In Re: Mh2025-006777

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE: MH2025-006777

No. 1 CA-MH 25-0182
FILED 02-18-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. MH2025-006777
The Honorable Terri L. Clarke, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Lindsay Ficklin
Counsel for Appellant

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Joseph J. Branco, Sean M. Moore
Counsel for Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
 IN RE: MH2025-006777
Decision of the Court

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 A.J. appeals from an order committing him to mental health
treatment. A.J. argues he was deprived of due process because the superior
court was not provided a record of all treatment he received in the 72 hours
before the hearing. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 36-539(A) (2026).1 Because
A.J. has shown no error, the commitment order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Pursuant to a previous order, A.J. was subject to mental health
treatment through July 28, 2025. Anticipating the expiration of that order,
on July 7, 2025, Dr. Evan Duffy, deputy medical director at Valleywise
Behavioral Health, filed a petition seeking an evaluation of A.J. See A.R.S. §
36-523. The superior court issued an order directing A.J. be evaluated and
appointing an attorney to represent him. See A.R.S. § 36-529(A).

¶3 Doctors Shabnam Sood and Lydia Torio evaluated A.J. and
concluded he was suffering from a severe mental disorder requiring court-
ordered treatment. On July 14, 2025, Dr. Sood filed a petition for court-
ordered treatment, alleging A.J. was persistently or acutely disabled and
unwilling or unable to accept treatment voluntarily. See A.R.S. § 36-
540(A)(2) & (3). As required by statute, the petition attached affidavits from
Drs. Sood and Torio. See A.R.S. § 36-533(B). Both affidavits noted that A.J.
had a history of past hospitalizations and that he was under court-ordered
treatment while being held in jail on criminal charges. The petition sought
an order for a combination of inpatient and outpatient mental health
treatment. See A.R.S. § 36-540(A)(2).

¶4 At the August 6, 2025, evidentiary hearing, the parties
stipulated to the admission of the Sood and Torio affidavits. The court also
heard testimony from two other witnesses about their observations of A.J.
while he was in jail.

¶5 At the hearing, the court noted that it had not been provided
a 72-hour medication report, adding A.J. was being held in the jail, not at
Valleywise (the evaluating agency). A.J. objected to the lack of the 72-hour
medication report, arguing the jail as the inpatient provider was required
to provide it. Overruling the objection, the court noted A.J. was held in jail,
but the jail was not the evaluating agency and was not the petitioner.
Accordingly, the court concluded, neither the jail nor Valleywise was

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

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Decision of the Court

required to provide a 72-hour medication report. During the hearing, A.J.’s
counsel cross-examined the observational witnesses (who were working
with A.J. at the jail), who testified that they had each seen A.J. take
medication once. The observational witnesses, however, were not asked
whether A.J. took any medication or had received any treatment 72 hours
before the hearing. A.J. also addressed the court.

¶6 During closing argument, A.J.’s counsel renewed his
objection to not having a 72-hour medication report, arguing the jail was an
evaluation agency required to provide that information, which would show
“whether [A.J.] was med-compliant or not.” Overruling that objection, the
court found petitioner had met its burden by clear and convincing evidence,
ordering combined inpatient and outpatient treatment for no more than 365
days, with inpatient treatment not to exceed 180 days.

¶7 This court has jurisdiction over A.J.’s timely appeal
challenging the commitment order under A.R.S. §§ 36-546.01 and 12-
2101(A)(10).

DISCUSSION

¶8 The superior court’s findings of fact will be affirmed unless
clearly erroneous, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining
those findings. See In re MH 2008-001188, 221 Ariz. 177, 179 ¶ 14 (App. 2009)
(citing cases). Issues of law, by contrast, are reviewed de novo. See In re
MH2010-002637, 228 Ariz. 74, 78 ¶ 13 (App. 2011) (citing cases). Particularly
given these proceedings can result in a deprivation of an individual’s
liberty interests, the record must show “complete compliance with each
statute’s requirements.” In re Pima Cnty. Mental Health No. 20200860221, 255
Ariz. 519, 524 ¶¶ 10-11 (2023). In reviewing statutory requirements, the
court looks to “the plain meaning of the words the legislature chose to use,
viewed in their broader statutory context.” In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18
¶ 5 (2024) (citation omitted).

