State v. Hon gordon/owen

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Petitioner,

v.

THE HONORABLE ERIC E. GORDON, Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of MOHAVE,
Respondent Judge,

GREGORY JAMES OWEN, Real Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA-SA 23-0162
FILED 2-13-2024

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. CR2023-00497
Lake Havasu Consolidated Court No. M0844TR2022000209
The Honorable Eric E. Gordon, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Lake Havasu City Attorney’s Office, Lake Havasu City
By Sherman Jackson
Counsel for Petitioner

Debus & Kazan, Ltd, Phoenix
By Lawrence I. Kazan, Gregory M. Zamora
Counsel for Real Party in Interest
 STATE v. HON GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 28-645(A)(3)(a)
(“red-light statute”) requires vehicular traffic to stop at a red light. Under
A.R.S. § 28-672(A)(1) (“enhanced penalty statute”), “[a] person is guilty of
causing serious physical injury or death by a moving violation if the person
violates [the red-light statute] and the violation results in an accident
causing serious physical injury or death to another person.” We address
whether, for the enhanced penalty statute to apply, a driver in violation of
the red-light statute must have already entered an intersection before an
accident occurs.

¶2 The enhanced penalty statute does not require a vehicle to
have entered the intersection before causing the accident. A.R.S. § 28-
672(A)(1). We accept special action jurisdiction, grant relief to the State,
vacate the superior court’s decision, and remand to the municipal court to
conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
defendant’s conviction. State v. Thompson, 252 Ariz. 279, 287 n.3 (2022).

¶4 While driving his motorhome on State Route 95 in Lake
Havasu City, Gregory James Owen rear-ended a Jeep Grand Cherokee that
stopped for a red light at an intersection. The force of the collision propelled
both vehicles through the intersection, causing the death of a passenger in
the Jeep.

¶5 The State charged Owen with causing death by a moving
violation, a class 1 misdemeanor. See A.R.S. § 28-672(A)(1), (I). After a two-
day bench trial, the municipal court found that the Jeep came to a complete
stop at the red light, Owen “was unable to control his speed to avoid the
accident,” and the light facing Owen was red when Owen rear-ended the

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Opinion of the Court

Jeep and entered the intersection.1 The municipal court then found Owen
guilty as charged.

¶6 Owen appealed the verdict to the superior court, arguing that
he did not commit a red-light moving violation, and, even if he did, the
violation did not cause the victim’s death because “the accident happened
before the intersection, and the predicate moving violation can only happen
upon entering an intersection.” Thus, Owen maintained, even though he
failed to stop before the intersection and entered it when the light was red,
the “accident” occurred before he went through the red light.

¶7 The superior court agreed that Owen violated the red-light
statute because he “failed to stop his vehicle before it entered the
intersection, and such entrance did not occur until the signal had already
switched to red.” But the court concluded that Owen did not violate the
enhanced penalty statute as a matter of law because the initial impact
occurred before Owen’s motorhome entered the intersection, “so it was not
that violation that resulted in the accident.” The superior court reversed
the municipal court and directed a verdict of acquittal.

¶8 The State filed this special action petition, challenging the
superior court’s interpretation of the red-light and enhanced penalty
statutes. A.R.S. §§ 28-645(A)(3)(a), -672(A)(1).

SPECIAL ACTION JURISDICTION

¶9 With limited exceptions not applicable here, a party may not
appeal the judgment of the superior court in an action appealed from a
municipal court. See A.R.S. § 22-375(B). Thus, the State has no equally
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act.
1(a); Guthrie v. Jones, 202 Ariz. 273, 274, ¶ 4 (App. 2002) (accepting special
action jurisdiction “when, as here, the superior court has acted as an
appellate court” and “a special action is [the petitioner’s] only means to seek
relief”). The State’s petition also raises a legal question of first impression.
See State ex rel. Romley v. Martin, 203 Ariz. 46, 47, ¶ 4 (App. 2002) (“Special

1 The record contains video evidence of the accident, which shows the light

for traffic crossing perpendicular across the highway in front of Owen and
the Jeep turned green before the accident, which in turn supports the
municipal court’s conclusion that the light Owen was facing must have
been red when Owen entered the intersection. Thus, nothing leads us to
conclude that the municipal court’s ruling is clearly erroneous or an abuse
of discretion.

