Hill v. State

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

VALENTINO HILL, Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent.

No. 1 CA-SA 25-0174
FILED 08-12-2025

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2024-108832-001
The Honorable Suzanne Nicholls, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Zachary Stern
Counsel for Petitioner

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Johnny Jacquez
Counsel for Respondent
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 The defendant, Valentino Hill, seeks special-action relief from
the superior court’s finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing. We
accept jurisdiction but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 One night in January 2022, Daniel Drake (a pseudonym)
drove with Hill to an apartment complex so that Drake could buy drugs.
Drake parked his truck in the complex’s lot and remained in the driver’s
seat while Hill, a repeat visitor to the complex, got out and talked to
multiple people. Then, while Hill was standing at the truck’s passenger
door, another man (“shooter”) came to that door and fatally shot Drake
through the window.

¶3 Hill and the shooter fled in opposite directions. They then met
each other on another side of the complex, briefly talked, and entered an
apartment together. They later left the apartment together, got into the
same car, and drove away.

¶4 Law enforcement officers questioned Hill about the shooting
multiple times. Hill gave inconsistent statements about whether he knew
people at the complex, and he provided only a vague height-and-build
description of the shooter. He said he did not know the shooter and did not
know that the person he was with after the event was the shooter. He failed
to identify the shooter in surveillance-video stills and a photo lineup.
Several times, including right before he was shown a lineup, he told law
enforcement he was concerned for his and his family’s safety. He also
claimed he was drunk at the time of the shooting, although no other
evidence supported his claim.

¶5 The State charged Hill with first-degree hindering
prosecution, a Class 3 felony, under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)
§§ 13-2512 and -2510(6). Those statutes together provide that a person is
guilty of the offense “if, with the intent to hinder the apprehension,

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prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for any felony” that he or
she “knows or has reason to know . . . involves . . . murder,” he or she
“renders assistance to the other person” by “[c]oncealing the identity of the
other person.” A.R.S. §§ 13-2512, -2510(6). After considering the evidence at
a preliminary hearing, the superior court found probable cause for the
charge and affirmed the case for trial.

¶6 Hill seeks relief through special action, arguing that the court
misinterpreted what constitutes “[c]oncealing the identity” of another and
that the evidence could not support the probable-cause determination.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 “Generally, errors at a preliminary hearing must be remedied
before trial; once the trial is over and properly completed, a
nonjurisdictional error at a preliminary hearing is lost.” Brailsford v. Foster, 242 Ariz. 77, 81, ¶ 11 (App. 2017) (quotation omitted). Because Hill has no
adequate remedy by appeal, we accept special-action jurisdiction. See Ariz.
R.P. Spec. Act. 12(a). We determine whether the superior court exceeded its
authority or discretion by reviewing de novo whether it committed a legal
error or acted on insufficient evidence. Brailsford, 242 Ariz. at 81, ¶ 12.

DISCUSSION

A. The Superior Court Correctly Applied the Law.

¶8 We first address Hill’s argument that the superior court
misconstrued what constitutes concealing the identity of another for
purposes of A.R.S. §§ 13-2512 and -2510(6). We hold that the court correctly
applied the law.

¶9 Hill argues that to conceal another’s identity, a person must
affirmatively act, not “simply be present for a crime and not provide the
police with the criminal’s name” or “be[] unable to identify [the criminal]
in a photo array.” We agree that there can be no criminal liability for merely
witnessing a crime and then being unable to identify the perpetrator. See
State v. Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 284 (App. 1996) (Mere presence at a crime
scene does not establish guilt.); see also A.R.S. §§ 13-2512, -2510(6)
(Hindering prosecution requires intentional concealment of another’s
identity.). But when a bystander deliberately misleads law enforcement
about his or her knowledge of the perpetrator’s identity, that constitutes
intentional conduct, creating liability. See A.R.S. §§ 13-2512, -2510(6).

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¶10 Hill relies on In re Victoria K., 198 Ariz. 527 (App. 2000), to
argue that hindering prosecution cannot be based on communications to
law enforcement. But Victoria K. merely recognized that because some
forms of hindering prosecution are based on non-communicative acts, such
as hiding a person or evidence, false reporting is not a lesser-included
offense of hindering prosecution. Id. at 529-30, ¶¶ 9-12. Hill’s reliance on
State v. Winkler, 176 Ariz. 212 (App. 1993), is also misplaced. Winkler
addressed what conduct may constitute hindering prosecution, merely
noting that “concealing knowledge of a crime” is not the only variety of the
offense. See id. at 214.

¶11 We reject Hill’s argument that under A.R.S. § 13-201, a
defendant can only be culpable for omitting information if he or she is
violating a disclosure duty. Section 13-201 provides that criminal liability
may be based on either an omission in contravention of a duty or “a
voluntary act.” A crime witness’s intentional failure to truthfully respond
to law enforcement’s inquiries is a “voluntary act” under the statute.

¶12 We hold that lying to law enforcement about another’s
identity, including lying by omission, may establish criminal liability for
hindering prosecution.

B. The Superior Court Correctly Found Probable Cause.

¶13 Hill next contends that the superior court acted on insufficient
evidence. We disagree.

¶14 The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to permit the court
to determine whether a trial should be held. Brailsford, 242 Ariz. at 85, ¶ 27.
As a result, the State’s burden at the preliminary hearing is to show
probable cause that the defendant committed the charged offense. Id. at 82,
¶¶ 15, 17; see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 5.3. The inquiry is whether “the proof is
sufficient to cause a person of ordinary caution or prudence conscientiously
to entertain a reasonable suspicion that a public offense has been committed
in which the accused participated.” Drury v. Burr, 107 Ariz. 124, 125 (1971).
The resolution of defenses, as well as the ultimate determination of
innocence or guilt, is not at issue. Brailsford, 242 Ariz. at 84-85, ¶¶ 24, 26-27.

¶15 Here, the State’s evidence supported probable cause that Hill
committed hindering prosecution as charged. The evidence showed that
Hill and the shooter both frequented the apartment complex where the
shooting occurred, Hill witnessed the shooting at very close range, and Hill
later met up with the shooter and left the scene with him. The evidence also
showed that Hill’s claimed intoxication was unsupported, and he

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repeatedly expressed fear for his and his family’s safety when questioned
about the shooting. Based on the evidence, a person could reasonably
believe that Hill knew the shooter’s identity and, motivated by fear,
deliberately concealed his knowledge when questioned by law
enforcement. The superior court correctly affirmed the case for trial.

CONCLUSION

¶16 We accept jurisdiction but deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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