Kuerschner v. Kuerschner

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STEFANIE A. KUERSCHNER, Petitioner,

v.

JAMES T. KUERSCHNER, Personal Representative of
the ESTATE OF THOMAS W. KUERSCHNER, Respondent.
________________

In the Matter of the Estate of:
THOMAS W. KUERSCHNER, deceased.
_________________

JAMES KUERSCHNER, Personal Representative/Appellee,

v.

STEFANIE KUERSCHNER, Petitioner/Appellant.

Nos. 1 CA-SA 25-0338, 1 CA-CV 25-1053 PB
(Consolidated)
FILED 09-18-2026

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. PB2021-003597
The Honorable Kerstin G. LeMaire, Judge
The Honorable Lisa Ann VandenBerg, Judge (Ret.)

SPECIAL ACTION JURISDICTION ACCEPTED AND RELIEF
DENIED; APPEAL AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Stefanie A. Kuerschner, Scottsdale
Petitioner/Appellant

Frazer, Ryan, Goldberg & Arnold, LLP, Phoenix
By Scott A. Erickson, Philip B. Whitaker
Counsel for Personal Representative/Respondent/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision in which
Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 In this consolidated case, Stefanie Kuerschner both petitions
for special action relief from the superior court’s order holding her in civil
contempt and appeals from the court’s order declaring her a vexatious
litigant. For the following reasons, we accept jurisdiction over her petition
for special action but deny relief, and we affirm the vexatious-litigant order
(“VLO”) on appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The full factual background of this matter—involving
Stefanie, the estate of her deceased husband Thomas W. Kuerschner (“the
Estate”), and the personal representative of the Estate, James Kuerschner
who is Thomas’s son—has been outlined in several of Stefanie’s prior
appeals.1 See, e.g., In re Est. of Kuerschner, 1 CA-CV 25-0108 PB, 2025 WL
2780806, at *1–2, ¶¶ 3–12 (Ariz. App. Sept. 30, 2025) (mem. decision). For
brevity, we do not restate that lengthy factual background here except to
say that after the superior court denied Stefanie’s claims against the Estate
following a bench trial, she sought to relitigate several issues in this probate
case—filing numerous pleadings. Id. at *3–4, ¶¶ 20–26. The following facts
are relevant to the two orders we address in this consolidated special action
and appeal.

1 To avoid confusion, we respectfully refer to the parties, who share a last

name, by their first names.

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I. October 8, 2025 Contempt Order

¶3 The superior court in this probate case issued a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) against Stefanie in February 2025, enjoining her
from requesting any additional discovery absent prior authorization from
the court. The court explained it issued the TRO to “bar [Stefanie] from
continuing to attempt to conduct third party discovery via subpoenas” after
she “used her defunct company . . . to issue and serve subpoenas on
[multiple banks] seeking records of [James,] the Personal Representative,
secretly, without copying counsel.”

¶4 After the TRO took effect, Stefanie issued and served
subpoenas to several banks in an unrelated landlord-tenant action. In July
2025, James brought a motion for contempt against Stefanie, asserting she
had issued the subpoenas in the landlord-tenant action to obtain his
records. Following an order to show cause hearing on the contempt motion,
the superior court found that Stefanie had “used the [unrelated case] as a
pretext to issue discovery for use in this probate case” and that she “did not
provide notice to counsel for [James] of her intent to serve subpoenas
seeking banking records from his client, even though she intended to utilize
such records in this probate case.” On October 8, 2025, the court found
Stefanie in contempt of court and ordered that she pay James’s legal fees
under A.R.S. § 12-349(A).

¶5 Stefanie filed a special action challenging the contempt order.
We initially declined jurisdiction but accept it here under the direction of
our supreme court.

II. November 3, 2025 VLO

¶6 In April 2025, James moved to designate Stefanie a vexatious
litigant in the probate case, arguing, among other things, that she filed
inordinate frivolous pleadings and abused the discovery process despite
previous sanctions. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing on
James’s motion, at which Stefanie appeared remotely, testified, and cross-
examined James’s witnesses. In July, the court issued two minute entries—
designating Stefanie a vexatious litigant within the probate case and
making detailed findings supporting that determination.

