Club West v. Shea homes/the Edge

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

CLUB WEST CONSERVANCY, Petitioner,

v.

SHEA HOMES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; SHEA HOMES, INC.; THE
EDGE AT CLUB WEST LLC, Respondents.

No. 1 CA-SA 25-0117
FILED 10-27-2025

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2021-018435
The Honorable Susanna C. Pineda, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Francis J. Slavin PC, Phoenix
By Francis J. Slavin, Daniel J. Slavin
Co-Counsel for Petitioner

Osborn Maledon PA, Phoenix
By Colin F. Campbell, Eric M. Fraser, Andrew G. Pappas, Gideon Cionelo
Co-Counsel for Petitioner

Cohen Dowd Quigley PC, Phoenix
By Cynthia C. Albracht-Crogan, Kaysey Lauren Fung, Alejandra Curiel
Counsel for Respondents
 CLUB WEST v. SHEA HOMES/THE EDGE
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) allows courts in a civil
action to enter judgment as to fewer than all claims or parties. When a court
does so, Rule 54(g)(3)—which describes how and when a party should
request attorney fees—usually applies. Rule 54(h) then requires the final
judgment to reflect a fee award.

¶2 Under Rules 54(b), (g), and (h), entering a civil judgment
usually plays out as follows. The court issues a decision resolving all claims
against a party, while other claims against other parties remain. The
successful party does not want to wait for those claims against other parties
to conclude before obtaining judgment. So the successful party asks the
court to enter judgment under Rule 54(b) and files a proposed form of
judgment with a blank space for the court to enter a fee award. That party
also moves for attorney fees. After full briefing, the court resolves the fee
request. If the circumstances are right, the court then enters a judgment with
Rule 54(b) language and reflecting fees awarded.

¶3 But courts sometimes enter judgment under Rule 54(b) when
no party requests it. And they sometimes do so without awarding attorney
fees to the successful party. That happened here. So this special action
requires us to decide how and when a successful party must request
attorney fees if the court unilaterally enters a Rule 54(b) judgment on all
claims asserted against the successful party when claims against other
parties remain.

¶4 We conclude Rule 54(g)(3) does not govern here—Rule
54(h)(2)(C) does. When the court unilaterally enters judgment without
awarding fees, “a prevailing party seeking costs and/or fees must file a
motion to alter or amend the judgment within the time required by Rule
59(d).” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(h)(2)(C). Under Rule 59(d), that must usually
occur within “15 days after the entry of judgment.” Because no such motion
was timely filed here, we accept special action jurisdiction and grant relief.

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 CLUB WEST v. SHEA HOMES/THE EDGE
Opinion of the Court

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶5 Club West Conservancy (“Club West”) sued Shea Homes
Limited Partnership, Shea Homes, Inc. (collectively, “Shea Homes”), and
the Edge at Club West LLC. As against Shea Homes, Club West sought a
declaration that the Foothills Club West Golf Course must remain a golf
course or an open space. Shea Homes moved for summary judgment.

¶6 On February 14, 2025, the superior court entered a signed
minute entry granting Shea Homes’ motion, dismissing it from the action,
and entering judgment under Rule 54(b). The judgment said nothing about
attorney fees.

¶7 One month later, on March 14, Shea Homes filed a “Notice of
Lodging Proposed Form of Final Judgment Pursuant to Ariz. R. Civ. P.
54(b).” It agreed the court “fully resolved all claims against [it],” but its
proposed form of judgment included space for a fee award, which Shea
Homes said it would seek “within the time allotted under Rule 54(f) and
(g).”

¶8 Club West objected. It argued that, because the court entered
judgment without a proposed form of judgment, Rule 54(h)(2)(C)
governed. Club West contended that Shea Homes had to move to alter or
amend the judgment within 15 days after its entry. Club West argued the
only way Shea Homes could extend that deadline was to show under Rule
6(b)(2) that it was not notified of the judgment within 21 days. And Club
West maintained Shea Homes could not make that showing, so its fee
request came too late. Shea Homes responded that its fee request was
timely under Rule 54(g), Rule 54(h) does not apply, and the court could
allow more time to move to alter or amend the judgment.

