In Re Term of Parental Rights as to T.T.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0052
FILED 8-12-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD41285
The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli, Phoenix
By Robert D. Rosanelli
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Veronica F. Rios
Counsel for Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.
Decision of the Court

¶1 Elaine T. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to T.T. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the
juvenile court’s termination order. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
196 Ariz. 246, 250, ¶ 20 (2000).

¶3 Mother’s daughter, T.T., was born in September 2021. The
day after T.T. was born, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) received a
hotline report from the hospital concerning Mother’s ability to parent.
Mother reportedly presented with a cognitive disability, causing her to
struggle to hold T.T. correctly and answer simple questions, such as what
her phone number was.

¶4 DCS took temporary custody of T.T. upon her discharge from
the hospital, then petitioned to adjudicate her dependent. The juvenile
court found T.T. dependent as to Mother in April 2022.

¶5 DCS referred Mother to parenting classes and supervised
visitation. At DCS’s direction, Mother self-referred for counseling. Mother
also received a psychological evaluation and was diagnosed with
“Intellectual Disability (Intellectual Developmental Disorder), Moderate.”

¶6 Mother regularly participated in services until March 2023,
when she moved to Illinois with her aunt and uncle. After Mother moved
to Illinois, DCS provided only virtual visitation and case management
services. Mother obtained counseling in Illinois through self-referral.

¶7 In June 2023, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental
rights and those of T.T.’s unknown father, alleging mental deficiency and
fifteen months’ out-of-home placement grounds as to Mother and
abandonment as to the unknown father. In December 2023, the juvenile
court terminated the unknown father’s parental rights but denied
termination as to Mother, finding DCS had not made diligent efforts to
provide reasonable reunification services since Mother moved to Illinois.

¶8 Mother returned to Arizona in March 2024. DCS provided
her with parenting classes, therapy, and supervised visitation. DCS also
assisted her with obtaining food, transportation, and disability resources.

¶9 Mother participated in all services recommended by DCS,
and DCS reported that she was “teachable and able to be redirected.” But

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.
Decision of the Court

due to her cognitive limitations, she made minimal progress in acquiring
the necessary skills to parent T.T. without prompting and assistance.
Mother’s Nurturing Parenting Program (“NPP”) provider reported that
Mother struggled to retain and apply the information she learned in class
despite the provider’s attempts to repeat and rephrase information, break
down lessons into smaller parts, and to use a kindergarten-level book to
assist Mother’s comprehension. Mother’s NPP referral was eventually
closed out in August 2024 because her provider believed Mother’s cognitive
impairment was so severe that she needed more in-depth support, such as
services through the Department of Developmental Disabilities (“DDD”).

¶10 Mother also struggled to focus and adequately supervise T.T.
during visits. She allowed T.T. to throw rocks down a slide without
stopping her until prompted by a case aide, to get her finger stuck in a
vending machine while Mother was distracted looking at clothes, and to
chew on a glowstick Mother handed her from the floor. Mother also
refused to give T.T. water when asked.

¶11 Mother did not comprehend how her cognitive impairments
limited her as a parent. She told DCS that she did not understand why her
child was taken from her in the first place. Mother also overestimated her
parenting abilities, stating that she has “very good” skills as to parenting
attachment, empathy, nurturing oneself, gentle touch, discipline, and
expectations of children. Mother’s NPP provider found otherwise, noting
that Mother especially struggled to understand the parent-child dynamic
and feel empathy for others.

¶12 In May 2025, Mother received a neuropsychological
evaluation by Dr. Kelly Rodriguez, who interviewed Mother, conducted
psychological and neuropsychological testing, and reviewed documents
from DCS and its service providers. Dr. Rodriguez concluded that, due to
her intellectual disability, Mother was unlikely to be able to safely parent
without ongoing support. Dr. Rodriguez also recommended Mother be
referred to DDD services to obtain ongoing support.