¶7 On November 3, 2025, the superior court issued a final order
designating Stefanie a vexatious litigant in the probate case and setting
restrictions as to any of her future filings in the case. The court found that
Stefanie “filed extensive pleadings” with frivolous allegations despite
previous sanctions, detailed Stefanie’s vexatious conduct, and determined

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that Stefanie met “every single criteria for a vexatious litigant
determination set forth in A.R.S. § 12-3201(E)(1).”

¶8 Stefanie timely appealed the VLO. She also contested the VLO
in her special action petition challenging the contempt order. In the interest
of judicial economy, we administratively consolidated her substantive
appeal of the VLO with the special action. We have jurisdiction over the
VLO appeal under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b), and we review the contempt order pursuant to
Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Action 12(a) (“Whether to accept
jurisdiction of an appellate special action is within the court’s discretion,
unless . . . an order requires the court to accept jurisdiction.”).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Stefanie challenges the superior court’s contempt order and
the VLO. We review both orders for an abuse of discretion. Stoddard v.
Donahoe, 224 Ariz. 152, 154, ¶ 9 (App. 2010) (contempt order); Madison v.
Groseth, 230 Ariz. 8, 13, ¶ 16 n.8 (App. 2012) (vexatious-litigant orders issued
within a single case constitute injunctive relief); Flying Diamond Airpark, LLC
v. Meienberg, 215 Ariz. 44, 47, ¶ 9 (App. 2007) (“We review a trial court’s
grant of injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion.”).2

I. Contempt Order

¶10 We first address Stefanie’s special action challenging the
contempt order. In her petition, Stefanie asserts that the superior court
found she acted in good faith but simply “followed the wrong process” in
violating the TRO. According to Stefanie, “[c]ivil contempt under Arizona
law requires clear and convincing proof of willful disobedience of a definite
and specific court order,” so the court’s purported good-faith finding
necessarily precluded its subsequent finding of contempt.

¶11 But Stefanie misrepresents the superior court’s contempt
findings. The court unambiguously determined that Stefanie violated the
TRO “knowingly, deliberately, and in bad faith.” Moreover, contrary to
Stefanie’s contention, there is no “willful disobedience” requirement for
civil contempt. Instead, civil contempt only requires “that the contemnor

2 In her notice of appeal and briefing, Stefanie references an administrative

order, issued by the Presiding Judge of the Maricopa County Superior
Court, designating her a vexatious litigant. To the extent she contests it, we
decline to address that order here because such administrative orders are
not appealable. Madison, 230 Ariz. at 13, ¶ 16 n.8.

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(1) has knowledge of a lawful court order, (2) has the ability to comply and
(3) fails to do so.” Lund v. Donahoe, 227 Ariz. 572, 583, ¶ 41 (App. 2011).

¶12 Although Stefanie cites Ong Hing v. Thurston, 101 Ariz. 92, 99
(1966), and In re Marriage of Chapman, 251 Ariz. 40, 46, ¶ 18 (App. 2021), to
support her contention that a civil contempt finding requires bad faith,
neither case imposes such a requirement. Once again, we admonish Stefanie
for providing incorrect citations. See In re Est. of Kuerschner, 1 CA-CV 25-
0491 PB, 2026 WL 619894, at *2, ¶¶ 12–15 (Ariz. App. Mar. 5, 2026) (mem.
decision) (admonishing Stefanie for providing incorrect citations and
omitting record references for the second time).

¶13 Finally, Stefanie raises numerous challenges to the validity of
the TRO, but the contempt order, not the TRO, underlies her special action,
and she does not contest that she had knowledge of the TRO and the ability
to comply with its terms, but did not do so. Therefore, she has not shown
that the superior court abused its discretion by issuing the contempt order.

II. VLO

¶14 Stefanie next challenges the VLO. She contends that: (1) the
superior court deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to oppose the
VLO, (2) no evidence supports the court’s finding of vexatiousness, (3) the
court improperly adopted James’s proposed order, and (4) the resulting
filing restrictions are not narrowly tailored. We address each claim in turn.

¶15 Although “Arizona courts possess inherent authority to
curtail a vexatious litigant’s ability to initiate additional lawsuits,”
vexatious-litigant orders “must be entered sparingly and appropriately.”
Madison, 230 Ariz. at 14, ¶ 17. “[W]hen ordering pre-filing restrictions,”
courts must: (1) ensure the litigant is “afforded notice and an opportunity
to oppose the order,” (2) “create an adequate record for appellate review,”
(3) “make substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the
litigant’s actions,” and (4) “narrowly tailor[]” the order “to closely fit the
specific vice encountered.” Id. at ¶ 18 (citation modified).

