Parra v. Mancillas

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

AIDA PARRA, Petitioner,

v.

JULIO ARMANDO MANCILLAS GUTIERREZ,
an unmarried man; MANCILLAS ENTERPRISES, LLC, an Arizona
limited liability company, Respondents.

No. 1 CA-SA 25-0236
FILED 02-03-2026

Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2022-010946
The Honorable Gregory Como, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Fraud Fighters Law, PLLC, Phoenix
By Samuel J. Doncaster
Counsel for Petitioner

Andersen PLLC, Scottsdale
By Marke E. Andersen, Mark W. Hawkins
Counsel for Respondents
 PARRA v. MANCILLAS GUTIERREZ/MANCILLAS
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined. Judge
Brian Y. Furuya specially concurred.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Aida Parra (“Parra”) seeks special action review of
the superior court’s order compelling release of her lis pendens prior to
final judgment. We accept jurisdiction and grant relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Parra and Julio Armando Mancillas Gutierrez (“Mancillas”)
were in a romantic relationship for over twenty years. During that time,
they acquired several properties titled in Mancillas’ name or in the name of
Mancillas Enterprises, LLC (the “LLC”). Parra alleges she and Mancillas
agreed to “acquire and rent real estate as partners, and eventually use the
mutual profit from their assets to retire securely.” Mancillas denies this
arrangement.

¶3 In August 2022, Mancillas filed a complaint against Parra
seeking, in part, to quiet title to property titled in Parra’s name as part of an
oral agreement. He later amended this complaint to include the LLC as a
plaintiff. Parra filed counterclaims alleging the parties formed a partnership
“by associating to carry on as co-owners for profit[,]” and seeking a
declaratory judgment as to which properties were owned by the
partnership. Additionally, each party asserted a claim for assault against
the other.

¶4 Parra later recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens in conjunction
with her counterclaims, identifying thirty-two affected properties. In
response, Mancillas filed a motion to release the lis pendens, which the
court denied. Mancillas then moved for summary judgment on all of Parra’s
counterclaims and moved to dismiss his claims, excluding his assault claim.
The court granted both motions except as to the parties’ respective assault
claims.

¶5 On July 31, 2025, the court postponed entry of final judgment
until after trial on the assault claims but ordered Parra to “release all lis

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Opinion of the Court

pendens and liens” by August 22nd because it reasoned the lis pendens1
was rendered groundless by its summary judgment rulings. The assault
claims were settled two weeks later, and Parra subsequently filed an
emergency request with the superior court to stay its July 31st order
pending appeal or resolution of this special action. The court denied Parra’s
request, stating there is “no reason to allow a party to maintain a groundless
lis pendens during an appeal or special action.” As a result, Parra requested
a stay of the court’s July 31st order in this special action, which we granted.

DISCUSSION

I. We Accept Special Action Jurisdiction.

¶6 Special action jurisdiction “may be appropriate when no
equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal exists.” Prosise v.
Kottke, 249 Ariz. 75, 77 ¶ 10 (App. 2020) (citation modified); Ariz. R.P. Spec.
Act. 2(b)(2). Specifically, jurisdiction may be warranted when a case
involves “issues of first impression, cases involving purely legal questions,
or issues that are likely to arise again.” Prosise, 249 Ariz. at 77 ¶ 10 (quoting
State ex rel. Romley v. Martin, 203 Ariz. 46, 47 ¶ 4 (App. 2002)); see Ariz. R.P.
Spec. Act. 12(b)(3)–(4).

