Cited by

§§ 25-1001 to -1067; ¶ 29 (App. 2002).

(“In construing statutes, we have a duty to interpret them in a way that promotes consistency, harmony, and function.”).

e affidavit would constitute compliance, it would have used some form of “accompany” instead of “include.” (“[W]hen the legislature chooses different words within a statutory scheme, we presume those distinctions are meaningful and evidence an intent to give a different meaning and consequence to the alternate language.”); (“If possible, each word or phrase [of a statute] must be given meaning so that no part is rendered void, superfluous, contradictory or insignificant.”).

¶24 A key purpose of the UCCJEA is to avoid jurisdictional conflicts by creating “consistency in interstate child custody jurisdiction and enforcement proceedings.” Angel B., 234 Ariz. at 72, ¶ 7 (citation and quotation omitted); ¶ 24 (App. 2002).

A.R.S.§ 25–1031(A); ¶ 15 (App. 2002).

As previously construed by this court, the term “home state” is not limited to the time period of “six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding;” rather, the appropriate time period in such circumstances is “within six months before the commencement of the [child custody] proceeding.” –09, ¶ 33 (App. 2002) (citing A.R.S.

-06, ¶ 19 (App. 2002) (stating that when another state is a child’s “home state,” that state has initial jurisdiction “regardless of any significant connections” to the forum state); see also Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

Special action jurisdiction also is appropriate when a statute requires “immediate interpretation;” when a petition “presents a purely legal issue of first impression that is of statewide importance” and when the issue “is likely to recur.” ¶ 13 (App. 2017); Welch– ¶ 10 (App. 2002).

“[W]hen there is a statutory conflict in the application of home state jurisdiction, the conflict should be resolved to strengthen (rather than dilute) the certainty of home state jurisdiction.” Welch– ¶ 32 (App. 2002).

-08, ¶¶ 24-32, -73 (App. 2002).

206 ¶ 22, (“In construing statutes, we have a duty to interpret them in a way that promotes consistency, harmony, and function.”).

See Chartone, -66, ¶¶ 7-8 , ¶ 10

If possible, each word or phrase must be given meaning so that no part is rendered void, superfluous, contradictory or insignificant.” (citations omitted).

Fam.Code § 3402(g) (West); ¶ 33

And, the issue of whether a court has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA despite the children’s presence in Arizona for less than six months “is of first impression, has statewide importance, and is likely to recur.” ¶ 10

605, 606-07, ¶¶ 7, 10, -71 (App. 2007); ¶ 29

First, to the extent he argues his first-in-time filing takes precedence over Arizona’s home-state jurisdiction

(we must interpret statutes to give each phrase meaning).

tently,” and quoting the Tennessee Supreme Court, which stated that “[i]t is axiomatic that a purpose in enacting uniform laws is to achieve conformity, not uniqueness____ This court should strive to maintain the standardization of construction of uniform acts to carry out the legislative intent of uniformity,” Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Olsen, 692 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Tenn.1985)); ¶¶ 33, 34 , (ruling consistent with the interpretation of other jurisdictions adopting the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdictio