Carson v. Hon. gentry/state
The holding in the court’s own words
We hold that the State’s allegations that Carson had complied with a prior order to take all prescribed medications for at least one year and was released from a civil commitment evaluation facility, by themselves, do not justify a reasonable belief that he may have regained competency.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we work.
Cited by
- Joel Carson v. Hon. gentry/state Ariz. 2025
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Hehman 520 P.2d 507
- Rider v. Garcia 312 P.3d 113
- Hiskett v. Hon. lambert/state 451 P.3d 408
- State v. GUNCHES 234 P.3d 590
- State of Arizona v. Anthony Lewis 340 P.3d 415
Opinion text
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
JOEL CARSON, Petitioner,
v.
THE HONORABLE JO LYNN GENTRY, Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of MARICOPA,
Respondent Judge,
STATE OF ARIZONA ex rel. RACHEL MITCHELL, Maricopa County
Attorney,
Real Party in Interest.
No. 1 CA-SA 24-0067
FILED 07-09-2024
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2022-006384-001
The Honorable Jo Lynn Gentry, Judge
JURISDICTION ACCEPTED AND RELIEF GRANTED
COUNSEL
Maricopa County Legal Defender, Phoenix
By Kush Govani
Counsel for Petitioner
Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Christine A. Davis, Quinton S. Gregory
Counsel for Real Party in Interest
CARSON v. HON GENTRY/STATE
Opinion of the Court
OPINION
Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the opinion of the court, in
which Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.
H O W E, Judge:
¶1 In this special action, Joel Carson challenges the trial court’s
denial of his motion to reconsider the ruling permitting the State to refile
charges against him.
¶2 In our order issued on April 22, 2024, we accepted jurisdiction
and granted relief for reasons more fully set forth here. Special action
jurisdiction is appropriate because Carson has no adequate remedy by
appeal, Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 1(a), and his “petition raises legal questions of
first impression and statewide importance,” Hiskett v. Lambert, 247 Ariz.
432, 435 ¶ 10 (App. 2019). We hold that the State’s allegations that Carson
had complied with a prior order to take all prescribed medications for at
least one year and was released from a civil commitment evaluation facility,
by themselves, do not justify a reasonable belief that he may have regained
competency. Therefore, the trial court erred in permitting the State to refile
the charges against Carson.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3 Carson is a diagnosed schizophrenic with a history of
psychiatric disturbance. He has received treatment for many years, but his
illness has persisted. In May 2018, Carson was charged in State v. Carson,
No. CR2018-124276 (the “2018 Case”) with first-degree murder and other
felony offenses. Defense counsel moved for competency evaluations and
the court granted the motion. Carson received treatment for a year as part
of the competency evaluations. The court then found him neither
competent to stand trial nor restorable within 21 months. See Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 11.5. It therefore dismissed the charges without prejudice. The court
ordered Carson transported to Valleywise Behavioral Health Center
(“Valleywise”) for civil commitment evaluation.
¶4 Just a few weeks later, Valleywise notified the State that it
would discharge Carson. The State then arrested Carson and refiled the
same charges against him in State v. Carson, No. CR2022-006384 (the “2022
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CARSON v. HON GENTRY/STATE
Opinion of the Court
Case”). The State also charged an additional felony, misconduct involving
weapons. Defense counsel initially moved for additional competency
evaluations but then moved to vacate the evaluations. Defense counsel
argued instead that Carson was entitled to a presumption of continued
incompetency because he was found incompetent in the 2018 Case and that
“no evidence” had been presented “to support a change in competency.”
Defense counsel also requested that the 2022 Case be dismissed on grounds
of incompetency.
¶5 The State moved in the 2022 Case to refile the charges based
on this court’s opinion in Johnson v. Hartsell ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 254
Ariz. 585, 591–92 ¶¶ 22–27 (App. 2023), which held that leave of court is
required before the State can refile charges that were previously dismissed
because the defendant was adjudged incompetent. The State based its
motion on the trial court’s order placing him under involuntary inpatient
treatment after being found incompetent in the 2018 Case and on his
impending release from Valleywise. Carson’s scheduled release from
Valleywise, the State argued, “demonstrate[d] that Valleywise deemed
[Carson’s] mental status significantly improved.”