¶7 Jurisdiction is appropriate in this case because a final, non-
appealable judgment has yet to be entered, and the court’s July 31st order
is interlocutory and not directly appealable. See Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) § 12-2101 (providing no authorization to appeal from
interlocutory order to remove lis pendens); Sw. Gas Corp. v. Irwin ex rel.
Cnty. of Cochise, 229 Ariz. 198, 201 ¶ 8 (App. 2012). The court’s order
compelling immediate release of the lis pendens could prejudice Parra
before a full merits appeal can be completed and a mandate issued. Thus,
Parra does not have an equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by
appeal as to the court’s July 31st order. Further, the issue of whether a party
has the right to maintain a lis pendens pending entry of a final, non-
appealable judgment is a legal question that has not yet been addressed by

1 In its July 31st order, the court alternates between using “lien” and
“lis pendens” to reference the document at issue. But a lis pendens is not a
lien. See Kelly v. Perry, 111 Ariz. 382, 385 (1975) (noting a lis pendens is
“fundamentally procedural” and “simply a statutory substitute for notice
of a legal proceeding which affects the title to realty”). And as Mancillas
asserts, and Parra does not dispute, “there were never any liens filed, only
lis pendens on [his] 32 properties.” Thus, we presume the July 31st order
refers to Parra’s recorded lis pendens whenever it uses the term “lien.”

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Opinion of the Court

this court and could arise in subsequent cases. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(3)–
(4). We accept special action jurisdiction.

II. Parties Have the Right to Maintain a Lis Pendens Pending Appeal.

¶8 Whether and to what extent statutes authorize parties to
maintain a lis pendens throughout resolution of a timely appeal process is
a question of law that we review de novo. TFLTC, LLC v. Ford, 253 Ariz.
413, 414 ¶ 6 (2022).

¶9 By statute, when pending litigation affects title to real
property, any party “may file in the office of the recorder of the county in
which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action or
defense.” A.R.S. § 12-1191(A). That filing, called a lis pendens, “is a
statement that a party is claiming an interest in real property which would
affect the title.” Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom P’ship, 155 Ariz. 215, 217
(App. 1987). “No interest is created by the filing of a lis pendens; a lis
pendens merely asserts an interest in a property by providing constructive
notice to lenders or prospective purchasers of a pending lawsuit that could
affect the property’s title.” Stauffer v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 233 Ariz. 22, 26
¶ 14 (App. 2013) (citing Santa Fe Ridge Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bartschi, 219
Ariz. 391, 395 ¶ 11 (App. 2008) and Coventry Homes, 155 Ariz. at 217); Warren
v. Whitehall Income Fund 86, 170 Ariz. 241, 243 (App. 1991) (“Constructive
notice and actual notice have the same effect and when the purchaser of
land has notice of a prior claim to the land, he takes it subject to that
claim.”). A lis pendens also protects the filing party by discouraging third-
party acquisition or investment that would “prevent the court from
granting suitable relief or such as would vitiate a judgment subsequently
rendered in the [action]2.” Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Gross, 141

2 Mammoth Cave appears to use the terms “action” and “litigation”
interchangeably. See Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Gross, 141 Ariz. 389,
391–92 (App. 1984). According to modern legal practice, such use appears
common. Compare, e.g., Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (“A
civil or criminal judicial proceeding; esp., Lawsuit.”) with Litigation, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (“The process of carrying on a lawsuit; the
prosecution and determination of a legal dispute before a judicial tribunal;”
“A lawsuit itself.”). For the sake of consistency with the language of A.R.S.
Section 12-1191, we favor use of the term “action” here. But we recognize
different courts use both “litigation” and “action” to refer to a lawsuit. See,
e.g., Walden v. Hutchinson, 987 So.2d 1109, 1121 (Ala. 2007) (“Generally, the
doctrine of lis pendens commences with the filing of an action and the

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Opinion of the Court

Ariz. 389, 391–92 (App. 1984). Thus, to fully protect both third-party
purchasers and the filing party, a lis pendens, under normal circumstances,
must provide continuous notice “during pendency of the [action]” that title
to the property is in dispute. Id. at 391.