¶13 Mother did not have stable housing at the time of the
neuropsychological evaluation, and Dr. Rodriguez was concerned that she
was at risk for “continued housing instability.” Mother also required
services from DCS above and beyond those that DCS usually provides and
called DCS frequently for help with daily tasks, including finding food or
furniture. DCS assisted Mother in submitting several applications for DDD
services throughout the dependency. After being rejected several times,
Mother was finally approved for DDD services around January 2026.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.
Decision of the Court

¶14 In December 2025, DCS again moved to terminate Mother’s
parental rights on mental deficiency and fifteen months’ out-of-home
placement grounds. The juvenile court held a termination trial in March
2026 and heard testimony from Dr. Rodriguez and Mother’s DCS case
manager, Tamika Lennear. Dr. Rodriguez testified that Mother had “pretty
significant impairment in terms of her cognitive abilities,” and that “in
general, a person’s intellectual cognitive abilities are stable.” Dr. Rodriguez
therefore explained Mother “may be able to improve some of her
deficiencies or impairments” but likely would not make “a big
improvement.” Dr. Rodriguez opined that Mother “would likely need
ongoing supports and resources in order to parent.”

¶15 Dr. Rodriguez was particularly concerned about Mother’s
impaired “cognitive flexibility,” which “impacts her ability to learn and
maintain new information and skills.” She testified that there were “a lot
of skills and parenting knowledge that [Mother was] going to have to learn
in terms of being able to identify certain safety risks,” which Mother was
likely “going to have difficulty in.” Dr. Rodriguez also testified that Mother
will likely struggle with maintaining schedules and communicating with
doctors and school officials. She further noted that Mother had impaired
fine motor skills, which “can negatively impact a person’s daily tasks, such
as dressing yourself, dressing your child, grooming[,] and things like that.”

¶16 Dr. Rodriguez testified that she learned Mother was now
approved for DDD services. But she did not know whether DDD services
would be “helpful in terms of parenting” and “believe[d] it focuses more
on the individual person’s functioning.” Ultimately, Dr. Rodriguez
concluded that due to the severity of Mother’s cognitive impairments,
Mother was unlikely to make “big improvement[s]” in her parenting skills.

¶17 Mother’s case manager, Tamika Lennear, testified similarly
regarding Mother’s lack of progress in improving her ability to parent
despite receiving services over a significant period of time. She discussed
DCS’s concerns that Mother “may not be able to understand and
appropriately respond or even plan for, or even have the capacity to
understand preventative measures for [T.T.]’s milestones and growing up
going forward.” She testified that Mother heavily relied on DCS to
“navigate housing, transportation, [and] resources such as food.” Lennear
noted that the assistance she provided to Mother in that respect—obtaining
food for her and T.T., housing, and furniture—was more than she would
typically provide. She also expressed concerns about Mother’s ability to
“make appropriate decisions [and] use sound judgment,” because Mother
was temporarily homeless when she left the transitional home where she

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.
Decision of the Court

lived in order to stay with her fiancé. She believed that lack of sound
judgment would continue to negatively impact Mother’s ability to safely
parent T.T. But she also testified Mother and her fiancé found housing after
about a month of homelessness and had lived there for four or five months
by the time of trial, which DCS considered to be “consistent housing.”

¶18 Lennear also testified that visitation was taking place at
Mother’s home, which was “safe and appropriate.” She reported that “the
visits go well and [t]here were no major concerns.” But she also noted an
incident where Mother gave T.T. a cup of hot water to wash paintbrushes
which T.T. accidentally knocked over, causing her to burn herself. Lennear
noted that although Mother became engaged during visits, she previously
got distracted by other parents when visits were happening at a visitation
center and would ignore T.T.’s “mama” prompts. Mother also displayed
affection towards T.T., which T.T. reciprocated, and the two of them shared
a strong bond. Lennear confirmed that in two recent visits, Mother showed
understanding of T.T.’s likes or dislikes and recognized when T.T. needed
to be cleaned or fed.

¶19 Lennear testified that Mother was receptive and had made
“her best efforts” in reunification services, but she did not believe Mother
would be able to parent independently “anytime in the foreseeable future.”
Lennear explained that Mother lives with her fiancé, but DCS did not deem
him a responsible parent to help Mother effectively parent T.T. because he
has boundary issues, struggled to set up consistent housing, and has
multiple undocumented psychological disorders for which he self-
medicates with marijuana; he reportedly told DCS he would choose
smoking marijuana over taking care of T.T.

