In Re Term of Parental Rights as to T.T.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0081
FILED 10-28-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD38762
The Honorable Michael C. Blair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Tavon T., Buckeye
Appellant

Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Advisory Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Autumn Spritzer
Counsel for Appellee DCS

Law Office of H. Clark Jones, LLC, Mesa
By H. Clark Jones
Counsel for Appellee Child

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Tavon T. (“Father”) appeals from the superior court’s ruling
terminating his parental rights to his son (“Child”).1 We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Child was born in September 2024 substance-exposed to
fentanyl, opioids, and methamphetamine. Father was incarcerated on
felony charges at that time. He ultimately pleaded guilty to multiple felony
offenses and was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment, the
longest of which is 8 years. His anticipated release date is in February 2030.

¶3 The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) instituted
dependency proceedings soon after Child’s birth. Initially, Child was
placed in his paternal grandparents’ home where Mother resided, subject
to a safety plan. The next month, Child moved to a placement where three
older half-siblings (Mother’s older children to whom her parental rights
had previously been terminated) resided with their adoptive mother.
Through the rest of the dependency, Child remained with that placement,
a potential adoptive home that met all his needs.

¶4 After Father established paternity, the court found Child
dependent as to him and set a case plan of family reunification. DCS
provided Father virtual visits with Child and encouraged him to pursue
other services available through the prison, such as parenting, conflict
management, and substance abuse classes. Father later testified that he had
completed a parenting class and a substance abuse class, and that he had
promptly signed up for other courses but remained on a waitlist even
months later.

¶5 Father’s virtual visits with Child went well. He engaged with
Child appropriately and never missed a visit, although coordinating the

1 Serena M. (“Mother”)’s parental rights to Child have also been
terminated, but she is not a party to this appeal.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.
Decision of the Court

virtual visits through the prison proved difficult. Despite Father’s requests,
in-person visits were never instituted given the long distance Child would
have to travel and, later, delays in securing the requisite authorization
through the prison.

¶6 After the dependency had been open for almost 14 months,
the superior court changed the case plan to severance and adoption. DCS
moved to terminate Father’s parental rights on three statutory grounds:
length of felony sentence, chronic substance abuse, and 9 months’ time in
care. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (4), (8)(a). Father and the DCS case manager
testified at the termination adjudication hearing. Although the court
specifically inquired about the possibility of a permanent guardianship, the
placement wanted to adopt Child and was not willing to pursue a
guardianship. The superior found DCS had not proven the latter two
grounds, but granted termination based on length of felony sentence only,
further finding termination to be in Child’s best interests.

¶7 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §
8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶8 The superior court may terminate a parent–child relationship
if clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one statutory
termination ground and a preponderance of the evidence shows
termination to be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Kent K. v.
Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). On review, we accept the superior
court’s factual findings if supported by reasonable evidence, giving due
regard to that court’s unique ability to weigh the evidence and assess
witness credibility. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30
(2023). We uphold the court’s legal conclusions unless clearly erroneous.
Id. at 478–79, ¶ 31.

¶9 The length-of-felony-sentence statutory ground authorizes
termination of parental rights if an incarcerated parent’s felony sentence “is
of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period
of years.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). For these purposes, a “normal home” means
“a stable and long-term family environment outside a foster care
placement, where another parent or a permanent guardian resides and
parents the child, and where the incarcerated parent affirmatively acts to
maintain a relationship with the child that contributes to rather than
detracts from the child’s stable, family environment.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.
Decision of the Court

Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 477, ¶ 27 (2022). The court considers all factors
relevant to deprivation of a normal home, including:

(1) the length and strength of any parent–child relationship
existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which
the parent–child relationship can be continued and nurtured
during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the
relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that
incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the
length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to
provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the
deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue.

Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251–52, ¶ 29 (2000). And
although not statutorily required for termination on this ground, DCS has
a constitutional obligation to make reasonable efforts to provide services
designed to facilitate an incarcerated parent’s desire to maintain the parent–
child relationship if the “incarcerated parent requests reunification services,
such as visitation, and providing the services will not endanger the child.”
Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 582, ¶ 21 (2021).

¶10 If the court finds statutory grounds for termination, it next
assesses whether termination is in the child’s best interests. Timothy B., 252
Ariz. at 474, ¶ 13. Termination is in a child’s best interests if, considering
the totality of the circumstances, the child would benefit from severance or
be harmed by a denial of severance. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz.
146, 150, ¶ 13 (2018). The child’s prospects for adoption, whether the
placement is meeting the child’s needs, and the parent’s rehabilitative
efforts are relevant considerations. Id. at 150–51, ¶¶ 13, 15; Demetrius L. v.
Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3–4, ¶ 12 (2016). Stability and security for the child
are “[o]f foremost concern.” Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 15.

¶11 Here, although Father has been incarcerated since before
Child’s birth, he seeks a chance to prove that he can be a loving and caring
parent, highlighting that he loves Child dearly and has built a parent–child
relationship through video visits.2 The superior court acknowledged as
much, finding that Father’s efforts to continue and nurture a relationship
with Child through the visitation available to him weighed against
termination. But the court found that termination was nevertheless

2 As the best interests of a child are at issue, we decline DCS’s request
to deem Father’s argument waived for failure to cite the record or legal
authority. Cf. Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 102–03, ¶ 18 (2003).

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.T.
Decision of the Court

warranted based on the other Michael J. factors, and the record supports that
determination. That is, even given Father’s love for Child and efforts to be
a part of his life, Father’s lengthy incarceration would leave Child without
a “normal home” in the care of another parent or a permanent guardian for
the bulk of his formative years. See Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 477, ¶ 27. And
given Child’s placement with siblings in a potential adoptive home that
meets all his needs, the record likewise supports the superior court’s best-
interests finding. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150–51, ¶ 13.

CONCLUSION

¶12 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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