¶10 Though a superficial reading of A.R.S. Section 12-1191 may
mislead a party to believe an action affecting title to real property
terminates upon final judgment entered by the superior court, Arizona
courts have held differently. Specifically, an appeal has been understood to
be a continuation of an action. In the case of Southwest Airlines Co. v. Arizona
Department of Revenue, 197 Ariz. 475, 477 ¶ 7 (App. 2000), we explained, “[i]n
the common parlance of lawyers and the law, the word ‘action’ refers to the
entire judicial process of dispute resolution, from invocation of the courts’
jurisdiction to entry of a final judgment that is not subject to further
appeal.” As Southwest Airlines Co. makes clear, timely appeals are part of
the entire action, and this necessarily means if a timely appeal is pursued,
a lis pendens must usually be permitted to continue in effect through the
end of the appeals process.

¶11 Nevertheless, only a valid lis pendens may remain through
the appeals process. A lis pendens is invalid under A.R.S. Section 33-420 if
the filing party “know[s] or ha[s] reason to know that the document is . . .
groundless,” A.R.S. § 33-420(A), which occurs when there is no arguable
basis that the underlying action affects title to real property or is not
supported by credible evidence, Evergreen W., Inc. v. Boyd, 167 Ariz. 614, 621
(App. 1991). An action affects title to real property “if any judgment would
expand, restrict, or burden a property owner’s rights as bestowed by virtue
of that title.” Santa Fe Ridge, 219 Ariz. at 396 ¶ 16.

¶12 Here, importantly, the court initially denied Mancillas’
motion to release the lis pendens. In so doing, the court implicitly made a
preliminary determination that Parra’s claim arguably could affect title to
the properties named in the lis pendens and there was at least some credible
evidence to support her claim. Thus, we assume for purposes of this
opinion that Parra’s recording of the lis pendens was not groundless at the
point of its initial recording. If the court had determined Parra’s claim could
not have affected title to real property or was unsupported by any credible
evidence, or both, that would have been a circumstance that the superior
court could have properly addressed immediately, before conclusion of the

contemporaneous recordation of a notice of lis pendens, and continues for
the duration of the litigation until it is terminated by judgment and the
expiration of any appropriate period for appeal . . . .”) (citation modified).

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Opinion of the Court

action, under A.R.S. Section 33-420. But here, it was not until after resolving
Mancillas’ motion for summary judgment against Parra that the court
concluded that her notice of lis pendens was rendered “groundless” by its
decision on the merits. It is only the court’s later finding of
groundlessness—based on its decision against Parra on the merits—that we
address now.

¶13 It is well-established that “even if a court might find that the
action ultimately fails on its merits—the notice of lis pendens is not
groundless.” Mining Inv. Grp., LLC v. Roberts, 217 Ariz. 635, 641 ¶ 24 (App.
2008) (citation modified); see also Evergreen, 167 Ariz. at 621 (“A suit does
not become legally groundless merely because plaintiffs fail to convince the
jury of the truth of their allegations.”) (citation modified). Thus, “[a] court’s
decision on whether the underlying action involves title to real property
should not involve a decision about which party will prevail on the merits
of the underlying claim.” Santa Fe Ridge, 219 Ariz. at 395 ¶ 11. And because
the issue of groundlessness should not involve consideration of the ultimate
outcome of the underlying claim, a determination of groundlessness must
be evaluated as of when the lis pendens was recorded, unless the recording
party later withdraws the claim affecting title to real property upon which
the lis pendens is predicated or that issue is finally resolved on its merits
after exhausting any appeal rights.

¶14 Synthesizing these principles, we conclude that as long as the
recording party asserts a claim which, if successful, could affect title to real
property and is supported by some credible evidence, the party has a right
to maintain a lis pendens unless: (1) that right is terminated by the party’s
withdrawal of the claim on which the lis pendens is predicated; or (2) the
claim is resolved against the party in a final judgment that is either not
timely appealed or is affirmed on appeal.

