Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Walter v. Wilkinson, 10 P.3d 1218.
- State v. Simental 563 P.3d 169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
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State v. Simental
563 P.3d 169
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
while ‘shall’ generally indicates a mandatory provision.” ¶ 7 (App. 2000) (citations omitted).
- Ball v. Ball 478 P.3d 704 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
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Ball v. Ball
478 P.3d 704
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶ 7 (App. 2000) (“If a statute employs both mandatory and discretionary terms, we may infer that .
- In Re Fredrick B. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
- In Re Fredrick B. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
- Curtis v. Thomas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
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Curtis v. Thomas
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
¶ 7 (App. 2000) (“If a statute employs both mandatory and discretionary terms, we may infer .
- Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. Pacific Financial Ass'n 388 P.3d 556 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. Pacific Financial Ass'n
388 P.3d 556
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
all lawsuits filed, judgments rendered, and payments made under this trust agreement and of any failure by Trustor to replenish the trust fund as required [by the Agreement].” Although Pacific also “may [have], within its sole discretion, invest[ed] the funds comprising the corpus,” this was not a mandatory obligation, as evidenced by the use of “may” rather than “shall.” ¶ 7 (App. 2000) (citations omitted).
- Lewis v. Arizona State Personnel Board 379 P.3d 227 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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Lewis v. Arizona State Personnel Board
379 P.3d 227
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 7, (“And, in fact, use of the word ‘may’ generally indicates permissive intent, while ‘shall’ generally indicates a mandatory provision.”) (citations omitted).
- Ponderosa v. Coconino Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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Ponderosa v. Coconino
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Section 2.1 of the Ordinance states that for the purposes of the Ordinance, the “word ‘shall’ is mandatory; the word ‘may’ is permissive.” ¶ 7, (holding that use of the word “may” in a statute generally indicates permissive intent, while “shall” generally indicates a mandatory provision).
- Glover v. Glover 289 P.3d 12 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
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Glover v. Glover
289 P.3d 12
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
¶ 14 Although, as Father asserts, use of the word “may” generally evidences permissive intent, ¶ 7 , he misconstrues the syntax of the initial sentence in § 25-1302(A).
- In Re Eric W. 271 P.3d 486 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
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In Re Eric W.
271 P.3d 486
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
(citing Flynt, 199 Ariz. at 94, ¶ 5 , 13 P.3d at 1211 ; ¶ 6 , ).
- State of Arizona v. Joseph Michael Goddard Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
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State of Arizona v. Joseph Michael Goddard
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
(“In interpreting statutes, we must strive to „find and give effect to legislative intent,‟ and to interpret the statute so as to give it a fair and sensible meaning.”) (citations omitted), quoting Bustos v. W.M.
- CYPRESS ON SUNLAND HOMEOWNERS, ASS'N. v. Orlandini 257 P.3d 1168 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
- CYPRESS ON SUNLAND HOMEOWNERS, ASS'N. v. Orlandini 257 P.3d 1168 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
- Hosea v. City of Phoenix Fire Pension Board 229 P.3d 257 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
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Hosea v. City of Phoenix Fire Pension Board
229 P.3d 257
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
¶23 We begin by noting that in construing statutes, we interpret them so as “to ‘find and give effect to legislative intent’ ” and to give them “a fair and sensible meaning.” ¶¶ 6 , (interpreting statute requiring mental health experts to conduct examinations “simultaneously” to mean within a “short time frame,” not at “precisely the same time”).
- City of Chandler v. Arizona Department of Transportation 167 P.3d 122 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
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City of Chandler v. Arizona Department of Transportation
167 P.3d 122
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
while ‘shall’ generally indicates a mandatory provision____If a statute employs both mandatory and discretionary terms, we may infer that the legislature intended each term to carry its ordinary meaning.” ¶ 7 , (citations omitted).
- Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona 121 P.3d 1256 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
- Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona 121 P.3d 1256 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
- Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 121 P.3d 843 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
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Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission
121 P.3d 843
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Consequently, just as “shall” generally indicates a mandatory provision, ¶ 7 , “should” assumes a similar meaning.
- In Re Wilputte S. 100 P.3d 929 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
- In Re Wilputte S. 100 P.3d 929 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
- Maricopa County v. Barfield 75 P.3d 714 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
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Maricopa County v. Barfield
75 P.3d 714
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
¶ 7 , (holding use of word “may” generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent).
- Knight Transportation, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Transportation 55 P.3d 790 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
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Knight Transportation, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Transportation
55 P.3d 790
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Further, we attempt to give a statute “a fair and sensible meaning,” ¶ 6 , and to avoid a construction that produces an absurd result.
- Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PlC 47 P.3d 1119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
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Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PlC
47 P.3d 1119
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
See, e.g., Outdoor Sys., , *489 307, ¶ 7
- State v. Seyrafi 32 P.3d 430 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
- State v. Seyrafi 32 P.3d 430 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001