 (2023).

¶3 Mother and Father are the parents of Stephanie, born in
September 2011, and Sara, born in August 2016. We use pseudonyms to
protect the children’s identities.

¶4 In March 2024, Father moved to California for a job
opportunity. He believed Mother and the children would join him there
after the school year ended. Soon after he arrived in California, however,
Mother informed him that she planned to file for divorce.

¶5 Mother encouraged Father to visit the children, stating she
wanted to give “the kiddos maximum time with [him].” In May 2024, he
returned to Arizona to spend time with the children and attend his younger
daughter’s school talent show.

¶6 Two months later, Mother petitioned for divorce. In her
petition, she requested the family court grant Father “reasonable parenting
time pursuant to the Yavapai County Child Access Guidelines.” The
parents communicated about a parenting time schedule, and Mother
explained to Father that she wanted their children to have time with him,
including vacation time. She expressed that she felt “it should be as open as
possible,” and that she didn’t “ever want to or feel the need to seek custody

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for the kids.” She told him he was “a great dad,” and she wanted “a
partnership.” She wrote, “I’m willing to have a blended family . . . I don’t
want to lose what we’ve built, I honestly think we can do this healthfully.”
She assured him that “the [divorce] papers are nothing we didn’t discuss.”

¶7 From April 2024 through August 2024, Father had some
contact with the children by phone or text message and mailed them gifts
regularly. He also made a limited effort to communicate with Stephanie’s
medical providers.

¶8 In September 2024, however, Mother told Father his texts and
gifts were triggering the children’s health problems. She assured him she
didn’t want to keep the children from him but told him she would broach
his request for a FaceTime call with the children with their therapist.

¶9 In November 2024, Mother obtained a default decree with a
parenting plan and child support order. Contrary to her prior assurances to
Father, the parenting order granted him only four hours of supervised
parenting time once a month in Arizona and a 15-minute phone call with
each child on Fridays. The court also ordered that he pay $1,870 in child
support per month.

¶10 That same month, Father requested contact with the children
while he was in town collecting his personal belongings. Mother denied his
request because he wasn’t following the parenting time orders. Shortly after
that failed visit, Father contacted her to confirm his weekly Friday
telephone call with the children. Mother informed him that the children
“deregulate[d]” when they learned he was in town collecting his property
“without permission and without coordination planning,” and that his
contact with the children would occur when “their therapists deem it to be
in the children’s best interests.” A few days later, she asked him to
communicate with the children by writing them a letter to discuss in
therapy. He, in turn, emailed the children long letters.

¶11 In January 2025, Father moved to set aside the default decree,
parenting plan, and child support order. He alleged that Mother failed to
give him proper notice of the default proceedings, that the parenting plan
wasn’t in the children’s best interests, and that what she alleged in the
petition didn’t support the court’s default orders. After a hearing, the
family court granted the set-aside motion. The court also ordered that the
parties attend mediation and stayed the family court proceedings pending
the outcome of mediation.

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¶12 In February 2025, in a request forwarded through counsel,
Father asked to speak to the children. A month later, Mother emailed Father
a telephone number for the children. In the same email, however, she told
him, “email communication is preferred, as we work with their therapists
to re-integrate your communication with them. Thank you for
understanding – your email from last week was discussed in therapy, and
at this time the kids prefer emails or letters, vs telephonic communique.”

¶13 In June 2025, the mediation didn’t succeed, and the family
court scheduled a hearing about parenting time and child support. That
same month, Father emailed Mother to request a card or video call from the
children for Father’s Day. Mother responded that she would
“communicate [the] request to the kids and let [Father] know what they
say.” This prompted his counsel to contact Mother’s counsel to express
concerns about Mother placing the children in the middle of the custody
dispute, and ultimately Father had a video call with the children for the
holiday.