III. The Court Erred in Finding Parra’s Lis Pendens Groundless and
Ordering Her to Release it Prior to Final Judgment.

¶15 We review a court’s determination that a lis pendens is
groundless for abuse of discretion. Tucson Ests., Inc. v. Superior Court, 151
Ariz. 600, 603 (App. 1986) (“The determination of whether [the]
requirements [of a lis pendens] have been met . . . requires the exercise of
the court’s discretion.”). A court abuses its discretion when it commits an
error of law or enters “an order unsupported by the record[.]” Shinn v. Ariz.
Bd. of Exec. Clemency, 254 Ariz. 255, 259 ¶ 13 (2022) (citation modified).
Where our analysis requires us to construe applicable statutes, such matters

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Opinion of the Court

are questions of law that we review de novo. TFLTC, LLC, 253 Ariz. at 414
¶ 6.

¶16 The court erred in its final analysis of groundlessness under
A.R.S. Section 33-420. As noted, the court initially denied Mancillas’ motion
to release the lis pendens. However, after granting summary judgment—
but before entering a final, appealable judgment—the court ordered Parra
to release her lis pendens because “there is no longer any basis for [Parra]
to assert liens against [Mancillas’] real properties, and . . . [Parra’s]
continuing assertion of these liens is groundless.” But the court’s decision
hinges on Parra’s lack of success on the merits, rather than whether Parra’s
counterclaims affect title to real property or were supported by some
credible evidence, which contradicts established case law. See Santa Fe
Ridge, 219 Ariz. at 395 ¶ 11 (“In determining whether a lis pendens was
wrongfully recorded, the court is limited to considering whether the action
is one affecting title to real property.”) (citation modified); Mining Inv. Grp.,
LLC, 217 Ariz. at 641 ¶ 24. Further, the court’s order is unsupported by the
record. As noted, the court previously found that Parra’s lis pendens was
not groundless when it denied Mancillas’ motion to remove the lis pendens.
Mancillas did not challenge this outcome and the record contains no
indication that the court erred in its conclusion. Thus, the court abused its
discretion in finding that Parra’s lis pendens became groundless once it
rejected her claims on the merits but before she had the opportunity to
challenge the adverse ruling by appeal.

¶17 The court also erred by ordering Parra to prematurely release
her lis pendens. Parra was ordered to release her lis pendens by August 22,
2025, at which time there was no final judgment. In the absence of a final
judgment and complete exhaustion of any timely appeals on the merits, the
action has not concluded and Parra’s right to maintain her lis pendens
during the pendency of the action has not been terminated. See Mammoth
Cave Prod. Credit Ass’n, 141 Ariz. at 391.

¶18 We are not alone in so concluding. Many other jurisdictions
have also determined that a lis pendens must be permitted to be maintained
until completion of the entire action, including throughout an appeal. See,
e.g., Walden v. Hutchinson, 987 So.2d 1109, 1121 (Ala. 2007); Ashworth v.
Hankins, 408 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Ark. 1966); Spinola v. Akaranta, 915 S.E.2d 24,
29 (Ga. App. 2025); Montierth v. Dorssers-Thomsen, 539 P.3d 578, 590 (Idaho
2023); Olson v. Leibpke, 81 N.W. 801, 802 (Iowa 1900); Kendall v. Crouch, 11
S.W. 587, 588–89 (Ky. App. 1889); Weston Builders & Devs., Inc. v. McBerry,
LLC, 891 A.2d 430, 438 (Md. App. 2006); State ex rel. Lemley v. Reno, 436
S.W.3d 232, 235 (Mo. App. 2013); Kelliher v. Soundy, 852 N.W.2d 718, 726

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Opinion of the Court

(Neb. 2014); Zuni Indian Tribe v. McKinley Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 300
P.3d 133, 139 (N.M. App. 2013); Stuart v. Coleman, 188 P. 1063, 1064 ¶ 4
(Okla. 1920); Grp. Purchases, Inc. v. Lance Invs., Inc., 685 S.W.2d 729, 731–32
(Tex. App. 1985); Guardado v. Taylor, 490 P.3d 274, 282 ¶ 12 (Wash. App.
2021).