¶16 Under A.R.S. § 12-3201(E)(1), a court may designate a pro se
litigant as a vexatious litigant based on any “vexatious conduct,” which
includes the following:

(a) Repeated filing of court actions solely or primarily for the
purpose of harassment.

(b) Unreasonably expanding or delaying court proceedings.

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(c) Court actions brought or defended without substantial
justification.

(d) Engaging in abuse of discovery or conduct in discovery
that has resulted in the imposition of sanctions against the
pro se litigant.

(e) A pattern of making unreasonable, repetitive and
excessive requests for information.

(f) Repeated filing of documents or requests for relief that
have been the subject of previous rulings by the court in
the same litigation.

¶17 First, Stefanie’s claim that the superior court issued the VLO
without affording her a meaningful opportunity to challenge it is belied by
the record. Stefanie filed a response to James’s motion for a VLO as well as
responses to his supplements. The court held an evidentiary hearing before
designating Stefanie a vexatious litigant, which provided Stefanie with an
opportunity to testify and cross-examine James’s witnesses. After the
hearing, the court granted James’s motion but subsequently allowed
Stefanie to file a motion for reconsideration, which the court ultimately
denied. Thus, the record establishes that the court afforded Stefanie a
meaningful opportunity to oppose the VLO.

¶18 Second, Stefanie argues that no evidence supports the
superior court’s finding of vexatiousness. To the contrary, the record
reflects that the superior court meticulously outlined the basis for its
finding that Stefanie “meets every single criteria” of A.R.S. § 12-3201(E)(1).
Among other things, the court pointed to Stefanie’s filing of: (1) numerous
subpoenas after discovery had ended, (2) “53 petitions, motions, and
notices in the six-month period leading to trial, many of which were
repetitive, irrelevant to matters before the Court, and sought relief already
denied by the Court,” (3) 16 affidavits and motions following sanctions for
filing a baseless motion, (4) 8 motions for a new trial, and (5) several
baseless motions accusing opposing counsel and court staff of fraud.
Although Stefanie asserts otherwise, the court’s findings are clearly
supported by the record. To be clear, Stefanie continuously filed irrelevant
and incomprehensible affidavits and declarations and other pleadings
attempting to relitigate resolved issues. She also abused the discovery
process by issuing subpoenas even when explicitly instructed not to do so.
And despite the court repeatedly rejecting her pleadings, she continued to

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file them. We discern no abuse of discretion in the superior court’s finding
that Stefanie engaged in numerous types of vexatious conduct.

¶19 Third, Stefanie contends the superior court improperly
“adopted wholesale” James’s proposed order as the VLO. But Arizona
Rules of Civil Procedure 5.1(d), 54(h), and 58(a) permit a party to submit a
proposed order and Stefanie did not object or respond when James noticed
his lodging of the proposed order. Equally important, the court’s findings,
as adopted in the final order, echo two preceding minute entries,
demonstrating that the court did not merely rubber-stamp James’s
proposed order. We therefore reject this argument.

¶20 Finally, Stefanie asserts the VLO is overbroad instead of
narrowly tailored to address her vexatious conduct in this litigation. The
language of the VLO belies this contention. The superior court ordered
Stefanie “to refrain from making any filing of any nature in this case without
prior authorization.” (Emphasis added.) In the event Stefanie “wishe[d] to
file a pleading in this case,” the court provided a mechanism for seeking
approval to do so, allowing her to file an application for leave “that may be
no longer than 150 words in length.” Numerous “unpublished decisions of
this Court have approved, as narrowly tailored, orders which impose pre-
filing restrictions covering the case at issue or the parties involved in the
current litigation.” See Johanson v. Casavelli, 1 CA-CV 21-0207, 2022 WL
453812, at *4, ¶ 16 (Ariz. App. Feb. 15, 2022) (mem. decision) (collecting
cases). Here, the superior court appropriately tailored the VLO to address
Stefanie’s vexatious conduct in this case.

CONCLUSION

¶21 For the foregoing reasons, we deny Stefanie’s petition for
special action relief from the contempt order and affirm the superior court’s
order designating her a vexatious litigant. James requests his attorneys’ fees
on appeal. Because Stefanie’s appeal is groundless, see A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1),
(F), we grant James’s request upon his compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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