Greenboom v. Ran

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

MAAYAN GREENBOOM, Petitioner,

v.

EYAL RAN, Respondent.

No. 1 CA-SA 25-0224
FILED 10-23-2025

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2024-005355
The Honorable Jay R. Adleman, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Hallier Stearns Brierley, PLC, Phoenix
By Angela K. Hallier & Natalie M. Jones
Co-Counsel for Petitioner

Jones, Skelton & Hochuli P.L.C., Phoenix
By Eileen Dennis GilBride
Co-Counsel for Petitioner

Reardon House Colton PLC, Scottsdale
By Taylor S. House & Kristi A. Reardon
Counsel for Respondent
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge David B. Gass joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Maayan Greenboom (“Wife”) seeks special action relief from
an order denying temporary spousal maintenance from Eyal Ran
(“Husband”) because of a premarital agreement currently being litigated in
a foreign country. We accept jurisdiction but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Wife and Husband signed a premarital agreement and lodged
it in an Israeli court after getting married. Within the agreement, the parties
chose an Israeli family court as the forum of choice for the agreement. They
stated in the agreement that if divorce proceedings “were to continue
beyond 3 months, the Wife irrevocably and absolutely waives in advance
her alimony, ketubbah, and tosefet ketubbah.”1 While lodging the agreement
with the Israeli court, Wife acknowledged she was “aware of the
problematic consent on [her] part” for the alimony subsection, but “it was
done willingly, after consideration.”

¶3 Sometime after getting married and lodging the agreement,
the parties moved to Arizona and have lived here consistently for over
fifteen years with multiple children. In September 2024, Husband
petitioned an Israeli court to enforce the premarital agreement as part of the
parties’ divorce. Wife responded in December 2024, moving to dismiss for
forum non conveniens. In October 2024, Wife petitioned the superior court for
dissolution and sought temporary orders in December.

1 “A ketubah is a document recording the financial obligations that
the husband undertakes toward his wife in respect of, and consequent to,
their marriage—obligations that, in principle, are imposed on him by
Jewish law.” Victor v. Victor, 177 Ariz. 231, 232 (App. 1993) (citing 10
Encyclopedia Judaica 926 (1972)).

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¶4 Husband moved to dismiss in the superior court because the
financial distribution was governed by the premarital agreement pending
in Israel. At the temporary orders hearing, the court held Husband’s motion
to dismiss in abeyance and allowed the parties to present evidence on
temporary maintenance. Both parties introduced evidence about spousal
maintenance, which explored the terms of the agreement. After the hearing,
the court denied Wife’s request for temporary spousal maintenance
without prejudice. Wife moved to reconsider, and, in its order on the
reconsideration motion, the court addressed temporary spousal
maintenance on the merits, finding, “[b]ased on the record presented at the
time of the temporary orders hearing,” “for the limited purpose of temporary
orders [] [Wife] is not entitled to an award of temporary spousal
maintenance.” (Emphasis in original.) This special action followed.

DISCUSSION

¶5 Temporary orders terminate upon entry of the final decree
and are not appealable. A.R.S. § 25-316(D)(4); Courtney v. Foster, 235 Ariz.
613, 615, ¶ 4 (App. 2014). Because any issues with the temporary order will
become moot before Wife may appeal, we accept jurisdiction per our
discretion. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(5).

¶6 Wife raises two arguments: the superior court erred by failing
to determine its jurisdiction and holding Husband’s motion in abeyance,
and the court denied her due process by ruling on temporary maintenance
without allowing briefing and argument on the applicability of the
premarital agreement. We do not consider Wife’s jurisdictional arguments
because the superior court later ruled on the merits about spousal
maintenance. We review the denial of temporary spousal maintenance for
an abuse of discretion. See Leathers v. Leathers, 216 Ariz. 374, 376, ¶ 9 (App.
2007) (spousal maintenance); Maximov v. Maximov, 220 Ariz. 299, 300, ¶ 2
(App. 2009) (temporary orders). But we review the denial of due process de
novo. Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 346, ¶ 28 (App. 2020).

A. Wife’s Failure to Challenge the Premarital Agreement’s
Enforceability Barred Arizona Courts from Granting Spousal
Maintenance.