¶9 The superior court concluded that, under Rule 54(h)(2)(C),
Shea Homes had to move to alter or amend the judgment. But the court
concluded it could, under Rule 6(b)(2), extend the deadline for Shea Homes
to do so. Because Shea Homes showed excusable neglect, the court
extended the time for amending the judgment and treated Shea Homes’
proposed form of judgment and attorney fee application as a motion to alter
or amend the judgment. Club West petitioned for special action relief.

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 CLUB WEST v. SHEA HOMES/THE EDGE
Opinion of the Court

JURISDICTION

¶10 Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Actions 2(c) outlines
the relief available in a special action. To obtain special action review, a
petition must seek relief formerly obtained through the writs of certiorari,
mandamus, or prohibition. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 2(c). But even when a
special action petition seeks such relief, jurisdiction “may be accepted only
if the remedy by appeal is not equally plain, speedy, and adequate.” Ariz.
R.P. Spec. Act. 2(b)(2); see also Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(a) (“In accepting or
declining jurisdiction, the court is determining whether remedy by appeal
is equally plain, speedy, and adequate.”). And even then, whether we
accept special action jurisdiction is discretionary. Id.

¶11 Club West argues the court’s Rule 54(b) judgment is now
final. If Club West is correct, then the superior court lacks jurisdiction to
alter it under Rule 59(d). See Preston v. Denkins, 94 Ariz. 214, 219 (1963) (a
superior court lacks jurisdiction to rule on an untimely post-judgment
motion); Egan-Ryan Mech. Co. v. Cardon Meadows Dev. Corp., 169 Ariz. 161,
166 (App. 1990) (if a Rule 59 motion is not timely, the court lacks jurisdiction
to address it). Special action jurisdiction is appropriate when a party claims
the court lacks jurisdiction. United States v. Super. Ct., 144 Ariz. 265, 269
(1985) (“[P]etitioners claim that the respondent trial judge is proceeding
with the action in excess of or without jurisdiction, so that special action
relief is appropriate.”). If Club West is correct that the court is acting
without jurisdiction, Club West’s only remedy to immediately stop it from
doing so is a special action. See Glenn H. v. Hoskins, 244 Ariz. 404, 407 ¶ 7
(App. 2018) (“Special action jurisdiction is . . . appropriate to prevent the
superior court from acting without jurisdiction.”); see also Westerlund v.
Croaff, 68 Ariz. 36, 41 (1948) (“[A] writ of prohibition lies to prevent an
inferior tribunal from acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction.”).

¶12 The parties also ask us to interpret procedural rules using
undisputed facts—a pure legal question. See Sw. Gas Corp. v. Irwin, 229
Ariz. 198, 201 ¶ 7 (App. 2012) (“[W]hen . . . the special action presents a
pure question of law, it is particularly appropriate for us to accept
jurisdiction,” because “the interpretation and application of a procedural
rule like Rule 54(b)” is “solely a question of law”). In recent years, we have
often accepted jurisdiction to interpret legal rules. See, e.g., Yauck v. W. Town
Bank & Tr., ___ Ariz. ___, ___ 568 P.3d 386, 391 ¶ 16 (App. 2025)
(interpreting Civil Rules 64 and 69); White v. State, ___ Ariz. ___, ___ 565
P.3d 1062, 1064 ¶¶ 7-8 (App. 2025) (interpreting Criminal Rules 1.5(c) and
26.9); Kelly v. Blanchard, 255 Ariz. 197, 200 ¶ 10 (App. 2023) (interpreting
Civil Rule 35).

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 CLUB WEST v. SHEA HOMES/THE EDGE
Opinion of the Court

¶13 Lastly, the issues here are of first impression, likely to recur,
and of statewide importance. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(3)–(4);
Stubblefield v. Trombino, 197 Ariz. 382, 383 ¶ 2 (App. 2000) (special action
jurisdiction is appropriate when an issue will recur). We accept jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

¶14 We consider the interplay between three civil rules: Rules 54,
59, and 6. We interpret court rules de novo. Kelly, 255 Ariz. at 200 ¶ 11.
Like with statutes, interpreting a rule begins with its text. Id. “If the text of
the rule, when read in context, is unambiguous, our interpretative task
ends, and we apply the text as written without resorting to other methods
of interpretation.” Id. But if not, we may use the rule’s subject matter and
history, its effects and consequences, and its purpose. Id.