¶14 The next month, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s
parental rights in the juvenile court, and the family court stayed its
proceedings for a second time. Mother alleged Father had abandoned and
neglected the children. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (2). She also alleged
termination was in the children’s best interests so they would have
“stability and a future free from abandonment and neglect,” and so Mother
could “plan for the children’s care should she be unavailable to parent.”
Father responded, asserting that Mother’s petition was a bad-faith effort to
delay the family court from entering parenting time orders.

¶15 In February 2026, the juvenile court held a termination
adjudication hearing. At that hearing, the court heard testimony from the
social worker Mother retained to conduct the severance social study
required by A.R.S. § 8-536(A). The social worker opined that Father hadn’t
abandoned the children because family court proceedings were ongoing
and she had concerns about his access to the children. She testified that
Father often sent the children gifts, and eventually Mother asked him to
stop sending gifts to the children. She observed that Mother restricted or
blocked Father’s contact with the children. The social worker added,
however, that if the juvenile court were to conclude that Father had
abandoned the children, she believed that the termination of his parental
rights would be in the children’s best interests because the children want to
be adopted by their stepfather.

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¶16 Mother testified that Father never paid child support and
hadn’t called the children or otherwise exercised his monthly parenting
time under the default parenting orders. She also testified that Father only
paid $1,100 towards the children’s support. She testified that his absence
benefited the children because they are in a stable home environment and
free from mental abuse.

¶17 On cross-examination, Mother agreed Father was part of the
children’s day-to-day lives before the parties’ separation. She admitted that
he had asked to talk to the children repeatedly, but she didn’t permit the
contact because the children didn’t want to talk to him. She explained that
the children told their therapist that they “wanted a break from hearing
from him.” She acknowledged that Father sent gifts but added that the
children didn’t want the age-inappropriate gifts he sent them, and the
children were upset that he was sending them gifts but not supporting them
financially.

¶18 The children’s stepfather also testified. He explained that he
and Mother married in March 2025. He described being very involved in
parenting the children, stating that they call him “Dad” or “Daddy” and
that they want him to adopt them. He also testified that he calls Father “bio
guy” at children’s request.

¶19 Father, for his part, testified that he was an “engaged parent”
before he and Mother separated. He explained that he didn’t respond to the
divorce petition because the petition was amicable and asked for reasonable
parenting time. He also described being shocked when he read the default
divorce decree and parenting orders because they provided him with
minimal contact with the children. He explained that, around the same
time, Mother told him to communicate with the children through letters.
He testified that he sent the children emails to read in therapy based on her
request. And he added that he resorted to the legal system to seek parental
rights because Mother wouldn’t allow him to have contact, and that he
spoke with the children on Father’s Day in 2026.

¶20 Finally, Father testified that after moving to California, he lost
his job and suffered a back injury, which made it difficult to travel to
Arizona. He stated that he owed no child support arrears because the
default order was set aside. He also testified that he wanted to provide for
his children and that, when the family court enters a child support order,
he will pay so long as he is employed.

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Decision of the Court

¶21 In a detailed ruling, the juvenile court denied Mother’s
termination petition. The court found the record evidence didn’t support
Mother’s allegation that Father abandoned the children. The court also
found Mother failed to prove the neglect ground. Because she failed to
prove either ground she alleged in her petition, the court didn’t address her
allegation that termination was in the children’s best interests.

¶22 Mother timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction. Ariz.
Const. art. VI, § 9; A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶23 On appeal, Mother contends the juvenile court abused its
discretion by concluding she failed to prove the statutory grounds of
abandonment and neglect under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (2).

¶24 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights only if it
finds a statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear and convincing
evidence and finds termination in the child’s best interests by a
preponderance of the evidence. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146,
149–50 ¶ 8 (2018). If, however, the petitioner doesn’t prove a statutory
ground for termination, the court may end its analysis without considering
best interests. In re E.C., 261 Ariz. 1, 7 ¶ 32 (App. 2025).

