Medina v. State

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

LUIS ALVIN MEDINA, Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA ex rel. RACHEL H. MITCHELL, Maricopa County
Attorney, Respondent.

No. 1 CA-SA 25-0201
FILED 12-26-2025

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2020-106499-001
The Honorable Sam J. Myers, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Office of The Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Grace M. Guisewite, John Gattermeyer
Counsel for Petitioner

Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix
By Jordan A. Smith
Counsel for Respondent
 MEDINA v. STATE
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Veronika Fabian joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 In this special action, Luis Alvin Medina challenges the
superior court's denial of his motion to dismiss with prejudice on double
jeopardy grounds. We accept jurisdiction but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The State charged Medina with first-degree murder and child
abuse. After a 15-day trial, which included 159 jury questions, the jury
began deliberations.

¶3 On the second day of deliberations, the jury sent a question
asking if the jury could find Medina "guilty of child abuse, but not guilty of
murder?" The superior court referred the jury to the jury instructions.

¶4 On the third day of deliberations, the jury asked if it could
"see the photos of the home that were initially taken (including the pizza
box in the trash)?" The superior court explained that the jury had access to
all the admitted evidence in the case and then directed the jury towards a
specific exhibit.

¶5 Later that day, the jury sent another question in which it
asked if it could "be considered child abuse if you witness severe child
abuse and don't report it or if a child needs medical attention and no call is
made and child deviates and still no call, can that be considered child
abuse?" Medina requested the superior court respond to the question with
a lesser-included-offenses instruction and a mere-presence instruction. The
superior court denied both requests and directed the jury to review its
original instructions.

¶6 Still later that same day, the jury sent another question which
read as follows: "We are at a standstill Murder: 5 Guilty 7 Not Guilty Child
Abuse: 5 Guilty 7 Not Guilty How do we proceed?" The superior court
asked the parties how they wanted to proceed. The State requested a
mistrial, stating "we don't know if the impasse instruction would be helpful,

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and we would be asking for a mistrial." The State supported its request by
citing State v. Kuhs, 223 Ariz. 376 (2010), and suggesting the superior court
should consider "if we know the numerical split of the jurors, how long they
have been deliberating, and whether or not they have given us any
indication about how we could help them." Medina requested the jury be
given the impasse instruction. After hearing both sides, the superior court
decided to declare a mistrial. The superior court explained:

I printed out the [impasse] instruction because I really was
unsure what you all were going to suggest, and I just wanted
to have that available as an option. The thing about this case
is there's only really one issue for them to decide, which is did
Mr. Medina cause the injury, and they have been deliberating
for two and a half days, and their previous instruction -- their
previous question suggested that that's really what they are
struggling with. And given all the factors that the State
indicated, I think the impasse instruction would be futile. So
I'm going to deny Defendant's request for the impasse
instruction and will declare a mistrial.

¶7 After the mistrial, Medina moved to dismiss on double
jeopardy grounds. The superior court denied the motion. Medina seeks
special-action review of that denial.

JURISDICTION

¶8 Special-action jurisdiction is appropriate "if the remedy by
appeal is not equally plain, speedy, and adequate." Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act.
2(b). A "special action is an appropriate procedural vehicle" for a double
jeopardy claim, "because double jeopardy protects not only against
convictions but also against multiple prosecutions." Fitzgerald v. Superior
Court, 173 Ariz. 539, 543 (App. 1992) (citing Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163
Ariz. 126, 130 (App. 1989)). We accept jurisdiction to consider whether
double jeopardy bars the retrial of Medina.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Both the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions prohibit the repeated
prosecution of a criminal defendant for the same offense. U.S. Const.
Amends. V, XIV; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 10. We review de novo whether
double jeopardy bars the retrial of a defendant. State v. Aguirre, --- Ariz. ---
, ---, ¶ 33, 578 P.3d 58, 64 (App. 2025). "Declaring a mistrial after selecting a
jury implicates double jeopardy." Id. at ---, ¶ 25. After a mistrial, a
defendant may only be retried if the defendant consents to the mistrial, or

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if the trial court holds manifest necessity existed for the mistrial. Id. When
a jury is deadlocked, there is manifest necessity for a mistrial. See Gusler v.
Wilkinson, 199 Ariz. 391, 394, ¶ 18 (2001). The State bears the burden of
establishing that manifest necessity required a mistrial. Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). Still, "[w]e will not disturb the trial
court's ruling on manifest necessity absent an abuse of discretion." State v.
Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 239, ¶ 13 (App. 2007). "When a mistrial is declared
because the jury is deadlocked, we should give great deference to the
court’s decision." Id.