I.

¶15 The superior court entered judgment for Shea Homes under
Rule 54(b) without receiving a motion to do so or a proposed form of
judgment. Club West contends that, by doing so, the court resolved all
claims by or against Club West. The judgment, therefore, triggered Rule
54(h)(2)(C) and, to request fees, Shea Homes had to move to amend the
judgment within the time limit in Rule 59(d). Club West argues Shea
Homes missed that deadline, so the judgment is final.

¶16 Shea Homes responds that its attorney fees request was a
separate claim against Club West, and by not resolving that claim, the
judgment did not resolve all claims by Club West. Because the judgment
did not do so, Shea Homes argues it did not need to move to amend the
judgment and the court could extend the deadline to request fees.

¶17 We agree with Club West that the court’s Rule 54(b) judgment
resolved all claims by or against Club West. So Shea Homes had to move
to amend the judgment under Rule 59(d) within 15 days. The court could
extend that deadline under Rule 6(b)(2), but only if Shea Homes received
delayed notice of the judgment. Shea Homes does not allege delayed
notice, and it does not dispute it missed the 15-day deadline. When that
deadline passed, the judgment became final, so the court now lacks
jurisdiction to consider Shea Homes’ proposed form of judgment and its fee
request. We now explain these conclusions.

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 CLUB WEST v. SHEA HOMES/THE EDGE
Opinion of the Court

A.

¶18 Shea Homes needed to move to alter or amend the judgment.

1.

¶19 We begin with Rule 54’s text. At its outset, Rule 54
differentiates between a judgment and a decision. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(a).
“[A] ‘decision’ is a written order, ruling, or minute entry” adjudicating “at
least one claim or defense.” Id. But a “judgment” “includes a decree and
any order from which an appeal lies.” Id.

¶20 When a civil action involves a single plaintiff bringing a single
claim against a single defendant, entering judgment is straightforward. But
when a civil action involves multiple claims or multiple parties to a side
(e.g., one plaintiff and two defendants), entering judgment gets more
complicated. In multi-claim or multi-party litigation, the superior court can
enter judgment in two scenarios. The first: when the court “adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties” and thinks it should enter judgment before resolving remaining
claims. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The second: when the court resolves all claims
against all parties. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c).

¶21 In neither situation is a decision automatically a judgment.
For a decision resolving all claims against all parties to be a judgment, the
court must sign it, recite that “no further matters remain pending,” and say
it “is entered under Rule 54(c).” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c), 58(b)(1). For a
decision resolving one or more but fewer than all claims against all parties
to be a judgment, the court must sign it, “expressly determine[] there is no
just reason for delay,” and recite that it “is entered under Rule 54(b).” Ariz.
R. Civ. P. 54(b), 58(b)(1). This distinction between a decision and a
judgment is important to the timing of fee requests.

2.

¶22 Rule 54—in subsections (g) and (h)—discusses five scenarios
in which trial courts adjudicate claims, and it describes the method and
timing for requesting fees in each.

¶23 The first scenario: the court files a decision resolving all claims
against all parties and “judgment is to be entered under Rule 54(c).” Ariz.
R. Civ. P. 54(g)(2). There, “any motion for attorney’s fees must be filed
within 20 days after the decision is filed” or by a later date the court sets.
Id.

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 CLUB WEST v. SHEA HOMES/THE EDGE
Opinion of the Court

¶24 The second: the court files a decision resolving all claims and
liabilities of a party, but other claims remain against other parties. See Ariz.
R. Civ. P. 54(g)(3)(A). If a party then seeks judgment under Rule 54(b), “a
motion for fees must be filed within 20 days after service of the” request
seeking a Rule 54(b) judgment or by a later date the court sets. Ariz. R. Civ.
P. 54(g)(3)(A)(i).

