In Re: Mh2025-001114

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE: MH2025-001114

No. 1 CA-MH 25-0053
FILED 09-30-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. MH2025-001114
The Honorable Elisa C. Donnadieu, Commissioner

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Sean M. Moore
Counsel for State of Arizona

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Lindsay Ficklin
Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 S.H. appeals the superior court’s February 12, 2025 order that
she submit to mental health treatment, which it entered after a civil
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commitment hearing from which S.H. was absent. Because the court did
not inquire into whether S.H. could have participated in her hearing by
“reasonably feasible means,” as the Fourteenth Amendment and A.R.S. §
36-539(C) require, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On February 3, 2025, Jared Posey, a psychiatric mental health
nurse practitioner, petitioned the superior court for an involuntary
evaluation of S.H. His petition alleged S.H. was a danger to herself, gravely
disabled, persistently or acutely disabled, and unwilling or unable to
undergo a voluntary evaluation. He alleged S.H. was “out of touch with
reality,” and did not seem to understand where she was or why she was in
a hospital. The court granted the petition and ordered S.H. to be detained
and evaluated.

¶3 Dr. Reema Multani then evaluated S.H. She later petitioned
the court to treat S.H. involuntarily, alleging S.H. was persistently or
acutely disabled. In support of her petition, Dr. Multani attached an
affidavit ascribing to S.H. a probable diagnosis of Bipolar I Disorder. Dr.
Multani also attached the affidavit of Dr. Kamala Premkumar, who attested
that she twice attempted to interview S.H., but that S.H. would not
cooperate. Based on S.H.’s medical records and Posey’s petition, Dr.
Premkumar ascribed to S.H. a probable diagnosis of “Unspecified
Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders.”

¶4 On February 12, 2025, the superior court held a hearing on Dr.
Multani’s petition. S.H. did not attend. While acknowledging S.H.’s
absence, her counsel told the court that counsel was “unable to waive
[S.H.’s] presence.”

¶5 Dr. Multani testified about S.H.’s non-appearance, claiming
that she had seen S.H. earlier that morning, and S.H. had been
“uncooperative” and “not speaking at all.” Dr. Multani further testified
that S.H. had not said anything about attending the hearing and had “just
stared” at Dr. Multani during their encounter. Dr. Multani opined that S.H.
could not meaningfully participate in the hearing if she was brought there
in restraints and that doing so would be detrimental to S.H.’s health.

¶6 Without identifying other means by which S.H. could
participate in the hearing, or asking about their feasibility, the court found
“by clear and convincing evidence that [S.H. was] unable to be present in
court because of medical or psychiatric reasons.” The court also found “it
would be detrimental for [S.H.] to appear by any other reasonably feasible

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means” and ultimately waived S.H.’s presence. The court’s later minute
entry stated S.H. “[did] not wish to be present,” though no party stated that
in the hearing.

¶7 The court proceeded with the hearing in S.H.’s absence.
Amanda Johnson, a registered nurse assigned to care for S.H. in the week
leading up to the hearing, and S.H.’s son, G.H., testified as acquaintance
witnesses. The court also admitted the affidavits of Dr. Multani and Dr.
Premkumar into evidence.

¶8 The court then found by clear and convincing evidence that
S.H. suffered from a mental disorder and, as a result, was “persistently or
acutely disabled and in need of psychiatric treatment.” The court ordered
S.H. to undergo a “combined inpatient and outpatient treatment program
until she is no longer persistently or acutely disabled,” but such treatment
must not exceed 180 days in-treatment or 365 days total. S.H. timely
appealed. We have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 12-
120.21(A)(1), 36-546.01.

DISCUSSION

¶9 The parties dispute the standard of review to be applied in
this matter. S.H. contends that the appropriate standard of review is de novo
because this matter concerns “the application and interpretation of statutes
as well as constitutional claims,” including her federal due process claims.
In re MH2010-002637, 228 Ariz. 74, 78 ¶ 13 (App. 2011). The State urges
review for clear error, arguing that this case presents only factual issues.
S.H. is correct. We review de novo S.H.’s request that we apply and interpret
Arizona statutes and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.

¶10 The Due Process Clause affords ordinary citizens the “right to
be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on
personal security.” Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980) (quoting
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV
§ 1. “Involuntary commitment involves a significant curtailment of
individual liberty.” In re MH2008-000867, 225 Ariz. 178, 182 ¶ 13 (2010).
Civil commitment proceedings must therefore afford individuals due
process. Id. at 180 ¶ 4 (citing Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491-92).