¶25 We accept the juvenile court’s factual findings if supported by
reasonable evidence, giving due regard to that court’s unique role in
weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility. Brionna J., 255
Ariz. at 478 ¶ 30. We will uphold the court’s legal conclusions on statutory
grounds unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 478–79 ¶ 31. We will not
reweigh the evidence. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 18 (“The appellate court’s
role is not to weigh the evidence.” (quotation omitted)). We review de novo
the meaning and application of A.R.S. § 8-533. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 476 ¶
17.

I. The Juvenile Court Didn’t Err in Concluding that Mother Failed to
Prove Abandonment Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1).

¶26 “Abandonment” is:

the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to
maintain regular contact with the child, including providing
normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial finding
that a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and
communicate with the child. Failure to maintain a normal

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Decision of the Court

parental relationship with the child without just cause for a
period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of
abandonment.

A.R.S. § 8-531(1).

¶27 The juvenile court concluded that Mother failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that Father abandoned the children. In
support of this conclusion, the court found:

(1) Father attempted to negotiate a “reasonable” parenting
time arrangement between April–July 2024; (2) despite those
efforts, Mother obtained a default decree that substantially
restricted Father’s access to the children and further required
him to travel to Arizona for any in-person visits; (3) Father
obtained a judgment setting aside those parenting time
orders; (4) Father attended a Yavapai County mediation in an
effort to negotiate a parenting time plan; (5) Father—through
his counsel—made efforts toward improving his access to the
children; and (6) prior to litigating their parenting plan in the
family court, Mother initiated her juvenile court petition to
terminate Father’s parental rights.

In addition, [ . . . ] the Court finds that (1) Father returned to
Arizona in May 2024 in order to see one of the children [ ]
perform in a school talent show; (2) during June–August 2024,
he communicated sporadically with the children on Facebook
Messenger; (3) Father made an effort to see the children in
Arizona during his brief trip in November 2024; (4) Father
made limited efforts to communicate with Mother regarding
the children and their mental health needs; (5) Father made
certain efforts—albeit limited in nature—to remain apprised
of the information regarding the children’s mental health
providers; and (6) in spite of Father’s unemployment that he
suffered shortly after his return to California, he has provided
approximately $1,000.00 in financial support since that time.

The record contains ample evidence to support these findings, and we don’t
reweigh conflicting evidence or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses on
appeal. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151–52 ¶ 18.

¶28 Mother argues, however, that the juvenile court erred by
treating Father’s actions to assert his legal rights in family court as a
“substitute” for maintaining contact and a normal parental relationship

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Decision of the Court

with the children. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249
¶ 18 (2000) (“abandonment is measured not by a parent’s subjective intent,
but by the parent’s conduct.”). She equates Father’s efforts to litigate his
parenting time in the family court as expressions of his subjective intent,
not “completed conduct.”

¶29 The juvenile court didn’t err by considering Father’s efforts to
assert his legal rights to parenting time in the family court. When a parent
faces circumstances that prevent him from “exercising traditional methods
of bonding with his child [the parent] must act persistently to establish the
relationship however possible and must vigorously assert [his] legal rights
to the extent necessary.” Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 296 ¶ 20 (App.
2013) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

¶30 That’s exactly what Father did. First, he tried to communicate
with the children through Mother. When she refused, he turned to “the
legal system as a last resort,” moved to set aside the default orders,
responded to the divorce petition, attended mediation, and negotiated
contact with the children through his counsel. Throughout this period,
Mother blocked or restricted his access to the children, improperly
defaulted him, and stayed the family court proceedings.

¶31 Mother questions Father’s failure to use the telephone
number she provided for him to call the children. True, she emailed him a
phone number for the children. But in the same email, she asked him not to
call the children and told him the children prefer he email them because
they could address his letters in therapy “to re-integrate [his]
communication with them.” So he emailed the children, showing respect
for what Mother represented were their therapeutic needs.

