Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Jackson v. Schneider, 86 P.3d 381.

28 citing documents.

  • Wright v. Hon. gates/state Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Wright v. Hon. gates/state Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    County of Maricopa, -84, ¶ 10 (App. 2004) (“fundamental error to prescribe a probationary term that exceeds the period permitted by statute”).
  • State v. Roberts Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Roberts Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    § 13–610 does not authorize the court to impose a DNA testing fee on a convicted defendant); ¶ 18, (“Imposition of an illegal sentence constitutes fundamental error that may be reversed on appeal, despite the lack of an objection in the trial court.”); ¶ 10, (“When a trial court exceeds its sentencing authority, the sentence is void as to the excess portion.”).
  • State v. Reyes 307 P.3d 35 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
  • State v. Reyes 307 P.3d 35 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
    of Maricopa (State), ¶ 10 , (“When a trial court exceeds its sentencing authority, the sentence is void as to the excess portion.”).
  • State v. Burns 298 P.3d 911 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
  • State v. Burns 298 P.3d 911 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
    While probation technically is not a sentence, Coy, 200 Ariz. at 443, ¶ 3, n. 2 , 27 P.3d at 800 , an illegal term of probation constitutes fundamental error equivalent to an illegal sentence, ¶ 10 , ( , ).
  • State of Arizona v. Albert Junior Lopez 298 P.3d 909 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
  • State of Arizona v. Albert Junior Lopez 298 P.3d 909 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
    -84 (App. 2004) (when trial court exceeds sentencing authority, sentence void as to excess portion).
  • State v. Stocks 258 P.3d 208 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
  • State v. Stocks 258 P.3d 208 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
    -69, ¶¶ 47-49 , -45 (App.2009)(trial court had no power to order defendant to pay statutorily unauthorized prosecution fee and that portion of sentence invalid); -28, ¶¶ 10-11 , -84 (App.2004)(if trial court exceeds statutory authority in sentencing, that portion of sentence not authorized by statute is void).
  • State v. Regenold 255 P.3d 1028 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
  • State v. Regenold 255 P.3d 1028 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
    ¶ 4 , (court properly set aside illegal probationary term authorized by signed plea agreement); ¶ 10 , (“When a trial court exceeds its sentencing authority, the sentence is void as to the excess portion.”).
  • State v. Dean 243 P.3d 1029 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
  • Distinguished State v. Dean 243 P.3d 1029 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
    ¶ 12 Finally, , as conflicting with our supreme court’s subsequent decision in Shrum .
  • State of Arizona v. Payne Nelson Daniels Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State v. Payne 225 P.3d 1131 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State v. Payne 225 P.3d 1131 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
    ed by law”); , (imposition of illegal sentence is fundamental error); -23 , -82 (App. 1997) (imposition of surcharge in addition to fine on indigent defendant abuse of discretion and fundamental error when defendant failed to request hardship waiver below); , -84 (App.2004) (when trial court exceeds sentencing authority, sentence void as to excess portion).
  • State of Arizona v. Payne Nelson Daniels Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
    by law”); (imposition of illegal sentence is fundamental error); -23, -82 (App. 1997) (imposition of surcharge in addition to fine on indigent defendant abuse of discretion and fundamental error when defendant failed to request hardship waiver below); -84 (App. 2004) (when trial court exceeds sentencing authority, sentence void as to excess portion).
  • Phoenix City Prosecutor's Office v. Ybarra 160 P.3d 695 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • Phoenix City Prosecutor's Office v. Ybarra 160 P.3d 695 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
    County of Maricopa, ¶ 5 , see also A.R.S.
  • State of Arizona v. Alvaro Felix Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
  • State of Arizona v. Alvaro Felix Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
    See Jackson v. Schneider, 5 (“This Court retains the broad discretion to decline jurisdiction.”); (acceptance of special action jurisdiction is “highly discretionary”).
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Talamante 149 P.3d 484 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Talamante 149 P.3d 484 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
    County of Maricopa, ¶ 5 , see also A.R.S.
  • State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Foreman 118 P.3d 1117 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
  • State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Foreman 118 P.3d 1117 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
    SPECIAL ACTION JURISDICTION ¶4 Special action jurisdiction is appropriate for a case of first impression, ¶ 5 , or when the party has no plain, adequate, or speedy remedy by appeal.