In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.H. and P.H.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.H. and P.H.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0091
FILED 10-15-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD509358
The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Robert D. Rosanelli
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Jennifer R. Blum
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Alexander Legal LLC, Chandler
By Amy Alexander
Counsel for Appellee Child J.H.

Maricopa County Office of Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda Adams
Counsel for Appellee Child P.H.

Law Office of Melissa McGlothlin, Phoenix
By Melissa McGlothlin
Guardian Ad Litem for Appellees Children

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Pamela H. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment
terminating her parental rights as to J.H. and P.H. (“the Children”). Mother
argues the Department of Child Safety (“the Department”) did not make a
diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In August 2021, P.H. found Mother unconscious and
unresponsive after she overdosed on prescription medication. The
Department took the Children into temporary custody and petitioned for
dependency. In July 2022, the juvenile court found the Children dependent
as to Mother due to mental health issues.

¶3 Since September 2021, the Children have been with the same
out-of-home placement. In June 2025, the Department moved to terminate
Mother’s parental rights. The Department alleged Mother could not parent
the Children due to mental illness and there were reasonable grounds to
believe Mother’s condition would continue for a prolonged period. See
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). The Department also alleged the Children had been in
an out-of-home placement for more than fifteen months and there was a
substantial likelihood Mother would be incapable of exercising parental
care and control in the near future. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8).

¶4 At the termination hearing, the Department offered reports
from three psychologists who evaluated Mother. The first evaluated
Mother in November 2021 and documented that Mother exhibited
symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”), persistent depressive disorder, borderline personality disorder,
and numerous somatic issues. That psychologist reported that Mother
frequently mentioned that she only attended the evaluation because the

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court ordered her to do so. The psychologist recommended that Mother
receive therapy.

¶5 The Department offered one of its progress reports to the
juvenile court to show that Mother independently sought a referral for
therapy and started attending sessions in January 2023. The Department
introduced another progress report explaining that Mother believed her
therapy was “pointless[.]” Mother testified she did not recall when she saw
that therapist, but she stopped attending sessions because the therapist
“broke [her] confidentiality and then apologized for it.”

¶6 In January 2024, a second psychologist diagnosed Mother
with an unspecified personality disorder with borderline features, bipolar I
disorder, PTSD (by Mother’s self-report), and somatic symptom disorder.
The second psychologist concluded that Mother’s “unstable moods and
emotions have rendered her incapable of providing consistently competent
care to her children,” and there was “little evidence that [Mother] has
participated adequately in treatment[.]” He “strongly recommended” that
Mother engage in therapy “indefinitely” with a therapist who possessed at
least a master’s degree and “experience in treating severe personality
disorders.”

¶7 The second psychologist later testified that in February 2025,
he reviewed Mother’s recent mental health records to provide the court
with an updated report. He opined that Mother had not changed following
his initial assessment. The psychologist’s report also stated that Mother’s
“marginal functioning, difficult behaviors, erratic emotions, and unstable
mood” indicated that she was still unable to parent the Children.

¶8 Mother retained a third psychologist, who evaluated Mother
in August 2025. That psychologist diagnosed Mother with PTSD and a
personality disorder with borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic traits. Her
evaluation expressed “significant concern” about Mother’s ability to meet
the Children’s needs due to her “emotional and behavioral” instability. She
also recommended that the Department refer Mother to receive intensive
treatment with a therapist experienced in treating personality disorders and
trauma.

¶9 The Department’s case manager testified that following the
third psychologist’s evaluation, the Department referred Mother to a male
therapist who had the qualifications the third psychologist recommended.
But because that therapist was male, Mother refused to engage, saying she
would work only with a female therapist. So the Department made a

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second referral to a female therapist. Mother admitted she refused to attend
an intake appointment with the female therapist’s agency because the
“agency was not a good fit” because ”all the [agency’s] credentials”
emphasized “making money.” The Department introduced an email
Mother sent to the Department rejecting the intake appointment and stating
she would “NOT be using [the Department’s] counseling services.” The
Department’s case manager testified that after that email, the Department
made no more referrals for therapy.

¶10 The Department’s case manager testified that termination of
Mother’s rights would benefit the Children. She testified that the
Children’s placement is consistent with the Children’s best interests and is
meeting all their needs. The Department also offered letters from both
Children stating they wanted their placement to adopt them.

