In Re: Mh2026-001297

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE: MH2026-001297

No. 1 CA-MH 26-0043
FILED 10-06-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. MH2026-001297
The Honorable Steven K. Holding, Judge Pro Tempore Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Sean M. Moore
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Lindsay Ficklin, D. Tyler Hodgin
Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

IN RE: MH2026-001297
Decision of the Court

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 M.L. (“Patient”) appeals the superior court’s order finding
him persistently and acutely disabled and requiring him to undergo
mandatory combined inpatient/outpatient mental health treatment. For
the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In February 2026, a medical director petitioned for a court-
ordered evaluation of Patient, alleging he exhibited psychosis/mania,
dangerous behaviors towards himself and others, and grandiose delusions.
One of the medical doctors who evaluated Patient subsequently petitioned
for Patient to receive court-ordered treatment. In his affidavit, the doctor
noted Patient had symptoms consistent with “bipolar 1 disorder,” was “not
safe for discharge to the community,” and “require[d] inpatient
hospitalization for further stabilization and treatment.” The second
evaluating doctor determined Patient’s probable diagnosis of “Bipolar I
Disorder,” with a “Most Recent Episode Manic with Psychotic Features[,]”
as the basis for her recommendation that Patient undergo court-ordered
treatment.

¶3 At the hearing on the petition for court-ordered treatment, the
parties stipulated to the admission of two doctors’ affidavits, both of which
recommended Patient receive court-ordered treatment in lieu of their
testimony. The State called two individuals to testify as acquaintance
witnesses at the hearing. Patient objected to Samantha Moss’s testimony,
contending she was not a proper acquaintance witness because her
observations were “intertwined with the expert opinions and conclusions
she reached.” Over Patient’s objection, Moss testified that prior to the
petition for court-ordered evaluation, she had one-time contact with Patient
for approximately thirty minutes to conduct a level of care assessment to
determine whether he needed mental health treatment. When repeatedly
pressed on cross-examination, Moss acknowledged she used her
professional skills to make this determination.

¶4 Moss testified she had no counseling, therapeutic, or
otherwise ongoing relationship with Patient. Based on her observations,
Patient appeared “agitated, very elevated, disorganized, kind of all over the
place, [and] made some grandiose statements saying that people would
blow their heads off if he wasn’t there.” She did not testify as to her opinion

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IN RE: MH2026-001297
Decision of the Court

on whether Patient exhibited mental health struggles or otherwise give
expert opinions or conclusions. After Moss and the other acquaintance
witness testified, the court denied Patient’s motion to preclude or strike
Moss’s testimony, finding it complied with the statutory scheme.

¶5 The court found Patient persistently and acutely disabled as
a result of his mental disorder and ordered him to undergo mandatory
inpatient/outpatient treatment. Patient timely appealed. We have
jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 36-546.01
and 12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Patient contends Moss was not a qualified acquaintance
witness because (1) she did not spend sufficient time with Patient in order
to be able to offer testimony relevant to acquaintanceship and (2) she
provided “expert conclusions and opinion in violation of [Section] 36-
539(B).”

¶7 “We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, but we
view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court’s
judgment and will not set aside its findings unless clearly erroneous.” In re
MH2020-004882, 251 Ariz. 584, 586, ¶ 12 (App. 2021). Given the liberty
interest at stake, the record must show “complete compliance with each
statute’s requirements” rather than “strict compliance.” In re Pima Cnty.
Mental Health No. 20200860221, 255 Ariz. 519, 524, ¶¶ 10-11 (2023). We must
look to the “plain meaning of the words the legislature chose to use, viewed
in their broader statutory context.” In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18, ¶ 5
(2024) (citation omitted). And we “will not inflate, expand, stretch[,] or
extend a statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions.” In
re M.N., 259 Ariz. 120, 141, ¶ 28 (2025) (citation omitted).

¶8 Section 36-539(B) requires a petitioner for court-ordered
treatment to present testimony from at least four witnesses, two of whom
must be acquaintance witnesses. An acquaintance witness is an individual
who “observed” or was “acquainted with the patient at the time of the
alleged mental disorder.” A.R.S. § 36-539(B). The witness testimony is
limited to “observed facts and may not include expert opinion or
conclusions.” Id. And an acquaintance witness must have “relevant,
personal knowledge” of the alleged mental disorder. See In re MH2012-
002480, 232 Ariz. 421, 423, ¶ 9 (App. 2013).