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action jurisdiction is appropriate in . . . issues of first impression, [and] cases
involving purely legal questions.” (citing Luis A. v. Bayham-Lesselyong, 197
Ariz. 451, 452–53, ¶ 2 (App. 2000))). We therefore accept special action
jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

¶10 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State ex
rel. Montgomery v. Harris, 234 Ariz. 343, 344, ¶ 8 (2014). “Absent ambiguity
or absurdity, our inquiry begins and ends with the plain meaning of the
legislature’s chosen words, read within the ‘overall statutory context.’”
Welch v. Cochise Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 251 Ariz. 519, 523, ¶ 11 (2021)
(quoting Rosas v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 249 Ariz. 26, 28, ¶ 13 (2020)). See
also S. Ariz. Home Builders Ass’n v. Town of Marana, 254 Ariz. 281, 286, ¶ 31
(2023) (“Statutory interpretation requires us to determine the meaning of
the words the legislature chose to use. We do so . . . according to the plain
meaning of the words in their broader statutory context. . . .”). Words are
“construed according to the common and approved use of the language,”
A.R.S. § 1-213, and we “give meaning, if possible, to every word and
provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous,” Nicaise v.
Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568, ¶ 11 (2019) (citing City of Tucson v. Clear
Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209 Ariz. 544, 552–53, ¶¶ 31–34 (2005)).

¶11 The red-light and enhanced penalty statutes are
unambiguous. The red-light statute states that “vehicular traffic facing a
steady red signal alone shall stop before entering the intersection and shall
remain standing until an indication to proceed is shown.” A.R.S. § 28-
645(A)(3)(a). And the enhanced penalty statute provides that “[a] person is
guilty of causing serious physical injury or death by a moving violation if
the person violates [the red-light statute] and the violation results in an
accident causing serious physical injury or death to another person.” A.R.S.
§ 28-672(A)(1).

¶12 The municipal court and superior court agreed that Owen
violated the red-light statute by running the red light and that Owen’s
collision with the Jeep caused the death of another person. The remaining
issue is whether Owen’s red-light violation resulted in the accident that
caused the victim’s death.

¶13 The State argues that the “accident” that caused the victim’s
death “did not stop/end before the intersection” and was instead the entire
sequence of events that occurred, from the time Owen’s motorhome hit the
back of the Jeep, to both vehicles careening through the intersection, and

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Opinion of the Court

ending shortly after the Jeep’s subsequent collision with another vehicle.2
Owen argues we should focus on where the initial collision occurred and,
because the collision occurred before the intersection, he did not violate the
enhanced penalty statute. In his argument, Owen substitutes the word
“collision” for the word “accident” in the enhanced penalty statute, arguing
that “[a]ny entry into the intersection against the red signal occurred post-
collision.” The superior court agreed with Owen’s argument and limited
its view of the accident to the initial impact of the motorhome colliding with
the Jeep.

¶14 The statute uses the term “accident,” and our focus is on the
statutory text—not purported synonyms. Welch, 251 Ariz. at 523, ¶ 11. The
legislature enacted the enhanced penalty statute in 1998, but neither the
original statute, nor subsequent amendments, defined “accident.” A.R.S.
§ 28-672; 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 243, § 1 (2nd Reg. Sess.) (H.B. 2327). We
may reference dictionaries when statutory terms are undefined. See Harris,
234 Ariz. at 344, ¶ 9. Around the time the enhanced penalty statute was
adopted, dictionary definitions of “accident” included “[a]n unexpected
and undesirable event.” Accident, Webster’s II New Riverside University
Dictionary (1994). In contrast, definitions of “collision” included “[t]he act
or process of colliding.” Collision, Webster’s II New Riverside University
Dictionary (1994). Thus, an “accident” is not necessarily synonymous with
a “collision.”

¶15 Interpreting an “accident” as encompassing more than a
single “collision” is consistent with our decision in State v. Powers, 200 Ariz.
123, 126, ¶ 9 (App. 2001). There, we noted that “[a]s commonly understood,
only one accident scene exists even though accidents often involve multiple
victims and impacts.” Id. It also reflects how courts in other states have
interpreted “accident.” See Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 255 A.3d 438, 447
n.14 (Pa. 2021) (“A vehicular accident may include any number of vehicles,
impacts, collisions, deaths, and injuries.” (citing cases)); see also Nield v.
State, 677 N.E.2d 79, 82 (Ind. App. 1997) (“In the context of vehicular
collisions, we conclude that an ‘accident’ means the entirety of an
occurrence that results from a common initiating event, regardless of

2 The State further argues that, to commit a red-light violation under the

red-light statute, one need not enter the intersection, but must merely fail
to stop and remain standing before the light until the traffic light changes
such that an indication to proceed is shown. We do not address this
argument because Owen’s motorhome entered the intersection, and we will
not decide hypothetical questions. See generally Contempo-Tempe Mobile
Home Owners Ass’n v. Steinert, 144 Ariz. 227, 229 (App. 1985).

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whether more than two vehicles were involved.”); Commonwealth v.
Wisneski, 29 A.3d 1150, 1153–54 (Pa. 2011) (“The terminus of an accident is
the completion of all the physical on-scene events with a direct nexus to the
onset of the incident, a conclusion particularly apropos where more than
one vehicle is involved.”). Thus, because an “accident” may involve
multiple “collisions,” Owen’s and the superior court’s view is too narrow,
as it simply treats the accident as the moment of the initial collision. But a
driver violates the enhanced penalty statute when his moving violation
results in an accident, not a singular collision. See A.R.S. § 28-672(A)(1).

