In Re: Mh 2025-012702

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE: MH 2025-012702

No. 1 CA-MH 26-0022
FILED 09-10-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. MH 2025-012702
The Honorable Terri L. Clarke, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Lindsay Ficklin and D. Tyler Hodgin
Counsel for Appellant

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Sean M. Moore
Counsel for Appellee

IN RE: MH 2025-012702
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 R.L. appeals from the superior court’s order for mental health
treatment. She argues that one of the witnesses (a social worker) who
testified at her hearing did not qualify under A.R.S. § 36-539 as someone
who was “acquainted with” the patient at the time of an alleged mental
disorder. But the statute also expressly permits testimony from someone
who has “observed” the patient, and there is no question that the social
worker satisfied that requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the superior
court’s order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In December 2025, R.L. was in a medical facility, but refusing
mental health evaluation and treatment. A psychiatric mental health nurse
practitioner at the medical facility petitioned the superior court for a court-
ordered evaluation of R.L. under A.R.S. § 36-523. The petition alleged that
R.L. was a danger to self, a danger to others, and persistently or acutely
disabled. The petition stated R.L. was unwilling and unable to undergo
voluntary evaluation. At the same time, a case manager at the medical
facility filed an application for involuntary evaluation of R.L. under A.R.S.
§ 36-520. The court granted the petition and ordered the detention and
involuntary evaluation of R.L., who was then transferred to a hospital for
evaluation.

¶3 Later that month, one of R.L.’s evaluating physicians filed a
petition for court-ordered treatment under A.R.S. § 36-533. The physician
concluded that R.L. was persistently or acutely disabled, and opined that
the superior court should, after giving notice and holding a hearing, order
treatment. The physician also reported that R.L.’s pre-petition drug
screening returned positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines. The
physician attached an affidavit to the petition, in which he gave R.L. a
“probable” diagnosis of “Bipolar 1 Disorder, Manic, Severe with
Psychosis.” The physician reported R.L. as voicing delusional content
during his interview with her, noting R.L.’s belief she might be pregnant or

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IN RE: MH 2025-012702
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might have had a baby who was being concealed from her and that she had
been poisoned while previously serving a term in prison. A second
physician attached an affidavit diagnosing R.L. with schizoaffective
disorder and concluding court-ordered treatment was necessary. Like the
first evaluating physician, the second physician reported that R.L. had said
“she thought maybe in October she had the Cartel’s baby,” and had gone
on tangents and was “flighty in her ideas.”

¶4 In January 2026, the superior court held a hearing on the
petition for court-ordered treatment. At the hearing, the parties stipulated
to the admissibility of the affidavits of both physicians. Two additional
witnesses testified at the hearing: a licensed social worker and a registered
nurse.

¶5 Before the hearing, R.L. filed a motion to preclude the social
worker’s testimony, claiming, among other things, that the social worker
was not eligible to testify under A.R.S. § 36-539(B) because she was
functionally part of the evaluation process. The court denied the motion
and the social worker testified.

¶6 The social worker explained that she worked as a crisis
interventionist at the hospital where R.L. was being evaluated when she
met with R.L. twice on the same day. The social worker clarified that the
meetings with R.L. were strictly for the purpose of pre-petition assessment
of R.L.’s mental health. The social worker noted that she relied on her skills
as a licensed social worker to identify any signs and symptoms of a mental
disorder while assessing R.L.

¶7 The social worker then testified as to her personal
observations of R.L. In their first meeting, R.L. inquired whether she was
pregnant. When the social worker told her she was not, R.L. said she did
not believe her and she was going to continue taking prenatal vitamins. R.L.
then told the social worker she no longer wished to speak with her, so the
social worker left.

¶8 During their second meeting, R.L. quickly became irritable
when the social worker did not immediately begin writing down what R.L.
was saying. R.L. asked when she would be leaving, and the social worker
responded that R.L. would not be leaving because there were concerns
about her mental health. R.L. started getting angry and yelling and then got
up from her bed and began approaching the social worker. At that point,
the social worker ended the interview, even though she had not been able
to ask R.L. about her mental health or medication history.

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IN RE: MH 2025-012702
Decision of the Court

¶9 The registered nurse’s testimony followed. After considering
the doctors’ affidavits and the testimony, the court found by clear and
convincing evidence that R.L. was suffering from a mental disorder and
that she was persistently or acutely disabled as a result. The court further
found that R.L. was either unwilling or unable to voluntarily accept mental
health treatment and therefore ordered R.L. undergo an inpatient and
outpatient treatment program not to exceed 365 days, with inpatient
treatment not to exceed 180 days.