¶7 Married individuals may contract to eliminate spousal
maintenance in a premarital agreement, A.R.S. § 25-203(A)(4), and to
specify the forum governing the agreement, if doing so does not violate
public policy, A.R.S. § 25-203(A)(8). The party against whom a premarital
agreement is being enforced bears the burden of proving its

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unenforceability. See A.R.S. § 25-202(C); In re Marriage of Pownall, 197 Ariz.
577, 580, ¶ 8 (App. 2000). As relevant here, a premarital agreement is
unenforceable if a party signed involuntarily or if the agreement was
unconscionable and, before its execution, issues arose with disclosure of the
other party’s finances. A.R.S. § 25-202(C). A premarital agreement may only
be amended or revoked by a written agreement signed by both parties.
A.R.S. § 25-204.

¶8 Husband presented a premarital agreement that, on its face,
denied Wife spousal maintenance in a term she signed voluntarily and
knowingly. The agreement also granted a foreign court jurisdiction to
resolve disputes arising from the agreement. At the temporary orders
hearing, Wife conceded she was not challenging the agreement’s formation,
and she does not contest the agreement’s validity or enforceability on
special action. She failed to prove that the agreement was unenforceable. If
Wife wants to challenge other aspects of the agreement, that is not for an
Arizona court to first decide. The court that the parties have contractually
chosen to have jurisdiction must address any remaining issues. See Societe
Jean Nicolas Et Fils v. Mousseux, 123 Ariz. 59, 61 (1979) (“[A] forum selection
clause that is fairly bargained for and not the result of fraud will be enforced
so long as to do so is reasonable at the time of litigation and does not
deprive a litigant of his day in court.”).

¶9 Wife contends she did not contest the validity of the
agreement because it was raised as part of Husband’s motion to dismiss,
which the court held in abeyance. But Wife raised her issues with the
superior court’s jurisdiction decisions in later pleadings, both in the
superior court and in her special action petition. At either point, she could
have also challenged the agreement’s enforceability.

¶10 Wife also had a chance to address the agreement at the
temporary orders hearing. Wife’s argument considers the premarital
agreement only in the context of jurisdiction. While true that the agreement
could bar the superior court’s jurisdiction because of the forum selection
clause, the agreement was also a substantive barrier to Wife’s request for
maintenance. If the agreement was valid, Wife “irrevocably and absolutely”
waived maintenance. Wife needed to show the unenforceability of this term
to receive maintenance as well. See A.R.S. § 25-202(C).

¶11 Wife’s due process argument fails because she had an
opportunity to challenge the agreement. She introduced evidence on
temporary spousal maintenance at the hearing, and both parties briefed
temporary maintenance in their prehearing statements. Wife could have

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addressed the validity of the premarital agreement at either point. See Volk
v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 468, ¶ 20 (App. 2014) (Due process requires the court
to “afford the parties an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.” (quotation omitted)). Indeed, she tried to address
the agreement at trial, but the testimony was precluded because it drew
legal conclusions. And she argued for the court accepting jurisdiction in her
motion for reconsideration. Wife had multiple opportunities to challenge
the agreement meaningfully.

¶12 The superior court did not err by denying Wife temporary
maintenance. On the record before it, the court had no grounds to doubt the
validity of the premarital agreement, so any substantive challenges to the
agreement are for the contracted-to forum to decide. If new evidence shows
that Wife is entitled to maintenance, Wife will not be harmed because
temporary orders may be modified before the final decree and can be
retroactive. See A.R.S. § 25-316(D)(2) (modification); Maximov, 220 Ariz. at
301-02, ¶ 10 (retroactivity).

¶13 If the foreign court does not decide matters of the agreement,
it is appropriate for the superior court to do so.2 Accordingly, our holding
is without prejudice to Wife raising the temporary maintenance issue
should the Israeli court not address spousal maintenance, either by
determining itself an inconvenient forum or by declining to rule on the
alimony term. Nor does our holding affect any request for permanent
maintenance. See A.R.S. § 25-316(D)(1) (Temporary orders do not prejudice
the rights of parties to be adjudicated at later hearings.).

2 Although the previous temporary order statute only allowed
changes “on a showing by affidavit of the facts necessary” to revoke or
modify a final decree, see A.R.S. § 25-315(F)(2) (2009) (amended 2022), the
current version of the statute does not address the required showing, see
A.R.S. § 25-316(D)(2). That said, modification is appropriate if the Israeli
court does not address the spousal maintenance term in the premarital
agreement.

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CONCLUSION

¶14 We accept jurisdiction but deny relief. Both parties request
their attorney’s fees under Arizona Revised Statutes § 25-324. Per our
discretion, we decline to award either side their fees.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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