In Re MH2025-005060

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE: MH2025-005060

No. 1 CA-MH 25-0138
FILED 12-12-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. MH 2025-005060
The Honorable Thomas A. Kaipio, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Lindsay Ficklin
Counsel for Appellant

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Joseph J. Branco, Caitlyn T. Mitchell
Counsel for Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
 IN RE: MH2025-005060
Decision of the Court

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Mental health patient (“Patient”) appeals the superior court’s
June 3, 2025 order requiring her to undergo combined inpatient and
outpatient treatment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 In May 2025, two physicians, Madeline Nykamp, M.D., and
Danielle Guthrie, D.O., evaluated Patient and diagnosed her with bipolar I
disorder. According to the physicians’ affidavits, Patient acknowledged
having bipolar disorder, but believed that she did not need to be in an
inpatient facility. The physicians affirmed that Patient’s disorder impaired
her ability to understand the risks and benefits of treatment. They further
said her condition was treatable through inpatient, outpatient, or combined
inpatient and outpatient treatment.

¶3 A few days later, Dr. Nykamp petitioned to place Patient
under court-ordered treatment, alleging (1) Patient was persistently or
acutely disabled as a result of her mental disorder, and (2) court-ordered
treatment was appropriate because Patient was unwilling or unable to
accept treatment voluntarily. Patient was served with the petition, and the
court set a hearing for June 3, 2025, at the Valleywise Health Behavioral
Center in Phoenix, Arizona.

¶4 The day before the hearing, counsel for Dr. Nykamp moved
to permit one of the acquaintance witnesses to testify remotely. According
to the motion, Jodi Knudson worked as a registered nurse in Mesa, Arizona,
and was scheduled to work on the day of the hearing. Counsel explained
that, because Knudson worked approximately 30 miles away, she would
miss at least two and a half hours of work for testimony expected to last
only five minutes.

¶5 Counsel acknowledged that Maricopa County Superior Court
Administrative Order No. 2022-113 (“Order”) established that hearings on
petitions for court-ordered treatment were presumptively in person.
Counsel added, however, that the administrative order permitted a court
“to make a hearing-specific deviation” when the presumptive hearing
format was impractical or not in the interest of justice.

1 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior

court’s order of treatment. See In re MH2011-000914, 229 Ariz. 312, 314, ¶ 8
(App. 2012).
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 IN RE: MH2025-005060
Decision of the Court

¶6 Through counsel, Patient objected to the motion and argued
that “being busy at work” did not constitute good cause. She recognized
that Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 43(e) authorizes live, remote
testimony upon a showing of good cause. In her view, the rule does not
permit a court to allow remote testimony based solely on a witness’s
convenience.

¶7 The day before the hearing, the court heard oral argument on
the motion. Dr. Nykamp’s counsel argued that Knudson’s remote
appearance would not prejudice Patient because (1) Knudson had been
timely disclosed, and (2) Patient’s counsel had the opportunity to interview
her. Counsel also referenced the Order to argue that the court could deviate
from the presumptive standard.

¶8 The court granted the motion and permitted Knudson to
appear remotely. The court found good cause based on (1) the distance
between the courthouse and Knudson’s workplace, and (2) the time
required to travel to and from the hearing. It also found that requiring her
to appear in person was not practical, not in the interest of justice, and not
prejudicial to Patient.

¶9 Patient’s counsel then asked that Knudson appear by video,
and the court ordered that she attend the hearing through videoconference.

¶10 The next day, the court heard live, in-person testimony from
both physicians and Patient’s daughter, and live, videoconference
testimony from Knudson. The court found Patient was persistently or
acutely disabled because of a mental disorder. Accordingly, it ordered
combined inpatient and outpatient treatment for no more than 365 days,
with the inpatient treatment not to exceed 180 days.

¶11 Patient timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(10) and 36-546.01.

DISCUSSION

¶12 Patient argues that the superior court abused its discretion by
finding good cause for Knudson’s remote testimony based on her potential
work and travel inconvenience. We disagree.

¶13 We review the superior court’s ruling on a discretionary
matter for an abuse of discretion. See Tracy D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252
Ariz. 425, 435, ¶ 41 (App. 2021). We defer to the court’s factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence.

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 IN RE: MH2025-005060
Decision of the Court

See MH2011-000914, 229 Ariz. at 314, ¶ 8; In re MH 2008-001188, 221 Ariz.
177, 179, ¶ 14 (App. 2009) (“[W]e will affirm the superior court’s order for
involuntary treatment if it is supported by substantial evidence.”). When
considering telephonic or remote testimony, we determine “whether good
cause has been shown for its use.” In re MH-2008-000867, 225 Ariz. 178, 181,
¶ 11 (2010).

¶14 The court granted the motion for Knudson’s remote
appearance by finding good cause based on (1) her distance from, and (2)
the travel time to and from, the courthouse. The court also found, for the
same reasons supporting good cause, that requiring Knudson to appear in
person was impractical or not in the interest of justice under the Order.

¶15 Even though a hearing on a petition for court-ordered
treatment is presumptively in person, the court retains discretion to allow
remote testimony. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 43(e) (stating that the court may
permit testimony “by contemporaneous transmission from a different
location”); Ariz. R. Evid. 611(a) (granting courts “reasonable control over
the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence”). The
court may make a “hearing-specific deviation” from the presumptive
manner of appearance when an in-person appearance is impractical or
contrary to the interest of justice. Order at 1. The Order further states that
its presumptions may not serve as a basis to challenge “the validity of a
hearing or court order.” Id.

¶16 The superior court’s findings were not an abuse of discretion.
Knudson worked around 30 miles from the courthouse and would have
missed at least two and a half hours of work to testify briefly. The petition
anticipated that her testimony would last about five minutes, and the
record reflects that her direct examination took less than that. Knudson
described her observations of Patient upon arrival at the facility and
testified that Patient insisted on immediate discharge despite Knudson’s
efforts to encourage her to remain and focus on her treatment.

¶17 Arizona law did not require that Knudson be physically
present to testify. See In re MH 2004-001987, 211 Ariz. 255, 258, ¶ 14 (App.
2005) (holding that § 36-539(B) does not require a witness’s in-person
appearance). Evidence Rule 611(a) also does not “necessarily preclude
telephonic testimony in this circumstance.” Id. at 259, ¶ 19. Here, the court
ordered Knudson to appear by videoconference, and she did.

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 IN RE: MH2025-005060
Decision of the Court

¶18 On these facts, the superior court did not abuse its discretion
when it allowed Knudson to testify via videoconference rather than appear
in-person. We therefore conclude that the superior court did not abuse its
discretion in granting Dr. Nykamp’s motion for Knudson’s remote
appearance.

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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