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¶21 A defendant challenging a search warrant affidavit is entitled to a hearing “when he makes a substantial preliminary showing (1) that the affiant knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth included a false statement in the supporting affidavit, and (2) the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause.” ¶ 27 (App. 2014).

¶ 12 (App. 2017) (special action is proper challenge to warrant); ¶ 1 (App. 2014) (similar); Ariz. R.P.

¶11 A defendant is entitled to a hearing on a Franks motion if he or she “makes a substantial preliminary showing (1) that the affiant knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth included a false statement in the supporting affidavit, and (2) the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause.” ¶ 27 (App. 2014).

¶ 26 (App. 2014); see also A.R.S.

Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (“The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to secure a warrant before conducting a search.”); ¶ 26 (App. 2014) (“The Fourth Amendment .

7 LOZANO, et al. v. PACCO, et al. Decision of the Court jurisdiction “in cases that raise issues of statewide importance, issues of first impression, pure legal questions, or issues that are likely to arise again,” ¶ 22 (App. 2014), or “when the party has no plain, adequate or speedy remedy by appeal, and justice cannot be obtained by other means,” Luis A. v. Bayham-Lesselyong ex rel.

“Probable cause cannot be established by mere suspicion that a search will reveal items connected to criminal activity.” ¶ 40 (App. 2014).

¶18 “The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires a search warrant be issued only upon probable cause.” ¶ 26 (App. 2014) (citing U.S. Const. amend.

-09 (1985) (adding deliberately or recklessly omitted material facts with the intent to mislead the magistrate to the Franks analysis); ¶ 27 (App. 2014).

¶14 Under Franks, "a defendant may challenge the truthfulness of the factual statements in an affidavit supporting a warrant," and may contest any "deliberate or reckless omissions of facts that tend to mislead," ¶ 27 (2014) (quotation omitted).

¶ 22 (App. 2014) (noting the acceptance of special action jurisdiction is discretionary and generally exercised “only in cases that raise issues of statewide importance, issues of first impression, pure legal questions, or issues that are likely to arise again”).

¶ 22, (citing Potter v. Vanderpool ex rel.

Special action jurisdiction is proper “in cases that raise issues of statewide importance, issues of first impression, pure legal questions, or issues that are likely to arise again,” ¶ 22 , (citing Luis A. v. Bayham-Lesselyong ex rel.