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As this Court has long recognized, “accepting special action jurisdiction is particularly appropriate where the welfare of children is involved and the harm complained of can only be prevented by resolution before an appeal.” Dep’t ¶ 6 (App. 2014).

See, e.g., Dep’t ¶ 9 (App. 2014).

Due process generally requires an “opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Dep’t ¶ 11 (App. 2014) (citation omitted).

For these same reasons, Malik has not shown he was denied his due process right of an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner.” Dep’t ¶ 11 (App. 2014) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

Generally, due process requires an “opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Dep’t ¶ 11 (App. 2014) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

Dep’t ¶ 11 (App. 2014); ¶ 33 (2005) (applying the Mathews test to a privately-initiated termination action).

¶6 “‘The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”’” Dep’t ¶ 11 (App. 2014) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

Rather, the court is free to hold additional hearings, for both the change in physical custody motion and Mother’s second Rule 59 motion, to ensure it has all current, relevant evidence before it in determining what actions will be in the child’s “best interests.” See Dep’t ¶9 (App. 2014) (“In dependency and severance proceedings, ‘the child’s best interests are paramount.’”) (quoting Don L. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766 (the State has an urgent “parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child” and its “goal is to provide the child with a permanent home,” preferably with a fit parent); JS-7359, 159 Ariz. at 236 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767); Ariz. Dep’t ¶ 13 (App. 2014) (“DCS has a compelling interest in protecting child welfare.”) (internal quotation omitted).

Dep’t ¶ 11 (App. 2014); see also In re MH-2008-000867, ¶ 12 (2010) (“’[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334).

See Dep’t ¶ 7 n.5 (App. 2014) (after finding appellate jurisdiction lacking, sua sponte accepting special action jurisdiction, “because the best interests of the children [were] implicated”).

DCS v. Beene , , 304, ¶ 9, , 51 (App. 2014) (collecting authority).

Recurring review of a child’s placement ensures that the court’s orders remain in his best interests — a consideration that “permeates dependency and severance proceedings.” ¶ 9 (App. 2014) (collecting authority).

¶ 62 (App. 2009) (holding that the failure to comply with ARCAP 13 can constitute waiver of that claim); see also Dep’t ¶ 9 (App. 2014) (“[C]onsideration of the child’s best interests permeates dependency and severance proceedings.”).

appeal again to obtain the correct order, this Court, in its discretion, treats this appeal as a special action and accepts jurisdiction of the same.3 ¶ 9 (App. 2018) (“Although ‘highly discretionary,’ accepting special action jurisdiction is particularly appropriate where the welfare of children is involved.”) (quoting Dep’t ¶ 6 (App. 2014)).

Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 33; ¶ 20 (2017); Dep’t –08, ¶¶ 10–20 (App. 2014).

“Although ‘highly discretionary,’ accepting special action jurisdiction is particularly appropriate where the welfare of children is involved and the harm complained of can only be prevented by resolution before an appeal.” Dep’t ¶ 6 (App. 2014) (citations omitted).

See Dep’t ¶ 9 (App. 2014) (noting a child’s best interests are paramount in dependency and severance proceedings and citing Hays for the proposition that a child’s best interests are paramount in a custody determination); Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

“Legal issues, including the correct legal standard to apply, are reviewed de novo.” Dep’t ¶ 8 (App. 2014).

See, e.g., Dep’t ¶ 11 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

Although “highly discretionary,” ¶ 6 (1999), “accepting special action jurisdiction is particularly appropriate where the welfare of children is involved and the harm complained of can only be prevented by resolution before an appeal,” Dep’t ¶ 6 (App. 2014).