¶19 Moreover, requiring otherwise runs the risk of rendering
Parra’s right to appeal moot. If Parra must release the lis pendens before
her appeal is resolved, Mancillas could sell the properties to third parties
without giving notice of the pending dispute. Such purchasers might then
enjoy bona fide purchaser status and protections. Delo v. GMAC Mortg.,
L.L.C., 232 Ariz. 133, 138 ¶ 18 (App. 2013) (“A bona fide purchaser is one
who purchases property for value and without actual or constructive notice
of a prior unrecorded interest.”). If the properties were to be sold to such
individuals, Parra’s appeal of her claims to the properties could become
effectively moot because a bona fide purchaser would take the property free
of Parra’s claims, regardless of whether she prevailed on appeal. See
Hunnicutt Constr., Inc. v. Stewart Title & Tr. of Tucson Tr. No. 3496, 187 Ariz.
301, 306 (App. 1996) (observing that a bona fide purchaser “would not take
subject to an unrecorded equitable interest of which there has been no
notice”). Alternatively, similar concerns could arise if Mancillas
encumbered the properties pending resolution of Parra’s appeal rights.
Thus, the court abused its discretion in directing a premature release of
Parra’s lis pendens.

¶20 However, by so holding we do not suggest the superior court
is never able to remove a lis pendens before entry of final judgment or
exhaustion of appeal rights. True, neither A.R.S. Section 12-1191 nor the
common law permit a court to quash a lis pendens solely by virtue of its
decision against a plaintiff on the merits of her claim affecting title to real
property. See ¶¶ 16–17 supra. But if a party wishes to obtain earlier relief
from a lis pendens, there are two mechanisms by which the court might do
so under proper circumstances: (1) via an A.R.S. Section 33-420 challenge,
or (2) by application of the court’s equity powers.

¶21 First, if a lis pendens is truly groundless, an aggrieved owner
or beneficial title holder may seek to have the court quash it. A.R.S. § 33-
420(B). If that aggrieved party proves a right to relief under the statute, the
court may quash it immediately upon sufficient findings establishing
groundlessness or another qualifying circumstance under A.R.S. Section
33-420. Id. But again, a lis pendens is groundless under this statute only if
there is no arguable basis that the underlying action affects title to real
property or there is no credible evidence supporting the recording party’s

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Opinion of the Court

claim upon which the lis pendens is predicated. Evergreen, 167 Ariz. at 621.
In making this determination, the court may not rely solely on whether the
party will succeed on the merits of the underlying claim, as the superior
court did regarding Parra’s lis pendens here. Santa Fe Ridge, 219 Ariz. at 395
¶ 11. This is because “the trial court need only find ‘some basis’ for
concluding that the action affects title to real property” for a plaintiff’s lis
pendens to withstand scrutiny under A.R.S. Section 33-420. Evergreen, 167
Ariz. at 620.

¶22 Second, the origins of the doctrine of lis pendens are
grounded in the common law and equity jurisprudence. Kelly v. Perry, 111
Ariz. 382, 383–84 (1975) (“[L]ong before the enactment of any statutory
regulations on the subject, the mere pendency of a suit in equity affecting
the title to real property was held, both at common law and in equity, to
constitute constructive notice thereof to all the world . . . .”); see also Weston
Builders & Devs., Inc., 891 A.2d at 433–36 (reviewing authorities explaining
origins of lis pendens as equitable doctrine). Although Arizona has adopted
A.R.S. Section 12-1191, this statute did not establish the doctrine, but rather
“limited [its] application” by imposing statutory requirements. Kelly, 111
Ariz. at 383–84. The existence of the statute does not entirely abrogate the
common law. Brandt v. Scribner, 13 Ariz. 169, 175–76 (1910) (discussing the
purpose of the predecessor statute to A.R.S. § 12-1191 “was to add to the
common-law rule”) (emphasis added). Thus, where the statute is silent, the
common law will govern, at least where it does not conflict with the U.S.
Constitution, or constitution and laws of Arizona. See A.R.S. § 1-201.