¶10 After learning that the jury was at a "standstill" and split
seven to five for acquittal on all charges, the superior court considered the
jury deadlocked and declared a mistrial. At oral argument before this
Court, Medina conceded that a "standstill" is the same as a deadlock and
that the superior court found manifest necessity for a mistrial existed in this
case.

¶11 Absent an abuse of discretion, we must defer to the superior
court's determination that a mistrial was appropriate. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. at
238, ¶ 7. The superior court explained that it considered the previous jury
instructions and questions and felt the jury simply could not decide the
case. The superior court also explicitly considered and rejected the
alternative course of providing an impasse instruction to the jury. See
Aguirre, --- Ariz. at ---, ¶ 53 ("Often there are viable alternatives to declaring
a mistrial. When that is so, a trial court should consider them first or risk
that double jeopardy will apply."). The superior court explained that the
jury's questions indicated it was struggling with whether Medina caused
the harm in this case. The superior court made this decision after presiding
over a 15-day trial and receiving 159 questions from the jury, providing
context from which the superior court could understand the issue with
which the jury struggled. The superior court noted that after two-and-a-
half days of deliberations and several more questions, the jury still could
not decide the issue. Given these facts and the jury's five-to-seven split, the
superior court concluded an impasse instruction would be "futile,"
determined further deliberations with this jury would not resolve the
"standstill," and declared a mistrial based on jury deadlock. See Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 22.5(a)(2) (requiring the superior court to discharge a jury that
cannot agree on a verdict).

¶12 Medina argues that the superior court abused its discretion
by declaring a mistrial without inquiring to determine if the jury was truly
deadlocked. Medina cites to Gusler and State v. Espinoza, 233 Ariz. 176 (App.
2013), to argue that the trial court may not declare a mistrial based on jury

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deadlock without making an inquiry of the jury. We disagree. The U.S.
Supreme Court has rejected the imposition of any "mechanical" procedure
or "rigid formula" for determining when "jury deadlock warrants a
mistrial":

And we have never required a trial judge, before declaring a
mistrial based on jury deadlock, to force the jury to deliberate
for a minimum period of time, to question the jurors
individually, to consult with (or obtain the consent of) either
the prosecutor or defense counsel, to issue a supplemental
jury instruction, or to consider any other means of breaking
the impasse.

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 775 (2010) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,
691 (1949)).

¶13 To the extent that Gusler and Espinoza provide exceptions to
this general rule, such exceptions are limited to the unique circumstances
of those cases, i.e., the interactions of lesser-included offenses and the
possibility of implied acquittal.

¶14 In Gusler, the jury sent a note to the trial court suggesting it
could have decided to acquit the defendant on one count and was
deadlocked on lesser-included offenses. 199 Ariz. at 392, ¶¶ 4–5. The note
read: "We are deadlocked 7–5—Count 1 Talked about crucial issue for 2
hours—no movement Not guilty on manslaughter Deadlocked on
negligent homicide—What do we do?" Id. at ¶ 5. Although the note
indicated the jury may have found the defendant not guilty of
manslaughter, when the trial court questioned the jury about its verdict, the
trial court only asked if the jury had reached a verdict on "count one" and
failed to inquire whether the jury had acquitted the defendant on
manslaughter. Id. at 395, ¶¶ 22–23. The supreme court held that retrying
the defendant on manslaughter violated double jeopardy because the trial
court had not inquired further, and the jury might have intended to acquit
the defendant of manslaughter. Id. at ¶ 23. However, the supreme court
explicitly permitted retrial on negligent homicide, the charge on which the
jury note indicated a seven-to-five deadlock. Id. at 396, ¶ 26.

¶15 Unlike in Gusler, this jury did not indicate that it may acquit
Medina of one charge but not the other. By allowing retrial of the negligent-
homicide count, Gusler supports the State's position. Here, the jury's note
stated it was at a "standstill" and voted seven to five on all charges. There

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is no risk that Medina would be tried twice for a charge of which a jury had
already decided to acquit him.