¶20 Although Mother was approved for DDD services shortly
before trial, Lennear testified “it [was DCS’s] view that the DDD services
are to help [Mother] and wouldn’t necessarily affect the areas that [DCS
was] concerned about, her being able to safely parent [T.T.].” But Lennear
acknowledged that depending on what services DDD provides, it could
possibly provide Mother with the means to safely parent T.T.

¶21 The juvenile court found grounds for termination based on
Mother’s mental deficiency and fifteen months’ out-of-home placement
proven by clear and convincing evidence. As to the mental deficiency
ground, the court found Dr. Rodriguez’s conclusion that “Mother [could]
not independently parent, and she would need ongoing support and
resources to do so” was “unrebutted.” As to the fifteen months’ out-of-
home placement grounds, the court found that “DDD services will help

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.
Decision of the Court

Mother individually but will not be able to help her parent independently”
because “[t]hat [wa]s not what those services [were] designed for.” The
court noted Mother could only retain new information for one to two days
so “essentially no real progress was being made[,]” which impacts her
ability to exercise sound judgment and make good decisions while
parenting T.T. It further found “Mother’s cognitive abilities . . . have not
changed over this entire case” and Mother could not reunify with T.T. “due
to her inability to comprehend and make good decisions for [T.T.].”

¶22 The court then found termination was in T.T.’s best interests
because her foster placement, which she had been with since birth, was
willing to adopt her, and “it would be unfair for [T.T.] to wait any longer.”

¶23 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and
-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶24 Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding statutory
grounds for termination existed. She contends substantial evidence does
not support the finding that she is either unable to parent now or in the
future. Accordingly, Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding she
was unable to parent due to her mental deficiency and reasonable grounds
existed to believe the condition would continue for a prolonged
indeterminate period. Mother argues the court likewise erred in finding
she has failed to remedy the circumstances that caused T.T.’s out-of-home
placement and that there was a substantial likelihood that she would not be
capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the
near future.

¶25 “[W]e will accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact unless
no reasonable evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm a
severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002).

¶26 To terminate the parent-child relationship, the juvenile court
must find (1) by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory
ground for termination exists, and (2) by a preponderance of the evidence
that the termination is in the child’s best interests. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149-50, ¶ 8 (2018); see also A.R.S. § 8-533(B) (listing
grounds for termination). As the trier of fact, the juvenile court “is in the
best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.
Decision of the Court

v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). We will therefore affirm the
juvenile court’s factual findings if supported by reasonable evidence.
Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 93-94, ¶ 4 (App. 2009).

¶27 To terminate parental rights due to mental deficiency, the
juvenile court must find “[t]hat the parent is unable to discharge parental
responsibilities because of . . . mental deficiency . . . and there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged
indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). The term “parental
responsibility” refers “to those duties or obligations which a parent has
with regard to [her] child.” In re Maricopa Cnty., Juv. Action No. JS-5894, 145
Ariz. 405, 408-09 (App. 1985). “The term is not intended to encompass any
exclusive set of factors but rather to establish a standard which permits a
trial judge flexibility in considering the unique circumstances of each
termination case . . . .” Id. at 409.

¶28 To terminate Mother’s parental rights due to her mental
deficiency, DCS was required prove that Mother is both presently unable
to parent due to her mental deficiency and that her mental deficiency is
likely to continue for a prolonged indeterminate period. See A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(3).

¶29 Mother contends that substantial evidence does not support
the juvenile court’s findings that she is currently unable to parent due to
her mental deficiency. She points to visitation notes from the two months
before trial documenting instances of her caring for and protecting T.T.,
therapy notes indicating she presented “within normal limits” in all areas,
including appearance, behavior, perception, and judgment, and the fact
that she has sufficient finances and stable housing. But “the resolution of
conflicting evidence is ‘uniquely the province of the juvenile court,’ . . . even
when ‘sharply disputed’ facts exist.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 18
(citations omitted). The juvenile court could reasonably rely on Dr.
Rodriguez’s testimony that Mother’s cognitive impairments rendered her
incapable of parenting T.T.