¶23 Because the lis pendens statute has its origins in equity, Kelly,
111 Ariz. at 383–84, a trial court retains inherent authority to order removal
of a lis pendens before final judgment or completion of appeals, provided
the court finds that equitable considerations demand it, see Tucson Ests., Inc.,
151 Ariz. at 602. And because of the presupposition under common law that
a lis pendens remains pending appeal, a party seeking to quash or amend
the lis pendens before final judgment or exhaustion of appeals must
expressly request such relief and has the burden of establishing
circumstances sufficient to warrant an exception to the presumptive rule.
Further, just as in an analysis under A.R.S. Section 33-420, a judgment on
the merits of the underlying claim is insufficient, by itself, to quash a lis
pendens under an equity analysis. Santa Fe Ridge, 219 Ariz. at 395 ¶ 11.
Equity demands something more, and courts should balance the “relative
benefits and burdens” of quashing or maintaining the lis pendens. Tucson
Ests., Inc., 151 Ariz. at 603.

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Opinion of the Court

¶24 Further, if the court finds the moving party has established
sufficient grounds to immediately alter or quash a lis pendens under A.R.S.
Section 33-420 or through its equitable powers before conclusion of an
action—and the court enters an order or judgment doing so—the party who
recorded the lis pendens may then seek to stay enforcement of that order or
judgment. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 7(a)(1)(A). In that event, posting of a
supersedeas bond may become relevant.

¶25 Here, however, the court did not determine Parra’s lis
pendens to be groundless under A.R.S. § 33-420 when Mancillas filed his
motion to release it. Neither did Mancillas move the court to exercise its
equity powers to quash Parra’s lis pendens. Nor, on this record, did he
establish—as was his burden—that equity demands that Parra’s lis pendens
be immediately quashed or amended based upon something more than just
the court’s entry of judgment against Parra on the merits. Therefore, the
court did not have a proper basis upon which to order Parra’s lis pendens
removed before entry of judgment or exhaustion of her appeal rights.

¶26 Accordingly, we hold the court abused its discretion in
finding that its rejection of Parra’s claims on the merits rendered her lis
pendens groundless and further erred in ordering her to release her lis
pendens before entry of a final, non-appealable judgment.

CONCLUSION

¶27 We accept jurisdiction and grant relief, vacating that portion
of the court’s July 31st order requiring Parra to release her lis pendens.
Further, we hold that the court may not require Parra to release her lis
pendens until the action is terminated by entry of final judgment followed
by exhaustion of her appeal rights.

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Furuya, J., Specially Concurring:

F U R U Y A, Judge, specially concurring:

¶28 Mancillas has further argued that Parra should have filed for
a supersedeas bond instead of filing this special action. Though the superior
court has not yet required Parra to provide a supersedeas bond, Mancillas
raised the matter himself, indicating that it is likely to arise on remand.
Further, the issue was briefed and can be resolved as a matter of law.
Therefore, I would also address this issue to provide guidance to the court
on remand. See State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 429 (1989) (addressing an
issue likely to arise on remand); Nayeri v. Mohave Cnty., 247 Ariz. 490, 494
¶ 15 (App. 2019) (“Because this is an issue of law likely to arise on remand,
we address it to provide guidance to the [trial] court.”); Buckholtz v.
Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. 126, 131 ¶ 17 (App. 2019) (same).

¶29 Mancillas’ argument that Parra may not maintain her lis
pendens during appeal because “[t]he law allow[s] [Parra] to pursue a
supersedeas bond if she chose pending appeal” is not well-taken because
notices of lis pendens and supersedeas bonds serve completely different
functions.

