In Re Term of Parental Rights as to N.R.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.R., C.R., and K.R.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0205
FILED 06-13-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015JD202200092
The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Harris & Winger, P.C., Flagstaff
By Chad Joshua Winger
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Autumn Spritzer
Counsel for Appellee Arizona Department of Child Safety
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.R., et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Michael R. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Amanda R. (“Mother”)1 have three children in
common, born in 2011, 2013, and 2016, respectively.

¶3 In June 2022, the Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”)
took temporary custody of the children and petitioned for dependency due
to the parents’ neglect, ongoing substance abuse, and history of domestic
violence. One month later, the juvenile court adjudicated the children
dependent and affirmed their placement in DCS custody.

¶4 During the dependency, DCS offered the parents
reunification services, including case management, child and family team
meetings, individual counseling, parenting classes, parenting time,
substance abuse treatment, drug testing, team decision-making meetings,
and transportation.

¶5 Father minimally engaged in these services. Early in the
dependency, DCS referred him to the Arizona Families F.I.R.S.T. (“AFF”)
program for substance abuse treatment. Though he completed an intake in
July 2022, he did not participate further in the program.

¶6 DCS also referred Father to Physician Services, Inc. (“PSI”) for
drug testing. Father tested twice in July 2022. His first test was positive for
amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC. His second test was positive
for amphetamine and methamphetamine. He did not test again for over a
year.

1 Mother also appealed the juvenile court’s termination order. However,

after she failed to file an opening brief, we dismissed her appeal.

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¶7 In August 2022, Father enrolled with Mohave Mental Health
Clinic, Inc. (“MMHC”) for substance abuse services. At MMHC, he
participated sporadically in drug counseling and group meetings for about
six months. In February 2023, he told a therapist he had a lengthy history
of abusing methamphetamine, that he had suffered two heart attacks
because of his drug use, and that his longest period of sobriety in the past
twenty-five years was approximately seven days. Father was admitted into
a high-intensity residential treatment program. But after just five days, he
left the program. Ultimately, the only service Father completed through
MMHC was a parenting class, which he finished in April 2023.

¶8 In May 2023, the juvenile court changed the case plan from
family reunification to severance and adoption. Two weeks later, DCS
moved to terminate Father’s parental rights, alleging two statutory grounds
as a basis: (1) the children’s out-of-home placement for nine months and (2)
Father’s substance abuse. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), (3).

¶9 That same month, both parents moved to the Phoenix area
and enrolled in an out-patient substance abuse treatment program offered
by Frontline Empire, LLC (“Frontline”). Father began to attend group
therapy at Frontline in June. In July, he started individual counseling and
completed a psychiatric evaluation.

¶10 In August 2023, the juvenile court held a termination
adjudication hearing. Though the court commended the parents for
engaging in substance abuse services “for approximately three months”
before trial, it also noted the parents “had multiple opportunities during
the case to show sobriety and stability,” but had not yet done so. The court
found that DCS made reasonable and diligent efforts to provide the parents
with appropriate reunification services and that “neither Mother nor Father
ha[d] completed any portion of their case plan with respect to addressing
their significant substance abuse history.” The court terminated both
parents’ rights to their children.

¶11 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6,
Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A),
12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶12 Before terminating parents’ rights to their children, a court
must find at least one statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear and
convincing evidence, Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249,
¶ 12 (2000), and that termination is in the children’s best interests by a

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preponderance of the evidence, Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41
(2005). We will “affirm a termination order unless the juvenile court abuses
its discretion or the court’s findings are not supported by reasonable
evidence.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474, ¶ 14 (2022);
Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 (2023). We do not
reweigh the evidence, but instead “look only to determine if there is
evidence to sustain the court’s ruling.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

I. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Best-Interests
Finding.

¶13 Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that
statutory grounds existed to terminate his parental rights under A.R.S.
§§ 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8)(a). See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz.
576, 577, ¶ 5 (App. 2017) (finding that by failing to challenge a ground for
termination, the parent “abandoned and waived any contention that the
court erred in granting severance on that basis”). Instead, Father only
challenges the juvenile court’s finding that termination of his parental
rights was in the children’s best interests.

¶14 In determining the children’s best interests, the court must
consider the totality of circumstances at the time of the termination
adjudication hearing, including the children’s adoptability and the parents’
rehabilitation. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 1 (2018).
The court must also consider whether the children will benefit from the
termination or be harmed if the relationship continued. Demetrius L. v.
Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 16 (2016).

A. The Juvenile Court’s Benefit Finding

¶15 Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by
finding the children would benefit from termination of his parental rights
merely because they were “adoptable” and in “potential adoptive
placement[s].” Relying on Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, Father asserts that
adoptability alone is insufficient to establish a benefit from termination and
the court must also determine that a child’s adoption is likely. 244 Ariz. 365,
370–71, ¶ 22 (App. 2018).

¶16 The juvenile court may find a child would benefit from
termination if there is an adoption plan or if the child is adoptable. Alma S.,
245 Ariz. at 150–51, ¶ 13. The court may also find that a child will benefit
from “the stability an adoption would provide[.]” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action
No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352 (App. 1994). Thus, when a prospective

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adoptive placement is meeting the child’s needs and the child’s adoption is
both legally possible and likely, the court may find that termination of the
parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4,
¶ 12.