¶16 Finally, had the legislature intended to limit the enhanced
penalty statute to the moment of impact, it could have done so by using the
narrower term “collision” or expressly requiring the collision to occur
within the intersection. See id.; Leibsohn v. Hobbs, 254 Ariz. 1, 5, ¶ 14, (2022)
(noting the significance of legislative language in one statutory section
compared to another); see also State v. Marshall, 197 Ariz. 496, 504, ¶¶ 27–28
(App. 2000) (stating, “[h]ad the legislature intended to restrict the
application of the statute . . . it could have done so by substituting” different
words than the words chosen). But the legislature chose “accident” here,
despite expressly using the term “collision” in other statutes. See, e.g.,
A.R.S. § 28-735 (establishing a civil penalty when a driver fails to leave a
safe distance between his or her vehicle and a bicycle, and “the violation
results in a collision,” causing serious physical injury or death (emphasis
added)); A.R.S. § 28-855(C) (requiring drivers approaching yield signs to
yield the right-of-way to vehicles in the intersection, and “[i]f after driving
past a yield sign without stopping the driver is involved in a collision with a
vehicle in the intersection, the collision is prima facie evidence of the driver’s
failure to yield the right-of-way” (emphasis added)). The enhanced penalty
statute references an accident, not a collision, and it does not require a
collision to occur within the intersection. A.R.S. § 28-672(A)(1). Thus, when
determining whether an accident resulted from a red-light violation, a court
must consider an accident as a continuous event in which the traffic
violation causes an event that results in death or injury.

¶17 Next, we address Owen’s contention that a failure to stop
before entering an intersection at a red light cannot “result[] in” an accident
when the initial collision occurs just before the intersection. See A.R.S. § 28-
672(A)(1). Owen asserts “the specific violation alleged must be the cause of
the accident” and argues his red-light violation did not result in the
accident. We agree with Owen that, for the enhanced penalty statute to
apply, the alleged moving violation must result in the accident. A.R.S. § 28-
672(A)(1). In other words, the violation must be the but-for cause of the
accident. But we disagree with Owen’s assertion that a red-light violation

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cannot be the cause of an accident when the initial collision occurs before
the intersection.

¶18 The legislature did not define “results in” within the
enhanced penalty statute, but A.R.S. § 13-203 details the required causal
relationship between “conduct” and “result.” Section 13-203(A) applies to
the enhanced penalty statute. See A.R.S. § 13-102(D) (“Except as otherwise
expressly provided, or unless the context otherwise requires, the provisions
of this title shall govern the construction of and punishment for any offense
defined outside this title.”). Under A.R.S. § 13-203(A), “Conduct is the
cause of a result when both of the following exist: 1. But for the conduct the
result in question would not have occurred [and] 2. The relationship
between the conduct and result satisfies any additional causal requirements
imposed by the statute defining the offense.” As applied here, the required
conduct is the violation of the red-light statute and the required result is the
accident causing serious physical injury or death. See A.R.S. § 28-672(A)(1),
-645(A)(3)(a).

¶19 The red-light statute requires vehicular traffic to stop at an
intersection with a red light and remain standing until receiving an
indication to proceed. A.R.S. § 28-645(A)(3)(a). When, as here, a driver fails
to stop and remain standing at a red light and then hits another vehicle,
immediately propelling both vehicles into the intersection, the entire
event—from initial collision to when the vehicles ultimately cease
movement—is an accident that resulted from the driver’s failure to stop at
the red light. Cf. Brogdon v. State, 683 S.E.2d 99, 104 (Ga. App. 2009)
(interpreting Georgia’s red-light statute, which is substantially similar to
A.R.S. § 28-645(A)(3)(a), and concluding that the statute “requires that a
driver facing a red traffic light stop behind the stop line or crosswalk and
also behind those vehicles stopped in observance of the traffic light”).

¶20 Owen also argues that viewing the accident as one continuous
event may allow “the predicate traffic violation to occur at any time during
the ‘accident,’” including when the moving violation is unrelated to the
accident. To support his argument, Owen poses a hypothetical in which a
collision occurs 100 yards before the intersection and the vehicle rolls into
the intersection after the light turns red. Even if it is possible that an
accident may be too attenuated from an alleged moving violation to
establish causation, that is not this case. Owen’s failure to stop at a red light
directly resulted in both vehicles being immediately propelled into the
intersection.

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Opinion of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶21 We accept special action jurisdiction and hold that the plain
language of the enhanced penalty statute does not require a vehicle to have
entered the intersection before the initial collision occurs when the accident
comprises one continuous event resulting from a driver’s failure to stop at
a red light. A.R.S. § 28-672(A)(1). We therefore grant relief to the State,
vacate the superior court’s decision, and remand to the municipal court to
conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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