¶30 The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to “stay[] enforcement
of, or execution on, a judgment so that an appeal may be pursued.” Ariz. R.
Civ. App. P. 7(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). But here, such a bond would
serve no purpose regarding a valid lis pendens. A lis pendens is not a lien.
It is not extinguished by entry of judgment on the merits, such that the
judgment must be stayed from execution during an appeal to maintain it.
Instead, as the majority opinion concludes, because its purpose is to provide
constructive notice of disputes affecting title, the right to maintain a valid
lis pendens continues until a final, non-appealable judgment is entered,
which cannot occur until after either (1) a final judgment is entered from
which no party timely appeals, or (2) all appellate rights are exhausted. See
Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass’n, 141 Ariz. at 391; cf. Sw. Airlines Co., 197
Ariz. at 477 ¶ 7 (observing that an “action” commonly is understood to refer
to “the entire judicial process of dispute resolution, from invocation of the
courts’ jurisdiction to entry of a final judgment that is not subject to further
appeal”). Thus, because the purpose of a supersedeas bond is to prevent
enforcement of a judgment during the appeals process, but a litigant, under
usual circumstances, has the right to maintain a valid lis pendens
throughout pendency of the action—including appeal—a supersedeas
bond is inapplicable here.

¶31 This principle finds further support in the common law.
A.R.S. Section 12-1191 does not contain any language regarding provision

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Furuya, J., Specially Concurring:

of security to maintain a lis pendens, so one must turn to the common law
to understand how the doctrine intersects with such concerns. See A.R.S. §
1-201 (adopting common law). As the majority opinion explains, it is well-
established at common law that a party has the right to maintain a valid lis
pendens until the end of the appeals process, and there is no requirement
for security. See Weston Builders & Devs., Inc., 891 A.2d at 437–40 (citing
several cases that conclude a lis pendens remains in place during a pending
action). Thus, under common law, a party generally can maintain a lis
pendens without the imposition of posting a supersedeas bond during
appeal. Insofar as Mancillas argues that Parra should be compelled to post
a supersedeas bond as a prerequisite to maintain her lis pendens until
exhaustion of her appeal rights, neither Arizona’s statute authorizing filing
of a lis pendens nor the common law appear to authorize such an
imposition by virtue of the court’s entry of judgment against her on the
merits of her claim affecting title to real property. See A.R.S. § 12-1191. Thus,
in my view, neither the court nor Mancillas have grounds upon which to
require Parra to post a supersedeas bond to maintain her lis pendens until
conclusion of the action, including until any timely appeals process is
completed.

¶32 Mancillas suggests that without requiring Parra to post a
supersedeas bond to maintain her lis pendens during appeal, his ability to
dispose of or encumber his property will be stymied by the ongoing
litigation, a cost that he would unfairly be compelled to bear. This argument
suggests a concern that unsuccessful litigants may impose undue burdens
on property owners through an appeal process. But concluding that a
supersedeas bond is not generally a requirement to maintain a lis pendens
during pendency of an action does not mean the court is wholly without
authority to provide relief where and when such would be appropriate. As
the majority opinion explains, where a lis pendens is groundless, see A.R.S.
§ 33-420(B) and Evergreen, 167 Ariz. at 621, or when equity demands it, see
Tucson Ests., Inc., 151 Ariz. at 602, the court may order a lis pendens released
or modified, and it may do so before entry of a final judgment or exhaustion
of appeal rights. See ¶¶ 20–24 supra. And as the majority opinion also
acknowledges, if the court does so, the recording party—now aggrieved by
the immediate loss of her lis pendens before conclusion of her action—may
seek a stay of enforcement of that order or judgment, see Ariz. R. Civ. App.
P. 7(a)(1)(A), thereby implicating a potential need to address security.

¶33 But here, because requiring a supersedeas bond is no
substitute for a lis pendens and is not contemplated by A.R.S. Section
12-1191 or the common law, I would additionally hold that a supersedeas
bond cannot be required either to replace Parra’s lis pendens or to maintain

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 PARRA v. MANCILLAS GUTIERREZ/MANCILLAS
Furuya, J., Specially Concurring:

her lis pendens during prosecution of an appeal. Instead, a requirement to
post a supersedeas bond would only become applicable if Mancillas first
requests—and then carries his burden of separately proving entitlement
to—an order quashing the lis pendens under A.R.S. Section 33-420 or
principles of equity. And, again, such a request cannot be established solely
by the court’s decision against Parra on the merits of her claim.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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