¶9 A.J. argues the superior court deprived him of due process by
failing to comply with A.R.S. § 36-539(A). That statute requires “[t]he
medical director of the evaluation agency” to “take all reasonable
precautions to ensure that at the time of the hearing the proposed patient is
not so under the influence of or does not so suffer the effects of drugs,
medication or other treatment as to be hampered in preparing for or
participating in the hearing.” A.R.S. § 36-539(A). That obligation includes a
specific mandate that “[i]f the proposed patient is being treated as an
inpatient by the evaluation agency, the court at the time of the hearing shall

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be presented a record of all drugs, medication or other treatment that the
person has received during the seventy-two hours immediately before the
hearing.” Id. A.J. argues this mandate was not followed here. The facts,
however, are to the contrary.

¶10 A.J. argues the jail was the evaluation agency and, because he
was being treated in the jail, it was required to provide a 72-hour
medication report. Here, however, the evaluation agency was Valleywise,
the entity seeking the order of commitment. See A.R.S. § 36-501(14)(b)
(defining “Evaluation Agency”). A 72-hour medication report is required
when the “patient is being treated as an inpatient by the evaluation agency.”
A.R.S. § 36-539(A) (emphasis added); see also In re MH2013-001564, 234 Ariz.
385, 386-87 ¶ 6 (App. 2014) (A.R.S. § 36-539(A) requires a 72-hour
medication report from petitioner when the patient is being treated as an
inpatient by petitioner). From the record presented, Valleywise was not
providing A.J. inpatient treatment in the days before the evidentiary
hearing, meaning it was not required to provide a 72-hour medication
report.

¶11 A.J. also contends a 72-hour medication report was required
because he received treatment within 72 hours of the evidentiary hearing.2
But he does not cite anything in the record supporting that assertion. A.J.’s
statements to the court at the hearing do not suggest impairment or
withdrawal. At the hearing, A.J.’s counsel did not raise concerns that A.J.
was impaired or suffering from withdrawal. Although A.J. suggests
witness testimony and the evaluating doctors’ affidavits indicate he was
voluntarily taking medication, they were not asked specifically about the
72 hours prior to the hearing. Moreover, A.J. does not point to anything in
the record suggesting that, at the hearing, he was under the influence of, or
suffering withdrawal from, “drugs, medication or other treatment,” which
is what the statute is designed to prevent. See A.R.S. § 36-539(A).

2 Although A.J. also relies on A.R.S. § 36-534(A), that statute does not apply

because the medical director of the evaluation agency did not find it was
appropriate to discharge him or admit him on a voluntary basis. Nor has
A.J. shown a failure to comply with A.R.S. § 36-530 (addressing evaluation
and treatment).

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¶12 A.J. acknowledges the holding in MH2013-001564 (rejecting a
due process argument that a patient had a right to a 72-hour medication
report when the patient had not received medication or treatment within
72 hours of the commitment hearing), but he argues it is distinguishable
because the record here shows A.J. was being treated within 72 hours of the
commitment hearing. But because A.J. has shown no evidence of
impairment at the hearing, MH2013-001564 is at least arguably relevant. On
this record, A.J. has not shown that the superior court deprived him of his
due process rights by proceeding without a 72-hour medication report.

¶13 Finally, A.J. argues the failure to require a 72-hour medication
report prejudiced him because he did not have a record from which to argue
against court-ordered treatment. A.J., however, did not move to continue
the commitment hearing after learning that no 72-hour medication report
would be provided. Nor did he argue prejudice in superior court, meaning
the issue was waived. See In re MH 2007-001895, 221 Ariz. 346, 350 ¶ 15
(App. 2009) (citing cases); see also In re Pima Cnty. No. MH-1140-6-93, 176
Ariz. 565, 568 (App. 1993) (due process claims raised for the first time on
appeal are waived) (citing cases). And waiver notwithstanding, he has not
shown that the commitment order would be different if a 72-hour
medication report record had been provided.

CONCLUSION

¶14 The commitment order is affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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