¶25 The third: like the second, the court files a decision resolving
all claims and liabilities of a party, but other claims remain against other
parties. Unlike the second scenario, no party seeks a Rule 54(b) judgment
or the court declines to enter one. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(g)(3)(A)(ii). Here,
a party seeking fees must do so “no later than 20 days after any decision”
adjudicating “all remaining claims” in the case, or “20 days after the action’s
dismissal, whichever occurs first.” Id.

¶26 The fourth: the court files “a decision or judgment
adjudicat[ing] fewer than all claims and liabilities of a party[.]” Ariz. R.
Civ. P. 54(g)(3)(B). The deadline here is the same as in the third scenario—
20 days after a “decision” resolving all remaining claims or the action’s
dismissal, whichever comes first. Id.

¶27 In each of these four scenarios, Rules 54(g)(2) and (3) peg the
deadline to request fees to a decision date, not a judgment date. So, in most
circumstances, Rule 54 contemplates a bifurcated process—decision first,
judgment second. To ensure that occurs, Rule 54 requires that “claims for
attorney’s fees and costs must be resolved before any judgment may be
entered under Rule 54(b) or (c).” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(h)(1)(A).

¶28 We urge courts to use that bifurcated process—the court here
did not. Rule 58 allows parties to submit and respond to proposed forms
of judgment, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 58(a), and that process is important. It helps
ensure all necessary items make it into the judgment. See Ariz. R. Civ. P.
54(h)(1)(B). It allows the court to consider the parties’ views about whether
to enter an interlocutory judgment. And it provides greater clarity about
later deadlines, including when to seek attorney fees and to appeal.

¶29 The fifth scenario—that in Rule 54(h)—differs from the first
four. Here, “the court enters a judgment under Rule 54(b) or (c) without
first receiving a motion for judgment or a proposed form of judgment[.]”
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(h)(2)(C). Without a bifurcated process, the parties will
not have applied for fees and the court will not have awarded them. So,
despite Rule 54 urging otherwise, the judgment will not reflect a fee award.
See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(h)(1)(B). The comments to Rule 54 state that instances

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Opinion of the Court

when a court “enters a judgment that should include fees or costs without
first receiving a motion for judgment or a proposed form of judgment” are
“rare.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54 cmt. (2017). But when those rare instances occur,
Rule 54 instructs that “a prevailing party seeking costs and/or fees must
file a motion to alter or amend the judgment within the time required by
Rule 59(d).” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(h)(2)(C).

3.

¶30 Which scenario occurred here? Shea Homes answers the
fourth (and, at times, the second); Club West answers the fifth. Club West
is correct.

a.

¶31 Everyone agrees the court entered judgment for Shea Homes
under Rule 54(b) without a motion for judgment or a proposed form of
judgment. Rule 54(h)(2)(C) applies when “the court enters a judgment
under Rule 54(b) or (c) without first receiving a motion for judgment or a
proposed form of judgment[.]” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(h)(2)(C). Rule 54’s
comment reiterates that subsection applies when “a court enters a judgment
that should include fees or costs without first receiving a motion for
judgment or a proposed form of judgment.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54 cmt. (2017).
There is no ambiguity here—Rule 54(h)(2)(C) applies. See Kelly, 255 Ariz.
at 200 ¶ 11 (when a rule’s text is clear, we apply it); In re Washburn, 2022 WL
839792 *3 ¶ 18 (Ariz. App. Mar. 22, 2022) (mem. decision) (applying Rule
54(h)(2)(C) when “the probate court entered final judgment without having
considered attorney fees”).

b.

¶32 But Shea Homes argues its fee request is a stand-alone claim,
so the court’s judgment did not resolve all its claims against Club West and
Rule 54(g)(3)(B) applies. Recall that Rule 54(g)(3)(B) applies when a
decision or judgment resolves fewer than all claims and liabilities of a party,
and it says a fee request must be made no later than 20 days after a decision
adjudicating all remaining claims. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(g)(3)(B). Shea Homes
claims its fee request remained after the court’s judgment because its fee
request was a separate claim.