¶30 Other evidence in the record also supports the court’s finding
that Mother is presently unable to parent T.T., including Mother’s extensive
reliance on DCS for daily activities such as obtaining food and furniture
and her struggle to maintain consistent housing. See Vanessa H. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz. 252, 257, ¶ 22 (App. 2007) (noting the juvenile
court’s ability to resolve conflicting evidence). The court could reasonably
conclude that Mother’s inconsistent ability to take care of her own basic
needs translates to an inability to adequately and safely care for T.T.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.
Decision of the Court

¶31 Throughout nearly five years of services with DCS, Mother
continually struggled to care for herself and recognize threats against her
or T.T. She relied on others to do basic tasks such as obtaining food and
furniture and could not connect resources provided by DCS to her life or
articulate how those resources would help her parent T.T. Mother also
needed extensive accommodations from service providers, including
breaking down lessons into smaller lessons and teaching her at a
kindergarten level, but even then, Mother could not retain information
beyond one or two days. So even if Mother receives additional resources
and services, there is evidence in the record that those services would not
meaningfully improve her ability to parent T.T.

¶32 Mother also displayed poor judgment that endangered T.T.
during visits. Supra, ¶ 10. Although Mother has made some progress in
recent visits, both Lennear and Dr. Rodriguez testified that Mother’s poor
judgment was unlikely to improve. It was not error for the court to credit
that testimony in finding that Mother’s mental deficiency was likely to
continue to negatively impact her ability to effectively care for T.T.

¶33 Mother focuses on the case notes from her two most recent
visits with T.T., in which the parenting supervisor found no safety concerns
to argue that she “has demonstrated that she can effectively parent [T.T.].”
But Mother’s recent improvement during two isolated visits does not
extinguish the evidence of her significant history of inability to perform
basic life functions—such as obtaining consistent food and housing—due
to her cognitive impairment. See Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224
Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29 (App. 2010). And we will not reweigh the evidence on
appeal. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 18.

¶34 The record also supports the juvenile court’s finding that
Mother’s mental deficiency will persist “for a prolonged indeterminate
period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). Mother broadly states that she needs, and has
now accessed, additional “support” and “resources” that provide her with
the ability to parent. But the court heard testimony from Dr. Rodriguez that
due to the severity and stability of Mother’s cognitive impairments, Mother
was unlikely to make “big improvement[s]” in her parenting skills.
Further, DCS was not required to prove that there are reasonable grounds
to believe Mother’s mental deficiency would continue to negatively impact
her ability to parent in the same way it does currently, only that the mental
deficiency itself would persist for a prolonged indeterminate period. A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(3); see also Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 25 (“To support
termination under § 8-533(B)(3) [DCS] must also prove there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the condition causing an inability to parent will

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.
Decision of the Court

continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period.”) (emphasis added).
And even if DCS was required to prove that Mother’s mental deficiency
would continue to negatively affect her ability to parent, there is reasonable
evidence in the record that Mother’s cognitive impairment will continue to
impact her ability to parent T.T. Supra ¶¶ 10, 31-32.

¶35 While Mother’s recent efforts to improve and be present for
T.T. are commendable, and the record shows the two share a bond, T.T.’s
well-being is paramount. And ultimately, there is reasonable evidence to
support the juvenile court’s finding that Mother is unable to discharge her
parental responsibilities due to her mental deficiency and that her mental
deficiency will persist for a prolonged indeterminate period. See Denise R.,
221 Ariz. at 93-94, ¶ 4. The juvenile court thus did not err in finding
statutory grounds for termination existed due to Mother’s mental
deficiency.

¶36 Because DCS must prove only one ground for us to affirm the
termination of parental rights, we do not address the court’s finding as to
the fifteen months’ out-of-home placement ground. A.R.S. § 8-533(B);
Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 376-77, ¶ 14. And Mother does not contest the
juvenile court’s best interests finding, so we do not address it either.

CONCLUSION

¶37 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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