¶32 Mother also argues that Father never exercised his parenting
time under the vacated parenting plan. Mother, however, provided no basis
in the divorce petition for these restrictive orders, which would have
required Father to pay for visit supervision and only provided one short
monthly visit in Arizona. Father explained that he had trouble traveling to
Arizona during this time due to his unemployment and medical problems.
Regardless, the family court vacated these orders and permitted Father to
seek reasonable parenting time and child support orders. That family court
matter would have gone forward had Mother not petitioned to terminate
his parental rights.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.F. and S.F.
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II. Mother Failed to Establish Prima Facie Abandonment Under
A.R.S. § 8-531(1).

¶33 Mother contends that the abandonment statute directs the
juvenile court to examine whether the parent abandoned the child during a
set period before the filing of the termination petition, and once
abandonment is established, a parent cannot undo the abandonment
through post-petition actions. She also asserts that Father didn’t move to
set aside the default order until January 2025, and that “action occurred
after Father had already” abandoned the children.

¶34 To establish prima facie abandonment, Mother needed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father (1) failed to maintain a
normal parental relationship with the children, (2) for six months, (3)
without just cause. A.R.S. § 8-531(1); see In re B.W., 260 Ariz. 123, 129–30 ¶¶
17–18 (2025) (analyzing just cause).

¶35 The record established that Father had some contact with the
children by phone and text message from April through August 2024.
During this period, he often sent them gifts. He visited the children in May
2024 and made a last-minute request to visit with them again in November
2024, which Mother denied. Even after Mother stopped permitting him to
call or text the children, he continued to send them gifts and letters.

¶36 On this record, Mother didn’t—and can’t—show Father had
no just cause for failing to maintain a normal parental relationship with the
children when she interfered with that relationship at every opportunity.
See Calvin B., 232 Ariz. at 297 ¶ 21 (“A parent may not restrict the other
parent from interacting with their child and then petition to terminate the
latter’s rights for abandonment.”).

¶37 On these facts, the juvenile court didn’t err in concluding that
Mother failed to prove the abandonment ground.

III. The Juvenile Court Didn’t Err in Concluding that Mother Failed to
Prove Neglect Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2).

¶38 Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred by
concluding that Father didn’t neglect the children. She argues the court
applied a narrow definition of neglect, which reduced the statutory ground
for neglect to “a child-support dispute.”

¶39 As relevant here, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) provides, “[e]vidence
sufficient to justify the termination of the parent-child relationship shall

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.F. and S.F.
Decision of the Court

include . . . [t]hat the parent has neglected or willfully abused a child.” Thus,
the juvenile court can terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent neglected the child by being unable or
unwilling to provide basic necessities “if that inability or unwillingness
causes substantial risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare[.]” A.R.S. §
8-201(25)(a) (defining “neglect”).

¶40 The juvenile court noted that Mother’s neglect allegation
“rests entirely on her assertion that Father has failed to provide financial
support for the minor children.” The court found Father’s failure to provide
consistent financial support wasn’t neglect because the statutory scheme
addressing the neglect ground requires proof that Father’s lack of support
“cause[d] substantial risk of harm to the [children’s] health or welfare.” The
court noted that the evidence indicates “both children are doing
exceedingly well” and there was “no evidence that Father’s financial
neglect has endangered the children’s health or welfare.”

¶41 Mother acknowledges that she and her husband were
meeting the children’s needs. But she contends the juvenile court erred
because the court’s analysis under this ground “should be on whether
Father met the needs of the children, not anyone else.” And, she continues,
the juvenile court “overlooked that Father was required to provide
supervision, care, and guidance.” These arguments, however, relate to the
abandonment ground—not neglect—and “[n]onsupport alone is not
enough to establish abandonment.” In re Yuma County Juv. Ct. Action No. J-
87-119, 161 Ariz. 537, 539 (App. 1989). Father also wasn’t avoiding his
financial obligation; instead, he was seeking to establish it in the family
court before Mother filed a termination petition.

¶42 Reasonable evidence therefore supports the juvenile court’s
conclusion that Mother failed to prove the neglect ground.

CONCLUSION

¶43 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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