¶9 Patient first argues Moss was an improper acquaintance
witness because she failed to “offer the informal, day-to-day observation

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IN RE: MH2026-001297
Decision of the Court

required by [Section] 36-539(B).” But as this Court has previously held in
multiple cases, Section 36-539(B) “does not impose a specific length of time
over which the acquaintance or familiarity with the patient must take place
or the manner in which the witness’s familiarity with the patient must be
acquired.” In re MH 2008-002596, 223 Ariz. 32, 36, ¶ 17 (App. 2009); see also
In re MH 2008-002596, 223 Ariz. 32, 34, 36, ¶¶ 8, 17 (App. 2009)
(acquaintance witness qualified to testify based on a single 15-minute
phone call with patient); In re MH2024-004594, 2025 WL 251857, No. 1 CA-
MH 24-0111, at *3, ¶¶ 19-20 (Ariz. App. Jan. 21, 2025) (mem. decision)
(rejecting the same argument that a witness did not qualify as an
acquaintance witness because she did not have “informal, day-to-day
information about [the patient’s] state”); In re MH2024-008242, 2026 WL
1071690, No. 1 CA-MH 24-0188, at *4, ¶ 16 (Ariz. App. Apr. 20, 2026) (mem.
decision) (rejecting the same argument). And we will not read
requirements into a statute that do not exist in its plain language. See MH
2008-002596, 223 Ariz. at 35, ¶ 13.

¶10 Patient further argues Moss’s statements “were the
quintessential ‘rubber stamping’ that [Section] 36-359(B) is designed to
prevent,” and claims this case is analogous to Matter of Commitment of
Alleged Mentally Disordered Person, Coconino County No. MH 1425, 181 Ariz.
290 (1995). Patient’s argument is unavailing. In Matter of Commitment, one
doctor evaluated the patient, who later refused to answer the questions of
three other doctors who tried to evaluate him. Id. at 291. Our supreme
court noted that an acquaintance witness must provide a perspective of
how patients behave “in situations other than commitment evaluation
interviews.” Id. at 292. As a result, it was improper for the other three
doctors to essentially “rubber stamp” the opinion of the single doctor who
evaluated the patient by basing their conclusions on that doctor’s reported
observations. Id. at 292-93. But the Court also clarified this did not “suggest
that medical personnel who are not part of the evaluation process become
ineligible to testify as acquaintance witnesses merely because of their
expertise.” Id. at 293. Here, Moss did not “rubber stamp” the affiant
doctors’ findings, but gave testimony based on her own observations of
Patient during her 30-minute meeting with him that occurred prior to his
court-ordered evaluations. The record shows Moss independently and
personally observed Patient separate and apart from (and before) the two
medical doctors’ own independent, personal evaluations of Patient.
Patient’s “rubber stamping” argument, therefore, is not well-taken.

¶11 Patient next argues Moss was an improper acquaintance
witness because she testified in violation of Section 36-539(B) by providing
expert opinion and conclusions. He specifically claims she used her

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IN RE: MH2026-001297
Decision of the Court

professional skills, including her “specialized knowledge,” “to determine
whether [Patient] needed a higher level of care, whether he was safe in the
community,” and “to diagnose [him] and determine ‘what comes next.’”

¶12 As previously noted, Section 36-539(B) limits acquaintance
witness testimony to “observed facts[,] and may not include expert opinion
or conclusions.” According to Arizona Rule of Evidence 701, lay witness
testimony is “rationally based on the witness’s perception” and “not based
on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” See MH2008-
002596, 223 Ariz. at 36, ¶¶ 15-16 (applying the evidence rules to mental
health proceedings).

¶13 Here, Moss testified that it was her job to use her professional
skills to determine the next steps for Patient upon his admission to the
hospital. But she limited her testimony to only her personal observations
of Patient. She testified that she observed Patient’s appearance to be
“agitated, very elevated, disorganized,” and “somewhat cooperative.” She
observed Patient did not appear to be “within reality[,]” “[i]t felt like he was
kind of on a different realm[,]” his mood “fluctuated[,]” and he admitted to
not taking his medications. Moss’s responses were therefore limited to her
personal observations of Patient’s behavior and did not venture into expert
opinion based on “specialized knowledge.” See Ariz. R. Evid. 701; see also
State ex rel. Montgomery v. Whitten, 228 Ariz. 17, 19, ¶ 8 (App. 2011) (noting
that a treating physician does not give expert opinion if the physician
testifies about observations based on personal knowledge) (citation
omitted). We discern no error.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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