Murphy-Logue v. Hon. steinlage/state

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STEPHEN MURPHY-LOGUE, Petitioner,

v.

THE HONORABLE JOSHUA STEINLAGE, Judge of the SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of
COCONINO, Respondent Judge,

STATE OF ARIZONA ex rel. WILLIAM RING, Coconino County
Attorney, Real Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA-SA 24-0233
FILED 01-16-2025

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. CR2022-00610
The Honorable Joshua Steinlage, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Blumberg & Associates, Phoenix
By Bruce E. Blumberg
Co-Counsel for Petitioner

The Bidwill Law Firm PLLC, Phoenix
By Josephine F. Bidwill
Co-Counsel for Petitioner
Coconino County Attorney’s Office, Flagstaff
By Sasha Charls
Counsel for Real Party in Interest

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Stephen Murphy-Logue seeks special action review of the
superior court’s denial of his motion to dismiss all charges against him with
prejudice. He alleges that his first trial ended in a mistrial because of
prosecutorial misconduct, so a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the United States Constitution and Arizona Constitution. For
reasons that follow, we accept jurisdiction but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The State charged Murphy-Logue with two counts of sexual
assault against his former fiancée, R.J., who asserted that Murphy-Logue
had sexual intercourse with her without her consent on February 4, 2017.
At Murphy-Logue’s first trial, the State called a Sexual Assault Nurse
Examiner, Michelle Kearney, to testify about statements R.J. made to her
shortly after the alleged sexual assault. During direct examination, the State
asked Kearney why she had indicated in her report that R.J. was at risk for
post-trauma syndrome. At the end of a long answer, Kearney tacked on the
sentence: “And, also, she noted that there were two previous incidents.”
The State immediately interrupted Kearney because the State had agreed
not to reference previous incidents unless they were brought up by the
defense.

¶3 Murphy-Logue moved for a mistrial at a conference in
chambers. The parties briefed the issue, and the superior court granted the
mistrial over the State’s objection, noting that it expected evidence from
both sides to make the ultimate verdict a close call, and that any minor
detail could sway the jurors. The court thus concluded that proceeding
with trial would be unfair to Murphy-Logue given the Nurse Examiner’s
reference to previous incidents.

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¶4 Murphy-Logue moved to dismiss all charges with prejudice
based on Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108-09 (1984) (barring retrial if
mistrial is caused by prosecutorial misconduct). After considering the
prosecutor’s explanation and hearing argument from the parties, the
superior court denied the motion, noting that the witness’s testimony was
clearly unexpected and a mistake, that there was no evidence the prosecutor
acted intentionally or indifferently regarding the risk of a mistrial, and there
was no evidence that the prosecutor elicited the testimony for an improper
purpose. Murphy-Logue filed this petition for special action review shortly
before his second trial was set to begin.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction.

¶5 Special action jurisdiction is discretionary. Milke v. Mroz, 236
Ariz. 276, 279, ¶ 2 (App. 2014). Here, a petition for special action is the
appropriate vehicle for raising an interlocutory double jeopardy claim
“[b]ecause the Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees the right to be free from
subsequent prosecution” and, if applicable, “the clause is violated by the
mere commencement of retrial.” State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 438, ¶ 22
(2004); Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130 (App. 1989). Thus,
we accept jurisdiction.

II. Double Jeopardy.

¶6 “Whether double jeopardy bars retrial is a question of law,
which we review de novo.” Moody, 208 Ariz. at 437, ¶ 18. We review for
an abuse of discretion, however, the superior court’s factual findings
regarding conduct underlying a mistrial. See State v. Korovkin, 202 Ariz. 493,
495, ¶ 5 (App. 2002).

¶7 Arizona’s Double Jeopardy Clause, like that of the United
States Constitution, includes the right to be free from multiple trials for the
same offense and, generally, to have a fair trial completed before the
original jury. Milke, 236 Ariz. at 281, ¶ 10; see also Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 10.
Moreover, Arizona’s Double Jeopardy Clause affords even greater
protection than its federal analogue, barring retrial when there are instances
of egregious prosecutorial misconduct that raise concerns about the
integrity of the justice system. See State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 438–39, ¶¶
29–35 (2002); State v. Jorgenson, 198 Ariz. 390, 391–93, ¶¶ 4–11 (2000); Pool,
139 Ariz. at 108–09. Arizona distinguishes “between simple prosecutorial
error, such as an isolated misstatement or loss of temper, and misconduct
that is so egregious that it raises concerns over the integrity and

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fundamental fairness of the trial itself.” Minnitt, 203 Ariz. at 438, ¶ 30 (citing
Pool, 139 Ariz. at 105–07). Double jeopardy bars retrial if there is extreme
and improper misconduct that is highly prejudicial to the defendant. Milke,
236 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 20.

¶8 When Murphy-Logue moved to dismiss all charges with
prejudice, he asserted that the prosecutor was warned against eliciting
testimony about prior incidents during a “bench conference” “just prior” to
Kearney’s examination. Murphy-Logue asserts that because the prosecutor
admitted that she had not admonished her witness before direct
examination, this omission establishes misconduct.

¶9 The prosecutor explained, however, that during R.J.’s
meeting with Kearney after the alleged sexual assault occurred, R.J. told
Kearney there were two prior incidents where she felt uncomfortable but
never said “no.” During a pretrial interview with Kearney, Murphy-
Logue’s counsel tried to portray this part of Kearney’s notes as saying that
R.J. never said no on the day of the alleged offense. Kearney clarified that
her statement referred to prior incidents, and the prosecutor instructed her
to do the same thing if Murphy-Logue’s counsel tried to misrepresent her
notes during cross-examination.

¶10 The prosecutor further explained that shortly before a
different witness took the stand and while she was preparing for that
witness, Murphy-Logue’s attorney drew attention to part of Kearney’s
report and asked what the prosecutor planned to do about it. The
prosecutor had asked Murphy-Logue’s attorney if he planned to go down
the “never said no” route—the way he had during the pretrial interview—
and he said no. The prosecutor had then said she would remind Kearney
not to testify about prior incidents during the next break. Because it was
late in the day on a Friday, however, the court did not give a break between
witnesses, and the prosecutor did not remind Kearney about volunteering
information about the two prior incidents. The prosecutor explained that
although she did not remind Kearney about volunteering information, she
did not expect Kearny to do so unless the defense opened the door.

¶11 The court denied Murphy-Logue’s motion to dismiss,
concluding that Kearney’s testimony was clearly unexpected and a mistake,
and that there was no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. The court
spelled out its reasoning for this denial, emphasizing that (1) its decision to
grant a mistrial was close, (2) the prosecutor was dissatisfied with that
decision (meaning the prosecutor did not seek a mistrial for tactical
purposes), (3) the “bench conference” Murphy-Logue repeatedly

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referenced was a conversation between the parties without any resulting
order, record, or ruling, (4) the Nurse Examiner was an inexperienced
witness, (5) the “two previous incidents” Kearney testified to were not
sexual assaults (only instances where R.J. felt uncomfortable about
engaging in intercourse with Murphy-Logue, but never said no), (6) the
parties’ discussion about those two instances did not occur immediately
before Kearney took the stand, and (7) the sequence of events did not
suggest the prosecutor instructed Kearney to bring up those instances.
These findings and the court’s reasoning are supported by the record, and
we will not substitute our judgment for that of the superior court regarding
whether there was intentional misconduct by the prosecutor. See Korovkin,
202 Ariz. at 495, ¶¶ 5, 8. Thus, Murphy-Logue has not established that the
superior court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss the
charges against him with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

¶12 Accordingly, we accept jurisdiction but deny relief.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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