¶33 We do not see it that way. Shea Homes’ interpretation would
make Rule 54(g)(3)(B) nonsensical. Take this case. Under Shea Homes’
view, the court’s judgment left a separate claim for attorney fees
unresolved. Because it did so, the court had to issue a second decision

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Opinion of the Court

resolving that claim before the 20-day deadline to file a fee request would
trigger. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(g)(3)(B). But Rule 54(g)(3)(B) gives no
deadline to resolve remaining claims, so Shea Homes would have had no
deadline to seek fees. Only after Shea Homes sought fees and the court
resolved that request would the 20-day deadline to seek fees start running.
But by then, Shea Homes would have already sought fees. We do not
believe, properly interpreted, Rule 54(g)(3)(B) requires the court to resolve
a fee request to trigger the deadline to file a fee request. See France v. Indus.
Comm’n, 250 Ariz. 487, 490 ¶ 13 (2021) (“[We] avoid construing a statute in
a manner that leads to an absurd result.”).

¶34 The rest of Rule 54 also cuts against Shea Homes’
interpretation. See Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509 ¶ 7 (2017) (“In
construing a specific provision, we look to the statute as a whole[.]”).
Again, Rule 54(g) contemplates a bifurcated process where fees are resolved
after decisions but before judgment. Rule 54(g)(3)(A) applies when a court
issues a decision resolving all claims by or against a party. If a fee request
is a separate claim, no single decision could resolve all claims against a
single party (the fee claim would always remain), and the 20-day deadline
in Rule 54(g)(3)(A) to request fees would not trigger until the court awards
fees. Again, the court would need to resolve the fee request to trigger the
deadline for a fee request—a strange result.

¶35 On the other hand, Club West’s interpretation gives coherent
meaning to Rule 54(g) and the role it plays in maintaining order when
entering final judgment. Rule 54(g), by its nature, treats a request for fees
differently than other claims because that Rule gives the framework for
granting fee awards and incorporating them into judgments. Put
differently, when determining whether a decision or judgment adjudicates
some or all claims in an action, and thus which part of Rule 54(g)’s
framework applies, a request for fees is not a separate claim. If a decision
resolves all claims by or against all parties, other than fees, then Rule 54(g)(2)
applies. If a decision resolves all claims by or against a party, other than fees,
then Rule 54(g)(3)(A) applies. And if a decision or judgment resolves one
or more, but less than all, claims against a party (other than attorney fees),
then Rule 54(g)(3)(B) applies.

¶36 In fact, Rule 54(g)(2) exempts attorney fees requests when
determining whether a decision resolves all claims and liabilities. That
subsection triggers when “a decision adjudicates all claims and liabilities of
all of the parties, except a claim for attorney’s fees, and judgment is to be
entered under Rule 54(c).” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(g)(2) (emphasis added). The
same consideration applies when a court determines whether its decision

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resolves all, or fewer than all, claims under Rule 54(g)(3). We do not think
“all claims and liabilities” has one meaning in Rule 54(g)(2) and a different
meaning in Rule 54(g)(3). See In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18 ¶ 5 (2024)
(we look at the whole text when construing a specific provision). Instead,
excluding an attorney fee request when determining whether a decision
resolves all claims and liabilities remains constant throughout Rule 54(g).

¶37 At times, Shea Homes argues Rule 54(g)(3)(A)(i) governs.
That subsection applies when “a decision adjudicates all claims and
liabilities of any party[.]” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(g)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
Had the superior court filed only a decision in its favor, then Shea Homes
would be correct. But the court went further, adding its signature and Rule
54(b) language to its minute entry. By doing so, the court entered a
judgment, not a decision, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(a) (distinguishing between
a “judgment” and a “decision”), and thus Rule 54(g)(3)(A)(i) no longer
applied.

¶38 But Shea Homes is correct in this sense: the better practice is
to follow the process in Rule 54(g)(3)(A)(i). Rather than entering judgment,
the court should have issued a decision. It then should have waited for a
party to move for judgment and for Shea Homes to request fees. Once Shea
Homes did so, the court could have resolved the fee request and included
any award in its final judgment. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(g)(3)(A)(i). That
would have been the optimal way to proceed because Rule 54(h)(1)(A)
requires the court to resolve a fee request before entering judgment under
Rule 54(b). And Rule 54(h)(1)(B) requires judgments to include “any award
of attorney’s fees or costs” “[e]xcept as otherwise allowed by this rule.”
That exception applies when Rule 54 “expressly allows a motion for fees or
request for costs to be deferred.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54 cmt. (2017). The only
time Rule 54 does so is in subsection (g)(3)(B), when the court resolves fewer
than all claims or liabilities of a party (not including attorney fees). But that
did not occur here.

c.