¶6 The court, the Honorable Jo Lynn Gentry, denied Carson’s
request to vacate the competency proceedings and granted the State
permission to refile the charges. The court dismissed the 2022 Case without
prejudice. It found that the State’s discovery that Carson was due to be
released from Valleywise gave the State a “reasonable belief . . . that
[Carson] ha[d] regained competency.” The State then refiled the charges in
State v. Carson, No. CR2023-000872 (the “2023 Case”) and the case was
assigned to the Honorable Kerstin LeMaire.
¶7 Carson moved to dismiss the 2023 Case, contending that he
was entitled to the presumption of continued incompetency after being
found incompetent in the 2018 Case. He argued that “the State’s proffered
reasons for a change in competency”—i.e., his participation in court-
ordered treatment and his imminent release from Valleywise—were
“insufficient” to “support a change in competency.” In response, the State
argued that Carson was engaged in “inappropriate forum shopping” by
asking Judge LeMaire in the 2023 Case to “second guess Judge Gentry.”
¶8 Judge LeMaire granted Carson’s motion and dismissed the
2023 Case without prejudice. Judge LeMaire found “that it does not appear
that the State had a reasonable belief that [Carson] regained competency
prior to refiling the charges in this matter.” The State sought relief by special
action from the dismissal order. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Lemaire in & for Cnty.
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CARSON v. HON GENTRY/STATE
Opinion of the Court
of Maricopa, 255 Ariz. 544, 545 ¶ 1 (App. 2023). This court accepted
jurisdiction and granted relief, setting aside the dismissal order and
remanding for further proceedings. Id. It held that “[a] defendant who seeks
to challenge a court’s determination that the State has sufficiently alleged a
reasonable basis to believe that the defendant is currently competent may
either move for reconsideration or challenge the ruling by special action to
an appellate court.” Id. at 549 ¶ 28.
¶9 On remand, Carson moved in the 2022 Case for
reconsideration of Judge Gentry’s denial of his motion to dismiss. Judge
Gentry denied the motion for reconsideration, finding that the State did not
need to prove Carson’s competence before filing the new charges and that
the new case provided an opportunity to redetermine his competence. This
special action followed.
DISCUSSION
¶10 Carson argues that Judge Gentry erred in finding that the
State presented sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that he
may have regained competency to stand trial. He contends that his being
under court-ordered treatment and released from Valleywise do not
support a reasonable belief that he may have regained competency. This
court reviews a motion to dismiss a criminal prosecution for an abuse of
discretion. Johnson, 254 Ariz. at 589 ¶ 14.
¶11 “It is well established that [due process] prohibits the criminal
prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.” Medina v.
California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162
(1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)). This “prohibition is
fundamental to an adversary system of justice” because mentally
incompetent persons cannot defend themselves. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171–72.
Moreover, failing to “observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s
right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent” violates due process.
Id. at 172 (citing Pate, 383 U.S. at 385). After making a finding that a
defendant is not competent and not restorable, the court may do any or all
of the following: remand the defendant for a civil commitment evaluation;
appoint a guardian; or release the defendant from custody and dismiss the
charges without prejudice. See A.R.S. § 13-4517(A); Ariz. R. Crim. P.
11.5(b)(3)(A).
¶12 “[A] prior adjudication of mental incompetency gives rise to
a presumption of continued incompetency.” State v. Hehman, 110 Ariz. 459,
460 (1974). This incompetency presumption is “charge-specific.” Johnson,
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CARSON v. HON GENTRY/STATE
Opinion of the Court
254 Ariz. at 592 ¶ 27. If new evidence suggests the defendant has regained
competency, the court must “hold an additional hearing to determine the
defendant’s competence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.6(a)(1), (4). But the “court
cannot make a subsequent finding of competence unless some new
evidence . . . is presented to rebut the presumption of continued
incompetence.” State v. Lewis, 236 Ariz. 336, 341 ¶ 14 (App. 2014). The State
need not prove that the defendant has regained competency, but must
present reasonable grounds that the defendant may be competent. Johnson,
254 Ariz. at 591 ¶¶ 23–24. The State does so by “provid[ing] information to
the court before refiling that supports a reasonable belief” that the
defendant may have regained competency. Id. at 591 ¶ 25.
