Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Simpson v. Owens, 85 P.3d 478.

45 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Christopher Arevalo 470 P.3d 644 Ariz. 2020
State of Arizona v. Christopher Arevalo 470 P.3d 644 Ariz. 2020
.” ¶ 13 (2017) ( ¶ 17 (App. 2004)).
Ohmstedt v. Ohmstedt Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Ohmstedt v. Ohmstedt Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Due process protections include a substantive component, which “protects an individual from government interference with ‘rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” ¶ 17 (App. 2004) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)).
State v. Cooper Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Cooper Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
“Substantive due process protects an individual from government interference with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” ¶ 17 (App. 2004) (quotations omitted).
State of Arizona v. Hon. wein/goodman 417 P.3d 787 Ariz. 2018
State of Arizona v. Hon. wein/goodman 417 P.3d 787 Ariz. 2018
241 Ariz. at 346 ¶ 16 (alteration in original) ( ¶ 40 (App. 2004)).
James Morreno v. Hon. brickner/state/montgomery 416 P.3d 807 Ariz. 2018
James Morreno v. Hon. brickner/state/montgomery 416 P.3d 807 Ariz. 2018
See Simpson v. Owens (Simpson I), ¶ 40 (App. 2004); see also Simpson II, 241 Ariz. at 346 ¶ 16.
Samiuddin v. Hon. nothwehr/state Ariz. 2017
Samiuddin v. Hon. nothwehr/state Ariz. 2017
2 “Substantive due process protects an individual from government interference with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” and “[p]rocedural due process guarantees that permissible governmental interference is fairly achieved.” ¶ 17 (App. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
State v. McCcd Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa County Community College District Board 395 P.3d 714 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. McCcd Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 12, (court must effectuate the intent of those who framed the proposition, and in the case of a referendum, the intent of the electorate that adopted it; if the meaning is not clear, the court will consider the history and purpose of the proposition).
State v. Wein 396 P.3d 608 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Wein 396 P.3d 608 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
-76, ¶ 44 , -93 (App. 2004).
Simpson v. Miller ex rel. County of Maricopa 387 P.3d 1270 Ariz. 2017
Jason Donald simpson/joe Paul Martinez v. Hons. miller/steinle/state Ariz. 2017
Simpson v. Miller ex rel. County of Maricopa 387 P.3d 1270 Ariz. 2017
Jason Donald simpson/joe Paul Martinez v. Hons. miller/steinle/state Ariz. 2017
Simpson v. Miller 377 P.3d 1003 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Simpson v. Miller 377 P.3d 1003 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
See Simpson v. Owens (“Simpson I”), ¶¶ 23-25
Adrian E. v. Department of Child Safety 369 P.3d 264 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
Adrian E. v. Department of Child Safety 369 P.3d 264 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
We give the words of a statute “‘their natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning.’”
State v. Hon. miller/martin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Hon. miller/martin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
In Re BOND FORFEITURE IN COCHISE COUNTY 307 P.3d 980 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
In Re BOND FORFEITURE IN COCHISE COUNTY 307 P.3d 980 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
¶7 “Although there is no right to bail, because of the potential for a compromise of personal liberty, there is a presumption in favor of bail.” Simpson v. 3 Owens
Lisa K. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 281 P.3d 1041 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Lisa K. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 281 P.3d 1041 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
7 ¶10 “The touchstone of due process under both the Arizona and federal constitutions is fundamental fairness,” whereas “[p]rocedural due process guarantees that permissible governmental interference is fairly achieved.”
Richard Anderson v. Valley Union High School District 22 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Richard Anderson v. Valley Union High School District 22 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
To hold otherwise would be to disregard the natural, obvious, and ordinary meanings of the terms used in the statute, or to impermissibly read subsection (B) in isolation from subsection (A) so as to create an ambiguity where none exists.
Star Publishing Co. v. State of Arizona, Timothy Lynn Kreus Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Star Publishing Co. v. State of Arizona, Timothy Lynn Kreus Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Brewer v. Rees 265 P.3d 436 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Brewer v. Rees 265 P.3d 436 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
See, ¶ 3 , (reviewing a “cash-only” restriction on a pretrial release bond); ¶ 13 , (reviewing bail hearing issues).
Segura v. Cunanan 196 P.3d 831 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Segura v. Cunanan 196 P.3d 831 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
¶ 5 One week later, after counsel was appointed, Tovar requested a
Hernandez v. Lynch 167 P.3d 1264 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Hernandez v. Lynch 167 P.3d 1264 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
1(a); -66, ¶ 13 , -83 (App.2004).
Marriage of McHale v. McHale 109 P.3d 89 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Marriage of McHale v. McHale 109 P.3d 89 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
J.L.F. v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System 91 P.3d 1002 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
J.L.F. v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System 91 P.3d 1002 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
¶ 15 When interpreting statutory language, “we seek a sensible construction” and construe the words in their “natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning.” (citations omitted); see also A.R.S.