¶39 Shea Homes also relies on precedent treating attorney fee
requests as separate claims. In Britt v. Steffen, decided in 2008, we
concluded that “Rule 54(b) now treats a claim for attorneys’ fees as a
separate claim from the decision on the merits of the cause[.]” 220 Ariz.
265, 270 ¶ 22 (App. 2008). We said, “now treats” because, before rules
amendments in 1996 and 1999, both our supreme court and this court
treated a judgment’s silence on a fee request as implicitly denying that
request, thus requiring a motion to alter or amend the judgment to request

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fees. See Mark Lighting Fixture Co. v. Gen. Elec. Supply Co., 155 Ariz. 27, 31-
32 (1987) (“Mark Lighting II”); Monti v. Monti, 186 Ariz. 432, 436 (App. 1996)
(treating a judgment’s silence on a fee request as implicitly denying it).

¶40 When we decided Britt in 2008, Rule 54(g) provided this about
the timing for fee requests:

(2) Time of Determination. When attorneys’ fees are
claimed, the determination as to the claimed attorneys’
fees shall be made after a decision on the merits of the
cause. The motion for attorneys’ fees shall be filed
within 20 days from the clerk’s mailing of a decision on
the merits of the cause, unless extended by the trial
court.

Britt, 220 Ariz. at 269 ¶ 17. And, in 1999, our supreme court added this last
sentence to Rule 54(b): “For purposes of this subsection, a claim for
attorneys’ fees may be considered a separate claim from the related
judgment regarding the merits of a cause.” Id. at 269 ¶ 18.

¶41 In Britt, we concluded that new last sentence and other rule
changes superseded Mark Lighting II, which treated a judgment’s silence on
a fee request as implicitly denying it (those rule changes also necessarily
undercut Monti and other opinions relying on Mark Lighting II). Id. at 270
¶ 22. Because attorney fees could be treated as a separate claim, we said the
defendants in Britt timely moved for fees on the twentieth day after the
court filed a signed order—a final judgment—dismissing the case for lack
of prosecution. Id.

¶42 We should also mention Trebilcox v. Brown & Bain, P.A., 133
Ariz. 588 (1982). In that case, “the trial court entered summary judgment in
favor of Brown & Bain dismissing the Trebilcox counterclaim with
prejudice.” Trebilcox, 133 Ariz. at 589. Trebilcox filed a notice of appeal. Id.
Brown & Bain moved for attorney fees, but the trial court deferred that
request until after trial on the remaining claims. Id. Following trial, the
court entered a second judgment in Brown & Bain’s favor for attorney fees.
Id. Trebilcox filed a second notice of appeal. Id. He then argued in this
court that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award attorney fees. Id.

¶43 We agreed: “Brown & Bain’s request for attorney’s fees was
not a separate claim nor” could that “request be fairly characterized as an
action in furtherance of the appeal.” Id. at 590. We concluded “that the trial
court may not make an award granting attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S.

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§ 12–341.01 where a notice of appeal has been filed from the underlying
contract claim upon which the award is based.” Id. at 591.

¶44 Like Mark Lighting II, Trebilcox became obsolete in 1999, when
our supreme court added the “separate claim” sentence to Rule 54(b). In
fact, the comments to the 1999 revision make this clear: “This amendment
changes the result in Trebilcox . . . which interpreted the prior version of
Rule 54(b).” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54 cmt. (1999).

