Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Boynton v. Anderson, 66 P.3d 88.

29 citing documents.

  • Nunez v. Valente Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    Under this canon, where “a statute specifies under what conditions it is effective, we can ordinarily infer that it excludes all others.” ¶ 8 (App. 2003); ¶ 7 (App. 2016) (“We analyze procedural rules using principles of statutory construction.”).
  • State of Arizona v. Hon. James Marner; Hanees Mohamed Haniffa 560 P.3d 338 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
  • State of Arizona v. Hon. James Marner; Hanees Mohamed Haniffa 560 P.3d 338 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
    (“use of the word ‘minor’ in § 13-3554(C) refers to an actual child”); (same); (“Although luring a minor for sexual exploitation is not a ‘dangerous crime against children,’ the legislature has prescribed that it is punishable in accordance with [§ 13-705] under certain circumstances, i.e. when the minor is under fifteen years of age.”).
  • State v. Lantz 430 P.3d 1262 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Lantz 430 P.3d 1262 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    See Boynton v. Anderson , , 48-49, ¶¶ 10-11, 15, , 91-92 (App. 2003) (striking DCAC designation of a conviction for an offense not found within DCAC, but affirming an enhanced sentence where the underlying offense statute incorporated the DCAC enhanced sentencing scheme).
  • Donetrius W. v. Dcs, P.W. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • Donetrius W. v. Dcs, P.W. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    -48, ¶¶ 8-11 (App. 2003).
  • Levine v. phoenix/suns Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Levine v. phoenix/suns Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    n.2, ¶ 15, n.2 (App. 2003) (citations omitted).
  • State ex rel. Polk v. Campbell 357 P.3d 144 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State ex rel. Polk v. Campbell 357 P.3d 144 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    Id.; ¶ 15 , (“Although luring a minor for sexual exploitation is not a ‘dangerous crime against children,’ the legislature has prescribed that it is punishable in accordance with § 13-604.01(1) under certain circumstances, i.e. when the minor is under fifteen years of age.”).
  • Cemex Construction Materials South, LLC v. Falcone Brothers & Associates, Inc. 349 P.3d 210 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
  • Cemex Construction Materials South, LLC v. Falcone Brothers & Associates, Inc. 349 P.3d 210 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
    ne whether the mailing provision in § 33-992.01(F) applies to twenty day notices sent pursuant to § 34-223(A) of the LMA, we apply the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, an established rule of statutory construction meaning “‘the expression of one or more items of a class indicates an intent to exclude all items of the same class which are not expressed.’” -91 (App. 2003), CEMEX v. FALCONE BROS. & ASSOCS., INC. Opinion of the Court 218, 221 (App. 2002).
  • State v. Gear 339 P.3d 1034 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Gear 339 P.3d 1034 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    “Or” is “a disjunctive particle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one among two or more things.” n.2, ¶ 15, n.2 (App. 2003) ( ).
  • State v. Regenold 255 P.3d 1028 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
  • State v. Regenold 255 P.3d 1028 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
    ¶ 15 , (“Although luring a minor for sexual exploitation is not a ‘dangerous crime against children,’ the legislature has prescribed that it is punishable in accordance with § 13-604.01(1) under certain circumstances, i.e. when the minor is under fifteen years of age.”).
  • Nowell v. Rees 199 P.3d 654 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
  • Nowell v. Rees 199 P.3d 654 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
  • State of Arizona v. Francisco Lazaro Gonzalez, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
  • State of Arizona v. Francisco Lazaro Gonzalez, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
  • Mejak v. Granville 136 P.3d 874 Ariz. 2006
  • Mejak v. Granville 136 P.3d 874 Ariz. 2006
    The presumptive term may be increased or decreased by up to five years.” 49, ¶¶ 6, 15, 92 (App. 2003).
  • DaimlerChrysler Services North America, LLC v. Arizona Department of Revenue 110 P.3d 1031 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
  • DaimlerChrysler Services North America, LLC v. Arizona Department of Revenue 110 P.3d 1031 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
    We recognize that this principle is a rule of construction to aid us and that it “is not definitive or an invariable standard of interpretation.” ¶ 8
  • State v. McDermott 93 P.3d 532 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
  • State v. McDermott 93 P.3d 532 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
    By excluding a “pack” from the classes of containers in which an individual may lawfully carry a concealed weapon on his person, the legislature indicated its intent to exclude any container that could be construed as a “pack” from qualifying as “luggage.” , 47 ¶ 8, (utilizing the established rule of construction “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” meaning “the expression of one or more items of a class indicates an intent to exclude all items of the same class which are not expressed” (cit
  • Pinal Vista Properties, L.L.C. v. Turnbull 91 P.3d 1031 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
  • Pinal Vista Properties, L.L.C. v. Turnbull 91 P.3d 1031 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004