In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.S.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.S.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0047
FILED 08-13-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Nos. JD534635
JS521402
The Honorable David J. Palmer, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John L. Popilek, PC, Scottsdale
By John L. Popilek
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Yu-Shan Kuo
Counsel for Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.S.
Decision of the Court

¶1 Terrence S. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental
rights to L.S. (“Child”). Because the superior court properly found that
termination was in Child’s best interests and Father does not challenge the
statutory grounds for termination, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Child was born to Chelsie R. (“Mother”) and Father in 2021.
In March 2022, the superior court ordered Mother to deliver Child into
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) custody based on allegations that she
engaged in criminal activity with Child present. In June 2022, the court
found Child dependent as to Mother based on Mother’s substance abuse
and criminal activity, and dependent as to Father due to his failure to
provide proper parental care and to establish his paternity.1 DCS
maintained custody of Child and placed her with a foster family.

¶3 After Father agreed in April 2022 to undergo paternity
testing, the court allowed him weekly visitation with Child.2 Because of
Father’s inconsistent visitation attendance, his visits were changed to
shorter twice-weekly visits. DCS also required Father to call to confirm
each scheduled visit. Even so, some visits were cancelled because Child
refused to see Father or Father failed to confirm his attendance. When
Father did visit Child, the visits generally went well, but problems arose at
times when Father confronted the DCS employees about injuries that Child
received while at school or in the placement’s care.

¶4 The superior court ordered Father to drug-test following the
initial dependency hearing. Father tested positive for fentanyl and
methamphetamine in March 2022 but refused further testing. He also once
brought a vial containing fentanyl to a visit. DCS referred Father for
substance-abuse treatment, but he did not engage with treatment or any
other reunification service aside from visitation.

¶5 After Child had been in foster care for almost two years, DCS
moved to terminate Father’s parental rights on substance-abuse grounds,
but withdrew its motion after a hearing and maintained a case plan for

1 The superior court terminated Mother’s parental rights in November 2025.

She is not a party to this appeal.

2 For reasons not made clear in the record, Father did not complete paternity

testing until 2024, and his paternity was not established until early 2025.

2

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.S.
Decision of the Court

severance and adoption. Between May 2024 and April 2025, DCS several
times moved unsuccessfully to terminate Father’s parental rights.

¶6 In July 2025, DCS again moved to terminate Father’s rights on
substance-abuse grounds under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 8-
533(B)(3), and alleged Child had been in an out-of-home placement for
longer than nine months and Father failed to remedy the circumstances
causing the out-of-home placement under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a). The
superior court held a termination hearing in January 2026 and found that
DCS established both grounds by clear and convincing evidence and
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in Child’s
best interests. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B).

¶7 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 To terminate parental rights, the superior court must find by
clear and convincing evidence that a ground for termination exists under
A.R.S. § 8-533(B) and must find by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination serves the child’s best interests. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
245 Ariz. 146, 149-50, ¶ 8 (2018). On review, we must accept the superior
court’s factual findings provided they are supported by reasonable
evidence and inferences. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478,
¶ 30 (2023). We do not reweigh the evidence; instead, we defer to the
superior court’s determinations on conflicting evidence and witness
credibility. Id.; Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 18.

¶9 Father argues that DCS failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that termination was in Child’s best interests. Father does not
raise, and therefore has waived, any challenge to the court’s findings on
either ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B). See Crystal E. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577, ¶ 1 (App. 2017).

¶10 “[T]ermination is in the child’s best interests if either: (1) the
child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if
severance is denied,” and the court’s primary concern must be “the child’s
interest in stability and security.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 13. In making
this determination, the court should consider “the totality of the
circumstances existing at the time of the severance.” Id. Here, the superior
court found that termination would benefit Child by furthering the case
plan of adoption, “which would provide [Child] with permanency and
stability in a loving home.”

3

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.S.
Decision of the Court

¶11 Father contends the superior court erred by disregarding both
the harm that would result from severing his existing relationship with
Child and the injuries Child sustained while with the foster placement.
Father’s argument is unpersuasive. Reasonable evidence supports the
court’s finding that termination would benefit Child. The court heard
testimony that Child is thriving in her current placement and that the
placement is meeting her needs. The court also heard testimony about the
benefits of permanency for a young child, and that Child is adoptable even
if her current placement cannot adopt her. This evidence suffices to support
the court’s determination that terminating Father’s parental rights so Child
could be adopted would benefit Child. And Father’s contention that the
court should have given more weight to the strength of his relationship
with Child and to Child’s injuries amounts to a request to reweigh the
evidence, which we will not do. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478, ¶ 28.

¶12 Father also argues that DCS had to present expert testimony
on whether the immediate benefits of permanency outweighed the long-
term harm caused by termination. As support, Father cites cases in which
Arizona courts have required that expert testimony be presented to prove
a claim, but none involve the termination of parental rights. And A.R.S. § 8-
533 does not require either party to provide expert testimony to prove a
child’s best interests, and we will not read an additional requirement into
the statute. See In re M.N., 259 Ariz. 120, 125, ¶ 28 (2025).

¶13 The court’s finding that adoption would increase Child’s
stability and security was sufficient to establish that Child will benefit from
termination and that termination is therefore in Child’s best interests. See
Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 13.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

4