¶16 In Espinoza, the State charged the defendant with aggravated
robbery. 233 Ariz. at 178, ¶ 2. The trial court instructed the jury that "if
they found her not guilty of aggravated robbery, or if they could not reach
a verdict on aggravated robbery, they could consider theft of a means of
transportation as a lesser-included offense." Id. The jury sent a note to the
trial court stating "[w]e may be hung on the first offense, how do we word
that and move on to the lesser charge?" Id. at ¶ 3. The trial court answered
its question, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty for theft of a means of
transportation. Id. Later, this Court overturned that conviction because
theft of a means of transportation is not a lesser-included offense for
aggravated robbery. Id. at ¶ 4. The State attempted to retry the defendant
for aggravated robbery and the defendant moved to dismiss on
double-jeopardy grounds. Id. at ¶ 5. We held the defendant could not be
retried for aggravated robbery, because the State had failed to demonstrate
a deadlocked jury, as required for a holding of manifest necessity. Id. at
181, ¶¶ 16–17. We explained that a jury is only required to make reasonable
efforts at agreement before moving on to consider the lesser-included
offense.

¶17 The trial court needed to inquire further of the jury in Espinoza
because it was impossible to know whether the jury had acquitted the
defendant of aggravated robbery, genuinely deadlocked on that count, or
had only made reasonable efforts at agreement before moving on to the
lesser included offense. In contrast, this case does not involve the
interaction of lesser-included charges, a reasonable-efforts alternative to
genuine deadlock, nor the risk of possible acquittal. Instead, the jury note
confirmed the jury was at a "standstill" and divided seven to five on each
count. There is no risk the jury acquitted on any count nor skipped
consideration of one count in favor of the other, as in Espinoza. Absent such
risks, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by declining to make
further inquiry of the jury after receiving the jury’s note.

¶18 Nor are we persuaded by Medina's argument that the
superior court abused its discretion by failing to give an impasse instruction
under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 22.4. Rule 22.4 states that "[i]f
the jury advises the court that it has reached an impasse in its deliberations,
the court may, in the parties' presence, ask the jury to determine whether
and how the court and counsel can assist the jury's deliberations." Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 22.4 (emphasis added). The use of "may" makes clear that this rule
is discretionary. See Magee v. Olson, --- Ariz. ---, ---, ¶ 13, 574 P.3d 1189, 1193

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(App. 2025). The superior court here determined it would be "futile" to give
the Rule 22.4 instruction. See supra ¶ 6. Given this determination, the
superior court complied with Rule 22.5, which requires the court to dismiss
a jury which cannot agree. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 22.5(a)(2). Medina has not
established the superior court abused its discretion.

¶19 Additionally, we disagree with Medina's argument that the
prosecutor's statement at trial that "we don't know if the impasse
instruction would be helpful" means that the State failed to meet its burden
to demonstrate manifest necessity. This statement is not an admission of
uncertainty, but rather an explanation of why the impasse instruction
would not resolve the deadlock. This statement came immediately after the
prosecutor explained that the superior court should find the jury
deadlocked based on the length of the jury's deliberations and the
numerical split of the jurors. Then, the prosecutor stated that there was no
reason to believe the impasse instruction would be helpful. Medina's
argument ignores the context of the prosecutor's entire statement which
included all the reasons the court should declare a mistrial and dismiss the
jury. The prosecutor's statement does not show the State failed to meet its
burden.

¶20 Certainly, inquiry of the jury may be preferable, and even
necessary in some cases. See, e.g., Gusler, 199 Ariz. at 395, ¶ 23; Espinoza, 233
Ariz. at 179, ¶ 10. But we decline to adopt a brightline rule that a judge
must do so in every case. See Renico, 559 U.S. at 775 (rejecting mechanical
rules for determining "whether jury deadlock warrants a mistrial"). An
absolute requirement to make an inquiry of the jury after it has indicated
deadlock is not always necessary and risks promoting jury coercion. See
State v. Kuhs, 223 Ariz. 376, 384–85, ¶¶ 42–43 (2010) (discussing what a trial
court must consider to avoid jury coercion); Sicellon v. Commonwealth, 250
N.E.3d 541, 546–47 (2025) (explaining concerns about coercion support a
court's decision not to make inquiry of jurors). And "the Supreme Court
has warned trial judges to avoid coercing deadlocked jurors." Harrison v.
Gillespie, 640 F.3d 888, 902 (9th Cir. 2011) (footnote omitted). The U.S. and
Arizona Constitutions do not obligate the superior court to make an inquiry
of the jury in every case before declaring a mistrial. Trial courts possess
broad discretion to decide whether jury inquiry is warranted on a
case-by-case basis. Cf. Sicellon, 250 N.E.3d at 547 (agreeing with a trial
court's decision that "inquiry was inappropriate in the particular
circumstances"). The superior court did not abuse its discretion here by
declining to make an inquiry of the jury before declaring a mistrial.

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CONCLUSION

¶21 We accept jurisdiction and deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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