¶11 The core of due process includes the right to a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). We
employ a three-part test to determine whether a patient received due
process in their civil commitment hearing. MH2010-002637, 228 Ariz. at 79

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¶¶ 16-17 (applying the Mathews test in Arizona civil commitment case).
These three parts are:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (emphasis added); MH2010-002637, 228 Ariz. at 79
¶ 17.

¶12 Our statutes assure the protection of these constitutional
rights. As a general matter, Arizona law requires the patient and their
attorney be present at all civil commitment hearings. A.R.S. § 36-539(B).
There is, however, a limited exception. Under A.R.S. § 36-539(C), a court
may proceed with an involuntary treatment hearing in the patient’s absence
if there is clear and convincing evidence that “the patient, for medical or
psychiatric reasons, is unable to be present at the hearing and cannot appear
by other reasonably feasible means.” We next explain why S.H.’s absence
from her civil commitment hearing did not comply with these standards.

Proceeding With the Civil Commitment Hearing Without
Inquiring as to Alternative Means for S.H.’s Appearance Violated
S.H.’s Rights.

¶13 S.H. argues the superior court deprived her of due process by
proceeding with the hearing without inquiring into whether S.H. could
have participated remotely. S.H. relies on MH2010-002637. See 228 Ariz. at
81 ¶ 25. There, a mental health patient diagnosed with schizophrenia could
not attend a hearing about subjecting him to involuntary treatment because
he was in medical isolation and at risk of contracting an infection if he were
exposed to persons outside his medical and social work team. Id. at 77 ¶ 5.
The superior court held the hearing in the patient’s absence without
considering whether they could have participated by remote means, and
ordered the patient to submit to involuntary treatment. Id. at 77 ¶¶ 5-11.

¶14 We reversed, because both A.R.S. § 36-539(C) and the Due
Process Clause bar the superior court from conducting an involuntary
mental health treatment hearing in the absence of the person facing
involuntary treatment “without first establishing that [the person] could
not appear through alternative means.” Id. at 78 ¶ 15. As we explained, all

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three factors in the Mathews test make this so. The first factor weighs in the
patient’s favor: the patient’s “liberty can be massively curtailed through
civil commitment,” which establishes a significant private interest. Id. at 79
¶ 18. The second factor weighs in the patient’s favor because when a patient
is absent from a civil commitment hearing, “the patient is no longer
afforded the opportunity to be heard personally and possibly observed by
the court, which participation might assist the court in determining the
alleged need for court-ordered mental health treatment.” Id. at 80 ¶ 20. The
third factor likewise weighs in the patient’s favor: “we are hard pressed to
find any government interest in precluding a patient from appearing
telephonically or remotely or in not requiring a trial court to simply inquire
as to such an appearance.” Id. at 80 ¶ 22.

¶15 These reasons apply with equal force today. The court’s order
represents a “massive[] curtail[ment]” of S.H.’s liberty. Id. at 79 ¶ 18.
Likewise, if S.H. appeared remotely by video or phone, allowing the court
to observe and hear her, the court may have been aided in assessing the
need for her treatment. Id. at 80 ¶ 20. Finally, there is no government
interest in precluding S.H.’s participation, and there was no meaningful
burden in merely inquiring as to whether she wished to appear. Id. at 80 ¶
22. We thus reiterate our prior holding that on these facts, the superior
court has a duty, arising under both the United States Constitution and
Arizona statutory law, to inquire into whether S.H. could have participated
in her civil commitment hearing by other reasonable means. See A.R.S. §
36-539(C); MH2010-002637, 228 Ariz. at 76 ¶ 1; see also In re Commitment of
Alleged Mentally Disordered Pers., 181 Ariz. 290, 293 (1995) (“Because such
proceedings may result in a serious deprivation of liberty, however, the
statutory requirements must be strictly adhered to.”).

¶16 Finally, while the court’s minute entry stated S.H. “[did] not
wish to be present” at the hearing, nothing in the hearing transcript
supports this statement, and no party argues for affirmance on this basis.

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CONCLUSION

¶17 We vacate the court’s treatment order and remand for further
proceedings. On remand, the superior court should consider whether S.H.
could have attended the hearing through alternative means. If she could
have, the court cannot issue a further treatment order in reliance on
evidence from the hearing.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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