¶13 Here, the State did not present sufficient information to
support a reasonable belief that Carson may have regained competency. Id.
To refile the charges, the State relied on the court’s ordering Carson to take
all prescribed medications for at least one year and alleged that Carson
complied with that order. But Carson’s participation in court-ordered
treatment is not synonymous with improvement in his competency. In fact,
the record shows the opposite: Carson previously received treatment for a
year without improvement of his condition and then the court found him
incompetent. And the examining doctors opined that Carson’s “current
presentation was likely going to be the most optimal state we would likely
see in the foreseeable future,” implying little progress in the future. Given
this record, Carson’s simple participation in treatment cannot support a
reasonable belief that he may have regained competency without some
indication that his treatment had been effective.
¶14 As additional information, the State cited to Carson’s release
from Valleywise. The State argues that Carson’s release from Valleywise
supported its reasonable belief that his condition had significantly
improved because it suggested he no longer needed treatment. But release
of a defendant from a civil commitment evaluation facility does not
necessarily by itself support a reasonable belief that the defendant has
regained competency to stand trial in a criminal case because such a release
proceeds under a significantly different standard. See Oligschlaeger v.
Mulleneaux, 1 CA-SA 19-0083, 2019 WL 2185161, at *4 ¶ 17 (Ariz. App. May
21, 2019) (mem. decision) (finding that defendant’s release from the
evaluation center where he was sent for civil commitment evaluation was
“not evidence of restoration”). A person is incompetent to stand trial if that
person is “unable to understand the nature and objective of the proceedings
or to assist in his or her defense because of a mental illness, defect, or
disability.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.1(a)(2); see also State v. Gunches, 225 Ariz. 22,
24 ¶ 9 (2010). In contrast, a court can civilly commit a person if it “finds by
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CARSON v. HON GENTRY/STATE
Opinion of the Court
clear and convincing evidence that the proposed patient, as a result of
mental disorder, is a danger to self, is a danger to others or has a persistent
or acute disability or a grave disability and is in need of treatment, and is
either unwilling or unable to accept voluntary treatment.” A.R.S. § 36-
540(A).
¶15 To be sure, the State was not required to prove that Carson
had regained competency to obtain leave to refile. Johnson, 254 Ariz. at 591
¶ 24. Nor does our holding mean that compliance with a treatment order
and a release from civil commitment evaluation facility can never constitute
sufficient information to support a reasonable belief that a defendant may
have regained competency if different or additional circumstances exist. See
Rider v. Garcia ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 233 Ariz. 314, 317 ¶ 11 (App. 2013)
(finding that the State had “reasonable grounds to believe that [the
defendant] may have regained competency” because all of the following
circumstances existed: (1) the state hospital was planning to discharge the
defendant, (2) defendant was not qualified for twenty-four-hour
supervision, (3) defendant’s psychologist reported that he had made
“considerable improvement,” and (4) previous hospitalizations had
restored defendant).
¶16 Under the circumstances of this case, however, Carson’s
compliance with a treatment order and his release from a civil commitment
evaluation facility are not enough to overcome the presumption of
incompetency previously established in this particular case. Therefore,
Judge Gentry erred in permitting the State to refile the charges in the 2022
Case because the State did not provide sufficient information supporting a
reasonable belief that Carson may have regained competency. Johnson, 254
Ariz. at 591 ¶ 25.
CONCLUSION
¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we accept jurisdiction and grant
relief by vacating the trial court’s orders denying Carson’s motion to
reconsider its ruling and permitting the State to refile the charges.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV
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