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Although a juvenile’s acts may be characterized as ‘delinquent acts’ rather than crimes for the purposes of rehabilitation and punishment, the acts are, nonetheless, criminal in nature.”); (“[A]s was true before Prop[osition] 102 was adopted, no statute or constitutional provision precludes adult prosecution of a juvenile who is no longer under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”).

(“[T]he meaning to be ascribed to the words is that which is generally understood and used by the people.”); , (“[T]he court must give meaning to each word, phrase, clause, and sentence of the provision.”).

Similarly, “[w]hen a court interprets the scope and meaning of an amendment to Arizona’s Constitution, its primary purpose is to achieve the intent of the electorate that adopted the amendment.” , see also Fields v. Elected Officials’ Ret.

Similarly, “[w]hen a court interprets the scope and meaning of an amendment to Arizona’s Constitution, its primary purpose is to achieve the intent of the electorate that adopted the amendment.” see also Fields v. Elected Officials’ Ret.

Re- *305 dist’g Comm’n, , and we “give meaning to each word, phrase, clause, and sentence of the provision so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial,”

§ 12-123; see generally -62, -51 (App. 1997); P.2d 19 (App. 1996).

(“[I]f the language of a constitutional provision yields a result so irrational that it cannot have been intended by persons of ordinary intelligence and discretion,” we modify the words to conform to the framers’ apparent intent.).

117 Further, Daryl could have been charged as an adult on the underlying crime, , and need not have been charged with the underlying crime before appellees could be charged with hindering prosecution.