¶11 After the termination hearing, the court terminated Mother’s
parental rights to the Children on the fifteen-month and mental illness
grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3); A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). The court found
the Department made diligent efforts to provide Mother with reasonable
and appropriate services, but Mother “steadfastly evaded or outright
refused” to participate. The court determined that Mother “blamed
everyone [but] herself for [failing] to participate in services,” “provided
inconsistent and distorted explanations for [failing] to . . . engage in
services,” and gave testimony that “was not persuasive or credible.”

¶12 The court found the Department proved by clear and
convincing evidence that there was not a substantial likelihood Mother
would be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and
control in the near future. The court referenced the three psychologists who
all agreed that “absent Mother engaging in counseling and therapy to
address her mental health conditions, she will not be able to safely parent
her children in the foreseeable future.”

¶13 As to best interests, the court found the Children’s current
placement has been providing a loving home since 2021, where the
Children thrive. Both the Children and the placement family want to
proceed to adoption, which the court found will provide the Children with
permanency and stability. The court found the Department established by
a preponderance of the evidence that termination would be in the
Children’s best interests.

¶14 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S.
§ 8-235(A).

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DISCUSSION

¶15 Mother does not challenge the court’s conclusion that the
Department adequately proved a statutory ground for termination and that
termination would be in the Children’s best interests. Mother argues only
that the Department did not make a diligent effort to provide her with
appropriate reunification services.

¶16 “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children as
they see fit, but that right is not without limitation.” Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 79 ¶ 14 (App. 2001). Before terminating a parent’s
rights, the juvenile court must find clear and convincing evidence that at
least one ground in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) exists and must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best
interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v.
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). We “affirm a
termination order unless the juvenile court abuses its discretion or the
court’s findings are not supported by reasonable evidence.” Timothy B. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 14 (2022). We accept the juvenile
court’s factual findings if supported by reasonable evidence and inferences.
Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 30 (2023) (citation
omitted). We do not disturb the juvenile court’s conclusions for insufficient
evidence unless no one could reasonably find the evidence to be sufficient.
Id. at 479 ¶ 31 (citation omitted).

¶17 Mother argues the Department did not provide appropriate
reunification services because its therapist referrals failed to “provide her
with therapy that met her needs.” But Mother did not contemporaneously
object to the services provided and thus waived this argument.

¶18 Although Mother objected to the juvenile court’s reasonable
efforts findings during two of the court’s periodic review hearings, Mother
did not request additional services. Also, those review hearings occurred
before the therapists accepted the referrals that Mother now challenges on
appeal. And Mother did not object to the court’s finding that those services
were adequate, despite that Mother rejected those referrals. Nor did she
utilize any other method to raise that issue with the juvenile court. See
Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178 ¶ 14 (App. 2014)
(“A parent may also object to the juvenile court’s ‘reasonable efforts’
finding or request an evidentiary hearing by motion to address the
adequacy of services.”) (citation omitted). Further, in its termination order,
the juvenile court found Mother did not challenge the adequacy of services,
and Mother does not challenge that finding on appeal. Mother has waived

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any argument that she objected to services. See Britz v. Kinsvater, 87 Ariz.
385, 388 (1960).

¶19 Notwithstanding waiver, we have reviewed the record and
conclude it contains sufficient evidence supporting the juvenile court’s
conclusion that the Department made reasonable efforts to provide Mother
appropriate reunification services. See Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t Econ. Sec.,
233 Ariz. 345, 350 ¶ 20 (App. 2013). Mother argues there is no evidence the
Department’s referrals complied with the recommendations of the
psychologists who evaluated her. But the Department’s case manager
testified about referring Mother to therapists who had the qualifications the
third psychologist recommended. Yet Mother rejected the Department’s
referrals, stating unequivocally that she would “NOT be using [the
Department’s] counseling services.” The Department is not required “to
ensure that a parent participates in each service it offers.” Maricopa Cnty.
Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). Mother’s “refusal
to participate in the programs and services [the Department] offered or
recommended does not foreclose termination of her parental rights.” See
id.

¶20 Mother also argues that the Department should have
consulted her before referring a therapist, because it was “paramount” for
her recovery for her to have a say in who her providers were. Contrary to
that position, the record shows that the Department considered Mother’s
concerns when referring therapists. For example, when Mother rejected the
male therapist and requested a female therapist, the Department made a
new referral to a female therapist. But Mother still refused to engage with
that therapist and then rejected the Department’s therapeutic services
entirely.

¶21 Reasonable evidence supports the court’s conclusion that the
Department provided Mother with appropriate reunification services. See
Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 30. And the court did not otherwise err by
terminating Mother’s parental rights.

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CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm the court’s order terminating Mother’s parental
rights to the Children.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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