¶45 Just as the 1996 and 1999 amendments undercut Mark Lighting
II, Monti, and Trebilcox, the 2017 amendments undercut Britt. In 2014, our
supreme court formed a task force to restyle the civil rules. See Ariz. Supr.
Ct. Admin. Ord. 2014-116. The task force proposed deleting the last
sentence in Rule 54(b) treating attorney fees as separate claims. See Ariz. R.
Pet. No. R-16-0010, Task Force Pet. App’x C at 39. In proposing that
deletion, the task force explained that “[t]his sentence was added to the rule
in 1999 to allow a trial court to certify a final judgment under Rule 54(b)
without first determining fees, changing the result in Trebilcox[.]” Id. The
task force proposed deleting the last sentence because its revisions “limit[]
the circumstances in which a final judgment may be entered without first
determining fees,” so “this issue should arise less frequently.” Id. Instead,
“[s]ubdivision (i)(2) would be added to incorporate the substance of the last
sentence of current Rule 54(b),” so a court could award fees only when a
Rule 54(b) judgment “adjudicates fewer than all the claims or liabilities of a
party[.]” Id. at 42.

¶46 The task force also proposed amending Rule 54(h)(3) to
provide that, if the court enters final judgment without awarding fees, the
successful party must move “to alter or amend the judgment within the
time required by Rule 59(d).” See Ariz. R. Pet. No. R-16-0010, Task Force
Amend. Pet. App’x A at 205. The task force explained that amendment
would clarify that “a judgment omitting . . . costs or fees will be final for
purposes for appeal, unless a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment
is filed.” See Ariz. R. Pet. No. R-16-0010, Task Force Amend. Pet. at 10.

¶47 Our supreme court adopted the task force’s proposals. It
deleted the last sentence in Rule 54(b) and amended Rule 54(h) to require a
motion to alter or amend if the trial court enters a judgment without
resolving attorney fees. Ariz. R. Pet. No. R-16-0010, Order 09/02/2016, at
Att. A at 155, 158.

¶48 With those changes, Rule 54 no longer treats attorney fee
requests as separate claims. Instead, the trial court retains jurisdiction to

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award fees only when its decision or judgment resolves fewer than all
claims and liabilities (other than attorney fees) against a party. See Ariz. R.
Civ. P. 54(g)(3)(B), 54(i)(2). That exception is where our supreme court
parked the substance of the now-deleted “separate claim” sentence. See
supra ¶¶ 45, 47. In all other circumstances, the trial court must resolve fee
requests before entering judgment under Rule 54(b) or (c) and include a fee
award in the judgment. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(h)(1). If the court does not,
a party seeking fees must move to alter or amend the judgment; otherwise,
the judgment is final. See Ariz. R. 54(h)(2)(C); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54 cmt. (2017)
(“Absent a timely motion under Rule 59(d), a judgment omitting fees or
costs will be final for purposes of appeal.”).

¶49 Britt followed a different path. The trial court in Britt omitted
a fee award in a final judgment resolving all claims (other than attorney
fees). Under the current regime, that final judgment would need to include
a fee award. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c), (h)(1)(B). And after omitting such an
award, the Britt defendants would now need to move to alter or amend the
judgment. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(h)(2)(C). But, in Britt, we concluded the
court retained jurisdiction to award fees. See 220 Ariz. at 270 ¶ 22. We
relied mainly on the last sentence in the prior version of Rule 54(b) treating
a fee request as a separate claim. See id. Although Britt’s analysis was
correct when decided, the last sentence in Rule 54(b) no longer exists and
the fee issue would now come out differently. So Britt does not help Shea
Homes.

¶50 Shea Homes also relies on A Miner Contracting Inc. v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of America. See 2021 WL 4477441 (Ariz. App. Sept. 30, 2021) (mem.
decision). There, we concluded the trial court did not err by entering two
judgments because a claim for fees may be considered a separate claim. Id.
at *9 ¶¶ 45-46. As an unpublished decision, A Miner Contracting is not
binding—it applies only if it persuades. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1)(C).
On the fees issue, it does not. In allowing the trial court to treat attorney
fees as a separate claim, we quoted an opinion relying on the then-deleted,
separate-claim language in Rule 54(b). A Miner Contracting Inc., 2021 WL
4477441 at *9 ¶ 46 (quoting Fields v. Oates, 230 Ariz. 411, 414 ¶ 10 (App.
2012)). So A Miner Contracting is unpersuasive.