¶17 In this case, the record supports the juvenile court’s findings
that the children will benefit from the termination of the parent-child
relationship. The DCS case manager testified the children are adoptable,
that they are in adoptive placements, and that one of the placements is
willing to adopt all three children. The case manager further testified that,
even if the children could not all be adopted by the same placement, the
placements are committed to maintaining the children’s relationships with
each other after the adoptions. This testimony supports the court’s finding
that the children were adoptable and in adoptive placements. From this
testimony the court could reasonably infer that the proposed adoption, or
adoptions, were legally possible and likely to occur if the parent-child
relationships were terminated. See id. at 3, ¶ 9.

¶18 Relying on Titus S., Father contends a child’s adoptability is
irrelevant unless the court finds a “return to [the] parent is unlikely.” 244
Ariz. at 370–71, ¶ 22. He argues the court could not have found that a return
to the parent was “unlikely” because DCS never attempted to preserve the
family unit and the court did not consider his recent sobriety.

¶19 His argument fails for several reasons. First, Titus S. does not
support his contention that the juvenile court must consider whether a
“return to parent is unlikely” before concluding a child will benefit from
adoption. 244 Ariz. at 370–71, ¶ 22. Second, by failing to challenge grounds
for termination, he has conceded the court’s finding that DCS “made a
diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services[.]” Moreover,
Father fails to identify any additional reunification services he believes DCS
should have offered him, but did not, to preserve the family. Third, the
court did not ignore Father’s participation in substance abuse services at
the time of the termination adjudication hearing. To the contrary, the court
commended the parents for engaging in treatment. But the court also
considered other factors, including the children’s out-of-home placement
for over a year and evidence that the parents “had multiple opportunities
during the case to show sobriety and stability and yet [had] not done so[.]”

¶20 On this record, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
by finding the children would benefit from termination of the
parent-child relationship.

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B. The Juvenile Court’s Detriment Finding

¶21 Father next challenges the juvenile court’s finding the
children would be harmed if the parent-child relationship continued. He
argues the record showed the children are bonded to him and, therefore,
the court erred by concluding that an ongoing parent-child relationship
would harm the children.

¶22 The juvenile court, however, expressly considered Father’s
bond, as well as the children’s desire to reunify with their parents.
Although a bonded relationship is a factor for the court to consider, it is not
dispositive in addressing the children’s best interests. See Dominique M. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98–99, ¶ 12 (App. 2016). Against this
familial bond, the court considered other factors including the fact the
children had “suffered for years” due to Father’s “inability to provide a
safe, stable home” and his neglect of their “medical, dental, emotional, and
educational needs.” In weighing the evidence, the court concluded “the
children deserve to have the opportunity to thrive in a safe, sober, and
stable environment” and that if the court were to deny the termination, the
children “will be at risk of future abuse or neglect.”

¶23 Father asserts this finding was error because there is no real
risk for further harm or neglect to the children because DCS, as their legal
custodian, can protect them from harm while he establishes sobriety. But
accepting his contention that the children should remain in DCS care until
he can show he is sober would leave them in foster care for an indefinite
period. Arizona law recognizes that long-term foster care can be harmful to
children. See Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 476, ¶ 23 (explaining that “the
legislature’s intent to avoid having children linger in foster care echoes
throughout other grounds justifying termination in § 8-533(B),” including
(B)(3) and (B)(8)). And “a child’s interest in permanency must prevail over
a parent’s uncertain battle with drugs.” Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240
Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 17 (App. 2016).

¶24 Additionally, by not challenging the court’s A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(3) finding, Father has conceded he was “unable to discharge [his]
parental responsibilities because of . . . chronic abuse of dangerous drugs,
and alcohol, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition
will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” Accordingly, the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding the children would
suffer a detriment if they maintained a parent-child relationship with
Father.

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C. The Children’s Right to Familial Integrity

¶25 Father also argues the juvenile court must consider the
children’s fundamental liberty interest in an intact family as part of its
best-interests analysis. He cites Kent K. for the position that “until a court
finds grounds for termination, [the] parent and child ‘share a vital interest
in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.’” 210
Ariz. at 286, ¶ 35 (quoting Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982)).

¶26 Father offers no legal authority to show he has standing to
challenge the children’s fundamental liberty interests once his parental
rights were terminated. See In re O.M., 254 Ariz. 543, 545, ¶ 9 (App. 2023)
(“A parent lacks standing to challenge a child’s placement once parental
rights are terminated.”). Regardless, the finding of a statutory ground to
terminate parental rights is synonymous to a finding of parental unfitness.
Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 9. Thus, in the best-interests stage of the analysis,
“[t]he weight of the presumption that the child shares the parent’s interest
in preserving the family relationship is greatly reduced by the potential
harm to the child from maintaining a relationship with an unfit parent.”
Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 285, ¶ 31 (citations omitted). The court’s “foremost
concern” then becomes “the child’s interest in stability and security.” Jessie
D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 583, ¶ 27 (2021) (quotations and
citations omitted). Here, the juvenile court carefully considered the totality
of the circumstances—including evidence of the children’s bond to their
parents and their desire to return home—in determining that termination
of parental rights was in the children’s best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶27 Read as a whole, Father’s arguments on appeal request that
we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Because reasonable
evidence supports the juvenile court’s best-interests finding, we affirm the
court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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