¶10 R.L. timely appealed from the court’s order for treatment. We
have jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution
and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A)(10)(a), and 36-546.01.

DISCUSSION

¶11 R.L. contends that under A.R.S. § 36-539(B), the social worker
was not “acquainted” with R.L. and therefore not a qualified witness.
Therefore, she concludes, the court order for treatment violated her due
process rights. R.L. does not make a due process argument independent of
the requirements of the statute. Witness eligibility under A.R.S. § 36-539(B)
is a question of law we review de novo. See In re MH2023-004502, 261 Ariz.
342, 346 ¶ 12 (2026).

¶12 On a petition for court-ordered treatment, the evidence shall
include, along with testimony of evaluating health professionals:

the testimony of two or more witnesses, regardless of the
witnesses’ professional licensure, if any, who observed or
were acquainted with the patient at the time of the alleged
mental disorder before the submission of the current
application for evaluation pursuant to § 36-520 or, if after the
submission of the current application, who were not formal
participants in the evaluation process. The testimony of the
witnesses shall be limited to observed facts and may not
include expert opinion or conclusions.

A.R.S. § 36-539(B).

¶13 R.L. maintains that to be “acquainted” with a patient
“requires more than merely being uninvolved in a commitment
evaluation,” and “requires some knowledge and familiarity with a patient
different from what the evaluator witnesses can provide.” R.L. asserts the
social worker “lacked the level of acquaintance necessary to serve as
acquaintance witnesses given her limited contact and testimony” about R.L.

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IN RE: MH 2025-012702
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and that the social worker’s testimony “failed to offer the informal, day-to-
day observation” required by the statute.

¶14 But the plain language of the statute does not require this. In
fact, the term “acquaintance witness” is now a misnomer given the recent
amendments to the statute in 2025. See 2025 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 20, § 1 (1st
Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1354). The statute now permits, in the disjunctive, witnesses
“who observed or were acquainted with the patient at the time of the
alleged mental disorder.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, under the current
version of the statute, which was in effect at the time of the underlying
proceedings, it is sufficient for the witness to have “observed” the patient.

¶15 Here, the social worker “observed” R.L. and her testimony
was “limited to observed facts” that did not “include expert opinion or
conclusions.” A.R.S. § 36-539(B). Thus, the social worker qualified under the
statute to testify about her pre-petition observations of R.L.

¶16 R.L. relies heavily on definitions of “acquainted” derived
from caselaw interpreting that requirement, such as In re Coconino Cnty. No.
MH 1425, 181 Ariz. 290 (1995). Given the statutory amendments that added
the “observed” language, that caselaw is of limited, if any, guidance.

¶17 Notably, the statute does not require that this observation
occur for any specific length of time. “The key . . . is that acquaintance
witnesses must have personal and relevant information as to whether the
patient is suffering from a mental disorder.” In re MH2012-002480, 232 Ariz.
421, 423 ¶ 11 (App. 2013). Although increased interaction with a respondent
in multiple contexts provides a basis for giving a witness’s testimony more
weight, the statute does not require a specific level of interaction. See MH
2008-002596, 223 Ariz. 32, 37 ¶ 19 (time spent gathering information goes to
weight of testimony rather than admissibility).

¶18 R.L. argues that the language of the statute shows that
“acquaintance witness testimony differs in nature from the expert
testimony to be provided by the evaluator witnesses,” and because
“acquaintance witnesses are meant to offer lay testimony based on
observations of the patient uncolored by any expertise,” such witnesses
must “offer testimony distinct from the physicians and relevant to a
patient’s mental health status at the time of the alleged mental disorder.”
But R.L. does not point to specifics as to why the social worker’s testimony
was not distinct from the evaluator’s testimony. Instead, she argues that to
have distinct testimony, the witness must have observed her in “informal,
day-to-day settings.” That is, the witness must offer testimony indicative of

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IN RE: MH 2025-012702
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her everyday behavior. Again, the statute does not say that. And the
caselaw interpreting “acquainted” to require such a perspective is
irrelevant to the meaning of “observed.”

¶19 Finally, a review of the social worker’s testimony shows that
it was distinct from that of the evaluators. The evaluators provided medical
diagnoses and expert opinions based on their interviews with R.L. The
social worker testified only to personal observations and reported R.L.’s
questions, statements, and reactions outside of R.L.’s evaluation. These
interactions, however brief, occurred outside the evaluation process and
offered a sufficiently distinct perspective.

CONCLUSION

¶20 The social worker was eligible to testify under § 36-539(B). We
affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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