¶51 To sum up, after the court entered judgment like it did,
neither Rule 54(g)(3)(A)(i) nor Rule 54(g)(3)(B) applied. Instead, Rule
54(h)(2)(C) required Shea Homes to “file a motion to alter or amend the
judgment within the time required by Rule 59(d).” And, absent Shea
Homes timely moving to amend it, the judgment became final and the court
lost jurisdiction. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54 cmt. (2017) (“Absent a timely motion

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 CLUB WEST v. SHEA HOMES/THE EDGE
Opinion of the Court

under Rule 59(d), a judgment omitting fees or costs will be final for
purposes of appeal.”); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(i)(2)(B) (the court retains
jurisdiction to award fees only “[i]f a judgment certified under Rule 54(b)
adjudicates fewer than all of the claims and liabilities of any party”).

B.

¶52 Shea Homes did not timely move to alter or amend the
judgment.

1.

¶53 When (as here) Rule 54(h)(2)(C) applies, a party seeking fees
after judgment must move to alter or amend the judgment “within the time
required by Rule 59(d).” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(h)(2)(C). So we now turn to
Rule 59(d). That subsection says, “A motion to alter or amend a judgment
must be filed no later than 15 days after the entry of judgment.” Ariz. R.
Civ. P. 59(d).

¶54 The court entered Rule 54(b) judgment on February 14, 2025.
Shea Homes did not move to alter or amend the judgment. But the court
treated Shea Homes’ proposed form of judgment as a motion to alter or
amend. Even assuming that treatment was correct, Shea Homes did not file
its proposed form of judgment until March 14, 2025, which was 28 days
after the court’s judgment—outside the 15-day period in Rule 59(d).

2.

¶55 There is one exception to Rule 59(d)’s 15-day deadline. The
court may extend the deadline “as allowed by Rule 6(b)(2).” Ariz. R. Civ.
P. 59(d).

¶56 Under Rule 6(b)(2), the court may extend the time to move to
alter or amend the judgment “for 10 days after the entry of the order
extending the time” when three requirements are met. As applied to a
motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(d), those three
requirements are as follows. First, the court must find that neither the clerk
nor any party notified the moving party within 21 days that the court
entered judgment. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2)(B). Second, the moving party
must ask for an extension within 45 days after judgment or 7 days after
receiving notice of the judgment, whichever is earlier. See Ariz. R. Civ. P.
6(b)(2)(A). And third, the court must find that an extension will cause no
prejudice to any party. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2)(C).

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 CLUB WEST v. SHEA HOMES/THE EDGE
Opinion of the Court

¶57 The superior court read Rule 6(b)(2) as applying only when
the court already gave more time to move to alter or amend the judgment
and the moving party seeks a second extension. That misreads the Rule.
Instead, Rule 6(b)(2) unambiguously applies any time the court “extend[s]
the time to act under” Rule 59(d), requires that all three conditions in the
Rule exist, and caps any extension at “10 days after the entry of the order
extending the time[.]” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).

¶58 Shea Homes concedes that if Rule 6(b)(2) applies, it cannot
satisfy its conditions. That concession is correct. The clerk notified Shea
Homes about the judgment when the court entered it. Without Rule 6(b)(2),
Shea Homes had to ask the court to amend the judgment within 15 days. It
did not do so. The judgment is now final and the court can no longer amend
it. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54 cmt. (2017) (“Absent a timely motion under Rule
59(d), a judgment omitting fees or costs will be final for purposes of
appeal.”).

II.

¶59 Shea Homes seeks attorney fees and costs under A.R.S. §§ 12-
341 and 12-341.01, and Club West seeks attorney fees under § 12-341.01. We
deny Shea Homes’ request because it is not a successful party. In our
discretion, we also deny Club West’s request. See Hart v. Seven Resorts Inc., 190 Ariz. 272, 284 (App. 1997).

CONCLUSION

¶60 We accept jurisdiction and grant relief. Shea Homes did not
timely move to alter or amend the judgment. The judgment is final, and the
superior court lacks jurisdiction. We vacate the court’s order treating Shea
Homes’ form of judgment as a motion to alter or amend the judgment. We
deny as moot Club West’s request for oral argument.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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